Papers of

International Conference On

Two Hundred Years After Kant

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Department of Philosophy
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Contents

In the Name of God

Introduction

On the occasion of bicentennial anniversary of the death of the most distinguished European philosopher, Emanuel Kant, the department of philosophy of Allameh Tabatabaii University Held an International Conference on **"Two Hundred Years after Kant"**, on November 20-22, 2004 in Tehran, Iran.

There were about 110 abstracts accepted by scientific committee for presentation in the conference (52 from abroad and 58 from Iran). At last, 95 papers from 23 countries all over the world could have the opportunity of presentation in the conference during these three days in 4 sessions simultaneously. The papers was in Farsi (Persian) and English.

The papers focused on:

I. General Topics

- Kant and Methodical Developments in Contemporary Philosophy
- Kant and the Question of Modernity
- A Study of Kant's Thoughts after Two Centuries
- Kant and Comparative Philosophies
- A Critique of Kant's Thoughts after two Centuries
- Transcendental Logic and Other Logical Methods
- Kant Posthumous Writings

II. Kant & Critical Philosophy

- New Interpretations on 1st Critique
- New Interpretations on 2nd Critique
- New Interpretations on 3rd Critique
- Transcendental Method and Critical Philosophy
- Kant and Leibniz-Wolff Philosophy
- Kant and Empirical Philosophy of England

III. Kant & Metaphysics

- Metaphysics and New Sciences
- Metaphysics and Kant Successors
- Metaphysics and Contemporary Philosophy
- Metaphysics and Philosophical Theology
- Metaphysics and Philosophy of Religion

IV. Kant & Political-Social Thoughts

- Kant's Political Thoughts and New Interpretations
- Influence of Kant's Thoughts on Western Political Developments
- Kant and Cosmopolitanism in the Era of Globalization
- Kant & Enlightenment
- Kant's Critique of Western Political Models

The papers had the opportunity of being revised after the conference. All revised papers were evaluated again by scientific committee. Some of them are published in this book and some others will be published in academic journal of our department: "Hikmat wa Falsafeh" (Wisdom and Philosophy). Unfortunately we had some limitations for publishing papers; therefore some papers that had priority by scientific committee could be published. We hope this contribution bring a fruitful examination of Kant's philosophy after two centuries among scholars all over the world.

The liveliness of philosophy in Iran has made our department to play an important role in philosophical cooperation in the world. We believe that Iran, as one of the most important centers for philosophical dialogue in a global age, must do its best attempts for this cooperation in the future. We hope all this efforts bring a better life for all human beings.

Hamidreza Ayatollahy

Head of Philosophy Department and Director of the International Conference on "Two Hundred Years after Kant"

Kantian Disinterestedness and Postmodern Geopolitics

Christopher Brown*

In September, 2004 a somewhat glib news item originated in London, spread across the wire services, and was subsequently picked up in various newspapers around the globe: apathy has been "ranked" as one of the most common and egregious "sins" in British society.

Acknowledging that *apathy* rests in opposition to *sympathy*, I began to wonder just what role pathos (emotion) is generally supposed to play in public and political life. Was the survey suggesting that the general consensus in Britain holds that sympathy and emotional interestedness are desirable, or even essential? To rationally analyze and engage the postmodern world, *disinterestedness* remains an essential disposition, without which the complex phenomena of the modern world stay opaque and incomprehensible. This banal survey might not be worthy of much consideration, but it can be used to begin a discussion of the very fruitful delineation between *uninterestedness* and *disinterestedness*: genuine uninterestedness--complete and utter disregard--must constantly be distinguished from the willful and proactive state of *disinterestedness*[1] that presumes a desire for judgment according to rules of pure reason. Simply put, I feel that we have confused apathy for the willful, emotional distancing that is required for one to begin to claim "objectivity." Perhaps things are not so entirely gloomy; perhaps there remains some segment of the intelligent Anglophone world that is being tarred with the apathy brush when in fact they are seeking deep and universally applicable truths (or at the very least, multi-cultural consensus).

Of course, the concept of *disinterestedness* has a lengthy, and often tangled, history. The term, together with its applications, has evolved in many ways over the centuries, and has had many champions, but the way in which Kant deploys the term strikes me as a particularly sound foundation upon which to build. Given the wide reverberations of Kantian thought through poststructural theory, it may be possible to imagine the sound and

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carefully mapped resonance of the term alive and influential today, both in the academy and further afield.

If we can summarize one of the immutable positions of Kant's *Critiques* as a "belief that reason can test and recognize its own limits and that the implementation of a philosophical critique in which we submit even our deepest beliefs to critical examination can save us from various forms of illusion,"[2] then surely it is time to return to Kant's *Critiques* to make sense of the contemporary issue of "terrorism" and modern geopolitics. Given the nearly irresistible urge to view the bellicose nonsense of the past few years through the dark and limiting lenses of nationalism, colonialism, or fundamentalism of any stripe, I wonder if we might heed Kant's advice and test our positions with the structures of logic and reason that he proscribes. Would it help us to judge our positions more honestly and objectively?

Kant opens the *Critique of Pure Reason* (trans. Norman Kemp Smith, 1965) with a plea for the reader "to undertake anew the most difficult of all its tasks, namely, that of self-knowledge, and to institute a tribunal which will assure to reason its lawful claims, and dismiss all the groundless pretensions, not by despotic decrees, but in accordance with its own eternal and unalterable laws [of reason]." Indeed, would the American populace have undertaken such self-reflection last week at the polls, I cannot but imagine that the results would have been greatly different. Likewise, a similar dose of reason and careful logic would go a long way towards dampening the vicious and vituperative reaction much of the near-East appears to feel towards the United States and just about anything that nation does. The request is a heady and complex one, but self-knowledge—that brutal honesty that divorces self-interest entirely—is perhaps one of the only hopes for a peaceful geopolitical future.

One of the preconditions that initiates the quest for purity of judgment, which is a form of pure reason, remains the ability to enforce a personal, subjective distance between the perceiver and the object of her scrutiny. In the *Critique of Judgment* (trans. James Creed Meredith, 1952), Kant writes: "A judgment on the beautiful which is tinged with the slightest interest is very partial and not a pure judgment of taste. One must not be in the least prepossessed in favour of the real existence of the thing, but must preserve complete indifference in this respect." (*Critique of Judgment*, p. 43) From his transcendental point of view, Kant insists upon an aesthetic distance, what he terms "disinterestedness," from the object in question. I do not wish to put words into Kant's venerable mouth, but it strikes me that while Kant invariably focuses upon the good, the beautiful, and the true, there is little reason why judging the unbeautiful does not require a similar emotional distance. As such, I hope to suggest that an identical strategy may be viable for pure judgment of that which does not resonate in the realm of the

beautiful, but rather which rankles in the realm of the unbeautiful.

To fully make sense of his use of the negated *dis*interestedness, we need to clarify what constitutes interest and interestedness. Most plainly, "the satisfaction which we combine with the representation of the existence of an object is called 'interest'."[3] For Kant, interest always flowed out of a conjoined pleasure/desire/satisfaction that results from the recognition that the linkage between the representation and the real. Yet that interested desire for pleasure spoils the "pure judgment of taste." Thus Kant writes: "Everyone must admit that a judgment about beauty, in which the least interest mingles, is very partial…."[4] Indeed to attain the desired judgmental purity—which is the defining characteristic of taste--a lack of interest must be present. As Henry Allison notes, in this usage purity encompasses "both the negative sense of being purely or merely a judgment of taste, that is, a merely aesthetic judgment based on feeling rather than a concept, and the positive sense of having an *a priori* or normative component."[5] Taking the notion a step further, Kant suggests that only in bypassing desire can the subject move towards unfettered, disinterested, judgment of beauty.

It is important to note, however, that for Kant the state of *disinterestedness* describes the subject's lack of desire for pleasure rather than a lack of interest in the object itself. Said otherwise, the object, whether a work of art or a political action, retains its allure, but the subject consciously distances himself from the pleasure of confirming a predisposed belief, for example. The result is that the subject's is always already aware that his judgment is significantly biased or prejudiced. Only through carefully casting the scene for judgment in a disinterested light can the subject begin to hope for success. The worm turns when the subject attempts to discern in the object a quality—or lack thereof—that leads to deeming the object as beautiful or unbeautiful. The lack of desire/interest in the process and results remains a necessary precondition which could thwart determinations that are subservient to other, less pure values.

How then can we take this concept—more or less intact—and work with it to use it as a tool to make sense out of contemporary issues? Is the Kantian notion the basis for a strategy to makes sense of a nouminal world that has partially obscure phenomena to represent it? I propose we accept the fundamental notion that in order to attain a pure judgment—aesthetic or otherwise—we need to maintain a degree of disinterestedness in the process and results of the analysis. To use more contemporary parlance, the aesthetic distance achieved by a conscious and conscientious emotional distance from a representation can allow us to more clearly analyze and interpret the sign. Beyond the realm of abstract literary theory, this same strategy proves essential to interpreting complex geopolitical phenomena in

a manner that seeks to understand their underlying noumina. This is precisely the path taken in the first attempts to expand Kantian formulae which began in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries with a variety of philosophers in the Romantic tradition.

These subsequent Romantics, especially Wordsworth, Shelley, and Hazlitt insisted—rightly, I believe—that *disinterestedness* was distinct from impartiality, detachment or negated interested; in a word, these examples of uninterestedness encompassed both the object of judgment as well as the process. In the Romantic schema, a willful suspension of emotional engagement marks an essential attitude that affords the critic an opportunity to make (aesthetic) judgments free from personal interests, predisposed conclusions, or force of habit.[6] Of course, in the Romantic muddle, disinterestedness serves as the preconditions that allows "true sympathy" to occur, but there can be no denying that once the subject has forged the bonds of empathy, *disinterestedness* is sacrificed entirely. In so doing, I believe the Romantic position to have made a wrong turn; they have sacrificed disinterestedness to ensure attainment of emotional sympathy. By this logic, if disinterestedness leads to aesthetic (feeling) interest, then interestedness should lead to anesthetic interest (numbness), which is clearly not the case at all.

In a partial rejection of the Romantic position, Matthew Arnold focused the term *disinterestedness* on the objective component of the term; the *dis* negates self-interest, thereby creating a term that suggested selflessness, neutrality or impartiality[7]. For clarity sake, Arnold then tinted the less important, but probably more commonplace, term *uninterestedness* with the stain of apathy and disengagement. Yet in Arnold's concept of *disinterestedness*, which seems more true to Kant's figuration, there is real power: whereas the Romantics insisted on disinterestedness as a disposable stepping stone to sympathy, Arnold imagined the state of *disinterestedness* as a constant state that is not at odds with sympathy since the whole aim of the exercise is objectivity and universal quality. In this tidy package, we return to the unbreakable divide between phenomena and noumina that is central to Kant's philosophy.

It is an easy leap to the position of Aestheticism that posits beauty as an end unto itself; both the Romantics and Arnold—in partly by provoking sharp rejection of certain elements--shaped the term and paved the way for Pater and Wilde, who, of course, adhered to Kant's definition of Art as "purposiveness without a purpose" with the formulation "art for art's sake." But by the time the Aestheticism movement inherited theses notions, they limited Kantian philosophy as a tool solely for making sense of art. Indeed, it would be some time before the *Critiques* would see daylight as a means to

interpret the political world. The key, perhaps, can be found by unpacking the notion of the sublime.

Whereas Kant's original notion of disinterestedness was particularly linked to perception and judgment of the beautiful, a number of more recent theorists have attempted to apply the concept as a precondition of engagement with the sublime: "Whereas the beautiful represents the coincidence or harmony of the imagination and the understanding, the pleasure we associate with the sublime derives from representations that allow us to see some dimension of our own inadequacy; specifically, these reveal the inability of the imagination to present ideas that can nonetheless be conceived."[8] It is at this juncture that critics like Jean-Francois Lyotard capture the notion of the sublime and fashion it as a way to present the unrepresentable, thereby imparting it with a reality that might otherwise be impossible to represent. For Lyotard, these sublime objects do not need to be good or beautiful—at least in the traditional sense—but they can range widely across the realm of the (ordinarily) unpresentable.[9]

Briefly, the classical notion of the sublime is a many-headed monster; as a signifier the word has approached being over-determined. Nonetheless, certain traits seem more-or-less constant: that which is marked by distinction and worthy of immortal fame, that which inspires wonder or awe, that which is characterized by greatness or vastness: all of these are aspects of the sublime. In English particularly, the sublime suggests something that simultaneously provokes fear or terror. In all cases, however, the sublime adheres to the Kantian suggestion that it is not the object that is sublime, but rather the affect inspired in the witness by the object. Indeed, the sublime, according to Kant, "raises the soul above the height of vulgar commonplace."[10] The startling might and power of an action may inspire fear, but in overcoming our fear we move closer to moral freedom.

In the aesthetic realm, such uncontainable and overwhelming phenomena—and especially the reaction they provoke—are often located in dramatic catharsis or the grandeur (at time malicious) of nature. Yet does the category of the sublime restrict membership to the good and the beautiful? Do not the Sepetember 11th attacks on the US, the "shock and awe" invasion of Iraq, or even the Beslan school massacre of 2004 constitute sublime moments? Overwhelmingly, our collective experience of these events is woefully *a posteriori*, but in a deconstructive turn, I wonder if these events are not tiny symptoms of some larger event, something that may be possible to know *a priori*?

The result is a suggestion that Kantian *disinterestedness* may be one of the mightiest weapons in the fight against emotionally charged and irrational public discourses about terrorism, and the bellicose obsessions that seem so

prevalent at this juncture in history. The endlessly re-circulating images of September 11th, the American "Shock & Awe" campaigns in Iraq, the morbid fascination of the Beslan massacre, to name but a few, begin to function as simulations—or even simulacra--of the sublime which further require the emotional distance afforded by *disinterestedness*. When married with the notion of the sublime, both in its Kantian and subsequent deployments, these two terms provide a tempting framework in which to read the early twenty-first century's obsession with terrorism.

It is worth invoking Lyotard at this juncture, and quoting his postmodern application of Kant at length. In his discussion of postmodern reality he claims:

> What does this 'lack of reality' signify if one tries to free it from a narrowly historicized interpretation?.I see a much earlier modulation in the Kantian theme of the sublime.The sublime sentiment, which is also the sentiment of the sublime, is, according to Kant, a strong equivocal emotion: it carries with it both pleasure and pain. Better still, in it pleasure derives from pain….Within the tradition of the subject…this contradiction, which some would call neurosis or masochism, develops as a conflict between the faculties of a subject, the faculty to conceive of something and the faculty to 'present' something….Taste, therefore, testifies that between the capacity to conceive and the capacity to present an object corresponding to the concept, an undetermined agreement, without rules, giving rise to a judgment which Kant calls reflective, may be experienced as pleasure. The sublime is a different sentiment. It takes place, on the contrary, when the imagination fails to present the object which might, if only in principle, come to match a concept….We can conceive the infinitely great, the infinitely powerful, but every presentation of an object destined to 'make visible' this absolute greatness or power appears to us painfully inadequate. Those are Ideas of which no presentation is possible.[11]

I concur entirely, and wonder if our collective obsession with the awe-inspiring images of terror—surely our insistence of viewing them over and over suggest some sort of morbid fascination and pleasure—place them into the realm of the sublime. If we then imagine the process of making sense out of these phenomena requires a sort of disinterestedness to allow us each the psychological space necessary to make sense of them, have we not approached a solid foundation from which to hope to make sound, rational judgments? I sincerely hope so, and hope that what the facile news media has lumped together as apathy is in fact—at least in part—a gesture of willful uninterestedness with the familiar images that will be the first step towards acknowledging a complex noumina that is out there but as yet unclearly represented.

 For a full treatment of the term, see David Bromwich, "The Genealogy of Disinterestedness" in A Choice of Inheritance: Self and Community from Edmond Burke to Robert Frost. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1989)

[2] Cassardi, Anthony J. In *The Johns Hopkins guide to Literary Theory and Criticism*, (Baltimore & London: The Johns Hopkins UP, 1994) p. 438.

[3] Hofstadter, Albert and Richard Kuhns. *Philosophies of Art and Beauty*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964) p. 281.

[4] Hofstadter and Kuhns, p. 282.

[5] Allison, Henry E. Kant's *Theory of Taste*, (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001) p. 87.

[6] Childers, Joseph and Gary Hentzi, eds. The Columbia Dictionary of Modern Literary and Cultural Criticism, pp. 85-86. (New York: Columbia UP, 1995)

[7] Arnold, Matthew. "The Function of Criticism at the Present Time." In *Poetry and Criticism of Matthew Arnold.* Ed. A. Dwicht Culler. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961)

[8] Cassardi, p. 440.

[9] Lyodard, Jean-Francois, The *Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi, (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1984) p. 81.

[10] Blackburn, Simon. *The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy*, (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1996) p. 366.

[11] Lyotard, pp. 77-78.

The Formality of Pure Logic: I. Kant and G. Frege.*

Yury.Chernoskutov

Abstract

The paper contains comparative analysis of Kantian notion of "formal" and nowadays accepted, principally Frege's one. Frege, who is regarded as one of the founders of modern logic, had inherited Kantian negative attitude to formal methods while in the same time he had put the cornerstone of our day's understanding of what is labeled as 'formal system'. The roots of the collision are analysed in the paper.

Key words: *formal logic, pure logic, Kant, Frege*

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1. Introduction

It was Kant who coined the term 'Formal Logic'. The scientific revolution which occurred at the break of 19 and 20 centuries has changed essentially the image of logic with respect to both its problems and methods of their decision. Nevertheless, contemporary logic is described as formal up to now, in spite of the fact that the content of the notion of formal has changed too. The changes in logic, as well as in the sense of the term 'formal', are closely connected to the contribution of Gottlob Frege. There is not agreement among Frege-scholars on the question of the role and place of Kantian philosophy in Frege's work. While one of them don't hesitate to label Frege as neo-Kantianist, other are sure that his breakthrough in logic and foundations of mathematics is inseparable from his crucial revision of the principal points of Kant's epistemology. Both of the views have good reasons, and I'd want to analyse in details what is common and what is different in Kant's and Frege's approaches; what are Kantian and what are Fregean components in the fundament of modern logic. This analysis is concentrated around the notion of formality.

One of the most important features of Kantian methodology consists in his distrust to abilities of mere formal methods for cognition, and I'll restrict my considerations of Kantian component in Frege's work by his anti-formal

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spirit; at the same time I'm going to show that essential part of Frege's achievements was attained due to his breaking of some basic principles of Kantian epistemology. In fact, the core of the problem being discussed here was expressed by Hintikka: it is "one of the minor paradoxes of the recent history of logic: the first complete formalization of first-order logic and indeed the very idea of a formal system of logic should have been developed by that sworn enemy of formalistic philosophies of logic and mathematics, Gottlob Frege" [Hint86, 10].

To explain roots of this paradoxical situation I shall first outline Kant's view on the nature of what is 'formal' (section 2), than show what part of these views Frege had inherited (section 3) and hence may be viewed as anti-formalist; and what he had broke (section 4), hence deserving the title of originator of formal system.

2. I.Kant On 'Formal' And 'Formal Logic' In Particular

Kant's main target is inquiry of human cognitive faculties. With respect to this, the distinction of formal and contentual is shaded by these of analytical and synthetical, and of *a priori* and *a posteriori*, for he tries to unfold conditions for knowledge extending through the latter concepts. Distinguishing two levels, or 'stems' of cognition – sensitivity and understanding – he divides among each contentual and formal components. As it is well known, he ascribes space and time to forms of sensitivity. The form he describes as "that which so determines the manifold of appearance that it allows of being ordered in certain relations" [CPR, B34(A20)]. Thus he means by form no more than some principle according to which ordering of material is being carried. The following characteristic is more essential: "…form must lie ready for the sensations a priori in the mind, and so must allow of being considered apart from all sensation" [CPR, B34].

The functioning of next level of cognition, understanding, is described, according to Kant, by so called 'pure', or 'general logic', which is formal as well, just because it abstracts from all content, whether empirical or transcendental; the forms of understanding are a priori as well. Besides, formal understanding is merely analytic – it does not have ability to go beyond given concept.

Understanding with its forms deals with the same content that sensitivity does, but this content is ordered by sensitivity. Understanding operates with concepts, which constitute higher level of cognition comparing to intuition. We do have ability to inquire thinking distinctly from content but in this case our considerations are only formal, for they are completely abstracted from object.

It is important, that for Kant neither of these two sources, being isolated, provides full-fledged knowledge. In particular, since "truth is

correspondence of knowledge and object", and object can be given to us exclusively by means of sensitivity, we cannot access genuine knowledge while we stay within formal considerations: "For although our knowledge may be in complete accordance with logical demands, that is, may not contradict itself, it is still possible that it may be in contradiction with its object" [CPR, B84 (A59)]. Consequently, Kant concludes, general logic can do job of only negative criterion of truth. As he put it, logic can serve only as *canon* for evaluation of knowledge, but by no means as *organum* for its extending.

The scope of logic is exhausted by the table of categories, each of them carrying certain function of unity in judgement; the functions are independent of each other. It entails the following conclusions explicitly expressed in his 'Logic': firstly, since categorical, hypothetical and disjunctive judgements are based on principally different functions of thinking, these types of judgements cannot be transformed into each other – they are quite different in their nature. Secondly, he rejects any possible usefulness of algebraic or combinatorial constructing of logic: the latter "is not algebra, using which one could discover hidden truths"; moreover, "we don't need inventions for logic, because it contains only form of thinking".

Thus, according to Kant formal structures are a priori, for they are pre-found in mind before any possible experience; formal methods are only analytical, for they permit no more than decomposing of already available contents of concepts, without transcending its bounds. And principal characteristic is that formal methods do not take into account any object of knowledge – they are objectless.

Neo-Kantianists, in spite of wide divergence of their positions, which make it difficult to depict the common features, which would hold for all of them, shared, in general, negative attitude towards productivity of mere formal approaches. Here I'd mention only one but extremely manifesting example. It is not a secret, that most of Neo-Kantianists practiced non friendly attitude towards to a new, algebraic, developments of logic, represented by works of G.Boole, A. De Morgan, E.Schr̲der et al. R.H.Lotze had inserted a special section into his [Lotze1880] devoted to criticizing of algebraic approaches to logic. One of the principal points of his critics amounts to the idea that combinatorial formulas of logical calculus have neutral sense, and there are no any reasons to handle them as definite magnitudes. Basic laws of logic, e.g. the law of excluded middle, become derivable, and inferring of them is based upon doubtful equation of second degree[1], which, in addition, do not correlate to natural thinking. The very

[1] The equation $a \cdot a = a$ is meant.

idea to found logic on mathematics which, in difference from the former, deserves the name of 'abstract', is "as much wrong as unclear" [Lotze1880, p.260]

W.Windelband used to call this line of inquiries one-sided. In his "History of Philosophy" he rejects Leibniz's ideas of universal language and general method and regrets that such original mind as Leibniz was, could ever think of mechanizing in this way the highest activity of mind; he annoys after desires to make syllogism the tool of philosophy. In his "Logic" ([Windel1907]) he evaluates English algebra as nothing more than 'logical sport'.

As a rule, their criticizing was addressed to formal character of these constructions, because of which these approaches appeared to be useless for real work of extending human knowledge.

Commentators sometimes regard Frege as close to Marburg school of Neo-Kantianism (Cohen, Natorp et al.) arguing that they, just as Frege, had rejected Kant's dictum that pure intuition serves as foundation for mathematics, and tried to demonstrate that the latter has its foundation in logic. But doing this, they meant not general logic in sense of Kant, but logic in wider sense, logic as epistemology.

Thus, one can conclude that essence of Neo-Kantian anti-formalism coincides with that of master: it is bad because it is objectless.

3. Kantian Frege

Frege had inherited, in essentials, significant portion of this dislike to pure formal approaches. He was not inclined to consider form separately from content. Frege expound it quite explicitly in a number of manuscripts, intended to compare his own approach and Boolean one. In particular, comparing Boolean algebra and his own '*Begriffsschrift*', he stresses that his aim, in difference from Boole's one, was not to construct a calculus of pure logic, but to express some content. "Ich hatte dabei von vornherein den Ausdruck eines Inhaltes im Auge. Der Zielpunkt meiner Bestrebungen ist eine *lingua characterica* zunächst für die Mathematik, nicht ein auf reine Logik beschränkter calculus" [Frege80, 177].

In fact, this Kantian presupposition was one of the ultimate reasons (at least on a philosophical side), which led him to distinction of 'Sinn' and 'Bedeutung'. Demand of a reference for language expression looks as renewed search for objecthood. Indeed, he does not admit objectless knowledge and as consequence, he constantly tries to attain reference for symbols of his script. As he put it in '*Über Sinn und Bedeutung*', "The thought ceases to have any value for us the very moment that we recognize that some of its parts lacks reference" [Frege1892]. In [Frege1895] he

expresses himself more explicitly, maintaining that names possessing sense but not reference are useless for science: "…in der Wissenschaft und überall, wo uns die frage nach der wahrheit beschäftigt, wollen wir uns nicht mit dem Sinne begnügen, sondern auch eine Bedeutung mit den Eigennamen und Begriffsw rten verbinden" [Frege95, 27]. As a result of those views, he searches for special proof (§§29-31 of *Grundgesetze der Arithmetik*) that every name of his script has a reference.

His criticizing of the formal theories of arithmetic amounts first of all to attacks against the views that arithmetical symbols should be handled as meaningless. For him, lawfulness of operations with symbols must be justified by meanings of the symbols.

I think it is this presupposition that had determined the especiality which van Hejenoort and J.Hintikka had identified as 'universality'. Indeed, if using of symbol is justified by its meaning, and this meaning must be given unambiguously, than any question of discourse universum varying or of model theory cannot arise. In view of above mentioned Kant's opinions concerning unproductivity of formal, objectless knowledge, in particular, his dictum that formally consistent knowledge might contradict the object of that knowledge, it becomes obvious that this feature of Frege's outlooks has its roots in the Kantian anti-formalism.

4. Anti-Kantian Frege

In fact the very ideas, which permit to interpret Frege's outlooks as especial development of Kantian presuppositions contain components leading to upsetting those presuppositions.

Surely, Frege didn't ever use the term 'pure logic'. In his early period he used 'pure thought', but in fact the only occurrence of the term we can find in the subtitle of the 'Begriffsschrift': "…Formelsprache des reinen Denkens". Nevertheless, Frege's logic doubtless can be regarded as pure, in the Kantian sense of the term. Indeed, it is inquired independently of any sensitivity. Frege made too many discussions against psychologism, he too often attracts attention of his readers to the fact that nowhere in his derivations we can discover anything intuitive, anything empirical. But although it was pure, it was not formal in Kantian sense.

In order to see it clearly, one should take into consideration such especial part of his outlooks, which brought him, in later works, to the conception of the 'third realm'. It was shown, in the previous section, that objectness was a principal presupposition for Frege. But his view on the object of knowledge differs from Kant's one notably. The differences are sufficient to enable talking of not just reforming or improving Kantianism but of its radical change.

According to Kant, object can be given only in intuition. Meanwhile Frege, constituting the subject of logical inquiry, comes to the conclusion that there exists certain realm of entities being grasped directly by reason, without aid of intuition. It is realm of senses, including senses of sentences, i.e. thoughts. In fact, this realm constitutes for Frege the proper sphere of logic. Although this doctrine was exposed explicitly only in 1918 [Frege1918], its anticipation, for instance, in [Frege1884], is quite enough to serve as adequate description of it. Moreover, he adhered to this idea at the period of '*Begriffsschrift*', where the mission of the third realm was performed by "*beurtheilbaren Inhalt*". In [Frege1918] he refused to discuss the nature of 'grasping' referring to it as 'mysterious', but in reality he should not be interested in its nature – what he was interested in was "what is being grasped"; for the edifice of science consists of true thoughts, i.e. what is grasped, and consequently, could be erected without deepening into what is "grasping".

Here one historical digression would be relevant, which is to show that such account of subject of logic not only was not absolute novelty, but is closely connected to special way of doing logic as well.

After Kant views on foundations of logic were diverged in two directions – I'd use for them later invented terms 'psychologism' (J.Fries, E.F.Beneke et al.) and 'realism' (J.Herbart, A.D.Ch.Twesten, M.W.Drobisch). I'd pay some attention to the latter, which may be considered as a kind of mediator between doctrines of Kant and Frege. As we have noted above, formal logic was, according to Kant, science of mere understanding, or thinking, not correlated to any external object. But the direction we labeled as 'realism' had shifted the subject from thinking to thinkable. In particular, this was position of J.Herbart, who starts his [Herbart1807] by following reasoning: "Logics deals with representations; but not with acts of representing, hence neither with ways of obtaining and genesis of that representations in us, nor with changes of states of mind which they cause". Logic deals with "only what is represented" [Herbart1807, 467]. Further development of this approach we can find, among others, in [Lotze1880], whose possible influence on Frege has been discussed extensively. Independently, similar ideas were expressed in [Bolzano1837]. He agreed that logic is formal science, but not because it deals with form of thinking, rather because it must inquire forms of sentences-in-itself [Bolzano1837, Bd.1, 48-49].

Herbart pointed only negative characteristics of this subject: they (concepts) are "neither real objects nor actual acts of thinking" (Begriffe weder reale gegenstȕnde, noch wirkliche Acte des denkens sind) [Herbart1813, 78]. Bolzano was capable to add something positive, namely, he described his 'Vorstellungen-an-sich' and 'Sȕtze-an-sich' as 'objective' [Bolzano1837, Bd.1, 144]. Lotze, holding these all, added another one

feature to this subject – he distinced it as meanings of language expressions [Lotze1880, 15-16].

This type of account although if not unavoidably entails, then at least creates bases for possibility to develop logic as a tool for manipulating with some uniform entities.

Indeed, in fact, all sphere of logic is transferred from acts to content (or realm of thinkable, or a set of some entities-in-itself etc.) and as consequence, admit handling in unified framework. As a result, for example, Herbart concluded that "Difference of categorical, hypothetical and disjunctive judgements completely belongs to language form" [Herbart1808, 473]. Compare it with Frege's claim in §4 of '*Begriffsschrift*': "Differentiation of judgements into categorical, hypothetical and disjunctive has, it seems to me, only grammatical sense".

Bolzano converts Kantian acts, or functions of thinking, into kinds of '*Vorstellungen-an-sich*', as a result even so called 'syncatrgorematic' terms of medieval logic become '*Vorstellungen-an-sich*'. Then negative sentence is combination of four representations. For instance, the proposition "Soul is immortal", being reformulated as "Soul has absence of mortality" is, in itself, combination of representations-in-itself 'soul', 'has', 'absence' and 'mortality' [Bolzano1837, Bd.2, 44-48].

Similarly, in the same section 4 Frege found it more suitable to see negation as a feature of judgeable content (Ich halt es daher für angemessener, die Verneinung als ein merkmal eines beurthelbaren Inhalts anzusehen) [Frege1879]. Thus both Bolzano and Frege came to the conclusion that the negation is not special mental act opposing to the assertion but that it is one of possible constituents of, in Frege's terms, judgeable content.

In fact, Frege retains only one, atavistic, mental act – recognizing of truth, or judgement itself. All Kantian types of judgement (excepting modal judgements) are interpreted as parts of unified content, and hence admit handling in unified framework as well as expressibility in unified formal language.

These collations are by no means intended to maintain that Frege was in some way influenced by authors mentioned. This problem is not discussed here at all. I've drawn these analogies in order to show that this attitude, which was finally formulated by Frege as availability of special realm of unreal but objective entities which constitutes subject of logic, is not contingent addition to his logicism, but is ground which led different authors to similar conclusions. Hence they can serve, I think, as additional confirmation for thesis that such a way to constitute subject of logic promotes its elaborating as special kind of calculus.

The following feature of Frege's logic is also closely connected with his

doctrine of the third realm and demonstrates another one point of Frege's departing from Kantian version of formalism.

Having rejected the possibility of full-fledge knowledge which would be disconnected from any object, Kant excluded the possibility of a direct access of understanding to an object, access which is not mediated by intuition as well: "…no concept is ever related to an object immediately, but to some other representation of it, be that other representation an intuition or itself a concept" [CPR, B93 (A69)]. Analogous we read in his *Logic*: "Although representation is not knowledge yet, but knowledge always presupposes representation". Frege, having condemned the 'representation' as something unavoidably leading to the morass of psychologism, aspires to argue justifiability of objective arithmetic knowledge without aid of representation. "Even if, as seems to be the case, it is impossible for men such as we are to think without ideas, it is still possible for their connexion with what we are thinking of to be entirely superficial, arbitrary and conventional" [Frege1884, 71].

Here we see one of the most specific features of Frege's epistemology, which differs it essentially from the epistemology of Kant. For Kant, object of knowledge can be given only in intuition. Thus, pure logic, being separated from the latter, is objectless knowledge. But Frege insists that there is a special type of objects, which are given without sensitivity. Those objects are inhabitants of the very third realm, and we have knowledge of them due to grasping, that is directly, without mediation of sensitivity.

So, transformation in logic is correlated with the transformation in the epistemology. Logic remains pure because it does not depend on sensitivity and intuition. But it ceases to be objectless and as consequence, it is not formal in Kantian sense.

In addition, those entities from the third realm are not only grasped directly, they can be depicted in the formula language, in the 'Begriffsschrift'. This moment is especially important. For meanwhile Frege shared Kantian account of 'formal' (i.e. as objectless), nowadays it is first of all understood as occurring into such expressions like 'formal system' or 'formal theory'; and such system (or theory) is labeled as formal, if all its sentences are either primitive, or basic, (axioms) or derived from primitive in accordance with explicitly exposed rules of transformation. In fact the latter was firstly exposed in [Frege1879] as realization of his project intended to develop language enabling to carry gapless proof where at any step nothing intuitive could occur. That is, being anti-formalist in traditional sense, he had put one of cornerstones into formalism in modern sense.

And some final remarks. The very idea of deriving arithmetic from pure logic – the core of Frege's contribution – hardly fits to Kantian doctrine, where general pure logic was exclusively analytic while arithmetic –

synthetic. Here I'd want only to note that philosophically, Frege's logicism was connected to the idea of third realm too. For not only thoughts are inhabitants of this realm, but numbers as well. In [Frege1892] he maintains that Truth and False are special kinds of objects. He refuses to make definition of these objects, but he explains (in [Frege1918]) that it is something closely connected to thoughts. Defining logic as inquiry of interconnections among truths, which in turn are associated with the realm containing objective but not actual thoughts as well as numbers, he provided presuppositions for logic (formal in modern sense) could be applied to something beyond thinking. It was pointed above that reforming of logic in the manner of Frege was possible due to distinguishing of special realm, content of which could be handled in unified framework. Now we see that this realm contained for Frege not only proper logical objects but numbers as well. Henceforth numbers admit handling in the same framework. This is why we can claim that Frege has created philosophically justified precedent of applying formal (again, rather in modern than in Kantian sense) methods beyond logic.

5. Conclusion

Frege's logic might be named pure in the sense of Kant, for it does not depend on intuition. In the same time it is not formal in the sense of Kant, for it is not objectless: its validity is justified by reference. Nevertheless it is analytic, even if not in proper Kantian sense.

Surely, contemporary logic is not identical to Frege's logic. To establish the complete picture of the place of Kant in the structure and basic presuppositions of logic of our days, one should trace the impact of Kantian ides on other founders of the science, first of all on D.Hilbert, for the very term 'formalism' is nowadays associated with his contribution, and surely, views of Frege and Hilbert on what is formal are very different.

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The Eschatology of Kant and Mullā Sadrā

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Abstract

I shall start my paper with a trivial observation, namely, with a statement that eschatology cannot be counted among the key issues of Kant's philosophy, while it definitely constitutes one of the crucial topics of Sadrā*'s transcendent wisdom.*

What were the underlying motives for viewing/not viewing eschatology as a priority issue in their particular philosophical systems? Does this choice has anything to do with the fundamentals of German/Lutheran and Iranian/Shiite spirituality? I shall try to address these questions briefly in my paper.

In my analysis of Kant's eschatological views I shall rely mainly on the published text of his lectures on rational psychology, better known as the „Metaphysica LI" (circa 1779), while my key sources of information regarding Sadrā's *treatment of the issue will be his „Journeys"* (Asfār) and „Wisdom of the Throne" (*al-Hikma al-'arshiyya).*

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Kant's Proofs of the Immortality of the Soul

1.The Transcendental Proof. According to Kant, the soul is a spontaneously acting single non-compound substance. This substance is the subject of our inner sense, „I" or „consciousness" in the strict sense of the word.The soul is alive by virtue of its being a substance, because all substances subsist (even corporeal ones – this is only their parts that is destroyed by burning etc.). However, the kind of life possessed by other substances except the soul is an accidental life which may come to an end at some point in the future. In order to prove the immortality of the soul, we need to adduce decisive evidence that would show that life is a natural necessity of the soul,in the same way as immortality is a natural necessity of true substantial life. This can only be done by means of a transcendental proof – one that transcends empirical knowledge and is based on the very

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nature and concept of the thing.

The soul is the source of life that makes the body alive.(It must be kept in mind that, in Kant's view, matter is lifeless and the human body represents a kind of matter.) The acts of spontaneity cannot be produced by an outer principle, i.e., the life of the substance cannot be caused by external causes – otherwise it would lack spontaneity. The impossibility of life's being caused by external causes is presupposed by the very concept of life (defined by Kant as an ability to delimit actions out of the inner principle). Since every body is a kind of matter and matter is lifeless, the body cannot be a source of life.Rather it is a hindrance of/an obstacle to the principle of life.

Hence, even if the body disappears, the principle of life, which performed the acts of life independently of the body, still remains and, therefore, it must continue to perform them unhindered.

Kant holds that the human being possesses two kinds of life – animal life and spiritual one. The animal life is life that is impossible without the body. In spiritual life the soul continues to perform the same acts of life independently of the body. In this regard, Kant makes an interesting remark: „As long as the spirit represents [itself as] the soul, it remains in interaction with the body"[1], whence we can conclude that he views the soul as a particular state or degree of the spirit – namely, the initial one, in which it (the spirit) remains related to the body. As long as the animal is alive, the soul is its principle of life, whereas the body is a tool (an organon), by means of which the soul's acts of life are performed. As long as the soul is attached to the body, says Kant, it resembles a man who is chained to a cart. Whenever the man moves, the cart moves together with him. In so far as this state continues, the (movement of the) cart is a precondition (and simultaneously a hindrance) of the movement of the man. Only when the hindrance is completely removed, the soul's true and essential life can manifest itself fully. Hence, death is not the cessation of life. Rather it is the removal of hindrances preventing the full manifestation of life.

The aforementioned proof, according to Kant, is the only possible proof of the immortality of the soul that can be given *a priori* – a proof which is „borrowed" from the knowledge of the nature of the soul as it is contemplated *a priori*.

2.The Theological or Moral Proof. Another *a priori* proof of the immortality of the soul can be provided on the basis of the knowledge of another substance. It should be kept in mind that a substance which can be known *a priori* must be absolutely necessary.Contingent substances can be known only empirically. Such absolutely necessary substance is the substance of God. However, the human soul is not a part of this divine substance, therefore the existence of the substance of God does not

necessitate the immortality of the soul. What is left, is freedom. (Kant holds that, in every substance, only its nature and freedom can be known.) The knowledge of the divine will allows us to reason to the immortality of the human soul. Here are the main stages of this reasoning: all our actions depend on the practical compulsory rules. These practical rules constitute the sacred law of morality. Now, our way of thinking must correspond to the sacred law, so that the motive of our action be moral as well. Every sort of morality consists in the embodiment of a rule, in accordance with which we become worthy of happiness if we act in keeping with it.(It can be said that morality is about the fulfilment of the preconditions that make happiness possible.)

Unfortunately, in this earthly world, it is impossible to achieve happiness by means of the aforementioned actions (i.e.,we become worthy of happiness, but do not actually attain it). Acting in accordance with the moral law, I have made myself worthy of happiness. In case I cannot hope to experience it, the moral rules are invalid and insufficient because they cannot provide what they promise.

Yet still I recognize the existence of the absolutely necessary being, which is capable of giving me that happiness, which I am entitled to receive due to my observance of the moral law. But, since I see that in this earthly world I cannot experience that happiness to which I have entitled myself, there must be another world, or state, in which my well-being would match up my proper behaviour.

However, Kant admits that, from a purely logical point of view, this proof is insufficient, because the fact that we do not see the punishment of sin and the reward of virtue in this world does not necessitate the existence of another world, because we cannot know for sure whether the sins have not been punished and the virtues rewarded here without our notice. Besides, the receipt of reward or punishment in the hereafter does not automatically necessitate the immortality of the soul. (Kant, nevertheless, holds that the moral proof provides a sufficient basis for faith.)

3.The Empirical Proof, deduced from Psychology. It is based on the nature of the soul, as it is known from experience. From our experience we know that psychical powers increase and decrease in the same way as physical powers do. Namely, the soul weakens and strengthens in the same fashion as the body does. However this observation does not prove the death and complete destruction of the soul simultaneously with the death of the body. All our experiences and observations of the nature of the soul occur while it is connected with the body. Hence, they cannot show us what we might be without the body. But, at the same time, they possess a negative validity, namely, we cannot draw any negative conclusion regarding the

continuance of the life of the soul after the death of the body, i.e., we cannot exclude such continuance as a possibility.

4.The Empirically-Psychological Proof, built on Cosmological Basis. In the entire realm of nature we see that none of the substances, alive or lifeless, possesses a faculty or a tool that does not serve to any purpose. However, in the soul, we find such powers and faculties that serve to no definite purpose in this-worldly life. Since there is nothing useless and void of purpose in nature, there must be a state in which these faculties and powers become useful. (Kant points to human mind and its theoretical faculty as a particularly grateful example.)

Sadrā's Proofs of the Immortality of the Soul

Sadrā's belief in the immortality of the soul is based, first and foremost, on the indications present in the Qur'ān and Shiite Imamite traditions. Nevertheless, in the „Journeys" (Asfār) he provides at least two philosophical proofs.

The first of them, in a nutshell, comes down to this: the soul is a contingent being (literally: possibly existent) (mumkin al-wujūd). Every contingent being has an occasion that occasions its existence. Hence, the soul must have an occasion. As long as the occasion subsists, together with all its directions (=aspects) in which it manifests itself as an occasion, the disappearance and vanishing of the occasioned thing is impossible. Hence, if the soul ceases to exist, this happens due to the cessation of the existence of its occasioner or some of the parts of its complete occasion. Now, there are four occasions: efficient, material, formal and final. Its efficient occasion represents an intelligible substance that is essentially separated from the matter in all aspects. Hence, its non-existence is impossible. It is also impossible that the soul would cease to exist due to its material occasion, because the soul is not a material substance, but an immaterial (i.e., separated from the matter) one. The cessation of the existence of the soul due to the cessation of the existence of its formal occasion is also impossible, because the soul itself constitutes its formal occasion. Exactly the same is the case with its final occasion. Hence, the soul's vanishing and the cessation of its existence is impossible.

The substance of the second prof is as follows: corruption (*fasād*) is a self-renewing affair. Every self-renewing affair, be it engendered existence or corruption, is preceeded by the subject (literally: carrier) (*hāmil*) of the preparedness. The subject of the preparedness for the corruption of the soul is either the soul itself – which is self-evidently wrong, or its matter, but the soul is void of any matter (because the supposition of its possessing matter entails a contradiction, since matter is a constituent part. And because the soul lacks

any position, space etc.,it is subsisting.[2]

The Mode of the Existence of the Soul after Its Separation from the Body

Spiritual and Corporeal Resurrections

Kant holds that no definite statement can be made regarding the particularities of the state of the soul after death, because the limits of our reason do not transcend the latter (death). Therefore he discusses only general matters.

First, he proves the necessity of the soul's awareness of itself in the hereafter, demonstrating that the opposite (the soul's unawareness of itself) would mean its spiritual death or, at least, spiritual sleep, caused by the insufficiency of spiritual power.However, since the soul itself is a spiritual power, such insufficiency cannot be proved at all – quite the opposite, being itself a spiritual power, it cannot experience the lack or insufficiency of the latter.

The soul's personality – the main characteristic of the soul after death – consists in its awareness of its being a personality and its awareness of its identity with itself before the death and after it (otherwise there would be no connection between the past and the present).

The personality of the soul can be considered in practical and psychological terms. In practical terms – when free actions are attributed to it; in psychological ones – when it is aware of itself and of its continuance after the death. The awareness of itself and of its identity is based on the inner feeling, which continues to exist without the body.

But, if the soul is aware of itself, the question arises, whether it is aware of itself as a pure spirit, not connected with any organic body. To this question, no definite answer can be given, says Kant. There are two possibilities:

1) if we assume that the restored life is the animal one, it can be restored in either earthly or non-earthly way. The restoration of the animal life in the earthly way means that the soul must incarnate in either the same, or another earthly (=material) body. In the non-earthly way (which presupposes a transition to another mode of animal life), the soul should incarnate in some sort of transsubstantiated body;

2) in case we agree that the restored life is a spiritual one, the soul will have no body of any sort.

In the traditional terms of Islamic philosophy and theology, the two options at issue are named „corporeal resurrection" (*al-maʿād al-jismānī*) and „spiritual resurrection" (*al-maʿād al-rūhānī*) respectively.Like the

overwhelming majority of pre-Sadrian Islamic philosophers, Kant holds that the second option (that of purely spiritual resurrection) agrees with the fundamental principles of philosophy much better than the first one (that of corporeal resurrection). He reasons thus: the body is a hindrance of/an obstacle to life, but the next life must be a perfect one. Therefore, it must be purely spiritual.

In his turn Sadrā, while he shares the common belief of philosophers in spiritual resurrection, also takes great pains to demonstrate the necessity and inevitability of corporeal resurrection. His teaching on corporeal resurrection is based on Suhrawardī and Ibn al-'Arabī's ideas of the existence of the world of imagination (*'ālam al-khayāl*) – an intermediate domain situated between the realm of pure intellects and the realm of material bodies. However, while Shaykh al-Ishrāq and the Greatest Shaykh treat the world of imagination as a universal cosmic level/presence, Sadrā postulates the existence of the minor world of imagination - a particular level of human consciousness, possessed by every individual.This world is created by and subsists on the imaginal faculty of the human soul – the faculty which, unlike the five outer senses, is not destroyed through the bodily death, but continues to exist after it. Sadrā agrees with his predecessors that most human souls never achieve the realm of pure intellect, and, therefore, their spiritual resurrection is an arguable matter. However, unlike they, he points to another kind of resurrection, which is available (in fact, inevitable) for them: the resurrection in the world of imagination by means of the faculty of imagination, which continues to create forms or „likenesses" (*muthul*) after the soul's seperation from its material body. Depending on the habitudes (*malakāt*) which the soul has acquired during its life in the material body, the created images are either pleasant and agreeable or unpleasant and disagreeable. Witnessing of pleasant and agreeable images is interpreted by Sadrā as the state of posthumous happiness and reward, i.e., „paradise", while contemplation of the unpleasant and disagreeable ones is described by him as the state of hereafter suffering and punishment, i.e., „hell".

Sadrā counts seven fundamental premises on which his doctrine of the corporeal (read: imaginal) resurrection is based :

1) the constituent of every thing is its form, not its matter;

2) the individuation of every thing consists of its particular mode of existence;

3) the individual existence is capable of strengthening and weakening;

4) extended forms and figures and their shapes that arise from their agent owing to the preparedness of the matter and the participation of the receptacles can also arise from it through innovation (*ibdā'*) only due to the conceptions (*tasawwurāt*) of the agent and the active directions, without the participation of the receptacle, its position and preparedness;

5)the imaginal faculty of the human being, i.e., the imaginal level of its soul, is a substance that is not connected with this sensed (perceived by five external senses) body neither in its essence, nor in its acts;

6) every thing that is truly conceived of by a human being and perceived by it by any kind of perception, in this world or in the hereafter, is connected with its essence and is not separated from its he-ness (ipseity). On the contrary, the object of its essential perception is found (=present) in its essence, not in any other locus;

7) the conceptions, and virtues, and habitudes of the soul necessitate outer traces.[3]

The Reality of the Other World according to Kant and Mullā Sadrā

Kant and Sadrā apparently agree with each other in describing the other world as another state, different from the states of the material world, and in excluding the possibility to locate it in any place of the material universe.

To Kant, the other world means nothing else than another kind of contemplation, while the separation of the soul from the body consists in the transformation of the sensory perception into the spiritual one. He interprets „heaven" as enjoying the company of well-intentioned and saint spirits and „hell" as finding oneself in the company of the evil ones (describing such interpretation of the other-wordly states as the „necessary hypothesis of reason").If the obstacle (=veil) of the sensory perception would be lifted for a while, we would learn that we already reside either in heaven or in hell, holds Kant.

In turn, according to Sadrā, paradise and hell both possess three levels of existence – intellectual or spiritual, imaginal and material or physical. Intellectual paradise is spiritual nearness to God and intellectual hell – spiritual remoteness from Him.Imaginal paradise consists in witnessing pleasant and agreeable imaginal forms, but imaginal hell – in witnessing unpleasant and disagreeable ones. Physical paradise is situated in the two highest heavenly spheres (referred to as the „Throne" (*'arsh*) and the „Footstool" (kursī)), while physical hell is the rest of them.The sublunary sphere, where the change and corruption have their greatest share, should be described as the „bottom of hell".

Conclusion

The main cause of differences in Kant and Sadrā's opinions lies in their different understanding of the nature of the soul and the character of its relationship with the body. While Kant follows the common Peripatetic treatment of the soul as an intellect that is attached to the body by some

overwhelming external force (God or Creator) and views the body as a lifeless matter, void of life and an obstacle to life, Sadrā treats the soul's existence in the body as the initial stage of its substantial development (and even qualifies the body as a descendent level of the soul and an existential trace and property of it).

Another important difference between Kant and Sadrā lies in Sadrā's belief in the existence of an intermediate level between the purely spiritual and the purely material ones – namely, in the existence of the world of imagination. Sadrā's well-known teaching on the corporeal (read: imaginal) resurrection is, however, meaningless to Kant, who never even considers the possibility of the existence of such world or presence. Like most post-Cartesian European philosophers, in psychological (in particular – eschatological) matters Kant is a typical representative of the Averroes trend. In the final lecture, he subscribes to the impossibility to make definite judgments on eschatological issues and, instead of speculating on the hereafter, urges his audience to fulfil the requirements of the moral law in this-wordly life in the best possible way.

In turn, Sadrā's eschatological doctrine is a logical conclusion of his teaching on substantial motion, applied to the human soul. To Sadrā, eschatology constitutes a part of our everyday life, because every night, during the sleep hours we experience the states of imaginal resurrection.

Endnotes

[1] I.Kant, *Akademieausgabe*, Bd. 28, Berlin 1983, s.205. Cf. the Russian translation by V.Vasilyev in the *History of Philosophy Yearbook '97,* Moscow: Nauka !999, p.132.

[2] See: Sadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, al-Hikma al-muta'āliyya fī-l-asfār al-'aqliyya al-*arba'a*, , eds. R.Lutfī, I.Amīnī and F.Ummīd, 3rd edition, Beirūt: Dār Ihyā' al-turāth al-'arabī 1982, part 8, p. 380 – 392.

[3] Sadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, *al-Hikma al-'arshiyya*, ed. Gh.Āhanī, Isfahān: Kitābfurūshi-ye Shāhriyār 1341 S.H., p.245 – 249. Cf. J.Morris's English translation in: J.W.Morris (trans.), *The Wisdom of the Throne : an Introduction to the Philosophy of Mulla Sadra*, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1981, p.153 – 160.

The Teleology Of Freedom: The Unique Unity Of The Human Will in Kant's Moral Philosphy

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Abstract

The role and significance of teleology in Kant's moral philosophy has long been a matter of dispute. Very recently, however, scholars such as Richard Velkley, John Silber, Allen Wood, and Paul Guyer have put together a picture of Kant's moral philosophy in which teleology plays a central role in the application of the moral principle and in the development of moral character. The thesis of the present paper is that in addition to these roles, a more fundamental teleology is to be found in the inner constitutive structure of freedom itself, and furthermore that the recognition of this fact is the key to making sense of several apparent inconsistencies in the way that Kant speaks of freedom.

Key Words: *Freedom, Kant, Teleology*

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Although recent research into Kant's moral philosophy has proven the importance of a teleology of the highest good for understanding its structure and unity, no study in my view has presented in a systematic fashion the distinctive teleology that lies at the very heart of Kant's notion of freedom.

Naturally, none of the canonical interpretations make the error of characterizing Kant's moral theory as entirely non-teleological. The very ubiquity of teleological formulations in Kant's ethical writings makes this impossible. Yet there is a general agreement that the root and significance of this teleology is unclear. Still more unclear is its relation to Kant's theory of freedom and duty, which seem to strictly preclude any form of consequentialism. Indeed, the combination of these factors is most likely responsible for the tendency among commentators to suspect that Kant's doctrine of the highest good as the synthetic unity of happiness and virtue, as well as his wider teleological doctrines regarding history and international law, are perhaps actually incompatible with what Kant says elsewhere regarding freedom.

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In the following sections I will defend the thesis that Kant's account of freedom, the very unity of the human will, is deeply teleological in the strongest sense. That is to say, it is my claim that this teleological structure belongs to the internal *constitution* of the human will, and not merely to the external way in which we must use the idea of freedom to regulate our knowledge of human history, culture, and moral practice. In demonstrating this, I aim to extend and support from the moral point of view, the important thesis that Dieter Henrich has forwarded in the theoretical context, namely, that the unity of subjectivity in Kant is essentially teleological.[1]

I

Before turning to the topic of freedom, it is necessary to describe more fully what I mean by teleology, and especially by the distinction between teleology in its strong and weak senses.

When I say that there is a *teleology* of freedom, I want to stress that I mean this in the strongest sense of the term. In this sense teleology describes a cause that is both prior to its effects in the order of causality (*nexus finalis*), and posterior to its effects in the order of time (*nexus effectivus*). A still more general formulation that does not require the concept of time in its definition is the following: teleology describes the structure of a whole in relation to its parts in such a way that the complete concept of the whole is the only *sufficient* and *efficient* cause of the existence of each individual part and thereby also of the specific connections amongst the parts within this whole.[2] One way of characterizing this strong concept of teleology that reveals its peculiarity is to say that a being teleological in this sense would be its own end, and so would pursue and generate itself. In a word, it would be originally and independently self-formative.

At this point it would be fitting to give an example of such strong teleology. But as it is precisely part of my thesis that only the human will under moral laws possesses such strong teleological unity, and the rest of my paper is an attempt show this, the best that I can do at this point is to illustrate it by way of contrast with what I will call weak teleology.

Now in order to elucidate teleology in the latter sense, let me paraphrase Kant's own explanation of a classical example of teleology, namely that apparent in the structure of the human eyeball. First of all, Kant observes that as a natural thing the eye contains a manifold of mechanical structures that are the material conditions of seeing, and as mechanical means to this product, namely sight, they clearly precede seeing in the order of time. Yet because of the special unity that we attribute to the human eye, seeing is thought in another sense as itself preceding these same mechanical structures as their condition. The reason for this is that on merely mechanical grounds the coordination of the mechanical causes that is required in order to

generate an eye can only be understood as accidental, and hence such causes can at best be viewed as a mere aggregate in which there is apparent, but not real unity.

This however conflicts with our experience in which there is a sort of regularity and necessity in the generation of eyes that is essentially different from the way that merely accidental things come about. Yet, on Kant's account, the only way to represent this unity to ourselves as real is to think the collective unity of the mechanical means leading up to it as somehow necessary, and therefore as guided by or originating from a common ground or cause that operates with the intention of forming instruments of sight. In Kant's own words, "only of the eye I judge that it *ought* to have been suitable for seeing," and that it is formed "in accordance with a concept that precedes the formative causes of this organ."[3] But how is it possible for seeing to be both the final cause or end, and at the same time the efficient cause of the structure of the eye, the very ground of its own material generation? This is precisely the inner mystery of Aristotelian teleology. How, for example, can the soul be the goal and perfection of the human being, and also the spring of actions that ought to lead to this goal? For Kant, this problem is all the more insoluble as it stands since in his view only conscious rational beings can operate according to ends. A natural end such as the human eye would seem to require the introduction of a conscious living force at work within matter itself. Yet as Kant points out in the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, this hylozoism as he calls it, would contravene the law of inertia and lead to the "death of all natural philosophy."[4]

Kant's solution to this difficulty is to be found in the §§77-78 of the *Critique of Teleological Judgment*, and naturally involves an epistemological nuance. In application to the example at hand, Kant would say that indeed what an eye essentially is, its specific unity, can only be understood through a reference to the intention of a efficiently creative intellect that as it were has pre-arranged the manifold of empirical mechanical laws in such a way that instruments for seeing naturally develop. So in this creative intellect the representation of an end, namely seeing, would be the ground of the selection and creation of the individual mechanical laws that then lead to the empirical organ that is the condition of seeing. Yet in order to preserve the integrity of material nature, this creative intellect must be posited outside of nature, and its causality must be transcendent for us.

It is important to note, however, that seeing as a specific end is thought to guide God's creation of the mechanical world as a whole, and so it is in part the ground of an ultimate efficient causality. Of course, Kant is adamant in these sections that we can have no knowledge of the specific operations or

even the existence of such a creative intellect. It is merely a regulative idea upon which we must base all our teleological judgments.

Now this is what I call teleology in a weak sense. It differs from the teleology previously defined in that although it does involve final causality – that is, an efficient causality based on the representation of an end – it is not truly self-formative. This follows from the fact that the intention that forms such a thing as the human eye cannot be attributed to the eye itself. Rather if it is admitted at all, this intention and causality must be thought of as belonging necessarily to an extrinsic supersensible causality. So rather than expressing a complete organic unity, teleology in this weaker sense leads one from the question of the unity of nature itself to questions regarding God's ultimate purpose in creating such a world. As Kant says, "teleology cannot find a complete answer to its inquires except in a theology."[5] Of course, since God's ways are inscrutable and his choice is unconditioned, it seems that the complete unity of nature, and of natural ends can never be known determinatively. In the case of the eye, I can judge that its structures ought to be formed in a certain way only if I presuppose that it is intended to be an instrument for seeing. Yet why there should be such a thing as seeing at all must ultimately remain a natural mystery.

With this clarification of my thesis in hand, let us turn to Kant's understanding of freedom.

II

The practice of keeping track of the different types of freedom in Kants works can become something of a pastime for the careful reader. If allowed to leave aside technicalities for the moment, however, I think we will find that there are basically two distinct manners in which Kant tends to speak about human freedom. I will now sketch these two manners in the broadest of strokes.

Freedom in the first sense – and this I will call freedom of responsibility – is considered by Kant to be a universal property belonging to every single act of the will, and not admitting of greater or lesser degrees. The universality of this type of freedom stems from the fact that every action is first made possible – as an action belonging to or imputable to a person – precisely through the freedom of an act. So while a person *can* be more or less responsible for an *empirical event*, a person *cannot* be more or less responsible for their actions.[6] It is precisely to clarify this point that Kant introduces the concept of a deed, or an action that is rooted in freedom, and as such unconditionally imputed to a person.[7] Another way of saying this is that freedom with regard to the choice of my actions is the condition of the possibility for an action to be a deed, and so to be counted as being 'mine' at all. With regard to freedom in this sense, every deed, empirical or otherwise,

good or evil, contrary to the moral law or in accord with it, is necessarily an expression of an act of freedom to the same extent as it is imputable.

Clearly practical freedom of this kind is intended by Kant to play a very similar role in relation to the manifold of actions as transcendental apperception plays in relation to the manifold of pure intuition in general.[8] That is, just as representations do not belong to me simply in virtue of the fact that I can be conscious of them as analytically united representations, but require a further synthetic ground, namely transcendental apperception, to make this analytic unity possible as belonging originally – *collectively* – to one consciousness; so, similarly, in order to be imputed to me, actions and choices require not only a relation to the causality of my will, but additionally also a relation to the ground in virtue of which my will itself forms an original practical unity. This latter ground is freedom itself, and is what distinguishes the causality of a rational will and its capacity for taking possession and being responsible, in a word, of performing deeds, from the causality of non-rational agent that lacks all such capacities. In short, both apperception and freedom function as the ground of the *collective* or *synthetic* unity of a given manifold. The manifold in the practical case is naturally made up of our empirical actions, and so we can see that freedom of responsibility provides a synthetic unity of empirical will under the determination of the noumenal will.

To summarize then, freedom of responsibility is described by Kant as the first universal action through which all subsequent actions of a person arise, and this because it is only as expressions of such freedom that actions can possibly be imputed to a person in the first place. In short, freedom of responsibility constitutes the very personhood of a person. It draws as it were the outer boundary and limit of persons much like the way the forces of impenetrability and cohesion determine the outer boundary of a physical body. Freedom, therefore, is understood by Kant as constituting a real unity from which derives all further unity of the manifold of particular actions or choices, and this in virtue of the fact that they all originate from the free will as their single common ground. What I want to stress is that from this point of view, freedom is not ideal, but real – it constitutes the very human being as a person.

Now the second type of freedom – which I will call freedom of self-constraint – is also viewed by Kant as a moving force in relation to actions, but this time because it is the single ground in relation to which one can *consciously* view the whole of one's actions as belonging to an ideal system.[9] In other words, this sort of freedom is present to consciousness in the form of a motivational force, and as a universal ideal or goal thrust upon it as a duty by the moral law. Hence it is also something one must strive to

realize in particular empirical actions. In this respect Kant often speaks in a way that suggests that the closer an action comes to fulfilling the moral law – its letter and its spirit – the freer it is. It is with this conception of freedom in mind that Kant says, for example that: "To be able to compel oneself is the highest degree of freedom."[10] "The more a man can be morally compelled, the freer he is . . ."[11] And again: "His freedom increases with the degree of morality . . . the more he accedes to the moral ground of motivation, the more free he is."[12]

Additionally, freedom in this sense is clearly possible of increase and decrease, and is attributable to a deed only to the extent that the later is *purposively* ordered to the fulfillment of the moral law. Kant here speaks of the "magnitude of freedom" which can be estimated from the degree of the sensible impelling causes that must be overcome in the performance of a moral act.[13] In this view, it would seem that freedom arises through, and hence in some sense arises *after or out of* empirical actions. Freedom here is an unattainable ideal that is to be made real through our particular actions. Correlatively, evil or counter-purposive actions are not free in this sense at all, but rather to evince a sort of heteronomy or slavishness in relation to external causes. What is distinctive about this way of talking about freedom is that it is understood as a merely ideal ground of actions, while the real ground of such actions is located in a previous empirical act or state of affairs. Here Kant speaks of our having to make freedom a reality, by which he clearly means that it should become actualized in the sense of as having an effect on the phenomenal world.

Of course, I am not the first to recognize these two basic views and their apparent incompatibility. H. J. Paton for one has claimed that these distinct views on freedom pose a serious difficulty that Kant never adequately resolved.[14] Lewis White Beck has also pointed to this problem, though in a slightly different form, and claims moreover that its resolution would require an extensive revision of the first and second *Critiques*.[15]

I have chosen to outline these two types of freedom for a couple of reasons. Firstly, because they show how Kant's very technical approach to human freedom really does relate to considerations stemming from basic moral practices such as holding people responsible for their actions, and the idea that being a morally good person requires an effort and progress of self-transcendence. Secondly, because taken together – although I cannot demonstrate this here – these two conceptions involve all the more technical conceptions of freedom that we find in Kant's works. Finally and mainly, I present them because side-by-side they make visible in its sharpest form the apparent incompatibility in Kant's theory of freedom that can in my view

only be resolved by a strongly teleological account.

Before it is possible for me to present this teleology in its different parts, however, it is necessary that we consider Kant's conception of will. After this momentary excursion, we will return to the two concepts of freedom outlined above and attempt to show their unity, or at least their complimentary character, within a wider teleological structure of moral consciousness.

III

What is usually referred to as Kant's two-world theory is perhaps more accurately described as his two-will theory, since the problem of the juncture between the supersensible and the natural world only becomes relevant in the case of the human will under moral laws. That Kant holds something like a two-will theory is plain enough. In the *Critique of Judgment*, he says: "The will, as the faculty of desire, is one of the many natural causes in the world, namely that which operates in accordance with concepts."[16] These words state unequivocally that the human will is an object of experience, and so to this extent falls under the universal pre-determinism of nature. Again, this time in the *Groundwork*, Kant speaks differently: "A rational being counts himself, as intelligence, as belonging to the world of understanding, and only as an efficient cause belonging to this does he call his causality a *will*." This passage indicates that the will almost by definition belongs to the noumenal world. Finally, in a crucial passage Kant combines the two, saying: "To my will affected by sensible desires there is added the idea of the same will but belonging to the world of understanding – a will pure and practical of itself, which contains the supreme condition, in accordance with reason, of the former will…"[17]

As is clear from these passages the will is not exclusively a noumenal causality, whose actions are its empirical effects. Rather, the causality of the will itself has both an empirical and a noumenal character. Indeed, the empirical operation of the will is something that I can observe within myself, and as such is nothing other than the capacity to use reason in order to make choices that are directed to an end. Reason as the faculty of principles in this function simply represents a concept as an end, and hence also as a principle from which hypothetical imperatives governing the necessary means to that end can be derived. This use of practical reason is, as far as the cognition upon which it is based is concerned, requires only the logical use of reason. This is practical reason, and it is clearly teleologically structured in the sense that the representation of an end is also the ground of the action whereby the end is to be brought into existence. In a word, in practical reason that which is first in the order of intentions is last in the order of causes.

In another respect, however, the empirical will is not a teleological unity

in the strong sense outlined above. This follows from the fact that practical reason's adoption of an end is not self-determined, but rather is pre-determined in time by empirically given incentives. So practical reason as an empirical faculty is not purely self-determining, and does not have itself as its end. Hence, it is not self-formative. Rather it is completely explicable, at least in principle, from the empirical laws of human nature.[18] As Kant famously admits, in principle we could "calculate a human being's conduct for the future with as much certainty as a lunar or solar eclipse."[19] In this case, the manifold choices of the will form a mere aggregate of empirical events governed only by the natural laws of human desire and the objects that are available to it. As is said, there is no unity or stability in a life driven by pleasure, just an unending succession of states. If this were all there is to the human being, then in Kant's view it would lack both personality and character.[20]

With an understanding of this two-fold character of the human will in hand, let us turn to a more detailed examination of the two types of freedom previously outlined as they are generated in moral consciousness.

IV

As different and as incompatible as freedom of responsibility and freedom of self-constraint may seem, they are both implied in Kant's description of the to-and-fro of moral self-consciousness. As Kant says, as soon as we set about to make a choice of will we are met by an immediate awareness of duty, of the authority of the moral law within us. Now this ever-present 'ought' intimates to us that every choice of the will is potentially an independent act of self-determination. Because I ought to observe the moral law, I must presuppose that I in fact have at all times the freedom from external causes necessary to determine my will by this law. It is at this moment, according to Kant, I become aware of the practical reality of an intelligible will within me, and hence that this intelligible will contains the causal ground of all my empirical will. In other words, I become conscious that pure reason is indeed practical. Hence, it is precisely in this movement *to* the awareness of the supersensible ground of my will, that I am constituted for myself as having a character and as being responsible. Kant describes this particular constitutive moment of moral consciousness by saying: "From the view-point of the intelligible consciousness of its existence (the consciousness of freedom), the life of the senses has the absolute unity of a phenomenon..."[21] Here we can see that the consciousness of what I have called freedom of responsibility is generated in the to-movement of moral consciousness from the empirical will to consciousness of the supersensible will as the real efficient ground of its determination.

Now complimenting this movement to the consciousness of my intelligible will, there is a corresponding movement from the intelligible back to the standpoint of myself as having an empirical will. Naturally, this movement does not return me to the same state I was in before encountering the moral law within myself. I certainly retain the consciousness of my pure will, but now I compare it with the reality of the empirical will and its natural determination. This from-movement is initiated with the recognition of the "ought" character in the moral law. As Kant says, the form of moral consciousness is precisely an 'ought' because I regard my will and my choices "at the same time as a member of the world of sense."[22] So not only do I discover through the moral law that my empirical will has an intelligible side – that I am free – I also discover that I have an intelligible will with an empirically real natural counterpart. Now when considering myself from this point of view, says Kant, what is necessary for me as an intelligible will appears to be entirely contingent according to natural laws.[23] For this reason, when I compare this natural contingency of my empirical will with the thought of its intelligible ground, I recognize that the former ought to have the form dictated by the laws of this intelligible will.

Of course the empirical will does not have the form that it should, but the source of this moral evil, is, according to Kant, impossible to explain. All I can know is that there is a duty placed upon me to bring these two wills or sides of the will into accord with one another. In other words, this particular movement of moral consciousness confronts me with the idea that my practical reason ought to be pure. It is with this moment in mind that Kant says – this is the part I left out of a sentence quoted a moment ago – "the sensible life . . . must be appraised not in accordance with the natural necessity that belongs to it as appearance but in accordance with the absolute spontaneity of freedom."[24] Here freedom is precisely the norm to be achieved by the will in its phenomenal character, and it is essentially what I called earlier the freedom of self-control.

So to summarize, the unity of the to-and-fro of moral self-consciousness entails viewing the unity of my own will from two different but complimentary points of view: first, as a natural being with a practically real noumenal will, and second, as a noumenal being with an empirically real natural will. Kant combines this complex motion of moral consciousness in a very precise formula, saying that with regard to the human being under moral laws: "The moral 'ought' is then his own necessary 'will' as a member of an intelligible world, and is thought by him as 'ought' only insofar as he regards himself *at the same time* as a member of the world of sense."[25]

Now it is precisely from this fact, to wit, that moral consciousness brings

me to the assertion of the unity of both of these conceptions of freedom as belonging to one and the same will, that makes the human will under moral laws the sole example of a teleological causality in the strong sense. Here, freedom on the one side is – on necessary practical grounds, of course – asserted to be a real efficient causality that stands at the absolute foundation of the manifold of my empirical will. On the other side, this very same freedom is seen as the origin of both the possibility and the necessity of purifying my practical reason, and thereby of bringing the manifold of empirical desires under the unity of the idea.

Strange as it may seem, freedom is here the causality belonging to a truly self-formative being. The will as a noumenal cause brings form to the phenomenal will so that from the empirical side freedom is again achieved in the context of the natural world. Its as if, just like a living organism, the noumenal will through its own power is to incorporate the material of its body, in this case the phenomenal acts of the will, into this higher organic unity. The moral will is its own end. Or as Kant says so often, but never in quite this context – the moral human being is an end in itself. In a word, consciousness of *pure* practical reason determines us to the end of making our practical reason *pure*.

To summarize then, it is my claim that this strong teleological structure is the way that moral consciousness must necessarily conceive of it's own dynamic structure.

V

In the *Critique of Teleological judgment*, Kant speaks of the moral human being as the final end of the existence of the world. All other beings in the world, he says, are instruments for the production of ends external to themselves. The causality of the human will as a moral will, however, has only itself for its end, be it in my own person or in that of another's. As Kant says, such a will is the single natural being about which we can "cognize, on the basis of its own constitution, a supersensible faculty (freedom) and even the law of the causality together with the object that can be set for itself . . ."[26] It is in Kant's own words, the "*single* sort of beings whose causality is teleological."[27]

As I hope to have shown, this central feature of Kant's notion of freedom, pace Paton, is not a serious difficulty at all.[28] It is rather the unique unity of the human will as it is present to us in moral consciousness. And although we certainly cannot have theoretical insight into the specific operations or even the possibility of the teleological structure of its causality, we do nevertheless have a duty, on Kant's view, to acknowledge at the same time the reality of freedom and our obligation to make freedom real.

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[1] Dieter Henrich, "On the Unity of Subjectivity," *The Unity of Reason*, ed. Richard L. Velkley, trans. Guenter Zoeller (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1994), 17-54. I would like to note that while I agree on this general point with Henrich, this paper is in no particular way inspired by Henrich's own work on Kant's moral philosophy.

[2] As my aim in this paper is to explore the teleological structure of Kant's conception of freedom, and not to track down the origin of Kant's notion of teleology itself, I offer these definitions without comment. They are, however, motivated by Kant's notion of system and organism as they are expounded throughout his works. Chief among these are Immanuel Kant, *Critique of the power of judgment*, ed. Paul Guyer, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), §§65-6; *Gesammelte Werke*, ed. Königlich Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1902), 5:372-8. See also *Gesammelte Werke*, 21:211, 22:184, 22:481, 22:547.

[3] Immanuel Kant, "First Introduction to the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*," *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, ed. Paul Guyer, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 40; *Gesammelte Werke*, 20:240. The translation has been slightly altered to fit its context here.

[4] Immanuel Kant, *Metaphysical foundations of natural science*, in *Theoretical Philosophy after 1781*, ed. Henry Allison and Peter Heath, trans. Gary Hatfield, Michael Friedman, Henry Allison and Peter Heath (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 251-2; *Gesammelte Werke*, 4:544.

[5] Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, 269; *Gesammelte Werke*, 5:399.

[6] Kant does often speak as if there are degrees of responsibility, for example, Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Ethics*, trans. Louis Infield (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1978), 62-70. Clearly he means by this, however, not that there are degrees of responsibility, but rather that there are degrees to which one is responsible.

[7] Immanuel Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals*, in *Practical Philosophy,* trans. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 378; *Gesammelte Werke*, 6:223.

[8] Kant explicitly draws attention to this comparison in *Groundwork of The Metaphysics of Morals*, in *Practical Philosophy*, 101; *Gesammelte Werke*, 4:455. For Kant's examination of the synthetic function of transcendental apperception, see B 131-6.

[9] For the clearest exposition of this sense of freedom, see Immanuel Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals*, 512-14; *Gesammelte Werke*, 6:379-82.

[10] Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Metaphysics*, trans. by Karl Ameriks and Steve Nargon (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 380; *Gesammelte Werke*, 28:679.

[11] Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Ethics*, ed. Peter Heath and J. B. Schneewind, trans. Peter Heath (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 60-1; *Gesammelte Werke*, 27:268-9. See also, Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Metaphysics*, 70-1*; Gesammelte Werke*, 28:255-6.

[12] Ibid. For a late text, see Immanuel Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals*, 514n; *Gesammelte Werke*, 6:382n.

[13] Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Metaphysics*, 71; *Gesammelte Werke*, 28:256.

[14] H. J. Paton, *The Categorical Imperative*, H. J. Paton (London: Hutchinson, 1970), 276.

[15] Lewis White Beck, "Five Concepts of Freedom in Kant," *Stephan Körner – Philosophical Analysis and Reconstruction*, ed. Jan T. J. Srzednicki (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), 35-51.

[16] Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, 60; *Gesammelte Werke*, 5:172.

[17] Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of The Metaphysics of Morals*, in *Practical Philosophy*, 100-1; *Gesammelte Werke*, 4:454.

[18] See Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, in *Practical Philosophy*, 95-98; *Gesammelte Werke*, 4:447-51.

[19] Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, 99; *Gesammelte Werke*, 4:219.

[20] Immanuel Kant, *Anthropology From A Pragmatic Point Of View*, trans. Mary J. Gregor (The Hague: Martinus Nijhof, 1974), 151; *Gesammelte Werke*, 7:285.

[21] Immanuel Kant, *Gesammelte Werke*, 99; my translation.

[22] Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, 101; *Gesammelte Werke*, 4:455.

[23] See Immanuel Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, 273-4; *Gesammlte Werke*, 5:403-4.

[24] Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, 219; *Gesammelte Werke*, 5:99.

[25] Ibid. 101; 455. Emphasis added.

[26] Immanuel Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, 302; *Gesammelte Werke*, 5:435.

[27] Ibid. Emphasis added.

[28] One important result that follows from this interpretation is the following: It is generally admitted that despite his direct assertions to the contrary, Kant must

admit a morally neutral conception of freedom, a sort of freedom of indifference. This seems to follow from the fact that freedom of responsibility requires immoral actions to be a product of freedom. Yet in the *Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant says freedom cannot be defined in this way, because "only freedom in relation to the internal lawgiving of reason is really an ability; the possibility of deviating from it is an inability" (Immanuel Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals*, in *Practical Philosophy*, 380-1; *Gesammelte Werke*, 6:226-1). Now a teleological account makes this immediately comprehensible since a potency is always defined by its end, that is, essentially by its being a potency *for* something. For example, within a seed lies the potency to be a tree, and it is only for this reason that seed can both grow or fail to grow (note that a rock cannot fail to grow). Yet this cannot be used as the definition of being a seed, because its form is determined not by the accidental, but by its essential end. Similarly, the human being has a potency to be free (freedom of responsibility), and only for this reason can become free or not free (freedom of self-control). But the possibility of being indifferent to the achievement of its essence cannot be counted as a positive capacity of freedom. Hence, since freedom and the law reciprocally imply one another, and this in relation to the empirical phenomenon of the will is its defining essence as end, there can be no morally neutral concept of freedom. Rather, freedom as a capacity, is essentially the capacity to be free.

The Two sides of I. Kant: Kant's Moral and Political Philosophy vs His Race Theory

Bekele Gutema*

Introduction

The achievements of Kant in the history of philosophy are enormous. In the realm of metaphysics Kant thought to constitute philosohy on a scientific basis by stripping it of "the endless controversies" through which it has been by putting a limit to its grandiose claims.

We have found in deed, that although we had contemplated building a tower which should reach to the heavens, the supply of the materials suffices only for a dwelling - house, just sufficiently commodious for our business on the level of experience, and just sufficiently high to allow for our overlooking it. (Kant cited in F. Ankersmit and Hans Kellner 1995:16)

The intentions of the mind to know the real nature of things is far beyond its capabilities and Kant found it appropriate to draw a distinction between what can be known and, or more exactly what could be the object of knowledge and what could not be. He said, "I have therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith." His mission of liberating metaphysics from its endless controversies and founding it on an equal footing with science was unfulfilled. Hegel's view regarding particularly the "endless controversy" attests to this.

In the realm of moral philosophy Kant's achievements are also enormous. By putting emphasis on the free will, respect for the moral law, and respect for the autonomy of others, Kant attempted to establish a moral philosophy based on the recognition of the intrinsic worth of the members of a community.

His political philosophy consummates in the idea of a *recht Staat*, a community of civil persons who are the authors of the laws that bind them in a given community.

His achievements are enormous and I don't have the intention to summarize the works of a giant in such a short paper. My purpose would be to highlight on the core ideas of Kant's moral and political philosophy and contrast them with his ideas as presented in Physical Geography and Race Theory. Somebody like Kant who is without parallel in his metaphysical,

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moral, political, etc. thinking could not transcend the horizon of racism. Kant's racist prejudices towards peoples of other colors and geographic regions are also without parallel. One only wonders how such diametrically opposed ideas could come out of a person who is seen as the epitome of rational and critical thinking. One can justifiably argue that the modern ideas of justice, international relations, international justice, moral righteousness, duty, equality, etc. had their origins in Kant. But at the same time no body can deny the negative impacts of Kant's thinking on races. On the basis of information received from travel reports and that are in no way reasonably founded Kant showed his prejudice and hatred for people of other colors and other cultural orientations. My purpose in this paper therefore, will be to counter pose these diametrically opposed ideas and attempt to show where Kant failed in showing humanity the right way to enlightenment and the triumph of reason.

Kant's Moral Philosophy

The idea of what a morally right action, of good and bad, of duty and the like engaged a long list of philosophers right from the beginning of philosophical reflection. Kant wanted to answer the same question. He wanted to understand a morally right action not as some thing, which has to be explained in terms of its achievements. Moral philosophy focuses on human actions and values. In some moral theories the judgement of the values depends on the outcome of the action. For Kant this must be a totally different thing in that he attempted to put moral judgements on objective basis. He thought that this could only be possible if it is understood as an act that has its moral worth not for what it achieves but for what it really is. Morality has to be understood in terms of a law that is applicable to all human beings. The quintessence of the moral law has to be sought in its non-teleological nature. It has to be understood in separation from any end what ever. Only conceived as a law which has nothing to do with the particular interest of an individual or a group and for that matter conceived as an objective law can morality be worthy of the name. It is in this way that he drew a distinction between his deonotological moral philosophy and the others like the utilitarians who tried to understand morality in view of the individual's interest and happiness.

In order to understand Kant's moral philosophy it is essential to have an insight into his epistemology where he says, our knowledge begins with experience but this knowledge also is meaningless without the *a priori* categories of the mind without which experience remains meaningless. Experience gives us the raw data of knowledge but without the *a priori* concepts they remain obviously a raw data alone. He in fact said that,

> Our knowledge begins in experience. Our faculty of knowledge is awakened into action by objects that affect our senses. Experience originates as a result of the fact that our understanding works upon the raw material of sense impressions. In the order of time, therefore, we have no knowledge antecedent to experience. All our knowledge begins with experience. (Kant 1970: 41)

Knowledge originates in experience, but it does not necessarily mean that the source of all our knowledge is experience. There are certain things that are supplied by the faculty of knowledge. Knowledge is formed through what is received from experience and what the faculty of knowledge gives. That, which is supplied by the faculty of knowledge, is *a priori* knowledge. As he said, "In human knowledge there are judgments, which are necessary and strictly universal. There are pure *a priori* judgments ... Pure *a priori* judgments are indispensable for the possibility of experience and to prove their existence *a priori*. Experience can't establish its certainty without such principles."

Going back to a point raised earlier regarding the existence of an objective law of morality, Kant thought that it is only when we are able to talk of such a law that we can talk of morality as some thing real and objective. So following the principles established in his epistemology he assumed that the existence of moral principles in accordance with which humans ought to act would imply knowledge of these principles a *priori*. That shows that knowledge cannot be based on experience alone. Just like the other *a priori* categories of the mind that give content to our knowledge, so also the principles or laws regarding morality are also *a priori.* So we can talk of moral philosophy as having an *a priori* and an *a posteriori* part. The *a priori* aspect of moral philosophy is concerned with the formulation and justification of moral principles. Ideas of duty, ought, right, wrong and other key concepts within moral philosophy are dealt with in this part of ethics and he termed this the metaphysic of morals, since it deals not with the concrete and empirical aspects of what actions are right or wrong and the like. This part is concerned with establishing the principles only. Of course on the other hand there is an aspect of moral philosophy concerned with particular human duties, which depend on experience and finding out whether a particular act is in harmony with the objective moral law.

Dealing with the question what is good from an *a priori* (pure) metaphysical point of view, Kant says that the only thing that is good without qualification is the good will. The good will is good in all circumstances. Its goodness does not consist in its consequences, a point which is made clear right from the very outset by Kant in view of his deontological approach to moral philosophy. It is good neither because of its results nor because of specific situations nor circumstances but is good always and absolutely. It is unconditionally good and its goodness is

inherent.

Of course the good will is not the only thing that is good. There are a variety of things that are good. Wealth, health, and power are also good. Unlike the good will, however, the goodness of these other things is not inherent. In other words the goodness of the others is circumstantial or relative. Money is good, but it is only good when it is used for good purposes directed by the good will. Power may be good but its goodness lies in the capacity of the good will to use it for purposes that are good, other wise it could be extremely bad. So comparing the good will to a precious metal that contains its value within itself, Kant says, the good will is good irrespective of whatever results it may achieve. Obviously in determining the worth of the good will, consequence does not play any role. But this does not mean that the good will does not aim at producing results. On the contrary, it has consequences and its consequences are quite often good. But even when due to what Kant calls a blow of misfortune it results in bad consequences it still remains a good will, because its worth lies not in the consequences but inherently within itself. The point, therefore, that needs to be underlined here is that the goodness of the good will does not lie in its consequences but only in itself, in other words, it is good because it is a good will. He wrote:

> It is impossible to conceive anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which can be taken as good without qualification, except a *good will*. Intelligence, wit, judgment, and any other talents of the mind we may care to name, or courage, resolution, and constancy of purpose, as qualities of temperament, are without doubt good and desirable in many respects; but they can also be extremely bad and hurtful when the will is not good which has to make use of these gifts of nature... It is exactly the same with the gifts of fortune. (Kant 1964: 61)

Here we must underline that the factor by which we determine the essence of the good will is its own inherent virtue, which should not, however be taken, as suggested above to mean that the good will does not have a purpose. As a matter of fact the good will and any other kind of will must have results but only that the essence of the good will does not lie in its consequences.

Kant sees human condition as being determined by a whole range of situations. Human desires, interests and the ego for self-realization can drive the human being to using every means to fulfill these interests. It is here that the importance of the good will is seen. It is the good will that we have against the unruly, selfish and egoistic impulses. The good will enables us to overcome the unruly impulses and act for the sake of duty. A human action can only be morally good not when it is done either from inclination or from self-interest but only for the sake of duty. This implies, therefore, that an action done for the sake of duty does not have its moral worth in the results it attains but simply the principle of carrying out one's duty for its own sake,

what ever that duty may be. This does not rule out the attainment of purpose. Every action would naturally have a purpose. The purpose is good. One attains benefit, advantage, happiness and the like as a result of one's actions. But the important thing to be noted is that the motive of the action is none of the things that have been mentioned above but only the motive of doing one's duty for its own sake. The end result comes as a matter of course, inevitably but only that the result is not the motive of the action. The motive of the action is acting merely for the sake of duty. This, Kant calls a formal principle or maxim. It is a principle on which we act or better still we should act.

The maxim of a morally good action is doing one's duty for duty's sake as such. When one acts for duty's sake one has gone beyond one's interests and inclinations. According to Kant one is acting on principles that ought to apply to every human being. Duty for its own sake then is understood as meaning acting out of reverence for the law. A human being then is morally good if she/he seeks to obey a law valid for all human beings rather than following interests determined by one's desires or inclinations.

We should act for duty's sake, according to Kant mainly for two reasons. Reverence for the law can be understood in the first place as meaning that the law, which is made by rational beings and is self-imposed, must evoke reverence or in Kant's very words "a feeling analogous to fear." Even if it is self-imposed the idea of imposition, however, generates fear and respect for the law. Secondly that it is made and imposed by rational beings evokes attraction to the law. We should be attracted or be inclined to something, which we thought is necessary, and made it for our selves. The idea of acting for duty's sake out of reverence for the law can hence be understood in this sense.

I don't think that it is possible to do justice to Kant's moral philosophy in only a few pages. His attempt to formulate objective laws of morality led to the idea of doing one's duty for its own sake and that in the last analysis comes out to mean reverence for the law. The law ought to be respected because of the reasons given above, but one wonders whether one has to respect all laws merely because of the reasons given above. It is also impossible to understand every law within the perspective of the two reasons that Kant gave us. He tried to work out the maxims of morality, which say, "Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law." This is said to have been based on the autonomous and free will of individuals. It is this free will and autonomy that renders possible the formulation of such laws.

We have to only ascribe freedom to our will if we can also do the same thing to all rational beings. Morality can only be a law for one as a rational being. It has to be equally valid for all rational beings. It has to be derived

from the property of freedom. Freedom is the property of the will of all rational beings. As Kant himself said, "… I ought never to act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law." (Kant 1964: 70)

Alongside with this desire to establish a moral philosophy based on objective laws rather than interest or inclination Kant arrived at a formal moral philosophy which endorsed respect for the law as such irrespective of the nature of the law and its implications. What Kant's moral philosophy as William James Booth said, "... yields is the idea of the quiet dignity of a community of man, an idea that rests on the recognition of the intrinsic worth (autonomy) of each member of that community. That such a theory should awaken the hostility of those with grander designs for mankind is evident in K Marx's critique of Kant. Marx contrasted the revolutionary bourgeoisie of France (which 'by means of the most colossal revolution ... ever known, was achieving domination and conquering the continent of Europe') and England ('revolutionizing industry and subjugating India') with German burghers who 'did not get any further than "good will." Kant's idea of the good will ... fully corresponds to the impotence, depression and wretchedness of German burghers." I think this perfectly agrees with R. G. Collingwood's judgement that says that, "Kant's ethical theory expresses the moral convictions of German pietism." (Patrick Gardner 1974: 38)

Kant's Political Philosophy

Obviously political philosophy deals with the ideas of the ideal and good society in which justice, stability, freedom and the like are realized. The ideas of the foremost thinkers in political philosophy from Plato to the contemporary thinkers have been to set the philosophical foundations and justification for such a society.

Although Kant figures out largely in other areas of philosophy such as metaphysics, epistemology, moral philosophy and the like it is clear that he also attempted to work out a systematic philosophy of politics that had an impact on later generation of thinkers.

Kant attempted to work out philosophical principles that could serve as basis for a just and a stable internal order and international peace. The central idea of his political philosophy is what Kant calls the *Recht Staat* i. e. a government based on the rule of law or a constitutional government. In fact as Hans Reiss said,

> Kant did not set out to provide a blueprint for revolutionaries or a theory of revolution. On the contrary, he wanted to arrive at philosophical principles on which a just and lasting internal order and world peace could be based. He wanted to provide a philosophical vindication of representative constitutional

> government, a vindication that would guarantee respect for the political rights of all individuals. (H. Reiss 1991: 4)

Such an arrangement would assume a situation where the members of the society are the authors of the law that regulate their common affairs. Just like his moral philosophy, Kant wants to ground his political philosophy in the understanding of the human individual. The human individual has free will, must respect the moral law and must respect the autonomy of others. These are ideas on which his deontological moral philosophy is based. Human beings are free, but this freedom is not a freedom that enables a solitary and individual life. Apart from being free, human individuals are needy and lack direction in a world where the challenges are many. The real condition of life is challenging and tempting but it must be checked by the good will. The world is not just, but this needs to be checked by our idea of the autonomy of our reason, that is capable of enacting laws.

As W. J. Booth said:

> Our autonomy is reflected not in the mere independence from external guides (an independence that is at the same time a predicament) but rather in the capacity we have to give law to ourselves. Through the legislative capacity of reason, human beings become in a practical and moral sense the "mortal God" – they create in speech (in *a priori* history) a new world that displays the justice we find wanting in the one given us in experience, or (from the pure moral standpoint) the world is treated as a realm of free agency in which not the laws of God or nature hold sway, but those of practical reason. (W. J. Booth 1986: xviii)

Like his predecessors, Kant talks of a state of nature when there was no organized society. Once human kind evolved out of this situation society could be governed by different forms of rule: monarchy, aristocracy, etc. Compared to the state of nature this situation is much better in that people's lives and property were some how secure despite the arbitrary nature of the rules. It is the rule of law that is lacking and the purpose of Kant's political philosophy is the establishment of the rule of law (*Recht staat*). His political theory thus is a theory that is concerned with establishing the principles required for realizing the rights of the members of the political entity. The principles should be concerned with how the universal principles that would guarantee the rights of its members could be put in place. In deed as Reiss succinctly summarizes them,

> [Kant's principles of politics are] substantially the principles of right (*Recht*). The philosophical enquiry into politics must establish which political actions are just or unjust. It must show by what principles we can establish the demands of justice in a given situation. Justice must, however, be universal, but only law can bring it about. A coherent political order must then be a legal order. Just as in Kant's ethics actions ought to be based on maxims capable of being formulated as universal laws, so in politics political arrangements ought to be organized according to universally valid laws.

> Political action and legislation ought thus to be based on such rules as will allow of no exception. (Reiss 1991: 21)

Rights ought to be based on a universal law. The universal law establishes freedom. The freedom/free actions of individuals have to be reconciled with the freedom of other individuals within the bounds of the universal law. "Every action which by itself or by its own maxim enables the freedom of everyone else in accordance with a universal law is right." Hans Reiss summarizes this better as follows,

> This universal principle of right imposes an obligation upon us, but it does not expect, let alone require, us to act in accordance with it. It tells us merely that if freedom is to be restricted in accordance with right and if justice is to prevail it must do so in accordance with the universal principle of right. To restrict freedom in this manner does not entail interfering with the freedom of an individual, but merely establishes the conditions of his external freedom. (Reiss 1991: 25)

The representatives of the people, Kant believed, should make the law in such a state. Kant's formula also anticipates the separation of the legislative and the executive powers. It is such a state due to the fact that it is representative and hence accountable that is necessary for both internal security and stability and for peace between states.

Obviously his understanding of a political entity is based on his notion of right and a state ruled by law. Right as stated above must be based on a universal law. It is a law that will allow of no exception. Its applicability to all individuals without exception makes it a universal law. In moral philosophy Kant says, "I ought never to act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law." In a very similar way he says,

> Thus the universal law of right is as follows: let your external actions be such that the free application of your will can co-exist with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal law. And although this law imposes an obligation on me, it does not mean that I am in any way expected, far less required, to restrict my freedom *myself* to these conditions purely for the sake of this obligation. On the contrary, reason merely says that individual freedom *is* restricted in this way by virtue of the idea behind it, and that it may also be actively restricted by others; and it states this as a postulate, which does not admit of any further proof. (Kant 1991: 133-134)

Kant's Race Theory

The discussion of Kant's moral and political philosophy is a witness to the contribution of Kant to Moral and political philosophy. His attempt to found morality on formal principles which have nothing to do with the individual's immediate desire shows that he wanted to found morality on "objective" basis. By insisting on the autonomy of reason and the individual he tried to lay the foundation for a society and state based on the rule of law.

In this regard the following statements from Kant deserve particular attention,

> I am myself by inclination a seeker of truth. I feel a consuming thirst for knowledge and a restless desire to advance in it, as well as a satisfaction in every step I take. There was a time when I thought that this alone could constitute the honor of mankind, and I despised the common man who knows nothing. Rousseau set me right. This pretended superiority vanished and I learned to respect humanity. I should consider myself far more useless than the common laborer if I did not believe that one consideration alone gives worth to all others, namely to establish the rights of man. (Kant cited in P. Guyer 1992: 43)

It is particularly with this assertion of Kant about respecting humanity and establishing the rights of man that I want to introduce his race theory. A point that I would like to raise in passing is that it is the same Rousseau whom Kant says, "he set me right," that also said, in reference to travelers whose reports Kant mainly used to work out his race theory, that [they] are "more interested in filling their purses than their heads." In response to what they say about Africans, Rousseau also said, "... all of Africa and its numerous inhabitants, as remarkable in character as they are in color, still remain to be studied; the whole earth is covered with nations of which we know only the names, and yet we pretend to judge mankind." (Rousseau 1986: 7) In what appears to be a direct opposition to Rousseau' position Kant started to work on his scanty information to come up with a sweeping theory about people whom he hardly knew.

Kant's race theory divides human kind into four races. The basis for this division into races, which are "qualitatively different", is not at all clear or Kant does not provide any established facts with this regard. He was convinced that the differences based on color manifest deeper essential differences. But it is not clear whether the differences in color, language, etc. are the cause or effect of the difference in the essence of the races.

The four races that he recognized were the Whites, the yellow (Asians), the black Africans, Kant prefers to call them Negroes, and the indigenous Americans. What is taken essentially as differentiating the races and his outright hatred and denigration of the non-white races had its origins in philosophers like David Hume and Montesquieu but there is no doubt that Kant not only accepted and endorsed these approaches but did all in his powers to show that they are true. He described the difference between races as follows,

> In the hot countries the human being matures earlier in all ways but does not reach the perfection of the temperate zones. Humanity exists in its greatest perfection in the white race. The yellow Indians have a smaller amount of talent. The Negroes are lower and the lowest are a part of the American peoples. (Quoted in Eze 1997:118)

It is here that one cannot avoid doubting Kant's race theory. It is clear

that this does not have the slightest scientific basis. It is not based on any kind of empirical research or observation. It is well known that Kant never left the small town of Königsberg in his long life of eight decades. Obviously he was well informed and well read by the standards of the time. Apart from the literature that he could put his hands on he also relied on travel reports and such other reports that could reach Königsberg. They should therefore be the kinds of reports and writings that were received in this way that were the basis of Kant's "knowledge" on the different races. There is also the understanding that had been cultivated for some time that Europe is the center and epitome of culture, philosophy, history and others. There is an approach that puts the European particular experience at the center of the universe; i. e. is presenting it as universal. Apart from these it is impossible to find any rational basis or acceptable evidence to support Kant's assertion that the White is at the top and the Native Americans are at the bottom.

There seems to be a certain dependence on geography in describing races the way he did. It must be some sort of climatic or geographic determinism that has played a role in shaping races the way they are. I say this because at some point Kant says,

> "The inhabitant of the temperate zones is physically beautiful, hardworking, jocular, moderate in his passions, more understanding than any other human kind in the world. It is because of these that these people civilized the others even forcing them with weapons." (W. Smidt 1999: 60)

The reasons for Kant's race theory must therefore be sought not within the bounds of science or any similar thing. This last quotation tells us that Kant's purpose was none other than the colonizing mission. From the vantage point of "universal reason" Kant was telling the European colonizers that the other people are inferior to you and it is perfectly rational to colonize and "civilize" them.

At the time of Kant there was definitely a lack of information and knowledge on other parts of the world. The kind of knowledge that was available was not one that could enable some body like Kant to come up with an objective and impartial assessment of the other. In the absence of such knowledge Kant used his unfounded ideas, better still his prejudices to describe those that are non-European.

Looked at both from the religious and philosophical points of view Kant's ideas on race did not contain a grain of truth. They could not contain a grain of truth since they are not supported by any kind of credible evidence. The Christian religion, which constituted the background of Kant's philosophy, could not even help him to see that all the creatures of God are essentially the same in the sight of God. In view of Christianity's acceptance of the idea of equality of all human beings in the sight of God this is paradoxical. The question then is how a pietist like Kant could fail to

recognize this fact. In deed when he wrote, "Rousseau put me right ... and I learned to respect humanity..." it is precisely this that one would expect from Kant. But it turns out that the humanity that Kant learned to respect is only a certain fraction of humanity. Particularly with regard to Africa and the Native Americans his prejudices are unparalleled. It really requires a thorough knowledge of a people, its culture, habits and the like to judge a people. In deed it is essential to talk to the people that you want to know. One needs to come in communication with them to understand them. In fact the guiding principle of understanding the other must be coming in contact with the other and finding out what he or she is, his/her, customs, habits, philosophies, etc. If you want to understand me it is to me that you have to talk and find out what I am, my values, my history, my preferences, etc. I don't think that the kind of monologue in which Kant put himself could enable him to understand either the Asian, or the African or the Native American.

It really requires a thorough knowledge of a people before one comes up with the following judgement.

The Negroes of Africa have by nature no feeling that rises above the trifling. Mr. Hume challenges anyone to cite a single example in which a Negro has shown talents, and asserts that among the hundreds of thousands of blacks who are transported elsewhere from their countries, although many of them have even been set free, still not a single one was ever found who presented anything great in art or science or any other praise-worthy quality, even though among the whites some continually rise aloft from the lowest rabble, and through superior gifts earn respect in the world. So fundamental is the difference between these two races of man, and it appears to be as great in regard to mental capacities as in color. (W. Smidt 1999: 62)

The main reason according to Kant that leads to all these differences is color. To that may be added that Kant's races live in different parts of the world (geography), have different cultures and the like. He would not say that they have different histories because only the white race has history properly so called. On the basis of the foregoing, coming to the idea of history Kant says,

> The non-European peoples naturally have an existence that is out side of history; they have to be pulled into history mostly as objects of a civilizing endeavor… Many people cannot progress on their own. Progress must come from Europe. Those of us in the Occident must continuously bring the progress of mankind to perfection and look for it to be as widespread as possible. (cited in Alex Sutter 1989: 15)

This is basically where Kant's understanding of history and the subject of history clearly come out. I would normally understand history as the study of what happened in a people's life and the factors that contributed to the happenings. A people's life with its manifold relations with nature, with each

other, with the neighbors and the like constitute the object of history. I don't think history has to be taken as anything other than what happens in the material and spiritual life of a people. From among those happenings only a few would attain the status of being the objects of history. How these are selected depends of course on the historian and the circumstances of the recording of that history. We could say that history is nothing but the reconstruction of selected memory, the criteria of selection depending on the historians' opinion, the collective memory of a people and such other things. In selecting from among the memory and reconstructing the historian, however, has to be able to maintain objectivity. That means that as much as possible she/he should refrain from injecting her/his own prejudices in to the narrative.

As M. Stanford said,

> What we mean by "objectivity" is that our ideas, judgements and statements should be formed wholly from the object (what ever it may be) under consideration. Their truth or falsity should be independent of what any one thinks or feels. By contrast, subjective ideas, judgements and statements arise from the nature of the knowing subject; their truth or falsity is not independent of what he or she thinks or feels. (Stanford 1998: 51)

To say that the non-Europeans have an existence "*Dasein*" that is out side of the embrace of history is tantamount to the denial of the existence of the non-Europeans. There is no doubt that Kant's judgement does not have any other basis than the baseless claim that European existence represents the universal. Universal history, philosophy, civilization is the European and the rest are out of this. I don't think that one would find any other basis to Kant's claims if one were honest to oneself.

It is also appropriate to ask at this juncture, if the non-European people are, just as Kant characterized them, why do they have to exist at all? Is there any purpose for which they are there?

Kant's answer to this is that they have no purpose. Their existence, which may be a mere contingence, is superfluous. They find themselves at the lowest scale of human intelligence; they achieved nothing worthwhile either in the arts or the sciences and the attempt to "civilize" them is unsuccessful. This attests to the point, according to Kant, that they are only superfluous and Kant expresses this in a very an unequivocal way. He said, "Mankind has a motive force to make itself perfect that a nation that has completed its development and lives only for enjoyment is superfluous and believes that the destruction of Tahiti is not any lose for the world." (cited in Alex Sutter 1989: 27)

In connection with this it may be appropriate to talk once again about the essence and goal of history. History for Kant may be understood to be a phenomenon that moves towards the realization of an end that has been there from the very beginning. This movement may be seen as the moral

improvement of mankind or better still the white race since the others according to Kant are out side of the embrace of history.

We can easily find out contradictory assertions here, because Kant on the one hand seems to suggest that the whites only are endowed with the natural possibilities of realizing the goal of history, and on the other suggests that history does not make an exception.

He wrote in his "Rflexionen zur Anthropologie",

> the whites are the only people who are able to always move forward with perfection. All races will be eradicated, only the whites are an exception. The reason for this is the cultural superiority of the whites, for which they have to thank the climate. The Negro can be disciplined and cultivated but would never be civilized. He falls into his own wildness. (W. Smidt 1999: 60)

This quotation makes it clear that the purpose of history is known from the very beginning. It leads to a situation where the white race moves progressively towards perfection where as the others are condemned to slavery.

But when we look at the following quotation we can see the contradiction in which Kant is caught. He said, "The goal of history is the emergence of civil society under the rule of law. The history of mankind is the realization of a plan provided by nature. All the dispositions of a creature are determined at the beginning to purposefully develop to their full capacity." (W. Smidt 1999: 106)

Unless some body wants to read some thing unwritten into Kant's writings, he does not make any exceptions here simply because he says all creatures. Looked at rationally Kant seems to say that – or one can at least validly infer this from his argument – there are no particular races that are endowed with this potential but the whole of human kind. That is the sense, I would like to argue, of the expression "all the natural dispositions of a creature are determined to develop purposefully..."

Having established the hierarchy between races Kant indicated the level of development/civilization that they could achieve. With regard to the Negro, he says, "... as opposed to the native Americans who lack passion and affection and as a result are incapable of love, care, etc. the Negros are full of life, affection, passion, talkative, vain and surrender to enjoyment. They take the culture of the slave not the freeman and are incapable of being their own masters, children. (W. Smidt 1999: 63)

One wonders how Kant was able to come to such a judgement. His knowledge of these people, both empirical and theoretical is very limited. It requires an unprecedented degree of arrogance and blind courage to talk with certainty on something, which you don't know. That is what Kant did assuming that what the great philosophers say would be accepted irrespective of whether it is true or not merely because it comes out of the mouth of the master.

He then raised a number of astonishing points that he thought should be considered in dealing with the Negro. He made it clear to himself that the Native Americans and Negros cannot be masters of themselves. They can only serve as slaves. (W. Smidt 1999: 64)

In this particular case it is the purpose of the judgement that is clear than the judgement. A person with the slightest hint of objectivity, how far, he may be admiring Kant's genius, however, has to ask but what is the reason for this? The judgment emanates not from the lack of information or a result of a failure in judgement alone. It must without doubt contain elements of a civilizing mission that gave the legitimacy to colonialism. That is why I have argued that the purpose of the judgement is clearer than the judgement. Since the judgement does not have an objective basis Kant simply writes whatever bad idea that came to his mind and that could paint the black man in darker colors for no good reasons. Is it not really surprising that when he without the slightest worry about the truthfulness of the idea writes as follows, " the Negros would be born white apart from their reproductive area and a ring around the navel which are black. The black color expands from these points during the first month of their birth to the whole of the body." (C. Neugebauer, in H. O. Oruka: 265.

There is no doubt that Kant is one of the greatest philosophers in the history of Western philosophy. The range of topics that he treated is a witness to this. The depth and analytic rigor of his ideas also is a witness to his position in the history of philosophy. He is read, discussed and admired very sympathetically by a wide range of philosophers even today. The continuous admiration on the one hand shows his importance; while on the other hand one can still argue that the admiration for Kant, which after two centuries goes on, is indicative of the barrenness of the philosophical field. But the one-sidedness with which Kant is accepted is what is surprising. While many of the important philosophers of the last two centuries have realized the merits and contribution of Kant to philosophy, they have, however, on the other hand tried either knowingly or unknowingly to keep silent about his race theory and particularly his racist attitudes towards the blacks, Asians and native Americans. In fact instead of adapting a critical attitude to his writings we only find approaches that only magnify his contributions beyond proportion while keeping silent about his understanding of people of different colors and cultures. Ortega Y. Gasset wrote for example, "The decisive secrets of the modern epoch are contained in the works of Kant, its virtues and boundaries. Thanks to the genius of Kant it is possible to see the manifold life of the Occident, presented in Kant's philosophy, simplified and with the precision of a clockmaker." (cited in W. Smidt 1999: 5)

Ortega Y. Gasset would like to understand Kant as the philosopher who

took important steps in the direction of modernity. It is possible to agree with this particularly when we consider Kant's contribution in the realms of metaphysics, epistemology, moral philosophy and others. We must, however be able to see the unacceptable racist ideas that lurk behind Kant's other philosophical writings. We may even take works like *The Cambridge Companion to Kant* edited by Paul Guyer, published in 1992. There are 14 articles written by some of the important philosophers dealing with different aspects of Kant's philosophy. A cursory glance even at the topics simply shows us that these philosophers are out there to speak about the contributions of Kant alone giving a deaf ear or a blind eye to his other works. Here his ideas of metaphysics, epistemology, moral philosophy, etc. are discussed but some of his earlier works like the, "Anthropology, Race Theory, and Physical Geography are not mentioned. What reason would all these philosophers have to leave aside these works if not a deliberate task of not discussing these texts? Particularly the contribution by F. C. Beiser titled, "Kant's Intellectual Development 1746-1781," mentions only once Kant's work titled "On the Different Races of Mankind." This article ends with a discussion of the "Critique of Pure Reason" which was published in 1781. As it is often the case with admirers of Kant, Beiser in his long article discusses many aspects of Kant's philosophy. Nothing is said about the other side of Kant. I do not think that all these philosophers read only the works of Kant, which deal only with metaphysics, epistemology, moral philosophy, aesthetics, etc. I would like to assume that there is a kind of tacit understanding among them to simply keep silent about his writings in anthropology, geography and race theory while dealing properly with the other aspects of his writings.

What happened to Alex Sutter's article, titled, *Kant und die Wilden: Zum Implizten Rassismus in den kantischen Geschichtsphilosophie* is most probably telling of how the mainstream philosophical undertaking in the West deals with Kant. Sutter reports towards the end of his article that he wanted to publish this article in the well-known series of publications known as *Kant Studien.* The response that he got was that the thesis about Kant's implicit racism in comparison with Kant's idea of "eternal peace" is refutable. Sutter was not, therefore, allowed to publish the article in *Kant Studien*. He had to later on publish it in *Prima Philosophia*, 2, 1989, PP 241-265. For Sutter the denial of the publication of his article meant none other than a censorship of ideas that are not entertained by mainstream philosophy.

Conclusion

My discussion of Kant's moral and political philosophy was brief. I did this because my purpose was not to discuss these concepts at length but only to pick out the essential ideas in the concepts and to contrast them with his

race theory. I have attempted to show that Kant's moral philosophy tries to establish a moral law that evaluates the morality of an action not on the outcome of the action but the inherent value of the action. The human individual is rational and makes rational law and acts rationally. We impose rational laws upon ourselves; we fear and respect them. We should act in such away that our will is a universal law. Kant's formal maxim of morality deserves to be seen critically, but since that is not our purpose here we focus on what he tried to achieve.

On the other hand his political philosophy also is important in that it recognizes the autonomy of the individual and wanted to work out a philosophy of politics that takes this into account. By taking this into account he advocated the establishment of a society based on the rule of law rather than the specific will of particular individuals. A law that allows of no exception but even handedly applies to all citizens would contribute to internal stability and international peace. The importance of these ideas cannot at all be doubted.

But on the other hand, what does not at all match with these ideas is his race theory. It is difficult to imagine that a pietist like Kant can come up with such an idea. His race theory greatly undermines Kant's enlightenment and his call for courage in order to escape from self-imposed tutelage. The hierarchy that he established among races, his attitude towards people of other colors and cultures is just something that does not fit into his other ideas, particularly that of moral philosophy and political theory. It is the fact that he, without worrying for facts tries to establish the identity of others that need to be questioned. It is his understanding of history and the subject of history that does not at all fit into his edifice. It is difficult to understand how he could reconcile within himself these diametrically opposed ideas.

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Kant's Perpetual Peace and its Practical Actualization*

Simon Hoffding**

Studying "Perpetual Peace" (PP) leaves a question unanswered: Does Kant believe that his plan for peace can lead to lasting peace, considered in itself when its content with only very few exceptions excludes all notions of morals? This question seems of the outmost importance insofar as Kant in "Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals", claims that any consistent, effective law must have its ground in a priori truth and in the Categorical Imperative (CI) making it obvious that the CI should presuppose any legislation including that concerned with peace. My first task is, thus, to show how the CI exists implicitly in PP and to provide an analysis of the ground on which the CI stands, namely, Good Will, Freedom and their "a prioriness" or universality. History after Kant has shown very few signs of an implementation of PP and has not demonstrated any development towards a more peaceful society and we are therefore forced to consider what means in addition to PP we must utilize to achieve lasting peace.

I believe that education constitutes an essential element in peace, but education must not exist for itself but actively seek to promote peaceful ideals. Peace and morals in education are imbued in the concept of "Soka Education" (value creating education) and I wish to show that this idea of education is a practical application of Kant's ethics and most probably will contribute to lasting peace. My second task is, therefore, to demonstrate the connection between Kant's moral philosophy and that of the Soka University of America and its founder, Daisaku Ikeda, especially showing some very striking parallels between, for instance, Kant's notion of "Self Control" and Ikeda's of "Self Mastery", and of the word Soka or "value creating" and Kant's idea of "Happiness of Others". The conclusion of the paper will show how SUA's community, by acting in accordance with the founding principles, embody a renaissance of Kant's moral philosophy and hope for

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the practical actualization of perpetual peace.

I

Perpetual Peace's main body comprises six preliminary articles and three definitive articles. The preliminary articles state, narrowly defined, in what condition states must exist prior to peace, or what anti bellicose steps must be taken before peace presents itself as an option. I will go rather briefly over these articles to reach the definitive articles that define under which condition a state can reign in peace; they describe what elements of society must exist to maintain peace. Of importance to my essay come also the two appendices that mention the position of morality to that of politics and shows means of restraining the legislative power from acting for it's own good only.

To secure stability in a state, it is important that it can count on a peaceful future. Therefore shall, "No Treaty of Peace…Be Held Valid in Which There Is Tacitly Reserved Matter for a Future War". The first preliminary article states that a peace treaty must not merely be a ceasefire or suspension of hostilities; for the word "perpetual" to make any sense a peace treaty must address a total and final end of hostilities. The freedom of a state must also be secured, for a state is like a moral person and if it comes under control of another power it is reduced to a thing and deprived its possibilities of enlightenment. The second preliminary article therefore says that: "No Independent States, Large or Small, Shall Come under the Dominion of Another State by Inheritance, Exchange, Purchase, or Donation."

The third article claims that "Standing Armies shall in Time be Totally Abolished" because "the cost of peace [a standing army] finally becomes more oppressive that of a short war, and consequently a standing army is itself a cause of offensive war waged in order to relieve the state of this burden". The stability of a state is threatened by the three powers of armies, alliances and money. Money can purchase armies as well as allies and as an attempt to control the financial relationship between states, Kant defines the fourth preliminary article saying that: "National Debts Shall Not Be Contracted with a View to the External Friction of States. "National debt within states can easily become such an economic pressure that the freedom which is crucial to the states really no longer exist. The state must be free and independent, why "No State Shall by Force Interfere with the Constitution or Government of Another State". This fifth proposition addresses economical as well as military interference and comes to include the second, third and fourth proposition. The sixth proposition forbids "the Employment of Assassins, Poisoners, Breach of Capitulation and Incitement to Treason in the Opposing State". Even states in war must offer some confidence to each other otherwise the result would be a war of extermination. But I believe this proposition saying that "No State Shall,

during War, Permit Such Acts of Hostility Which Would Make Mutual Confidence in the Subsequent Peace Impossible" is included in the fifth proposition, for a state cannot without interfering with another, employ any of the means forbidden in the sixth proposition.

As mentioned, the definitive articles must exist with or during peace and the first article which refers to less concrete values such as freedom and equality says that the constitution shall be based on:

the freedom of the members of a society (as men)
- dependence of all upon a single common legislation (as subjects)
- the law of their equality (as citizens)

Kant mentions a republican state or a representative government which resembles the Western notion of a contemporary representative democracy. In this light, he can be seen as a founder of modern politics. Sustaining peace cannot be done purely by legislation; no, we must rely on more abstract notions such as freedom. A constitution that wishes to promote peace must be premised on freedom, but simultaneously its population must unite in obeying a common legislation as subjects. All must obey it under the same circumstances as citizens and this constitutes their equality. This constitution will lead to perpetual peace because the citizen will come to posses a state of enlightenment, realizing the cost of war and simultaneously having the political power to avoid engaging the state in "such a poor game". The opposite case is where a tyrant easily can decide on war because it will not affect himself, but only his subjects. Briefly, this article shows that when you give power to the people you also give them responsibility and that this responsibility requires enlightenment. The public will, in other words, grow with the task of building a peaceful constitution once is has freedom.

The second definitive article determines how two states shall act with one another on the premise that the first article is deployed: "The Law of Nations Shall be Founded on a Federation of Free States". We might find this analogous to the UN again showing Kant's contributions to modern society. It claims that just as people tend to gather in states so do states want to interact with one another. More and more would join, for the free man will see the benefit of this alliance and the state will say: "There ought to be no war between myself and other states, even though I acknowledge no supreme legislative power by which our rights are mutually guaranteed" realizing that only a free federation with equality among its members can ensure a civil order as it makes the law the object of its volition. Without freedom and a striving for unity, the root of national and regional dissolution is immanent in the states and will, at some point, lead to conflict. If we fail to create this world republic we are left with alliances that, as shown in the third, fourth and fifth preliminary articles, will eventually lead to war.

The third definitive article says that we shall treat foreigners not as enemies or that "The Law of World Citizenship Shall Be Limited to

Conditions of Universal Hospitality".

Nowhere in the main body of PP, are morals mentioned as an important element in perpetual peace. However, if we take a different approach and analyze the philosophical ground of, for example, the first definitive article we realize that there implicitly is a strong moral basis from Kant's ideas on free will and pure morals. This, I will address later.

It is quite ironic that the first mentioning of morality found in the title of the first appendix, is called: "On the Opposition between Morality and Politics with Respect to Perpetual Peace." In this part of PP, Kant might be referring to the necessity of a revolution: "Hence in the practical execution of this idea [that the people can unite and produce a common will] we can count on nothing but force to establish the juridical condition". This "force" comes from the people and could refer to an intellectual or mental force, an inner force, but in the context of all the practically applicable propositions I am convinced that Kant refers to an active overthrowing, for "We can scarcely hope to find in the legislator a moral intention sufficient to induce him to commit to the general will the establishment of a legal constitution" (PP, appendix 1). The legislator whether represented in tyranny or oligarchy will not give up his position, thus, in order to gain peace we must establish a representative republic, apparently through revolution. I will later on define PP in its historical context with the French Revolution to come to terms with the necessity of a revolution.

On the watch for connotations to morality, we finally find, in the second appendix, a moral regulation saying: "All actions relating to the rights of other men are unjust if their maxim is not consistent with publicity" also "All maxims which stand in need of publicity in order not to fail their end, agree with politics and rights combined". This is a very practical application of morals, but it concerns only that maxim by which politicians should act when making a law. Kant likely added this idea because it wasn't respected in his contemporary period. It is a powerful means for the public to restrain the legislators in case they have dishonest intentions and even in our time, this proposition is not respected. If we believe in the citizens acting in unison for the better of the whole state, no law will be executed that doesn't benefit the whole population.

Still, in the entire PP there is no trace of a necessity for the individual to adhere to moral laws in order to establish a lasting peace; further in the main body of the text there is simply a call for legislative regulations or juridical duties to achieve peace. There is, in other words, no explicit reference to ethical duty. Whether Kant believes that legislative force alone is enough to ensure peace is therefore not to be found in PP; his treatises on morals that were written some ten years before, however, do constitute an essential and inherent precept in PP which I will go on to show with emphasis on

"Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals".

When Kant states that, "Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good, without qualification, except a good will"(Page 256,"Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals") he implies that all good actions, including actions to establish peace, must come from the good will itself. He goes on to say that good will, "is good in itself, and considered by itself it is to be esteemed much higher than all that can be brought about by it in favor of any inclination, nay even of the sum total of all inclinations" (Page 256,"Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals") The good will is the cause of good, behind which there are no other causes; no empirical example can fully illustrate the implication of good will. But this does not make the good will unattainable, i.e., we can act according to it and in our actions come to represent the totality of this will. This is possible when we act on a priori premises, when we act as free individuals through the CI.

I will now explain the relationship between the CI, free will and good will. First comes the good will, which exists as an eternal, unchanging and universal principle in all actions that are good. Will and good are synthesized in Man in such a way that the goodness of our action depends on our will for it to be good. Here, we see the relation of the intention behind an act to the act itself: "an action done from duty derives its moral worth, not from the purpose which is to be attained from it, but from the maxim by which it is determined" (Page 259,"Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals"). The good will gives itself, but it is our wanting it to be good that determines the goodness of the act, i.e. the goodness of the object of the action is determined by our wanting the object to be good. Good will, in this respect, differs from free will. Our will is free – regardless of whether we want it or not. But it exists in an unmanifested form, and manifests itself by our understanding it. The character of free will is difficult to define; it is not unconditioned as the good will and yet it is conditioned by itself:

> "although freedom is not a property of the will depending on physical laws, yet it is not for that reason lawless; on the contrary it must be a causality acting according to immutable laws, but of a peculiar kind; otherwise a free will would be an absurdity. Physical necessity is a heteronomy of the efficient causes, for every effect is possible only according to this law, that something else determines the efficient cause to exert its causality. What else then can freedom of the will be but autonomy, that is, the property of the will to be a law to itself? But the proposition: "The will is in every action a law to itself," only expresses the principle: "To act on no other maxim than that which can also have as an object itself as a universal law." Now this is precisely the formula of the categorical imperative and is the principle of morality, so that a free will and a will subject to moral laws are one and the same." (Page 279-280, "Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals").

This observation beautifully concludes the triad between good will, free will and the CI because it shows that free will is conditioned by its own maxim, and thus is identical to the CI which is defined as acting in accord only with the maxims that you want to become universal laws. We cannot understand the essence of good will, free will, but when we act according to the CI we become free, as our will comes to constitute its own law. This implies that we cannot gain freedom in a state of ignorance, for the CI is only a CI if we understand its implication: You cannot want the maxim of an action to be a universal unless you understand the relationship between your concrete action and the universal law.

Two more concepts need to be defined before we can draw the important parallels between PP and the Metaphysics of Morals. A "Division of the Metaphysic of Morals according to the Objective Relation of the Law of Duty" is absolutely required when we later on will distinguish between "internal" and "external", but also when we will touch upon differences between universalism and holism.

We have "Ethical Duties" and "Juridical Duties", the former relating to an end which is, in itself inherent in Duty and the latter to what can be "promulgated by external legislation." (General Divisions of the Metaphysics of Morals, page 383) Free will comes into a new perspective, here together with what belongs to internal and external: "We know our own freedom- from which all moral laws and consequently all rights as well as all duties arise- only through the moral imperative, which is an immediate injunction of duty; whereas the conception of right as a ground of putting others under obligation has afterwards to be developed out of it." (General Divisions of the Metaphysics of Morals, page 383). What we see here, is the logical sequence of these three main terms. The spring of all is Freedom, or free will, then comes our internal duties which give rise to external legislation. The CI is the direct merging of ethical duties into external duties and it is solely through the CI that we can find the perfect balance between binding under obligations and being bound under obligations i.e. when we have both rights and duties. Most important, we come to understand that all exterior legislation is based on interior duty.

Not only did Kant stress that an internal sense of morality comes before any legislation, according to Carl Joachim Friedrich one of Kant's main undertakings was the dignifying of the common person: "To him who stressed the moral element within each man's make-up as the faculty of freedom, the common man was endowed with as much dignity as the most exalted."(Page 31-32, Inevitable Peace). Further I would observe that Kant himself was from a lower class and at one point called Rousseau, who, by means of the Social Contract also sought to liberate the ordinary man, The "Newton of the moral world" (Page 31, Inevitable Peace). From this, it is

clear that Kant was in support of the general public which is consistent with his first definitive article in PP, saying that the constitution of every state shall be republican which is interchangeable with bringing the common person to power. Friedrich's arguments come to an even stronger position when we consider the whole historical perspective presupposing Kant's peace proposal.

The latter half of the 18th century begins politically to employ the Cartesian philosophic basis that was established with a firm belief in certain knowledge the century before. In Discourse on the Method, Descartes states that "Good sense is the best distributed thing in the world" (Page 1) and it is with this new fletched optimism that Kant writes the essay, "What is Enlightenment?". With an intention of awakening the masses from their "dogmatic slumber" he yells out: Sapere Aude! Have the courage to use your own understanding. Being anti-Hobbesian, Kant believes in the enlightenment and power of the people. A proper government is not found in the enlightened despot; if we seek freedom and peace, this must happen through the liberation of the masses: "A revolution may well put an end to autocratic despotism and to rapacious or power seeking oppression, but it will never produce a true reform in ways of thinking. Instead, new prejudices, like the ones they replaced, will serve as a leash to control the great unthinking mass. For enlightenment of this kind, all that is needed is freedom." (What is Enlightenment, Page 2) We can here begin to distinguish between freedom from autocracy and freedom of prejudice and I will touch upon this important two-fold nature of freedom later. When Kant, in 1784, writes his essay mentioning revolution, he probably has an idea that precisely revolution was the inevitable practical result of enlightenment. Four years later, The Bastille falls and this constitutes the people exercising its power for the first time in European history. Even though Kant, mentions that a revolution will never produce a true reform in ways of thinking, the outcome of the French Revolution, i.e., the Declaration of the Rights of Man, is a symptom of the freedom being necessary for enlightenment. That Kant sees his essay come into practice must have excited him as much as the later consequences of the revolution must have disappointed him.

In 1793, the Reign of Terror began, killing thousands of people. I believe that this insane bloodshed, that must have made the enlightenment philosophers reconsider their optimism, is one cause behind the writing of PP. In "What is Enlightenment?", Kant never offers any practical or legislative solutions to the process of enlightenment, but in the period between 1784 and 1795 (publishing PP) he has practically formulated his entire philosophy, including Science of Rights, and does, thus, have a practical system on which he can base his philosophic ideas. Why is it that we go from "What is Enlightenment?" that offers no concrete guidance to

the process of enlightenment and that claims the means of a revolution to be inexpedient, to PP that gives 9 very applicable propositions for establishing peace and recommends a violent overthrowing of the government, as mentioned on page 4? I believe that Kant's experiencing the French Revolution provoked a reconsideration of idealism, enlightenment and government. The common person's striving for freedom resulting in revolution is a healthy means for the creation of a republic, but the untamed ideological force must find structure in legislation in order to survive under a republican constitution. The basis for lasting peace is the freedom of the people and their acting with the CI, but we must have concrete legislation to support and order the morality, otherwise it gets awry as seen in the French Revolution. Kant had a theory of enlightenment, saw some elements work in practice and revised it into PP.

Now, we can sum up the implications of Kant's interest in the enlightenment of the common person and his morals being founded in a priori concepts such as good will. Good will cannot be represented empirically, but exists as a necessity defining our good actions and is therefore a priori, based on pure reason and, most important of all, universal. In PP we find the practical principle applied to morality and it is in the vacuum between the passive, pure CI and the active, practical PP that the ordinary citizen is to be found. Just like we can find the root of PP in pure reason or go from external to internal, so can we identify the root of peace in society coming from the individual. In PP, all the preliminary articles point out to external factors in the state as a whole that must be changed to gain peace and. Only in the first definitive article is there an internal sphere of the individual mentioned – I here refer to the notion of freedom. In my deriving a direction from external to internal and from society to the single person through analyzing the ethical fundament of PP existing in Kant's works on morals, it becomes apparent that the ultimate first cause of PP is enlightening the ordinary person and giving him freedom to understand the CI. From the individual's internal liberation comes the perpetual peace of states.

Having argued thus far for the two essential points - namely, that PP is premised on a foundation of pure ethics and that it is not just for legislative power to act morally but that there must be a "Sapere Aude" throughout the whole population in order to establish PP, I will conclude the first part of my paper in discussion with Otfried Höffe: The freedom we gain from the CI comes with our understanding of its universality. If we prevent anybody from reaching this freedom, there can no longer be any universality, meaning that the constituting relation between good will, free will and the CI is dependent on universality. One person alone, acting with the CI, might theoretically gain freedom, but when Kant speaks of "a federation of free states" (Second definitive article for Perpetual Peace), he implies that the

people in the state must be free and this freedom must come from the actions performed in the name of the CI. In other words, if the ordinary person fails to perceive and act out the CI there can be no lasting peace.

I believe, after the paragraph concerning internal and external duties, that internal peace comes before any other peace, but on this point, Höffe states the exact opposite: "Whereas Plato's first polis degree (*Republic* II 369b-372c) binds social peace to inner or personal peace, Kant places peace in the domain of right, which manages without any personal attitude." (Page 15, "Peace in Kant's Theory of Justice": O Höffe, 2004). I will, later on analyze peace within oneself as such, with respect to universalism versus holism. Höffe acknowledges that perpetual peace must be based on the people and not just the legislating powers, but he argues for a practical basis for the people's morality and he goes as far as to say that "The citizen also does not need to be a truly moral person. It suffices that, as a legislator, he does his outmost to support laws that do not conflict with morals"(Page 14, "Peace in Kant's Theory of Justice": O Höffe, 2004)

At this point we must pause and ask ourselves, how one can support laws that do not conflict with morals without being a moral person oneself. As I have shown, there is an ultimate call for understanding the maxims upon which one bases one's actions. If we don't consciously choose the CI, don't make the will its own end, we exit the sphere of the universal. It is not the action or the result that determines its being good; no, it is the intention, the good will itself and this good will exists as a concept of pure reason. If we do not understand the power of our volition we cannot act with the CI. The action on behalf of the CI is of course practical, but the root is to be found beyond any empiricism. That the CI is an option open to all men, shows Kant's immense faith in the reason of ordinary people, for the CI implies understanding. It is Kant's contribution to humankind that he dignifies the common person who too, has the possibility of freedom. Without this very freedom the whole project of Perpetual Peace is lost. This is the reason Kant is considered the most important philosopher of the Enlightenment Period.

II

Perpetual Peace cannot exist without the common person's understanding of the CI; it follows, then, that when we don't have peace on this earth it is because of the lack of understanding of universal morality. In order to establish peace, it is not enough to make peace proposals or resolutions: the population of the world needs to be taught morality and its implications. In what system of education do we find such an emphasis? A most apt representative is Soka Education, founded in the 1920s in Japan by Tsunaseburo Makiguchi. The story of how Makiguchi was inspired by John Dewey and how he eventually died in prison for opposing Japanese militarism in the 1930s and 1940s, is beyond the scope of this paper, but I

will describe the most recent enterprise of Soka education, the Soka University of America, which opened its doors only three years ago.

SUA's three founding principles represent a highly Kantian code of morals: "Be world citizens in solidarity for peace", "Be the pioneers of a global civilization" and "Foster leaders of pacifism in the world".

These three mottos appear to be addressing world citizenship; they can also be seen as a prolongation of the second and third definitive articles in PP and does, as I will show later on, represent a Kantian notion of morality founded on pure reason acted through the CI. They are, in other words, universal, but universalism is actually not the ideological ground on which they are founded; they stem from a more holistic notion found in Buddhism. Before analyzing the mottoes, I will look at the similarities between universalism and holism. One is surprised to find in "Critic of pure Reason" what could refer to a holistic world perception: "There are two sources of human knowledge (which probably spring from a common, but to us unknown, root), namely, sense and understanding" (introduction, page 22). The sense and the understanding come to represent all phenomena if we interpret the former as derived from experience and thereby external and the latter as derived from pure reason and thereby internal. But Kant avoids expounding on this "root" and does instead in his works on morals and ethics proceed to what I entitle universalism.

My definition of universalism, is that it doesn't inhibit the freedom of others, that we act according to the CI and that the object of our freedom is to seek enlightenment. Universalism thus translates into global tolerance, respect and equality and again leads back to the first definitive article in which the constitution must be based on our equality as citizens. If we do not conceive all humans as equally able to understand and live according to the CI, universality ceases to exist, for implicit in this notion is "all humanity." This implies that as soon as we act selfishly or contrary to the CI we loose sight of freedom. Skeptics might claim that universalism is a western phenomenon that is not truly universal, but when compared to eastern holism we find obvious similarities and I believe that this justifies calling universalism truly universal.

In relation to SUA, eastern holism is to be defined specifically through the Buddhist ideals pertaining to the Japanese organization Soka Gakkai International (SGI)(meaning "value creating society") presided by Daisaku Ikeda. Embodied in the mottos is Ikeda's belief that an essential human quality is "The compassion to maintain an imaginative empathy that reaches beyond one's immediate surroundings and extends to those suffering in distant places." (Ikeda, Soka Education, Page. 101). This refers to the prevailing holistic idea that everything is interconnected. The implication of interconnection is that, when you hurt others you hurt yourself as well and

vice versa and we must therefore seek the improvement of others and of ourselves. This translates directly to the CI and only differs in the aspect that we, in Kant, find interconnection only in the realm of man, while holism believes that we are closely connected to nature as well. In SGI's Buddhism, the path to enlightenment is realizing one's unlimited potential, the interconnectedness of everything and one's true identity as a person of ultimate freedom. Responsibility and freedom are essential values just like in Kant's universalism, the former relating to the CI and the latter to enlightenment premised by freedom. It is now contradictory to claim that Kant's universalism is western, for it shares the same values as holism. On the two crucial points as how to act and how to gain enlightenment, there is a considerate overlap between the two philosophies and we must acknowledge that the CI is truly universal as it encompasses holistic perspectives as well. An outcome of Buddhist conviction, yet consistent with Kantian ethics, I will no go on an analysis of the mottoes:

First we must realize that the terms in the mottos, world citizen, pioneer and leader are interchangeable; all refer to a person of integrity who, through his actions shows a way of living that is beneficial to himself and others. Over the past few years the concept of a "world citizen" has been used more and more frequently, without anybody knowing precisely what this word signifies. In order to find the relation between Kant's morals and those of SUA, it is crucial to define the world citizen because this citizen constitutes the coming together of Kant's PP and ethical framework with the character that SUA seeks to develop. In this comparison, I wish to elaborate especially on two important concepts: Kant's idea of "self-constraint" and his duty of virtue, "Happiness of others", and SUA's founder Daisaku Ikeda's idea of "Self Mastery" and the notion of "Value creation" which is the meaning of the Japanese expression, soka, defined by Makiguchi.

In his book Soka education, Daisaku Ikeda states that the global citizen must possess the following qualities:

> - "The wisdom to perceive the interconnectedness of all life and being
> - The courage not to fear or deny any difference, but to respect and strive to understand people of different cultures and to grow from encounters with them."(Page 100-101, Soka Education)

Relating the first quality to the sphere of human beings, this "interconnectedness" comes to represent the equality of all men. If everything is connected, it is foolish to harm other people, since this will equally harm yourself. If we gain the understanding of interconnectedness, we will automatically begin acting in accordance to it; not doing so, would be contradictory. The first statement is compatible with the second in the sense that we necessarily will understand that other persons represent aspects of ourselves. If we therefore seek to benefit from encounters with other cultures or races we will develop ourselves and our ability to encompass

other worldviews in our cosmology. We see an abundant coherence between oneself and one's surrounding imbued in Ikeda's concepts and though the underlying conviction is not exactly the same as Kant's universalism, we see an obvious relation from holism.

The abovementioned duties of virtue are the only ends that are also virtues: "One's own virtue is, no doubt, an end that all men have"(Page 369, Metaphysical Elements Of Ethics). "If happiness, then, is in question, which it is to be my duty to promote as my end, it must be the happiness of other men whose (permitted) end I hereby make also mine" (Page 370, Metaphysical Elements Of Ethics). Here, we expose the same relationship between oneself and others as seen in Ikeda's works and we come to see the benefit in making the happiness of others one's own end. To understand the interconnectedness, can be compared to making one's own and others' happiness an end and leads to the categorical imperative by which we begin creating our concept of the world citizen as obeying this imperative. But what actions does the imperative imply, it so far being merely a maxim of action, thereby passive or speculative, how must we act? In speaking of our own perfection, Kant mentions the "cultivation of one's power", implying correcting one's errors and to make the law the spring of one's actions, and here another approximation appears to Ikeda's idea of a highly moral person (In this case, a so called Bodhisattva, whose mission in life, it is to encourage and help other people), who shall be:

- "rigorously strict towards oneself.
- warm and embracing towards others" (Page 59, For the sake of peace)

We often wish to make exceptions to the categorical imperative, but the sole element that lends this imperative its strength is its being respected in every case, and this requires an extraordinary amount of self discipline or "self-constraint" (Page. 374, Metaphysical Elements of Ethics). This principle comes very close to what Ikeda calls Self-Mastery (In, "For the Sake of Peace" he mentions seven paths to peace of which one is "The Path of Self-Mastery"). However vague in its description, self-mastery, Ikeda says, springs from introspection. Other where in the same work and in Soka Education, he gives Socrates as the most prominent example of introspection, because he was a master of dialogue. Dialogue is actively striving for improvement of oneself and others; it is a reaching out and this is a quality that constitutes a corner pillar of the world citizen:

- "One must not be satisfied with passive goodness; one must be a person of courage and mettle who can actively strive for good" (Page 112, Soka Education)
- "To be uncompromising when confronting evil" (Page 59, For the sake of peace)

The phrase, "confronting evil" is subject to many interpretations and can be invoked to justify many a non-virtuous deed. But when considering evil

as ignorance, we realize that Socrates firmly confronted evil and actively strove for the good by incessantly seeking to enlighten the citizens of Athens through dialogue. That he embodied an uncompromising spirit is seen in the fact that he died for his beliefs. Another concrete example of a person acting according to these principles is Tsunesaburo Makiguchi who was imprisoned by the Japanese military regime: Ikeda tells that Makiguchi "never retreated a step. It is said that he used to call out from his solitary cell, asking other prisoners if they were bored, offering to engage them in debate about such questions as whether there is any difference between not doing good and actually committing evil." (Page 117, Soka Education). Like Socrates, Makiguchi died for his beliefs, but it is important to realize that there is no necessary relationship between martyrdom and global citizenship. The global citizen is first and foremost defined as acting universally, this is what distinguishes a mere citizen from a global citizen and the only true possibility of enacting universality is by the categorical imperative. Being strict towards oneself and embracing towards others represents all notions I have mentioned in this context, and is inherent in the categorical imperative. In the CI we find the CI itself; it must be our maxim to act according to the CI. If we omit the level of action we are not pursuing the highest maxim. But we must always be cautious not to define a rigid opposition between good and evil, for this would not be conducive to dialogue and our views would grow static and cease to be universal. Fighting evil is a process of spreading enlightenment and spreading the notion of the CI - always with the tongue as a weapon.

The basic respect for human beings is formulated in Kant's other imperative: "Treat humanity…in every case as an end withal, never as means only." (Page 272, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals). This corresponds to the third Preliminary article in PP, that standing armies should be abolished, for are not soldiers always utilized as a means and never as ends? It's obvious from this paragraph that the world citizen, based on his individual conviction, acts universally with humanity as a whole in mind. The world citizen embodies the categorical imperative and has understanding of the necessity of doing so. The ultimate goal is realizing the freedom, both the interior that arises from the moral consciousness, but certainly also the exterior that arises from the cessation of war and oppression.

I believe the mottos of SUA will be carried out. I use the future tense "will be" to imply that the first class hasn't yet graduated, but that as soon as it does it will live on with the fundamental values that the mottos represent. In many universities, mottoes and principles are only public relations and marketing devices. This certainly isn't the case at SUA (I wish I could expound on the practical outliving of the core values, but for the paper to

remain within the boundaries of philosophy and not enter those of sociology, I will refrain from a practical description of the student and faculty body). If we accept that the principles are the theoretical foundation of a philosophy of life that is lived out, i.e., if we accept a correspondence between the mottos and reality, we must also acknowledge that world citizens are being educated with the purpose of spreading and embodying a philosophy of peace. The three mottoes, to,

- *Be world citizens in solidarity for peace*
- *Be the pioneers of a global civilization*
- *Foster leaders of pacifism in the world*

are the outline of the concept of Soka education and viewed in the context of the CI and the citizen of the world, we see that these three concepts have similar content. Soka education is the philosophy that binds the mottoes and it is derived from the same Japanese word that simply means value creation. In a Kantian perspective this represents both one's own perfection and the happiness of others, is it value creation on the exterior as well as the interior plane, value creation for oneself and others. This kind of world citizenship or globalism stand in opposition to the globalism of capitalism which is prevailingly deployed in modern society. For with economic growth, states and companies seek only their own perfection which is rarely a moral perfection, and never the happiness of others. In that pursuit they tend to see people as means to the end of profit or power, whereas Soka or Kant's globalism has humanity as its end. We therefore see that education must be utilized in the world of business to change the constituting code of "ethics" to one that encompass one's own perfection as well as the happiness of others.

We can now collect the different threads and see that the only possibility for the existence of a world citizen is his acting in accordance with the CI and simultaneously that the philosophical foundation of perpetual peace shall be the very same imperative. Yet the question remains, why Kant didn't include an ethical perspective in PP? Having shown the logical necessity of the existence of the CI presupposing PP and Kant's inclination to dignify the working class, I will risk the interpretation that Kant considered the notion of the CI inherent in PP so obvious that he simple didn't have to mention it. His works on morals were written some ten years before and constitute the speculative philosophical ground on which PP rests. We could, thus, consider PP the practical prolongation of "The Metaphysics of Morals" and "What is Enlightenment?"

I have, to my amazement, not found one single source mentioning the direct link between PP and pure reason or pure ethics and I hope the reader will acknowledge that this is because of the obviousness of the immanence of morality in any kind of peace notion. Before any practical action there must always come a moral consciousness and if the practical action is to

establish peace, the moral constitution must be the categorical imperative; no, this imperative must exist before any action that can be considered moral. Just as external freedom (meaning cessation of oppression) and internal freedom (that is derived from morals), peace has a double spherical connotation. On the external plane, it plainly refers to an existence without war, but in the internal realm it means having peace with oneself. Peace within oneself can be considered as a state mind in which we are not bothered by external trouble, but posses a strong, focused and happy attitude. Perpetual peace cannot exist without the liberation of the individual, i.e., an understanding within the common man of the importance of enacting the CI. The principles of peace and freedom does thus in this context come to be highly relevant since we achieve both peace and freedom internally as well as externally. I can now derive a general, existential direction: from state to individual and from external to internal, it all pointing to a starting point within the realm of speculative morals in the individual. The categorical imperative is the quintessential point from which all efforts to achieve peace and freedom must be derived.

This moral consciousness is trained at SUA and the mottos support the twofold nature that creates peace. For the CI, only directing itself towards maxims, is not of practical nature, it is in other words passive. We must not dismiss the practical aspect (which is, indeed, the content of PP) and at this point we see that the world citizen embodying the categorical imperative as well as the will and wisdom to actively fight ignorance through dialogue, comes to symbolize the perfect balance of the required qualities to establish peace. At SUA, with a student body of so far only 400, 38 different nations are represented and as each student returns to his respective country as a citizen of the world, the CI and its subsequent actions will spread throughout most of the world. The active and the passive principles associated with the CI must never be separated, the former leading to unethical behavior, the latter to nothing but abstract philosophy.

The categorical imperative is the defining and constituting notion for both perpetual peace and the world citizen. SUA, training people to understand their global role as citizens of the world and to enact the CI, therefore becomes an institution that seeks to carry on what Kant initiated: a moral revolution of consciousness and action. Being a world citizen, means to embody Kant's hopes for mankind and SUA's philosophy can thus be considered a renaissance of Kant's ideas, as well as a practical actualization of his wishes for peace and human happiness, an innovative enlightenment, in the contemporary period of globalization.

Appendix (December 04)

Having attended the conference in Tehran, I would like to introduce to

the reader a few adjacent perspectives existing in the papers of Dr. Pojman and Dr. Palmquist which can be found in this collection of essays and also draw the reader's attention to the work "Perpetual Peace, Essays on Kant's Cosmopolitan Ideal" from which I will present an interpretation by Jürgen Habermas.

Pojman criticizes Kant on the question of world government of which he is in favor in opposition to Kant proposing the maintenance of national legislative, executive and judiciary institutions. According to Pojman, there must be a global police force and standing army to enforce peace. Also, an international legislative agency that collects taxes and distributes wealth where it is most needed would be an essential factor to ensure peace. In my paper, I have avoided engaging in legislative proposals, for I believe that the upbringing of the moral individual must be the first constitutive factor in lasting peace. I choose here, not to interpret Pojman's proposal, but just mention that peace alone in the pure speculative moral realm is inconceivable and must be enforced trough legislative regulations.

This becomes interesting in Palmquist's perspective which concerns the relation between philosophers and politicians. Kant states that politicians loose their sense of morality when approaching power and that they, therefore, should listen to the philosophers who are uncorrupted. Philosophers must, Palmquist believes, make themselves heard and realize their responsibility and this must be enforced in education, in the university. I find this in accordance with the peace seeking educational philosophy of which Soka is a prominent example.

Habermas, like Pojman, takes a political and legislative approach to PP and states that PP shall be interpreted in a contemporary context; war does no longer consist of two armies or nations confronting each other in combat for new territory. He says that a revision of PP must focus on three aspects: "(1) the external sovereignty of states and the changed nature of relations among them, (2) the internal sovereignty of states and the normative limitations of classical power politics, and (3) the stratification of world society and a globalization of dangers which make it necessary for us to rethink what we mean by "peace."" (Habermas, Two Hundred Years' Hindsight, Page 127). This is Habermas' main concern together with a comment on Carl Schmitt's critic of universal morality which consists in showing the dangers of states invading other states in the name of "good" or "humanity". To engage in this perspective, I would also refer to Dr. Babbit's paper in this book.

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Syncopating Kant: Jean-Luc Nancy's Reading of the 1st Critique.

Ian R. James*

'Any philosophical treatise may find itself under pressure in particular passages (for it cannot be as fully armored as a mathematical treatise), while the whole structure of the system, considered as a unity, proceeds without the least danger', Emmanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*.[1]

What follows will aim to draw attention to those specific aspects of the *Critique of Pure Reason* which inform the reading of Kant given by the French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy in his 1978 work *Logodaedalus: discours de la syncope*. In this work Nancy interrogates the overall structure or 'architectonic' of the of the first Critique, the question of 'presentation' within critical philosophy ads a whole (or of *Darstellung*, a question which Kant himself addresses), and, crucially, the central role played by the 'schematism' within transcendental idealism. It will also aim to situate Nancy's reading within a broader history of certain approaches to Kant in order to show what is at stake for Nancy around the question of philosophical foundations, and perhaps also to suggest what this might mean for his broader understanding of philosophical writing in relation to literature and for his thinking around the nature and role of subject within philosophy.

As critique Kant's philosophy is, of course, about foundation but it is also about limitation, that is, it describes the grounds but also the limits of human experience. Thus it delineates the limits of what we can know on the one hand and designates, on the other, all that we must place firmly beyond the possibility of human knowledge. As Howard Caygill has noted, this tension between foundation and limitation has marked much of the reception of the first *Critique* since its publication in 1781. On the one hand there have been the constructive interpretations which follow the ambition of grounding the possibility of knowledge, namely the systematic syntheses of German Idealism (Fichte, Hegel), or the philosophical justifications of science undertaken by late nineteenth-century neo-Kantians (Cohen, Rickert). On the other hand there are those philosophers who have pursued the destructive, critical or more anti-foundationalist possibilities offered by transcendental philosophy, namely the Young Hegelians (Bauer, Feuerbach, Marx) and

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most famously Nietzsche.[2] In the twentieth century this more destructive tendency has given rise to readings of Kant which call into question the foundational ambitions of the *Critique of Pure Reason* itself by focusing on its status as discursive edifice and by highlighting the ways in which the foundations of this edifice may, in fact, be far from secure. Such readings include, pre-eminently, Heidegger's controversial work, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* and, after Heidegger, a number of texts published in France: works by Granel, and, more recently, by Derrida and Bennington.[3] Nancy's *Logodaedalus* can be situated very explicitly within this trajectory of anti-foundationalist responses to Kant which aim to question the discursive edifice of critical philosophy.

In the introduction of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant himself invokes the metaphor of an edifice provided with secure foundations in order to describe the overall structure, architecture, or *architectonic* of his work:

> Transcendental philosophy is here the idea of a science, for which the critique of pure reason is to outline the entire plan architectonically, i.e. from first principles, with a full guarantee for the completeness and the certainty of all the components that comprise this edifice (CPR, 150; A, 13; B, 27).

This architectonic could be described, in rather schematic terms as follows: the critique of pure reason is divided initially into the 'Transcendental Doctrine of Elements' and the 'Transcendental Doctrine of Method' with the bulk and by far the most important part of Kant's treatise being taken up with the elaboration of the former division. The 'Transcendental Doctrine of Elements' is in turn divided into two key parts the 'Transcendental Aesthetic' and 'Transcendental Logic', this latter itself comprising of a number of further layers and subdivisions (principally the 'Transcendental Analytic' and 'Transcendental Dialectic'). For most anti-foundationalist readings of the first *Critique* it is the manner in which these parts fit together to form the edifice of critical philosophy which is of crucial interest. Specifically for Heidegger, and then for Nancy after him, the relation between the 'Transcendental Aesthetic' and the 'Transcendental Logic' is of key importance.

As an reader of the first *Critique* will know, in its two parts the 'Transcendental Doctrine of Elements' offers an analysis of the human faculty of knowing, moving from the experience of objects in sensible intuition (the 'Aesthetic'), to the faculty of understanding, (which uses concepts in order to make judgements about intuited objects), and then to the faculty of reason, which is able to make further interconnected inferences from these judgements, in a logically rigorous and consistent manner (the 'Logic'). In each case the possibility of sensible experience, conceptual judgement or rational inference must be shown to occur in ways which are both universal and necessary and therefore not derived from the contingency

or particularity of experience (hence taken as a whole what is at stake is what Kant terms the possibility of 'synthetic a priori judgements' (*CPR*, 192; *B*, 73)).

What is essential for Kant, and this will be the central to Nancy's reading of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, is that formal logical structures, as discussed in the 'Transcendental Logic', can be united or synthesized with sensible content, that is the experience of sensory objects such as it is grounded in the forms of a priori sensible intuition, time and space. The necessity of transcendental philosophy, therefore, is to deal with concepts that are to be related to their objects *a priori*, and hence to:

> offer a general but sufficient characterization of the condition under which objects in harmony with those concepts can be given, for otherwise they would be without all content, and thus would be mere logical forms and not pure concepts of the understanding (CPR, 270; A, 136; B, 175).[4]

It could be argued, as Nancy will, that the success and solidity of critical philosophy depends on its ability, on the basis of 'a general but sufficient characterization', to present the universal and necessary conditions by which sensible intuition and conceptual forms can be united or synthesized in order to provide the foundation for the 'synthetic a priori judgements' constitutive of knowledge. The basis for the possibility of such a unity or synthesis of the sensible with the intelligible Kant calls the 'schema' of the concept, and the process or method by which concepts are applied to sensible intuitions he calls 'schematism'. The 'schema' of a concept is a pure, formal condition of the understanding which limits the usage of that concept. Like the *Critique* as a whole, then, the force of the schema is both enabling (it makes knowledge possible by grounding the unity of a sensible intuition with a concept) and limiting (it dictates that concepts cannot be united with intuitions in an arbitrary or variable manner). Kant views the schema in terms of what he calls a 'representation of a general procedure of the imagination' by which a concept procures its corresponding sensible image (CPR, 273; *A*, 140; *B*, 179-80). The function of what he calls the 'transcendental synthesis of the imagination' is central to his understanding of the process by which intuition and concept are united, or as he puts it in the language of the *Critique*:

> the schematism of the understanding through the transcendental synthesis of imagination comes down to nothing other than the unity of all the manifold of intuition in inner sense, and thus indirectly to the unity of apperception, as the function that corresponds to inner sense (to a receptivity). Thus the schemata of the concepts of pure understanding are the true and sole conditions for providing them with a relation to objects, thus with **significance** (*CPR*, 276; *A*, 145-46; *B*, 185).

At the center of the *Critique*, then, is this process of the imagination, the schematism, in which the content of sensible intuition and conceptual or

categorial principles are brought together, to make the experience and knowledge of the world of objects possible in a unity (referred to here as the unity of apperception) which Kant designates as the unity of the 'I think' of consciousness.[5] Thus the subject of philosophy in transcendental idealism (the 'I think' which recalls the Cartesian Cogito) is produced along with the experience of worldly, sensible objects, on the basis of a priori forms of sensible intuition, conceptual or categorial principles and the possibility of their synthesis in the schematism. This underlines the point that transcendental ideality is not subjectivity (and hence not subjective idealism) but rather that system of universal and necessary structures of the mind which make subjectivity, and with that objectivity, possible in the first instance.[6]

The philosophical, and indeed ontological, status of the schematism is of central importance for Nancy in *Logodaedalus* in his questioning of the foundations of the first *Critique*. Kant himself is famously vague about the exact nature and operation of the schematism:

> This schematism of our understanding with regard to appearances and their form is a hidden art in the depths of the human soul, whose true operations we can divine from nature and lay unveiled before our eyes only with difficulty (*CPR*, 273; *A*, 141; *B*, 180-81).

As has been already indicated Kant is explicit about the necessity for critical philosophy to 'offer a general but sufficient characterization' of the conditions under which the objects of sensible intuition may be brought into accordance with concepts. Yet here he suggests that the schematism is not at all straightforwardly 'offered' and this difficulty of presentation (which will form the crux of Nancy's reading of Kant) leads to a number of rhetorical moves on the part of the author of the first *Critique* in an attempt to remain within the realms of that which can be exposed in a clear and distinct manner. For instance, at a key moment after having elaborated on the role of the schematism and the importance of the schemata of concepts he immediately avoids pursuing his detailed elaboration any further:

> Rather than pausing now for a dry and boring analysis of what is required for transcendental schemata of pure concepts of the understanding in general, we would rather present them according to the order of the categories and in connection with these (*CPR*, 274; *A*, 142; *B*, 180).

Heidegger in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* questions whether it is simply the dryness or the tediousness of presenting the schemata of concepts which motivates Kant to turn suddenly to an adumbration of the categories (*KPM*, 72-73; *GA3*, 106). The introduction of the categories into the first *Critique* at this point is somewhat abrupt, and represents a return to familiar philosophical ground, insofar as the notion the categories represents (albeit modified in modified form) a return to an Aristotelian approach and

thus constitutes perhaps one of the least original moments of Kant's treatise. Kant's detailed adumbration of the categories compresses the rules of a certain method of (scientific) knowledge as they emerge within the history of Western philosophy up until the eighteenth century.[7] One might legitimately question, along with Heidegger, why Kant avoids elaborating further the transcendental schemata of pure concepts in favor of a return to familiar and well trodden territory, and whether this is solely an attempt to avoid 'dry and fastidious exposition'.

The answer Heidegger gives to this question sets the terms for Nancy's reading of Kant in *Logodaedalus*. In *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* Heidegger reads the foundational ambition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* in ontological rather than epistemological terms. The *Critique* is not, as neo-kantians of the late-nineteenth century such as Cohen or Rickert (one of Heidegger's teachers) would have it, a theory of knowledge, that is, a theory of how our concepts correspond to the given reality of the object world. Rather, in the way in which the 'Transcendental Aesthetic' and 'Logic' combine, it lays the grounds of possibility for subjective experience and phenomenal givenness per se, or as Heidegger puts it in his own terms:

> transcendental knowledge does not investigate the being itself, but rather the possibility of the preliminary understanding of Being, i.e., at one and the same time the constitution of the Being of the being … The *Critique of Pure Reason* has nothing to do with a 'theory of knowledge'. If one generally could allow the interpretation of the *Critique of Pure Reason* as a theory of knowledge, then that would be to say that it is not a theory of ontic knowledge (experience), but rather a theory of ontological knowledge (*KPM*, 10-11; *GA3*, 16-17).

In reading the first *Critique* in this way Heidegger necessarily confers a key ontological importance on the schematism and with that the 'pure productive power of the imagination' in which the schematism is grounded. The 'preliminary understanding of Being' is possible a priori, only in the ability of the schematism to unite sensible intuitions with the functions and concepts of the understanding, or, as Heidegger himself puts it: 'The Transcendental Schematism is consequently the ground for the inner possibility of ontological knowledge' and later: 'The problem of the Schematism of the pure concepts of the understanding is the question concerning the innermost essence of ontological knowledge' (*KPM*, 74, 76; *GA3*, 108, 111). In this context all conceptual representing per se, whether it be in first hand worldly experience which allows us to understand phenomena as such (in the unity of intuition and understanding) or in the very act of thinking, reasoning and philosophizing (e.g. that of Kant's treatise itself) is, or occurs, on the basis of schematism. Thus, in Heidegger's terms: 'The pure productive power of the imagination, free of experience, makes experience possible for the first time' (*KPM*, 91; *GA3*, 133). It becomes

clear, in the light of Heidegger's approach, the extent to which the whole edifice of Kant's critical philosophy may largely stand or fall on the successful exposition or presentation of the schematism. And yet, as has been shown, Kant himself elides his account of the schemata and of the 'schematism', that 'art hidden in the depths of the human soul', in favor of the more traditional and 'accessible' elaboration of the pure concepts of the understanding. And yet again, as has also been shown, these do not, in themselves, offer a foundation for experience and knowledge, since, in and of themselves, they are empty, logical forms and not pure concepts of understanding.[8] That which is given a foundational role in experience, the 'schemata' of concepts and the process of the schematism in the pure power of the imagination, is precisely that which appears to elude the 'exposition' of the first *Critique*. Heidegger ascribes this to an essential failure of thought on the part of Kant at the crucial moment. Just as he roots experience in a hidden art of the human soul inaccessible to clear presentation, he shrinks back from the implications of this by focusing on the more clearly presentable and reliable categories of transcendental logic:

> In the radicalism of his questions, Kant brought the 'possibility' of metaphysics to this abyss. He saw the unknown. He had to shrink back. It was not just that the transcendental power of the imagination frightened him, but rather that in between [the two editions of the Critique] pure reason as reason drew him increasingly under its spell (KPM, 115; GA3, 168).

It should be noted that this interpretation of Kant's motives would be hotly contested by more orthodox readers of Kant.[9] Yet the essential, point for Heidegger at least, is that the indisputably central and foundational role played by the schematism is rendered highly problematic by its mysterious, hidden and inaccessible nature, and thus, at the very center of the foundational ambition of transcendental idealism, an abyss opens up, which is never properly accounted for. Thus the moment of grounding within critical philosophy becomes a moment of un-grounding.

Nancy takes up this Heideggarian reading and develops it along more Nietzschean lines, by focusing on the problem of the style in Kant's first *Critique* and by posing the question of 'presentation' (or in German *Darstellung)*. He begins by drawing attention to Kant's own repeated, and rather defensive, comments on this issue in the Prefaces to the first and second editions. In the Preface to the first edition Kant comments on the clarity or accessibility of his treatise (defending against accusations of obscurity and inaccessibility which might be leveled against his work):

> Finally, as regards **clarity**, the reader has the right to demand first **discursive** (logical) **clarity**, **through concepts**, but then also **intuitive** (aesthetic) clarity, through **intuitions**, that is, through examples or other illustrations *in concreto* (*CPR*, 103; *A*, xvii-xviii).

The clarity of the work then will rest entirely on the clarity of its presentation of concepts and of concrete examples of intuition (and it should be borne in mind that this clarity will only be possible on the basis of the schematism that Kant himself will determine). This is qualified by the assertion that, at times, adding excess material in order to clarify specific points further may itself be an impediment to the clarity of the whole and the ability of the reader to grasp the overall structure and coherence of the *Critique* (*CPR*, 104; *A*, xix). Thus, at times, further elaboration or clarifying embellishments in relation to specifics may be sacrificed in favor of the accessibility of the whole (this might be an allusion to the curtailment of the account of the schemata of concepts that precedes the presentation of the categories in the 'Transcendental Analytic'). In the Preface to the second edition of the *Critique* Kant goes further invoking not just the clarity of concepts and intuitions but suggesting that the presentational style of his work must take as its example the clarity of demonstration achieved by scientific treatises, and he cites the idealist philosopher Wolff as his model in this respect:

> Wolff … gave us the first example … of the way in which the secure course of a science is to be taken, through the regular ascertainment of principles, the clear determination of concepts, the attempt at strictness in proofs, and the prevention of audacious leaps in inferences (*CPR*, 119-20, *B*, xxxvi).

The clarity and logical necessity of the scientific method is an ideal to which the style of the *Critique of Pure Reason* appears to aspire. Yet Kant once again goes on to qualify his assertion in a famous comment which is of key interest for Nancy and which was cited above as the epigraph to this discussion:

> Any philosophical treatise may find itself under pressure in particular passages (for it cannot be as fully armored as a mathematical treatise), while the whole structure of the system, considered as a unity, proceeds without the least danger (*CPR*, 123; *B*, xliv).

However much philosophical language might aspire to the rigor and exactitude of scientific methodology it will always fall short of that very specific rigor and exactitude proper to mathematics, but, Kant adds, this failing does not undermine the overall structure and integrity of his system as a whole. For Nancy, it is precisely the structural integrity of the system as a whole which is called into question in the problems of philosophical style or presentation that Kant himself poses in the two Prefaces to the *Critique*. Indeed Nancy detects in these assertions and qualifications a defensiveness which arises both from the necessity of transcendental idealism to pose such questions and an unresolved philosophical question within Kantian thought about the status of presentation itself.

In *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* Heidegger was not interested in posing the question of presentation per se, rather he sought to follow the path

of Kant's thinking: he traced Kant's attempt to lay the ground for metaphysics by demonstrating the possibility of synthesis of sensible intuition and intelligible forms in the schematism, but then tried to show how Kant recoils at a key moment when confronted with the groundlessness, the 'abyss', of the pure power of the imagination. Nancy develops Heidegger's account by addressing more specifically the way in which the obscurity of the schematism resists presentation and the way in which this impacts on the overall solidity of the first *Critique* as a foundational project. In so doing Nancy is responding to the clear necessity, within critical philosophy, not only to only to describe the a priori forms of sensible intuition and logical/conceptual function as well as their possibility of synthesis, but also to give an adequate presentation of these in order to fulfil properly its foundational ambition. This necessity arises because Kant's treatise, as the foundation for transcendental idealism, is both the description of that foundation and the very enactment of that foundation in and through its own discursive presentation of the a priori principles of reason. In Kant's own terms, it is not sufficient for these conditions simply to be described or alluded to, they must be presented or exposed in: 'the secure course of a science' and with: 'a general but sufficient characterization' ['in allgemein aber hinreichlichen Kennzeichen]'.

The assertions and qualifications in the comments from the two Prefaces cited above thus perform a crucial function insofar as they explicitly address the question of presentation, or as Nancy puts it: 'it was necessary that philosophy pose to itself the question of style or of philosophical genre, the question of the manner of presenting or exposing philosophy, or, absolutely, of philosophical exposition' (*L*, 26). His point is that this question needs to be explicitly addressed by Kant because, as Kant himself admits, philosophical argumentation can in fact never fully match the discursive rigor or exactitude of mathematics. Thus for Kant philosophical language has its strength insofar as it aspires to scientific or mathematical rigor, but falls short of such rigor insofar as it is language. According to Nancy this vulnerability of philosophical exposition has a threefold consequence:

> Exposition is vulnerable because it is philosophical. This implies three things: firstly, that exposition is not entirely independent, nor even heterogeneous in relation to "contents"; then, that philosophy presents a particular fragility insofar as it exposes itself [s'expose]; finally, and at the same time as the principle and consequence of these two findings [constats], that philosophy as such cannot avoid passing through this vulnerable exposition and exposing itself to its effects (*L*, 41).

Nancy, here, refuses to take for granted that the language of critical philosophy can abstract itself from its own contingent discursivity in order to attain, or even approach, the status of pure thought or mathematical abstraction. Crucially he refuses also to accept Kant's view that the

vulnerability proper to discursive exposition does not affect the structural unity of the system as a whole. In the formal-logical language of mathematics there is an exact equivalence or *adequation* between the presentation of the respective concept or intuition and the concept/intuition itself. A mathematical proof needs nothing other than its presentation as proof using mathematical signs for it to be grounded as such. In this sense mathematics is the only space of presentation proper, and its very exactitude or adequation, marks philosophical presentation as something different. Mathematics, Nancy writes:

> is thus the site of *presentation* - of Darstellung - in the proper and full sense of the term … the division of mathematics and philosophy opens the division of Darstellung itself, the *crisis* which separates Darstellung stricto sensu from another mode of "presentation", the philosophical mode, that for which Kant precisely chooses the name *Exposition* (*L*, 42).

It is precisely this gap which opens up between mathematical presentation and philosophical presentation or exposition which interests Nancy here. This gap signifies that, however much Kant may aspire to make philosophy, if not identical to mathematics, then akin to it, that is, to make of philosophy a movement and self-grounding of pure reason in and through the faculty of pure reason itself, its embeddedness in the sensible contingency of language may have more profound consequences than Kant is willing or able to allow. This is because for Nancy, exposition is not and cannot be presentation in the mathematical sense; it cannot unfold in the manner of a proof or equation, rather it must always necessarily be rooted in *discourse*. This, perhaps, is stating no more than the obvious, yet for Nancy it is vitally important to the extent that Kant's whole philosophical method depends, as has been shown, on philosophical language achieving a status superior to that of non-philosophical language, that is, on its ability to transcend the limitations of non-philosophical language. It is, here, according to Nancy, that the question of separation between philosophy and literature is posed within critical philosophy.

The potentially defensive tone of the comments about style and presentation in the two Prefaces has, Nancy contends, a certain necessity within the overall scope of critical philosophy. In order to be properly philosophical, to expose its concepts in a clear and distinct manner, and in order, above all, to approach the determination of the faculties of understanding and reason in the sure way of a science, critical philosophy must differentiate itself from the arbitrary and contingent embellishments or inventions of literature. Throughout his argument Nancy is careful to draw out the semantic resonance of the key German terms under discussion, namely *Darstellung* and *Dichtung*. The former which has been translated as 'presentation', means literally, 'placing-there', 'placing-in-front-of', 'showing' or 'exposition'. The emphasis of *Darstellung*, therefore, lies specifically on

the act of bringing into presence or into view the determinations and deductions of pure reason. The use of the term *Dichtung* in German is distinct from *Poesie* and implies more generally an invention or creation which would include all novels and literary forms as well as verse poetry. According to Nancy, Kant's critical philosophy finds itself in a curious double bind. It must, as philosophy, be the clear and distinct presentation (*Darstellung*) of forms, concepts, categories etc., and yet, by its own admission, it cannot achieve the (mathematical) exactitude or adequation of presentation proper, and so, as presentation, it also demands or is necessarily rooted in invention (*Dichtung*). This necessary relation of simultaneous distance and proximity which subsists between *Darstellung* and *Dichtung* leads to a structural ambivalence or equivocation in Kant's treatise which goes to the very foundation of the system as a whole.[10] In the first instance this ambivalence within critical philosophy demands resolution in the attempt to rigorously separate philosophy and literature:

> Defending philosophical language consists in defending a Dichtung which, in itself, has nothing to do with poetry - but which derives from Darstellung itself. Darstellung demands a Dichtung, because, as *exposition*, it has already been deprived of pure and direct Darstellung. It is therefore expsosition which demands, for its Darstellung or by way of its Darstellung, a Dichtung. The latter must be the palliative, the cloak of a naked and mutilated presentation (*L*, 94).

Philosophical prose, deprived of the purity of mathematical presentation, must present itself both as the work of pure a priori reason, abstracted from all sensible contingencies *and* as discursive exposition, that is, as contingent language or discourse which cannot ever attain the purity it necessarily desires. It is this very double bind that, according to Nancy, necessitates the distinction between philosophy, that is to say, sober prose or that which by means of: 'a general but sufficient characterization', is a *sufficient* (but not entirely pure) presentation of the work of reason, and 'literature', that is to say, all other creative use of language which remains more thoroughly embedded in its sensible contingency. Nancy describes this act of delimitation in the following terms:

> Prose guarantees the discourse of all literature - that is to say that it guarantees, by closing the eyes, ears and even the mouth of the thinker, the unblemished purity of reason. The institution of *pure* reason - or the critical gesture itself - , that is to say ontology as the legislative autonomy of reason, demanded the preservation of this purity, that is, the production of the *impure* mode of production, of Dichtung, in order to distance and banish its dangerous taint. It was necessary for it to name tainted Darstellung Dichtung … and to name *literature* all that it kept at a distance from its autology : the rest, all the rest (*L*, 90).

Taken in this light Kant's comments about style in the Prefaces to the

Critique can be interpreted, not just as defensive gestures, but more specifically as attempts to preserve a privileged space for philosophical presentation (the 'Darstellung souillé' which falls short of pure presentation as such), by instantiating itself as *Dichtung* or invention but only to the extent that this specific mode of invention is rigorously separated from literary or poetic invention, which then finds itself, held at a distance, marginalized or put into a position of secondary importance. Thus literature is produced by philosophy itself as philosophy's excess or remainder, that is, all that is left over once the language of philosophy has established the autonomy and self-grounding nature of reason in sober and rigorous prose.

The consequences of this are, according to Nancy, far reaching both for Kant's transcendental idealism and for philosophical discourse per se. This is because philosophical discourse here only succeeds in founding itself as such in and through a legislative gesture, which separates philosophical and literary invention, but does so by necessarily presupposing the very separation upon which it relies in order to perform the legislative gesture in the first instance. Thus it tries to attain a specificity for itself which it needs already to have taken for granted in order to attain that specificity. In this sense the initial double bind which dictated the necessity of separating philosophy from literature, namely that philosophy must be the pure presentation of reason (*Darstellung*) but at the same time the mediation of that presentation through discursive invention (*Dichtung*), this double bind is tightened even further in the attempt to produce literature as a category clearly demarcated from the work of philosophical presentation. In order to separate philosophy from literature in a clearly delimited and conceptually rigorous manner, philosophy must already be philosophy and this it cannot yet be. This, at least, is the train of Nancy's argument in *Logodaedalus*. The result of this is that philosophical presentation necessarily maintains an uncertain, or what Nancy calls 'undecidable' relation, with the very category of literary invention it seeks to distance itself from.

The term 'undecidable', or 'indécidable' in French, is precisely one of those terms about which Nancy speaks at the beginning of *Logodaedalus*, that is, a deconstructive term, which, when used freely and without due contextualisation in the 'fashion' of critical language, is deprived of its strategic ambivalence and transformed into a substantive and meaningful ground. As Nancy takes pains to point out: 'It is not enough to say that there is undecidability within a discourse. It is not enough to say it in order to have decided the fate, the structure or the power of that discourse' (*L*, 5). In order to highlight the specific rigour of this term Nancy draws attention to its origin within the context of mathematics. An undecidable proposition, he recalls, is a mathematical proposition which cannot be the object of a demonstration, that is, a proposition produced within and by a theorem, but

which that theorem cannot account for, or which is not deducible from within the bounds of its system. An undecidable proposition, then, is not just somethng which could loosely be 'this or that'; rather it can neither be proved nor refuted by the specific logic of the theorem or system which produces it, whilst at the same time not opposing that logic in any direct way (*L*, 11).[11] It is not sufficient, Nancy asserts, simply to say that a discourse produces undecidability, rather the production of such undecidability needs to be exactly and rigorously accounted for. This is, precisely, Nancy's aim working through the implications of the relation between *Darstellung* and *Dichtung* in Kant's *Critque*. The logic of critical philosophy necessarily requires a distinction between pure presentation (*Darstellung*) and philosophical presentation (*Darstellung* supplemented with the necessary blemish of *Dichtung* or invention), but this then requires a further distinction between philosophical and literary invention. Yet is the language which makes or legislates for such distinctions itself philosophical or literary invention? Prior to the making of the distinction it is both or neither and therefore not in a position *as* philosophy to make such a disinction. It is in this sense that the discourse of Kant's treatise maintains an undecidable relation between philosophy and literature since the very language which would distinguish between them is necessarily implicated in an uncertain play between one and the other. The undecidable status of Kant's discourse implies an ineluctable persistence of the literary within the philosophical insofar as the boundaries between the two are subject to this necessary undecidability, and thus gives rise to what Nancy calls: 'the multiple and insideous insistence of literature witihin philosophy' (*L*, 117).

In *Logodaedalus* Nancy argues that the Kantian system produces itself as fatally contaminated by, or implicated in, the very literary invention it would seek to exclude from its own constitution as system. This has further implications for the entire architectonic of the first *Critique*. Kant wants to give a clear and logically necessary presentation of the grounding principles of knowledge in the faculties of understanding and pure reason in what would effectively be the auto-foundation of reason itself. Yet the embeddedness of the language of the *Critique* in literary-philosophical invention means that presentational gaps or elisions, obscurities or inconsistencies, cannot be dismissed as contingent moments which do not affect the integrity of the system as whole. Such elisions and gaps will always be of decisive importance for that integrity. More serious still, this embeddedness of thinking in discourse also implies an essential and necessary *dislocation* of the whole, since thought finds itself dismembered into discursive parts which resist simultaneous and unified articulation. As literary-philosophical invention thought can never gather itself up into a simultaneous instance of the auto-foundation of reason: 'Philosophical

poetry, philosophy contaminated by poetry, against its will, means this : the system, insofar as it includes presentation - and it necessarily includes it - brings with it dislocation' (*L*, 118). The unity or synthesis of the various parts of the critique, a unity which the success of the Kantian account of phenomenality and knowledge requires, is called into question in the very moment of its presentation or exposition within the discursive edifice of the *Critique* itself. Nancy is alluding to the way in which Kant wants his reader both to be able to follow the logical necessity of his demonstrations as they unfold *and* to step back in order to: 'attain a survey of the whole' and to view 'the articulation or structure of the system, which yet matters most when it comes to judging its unity and soundness' (*CPR*, 104; *A*, xix). Rather than the various parts or divisions of the *Critique* being able to abstract themselves from the contingency of their exposition to be an instance of pure, unified thought, demonstrating its own conditions of possibility and grounding itself as such, these parts and divisions remain dislocated, embedded, dispersed within the language of their own discursive exposition:

> the system itself, to the extent that it is constructed or presents itself, carries with it amongst [au nombre de] its fundamental rules the disjunction of its places, dislocation. Kantian unity is always posed in plurality, and in this discourse always in principle forbids the simple resorption into pure self-presence (L, 118).

It could be argued that, ultimately, such a reading of the *Critique of Pure Reason* relies on a refusal of the distinction between the sensible and the intelligible. If such a distinction were maintained it would be possible to assert that, although a logical deduction presented in linguistic signs, needs to be carefully and rigorously presented with those signs, it is not dependent upon them for its ultimate logical truth or consistency (which would be non-linguistic in nature). By maintaining this distinction one could also argue that what is important about the first *Critique* is far more its overall logical conceptual structure than its specific discursive architecture, important though this will be. If the distinction between the sensible and the intelligible is suspended, however, such arguments become much more problematic.

It might be recalled at this point that Kant, in presenting the a priori forms of sensible intuition on the one hand, and the a priori forms of intelligibility or understanding on the other (logical functions, categories etc.) also required the operation of the schematism to unite or synthesize the two. The schematism, as Heidegger remarked, made possible all phenomenal or conceptual presentation per se. Indeed the operation of the schematism, grounded in the pure power of the imagination, was shown to be the bedrock upon which the whole edifice of critical philosophy was built. It appeared also, by Kant's own admission, to be inaccessible to presentation as such, to be that 'art hidden in the depths of the human soul'. Within the context of Nancy's argument, turning as it does around the whole issue of philosophical

presentation and the undecidable status of literary-philosophical invention, the inaccessibility of the schematism has the most far reaching consequences, or as Nancy himself puts it: 'it is not possible to present [prélever] the "schema" object, it carries away with it Kant's entire discourse' (*L*, 8). As the a priori condition of possibility par excellence, the schematism should be presentable or demonstrable a priori. Without the possibility of demonstrating it in the clarity of presentation (*Darstellung*), the possibility of grounding any synthesis between sensible intuition and conceptual form is suspended. At this point the entire edifice of transcendental idealism, its foundations, and with this its ability to properly delineate and delimit a priori conditions of possibility begin to shake, or in Nancy's terms to *syncopate*. Its critical, legislative powers of demonstration and presentation stand or fall on the basis of the schematism: 'what is at stake with [Kant's work], and with the schematism … is precisely the demonstration of the "face to face encounter" of theory with itself, and the exhausting, disequilibriating question of the standing of his discourse' (*L*, 8). Without its foundation in the schematism the ability of critical philosophy to be the work of pure reason, to make conceptual disintinctions, or demarcate conceptual limits, indeed its whole function *as* critique, is suspended also.

In the syncopation of Kant's discourse, philosophy, in the very moment of its self-grounding, encounters an absence of firm ground. In the very act of presentation or self-demonstration by which pure reason seeks to establish its identity, and with that the self-identity of its concepts and judgements, that identity is ruptured or syncopated. For Nancy the term syncopation describes a movement of presentation and withdrawal which governs any philosophical gesture seeking to present or posit in a direct and unmediated fashion the purity, self-identity, and self-groundedness of thought. As the purity of reason presents itself, it does so necessarily in the absence of pure presentation, in an undecidable relation of *Darstellung* and *Dichtung* (*Dardichtung* as Nancy calls it), and therefore vanishes in the very instant of its disclosure. What is presented therefore is not a pure instance of self-legislating reason, but rather a syncopated beat in which consciousness, the 'I think' of the transcendental unity of apperception, occurs only in the rupturing of self-identity, and the simultaneous presentation and withdrawal of a secure ground:

> In this way that which is called a consciousness without doubt only ever lets itself be apprehended as an identity when it disappears: this is syncopation. Syncopation decides self-identity: it marks it, irrefutably, in the gesture and in the instant which withdraws it from all demonstration, and above all from all auto-demonstration, from all auto-presentation or presentification (*L*, 13).

This play between grounding and groundlessness, between presentation and withdrawal, to a certain extent repeats Heidegger's reading of Kant. Heidegger argued that Kant established the transcendental unity of

apperception and the foundation of ontological knowledge in the pure power of the imagination and then recoiled at the very inaccessibility and abyssal obscurity of that faculty. But for Nancy the absence of foundation within philosophy is encountered not simply in the moment Kant hesitates or recoils from the implications of his own thinking, the exposure to the groundlessness of thought is constitutive of philosophical discourse per se, it exists or is held by this groundlessness in its very enunciation *as* discourse. In the structure of presentation and withdrawal which governs it: 'Philosophical discourse is articulated on a syncopation or by a syncopation. It is "held" by an undecidable moment of syncopation' (*L*, 17-18).

This then, according to Nancy, is the fate of metaphysics and of metaphysical foundations within philosophical discourse. His reading of Kant in *Logodaedalus* responds to the problem of the overcoming of metaphysics which dominates much French thought in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s. What emerges from this reading is the thought that the very language of metaphysics, as language or discourse, can never, in fact, establish for itself the foundation or ground which it desires. Nancy's reading bears witness to the inevitable recuperation of metaphysics into the contingency of discursive presentation, into an undecidable relation of philosophy to literature whereby: 'Pure reason opens vertiginously onto the exclusivity of its own ground: in this dichten and darstellen become indistinct' (*L*, 83). Syncopation, Nancy writes, is that which: 'metaphysical discourse cannot withstand, that which makes it sick to its core' (*L*, 16), but it is that which, at the same time, necessarily governs any attempt by metaphysical discourse to lay a foudation or ground.

The context for Nancy's reading of Kant is multiple, responding as it does to a certain tradition of anti-foundationalist approaches to the first *Critique* (most immediately Heidegger and Granel) and to more contemporary contexts (Derrida's deconstructive readings, Lacoue-Labarthe's problematization of the relation of philosophy to literature), as well as to the wider 'epochal' question of the overcoming or closure of metaphysics. The importance of Kant in *Logodaedalus* lies not just in the problematic foundational ambition of the first *Critique*, but also in its attempt to think that foundation on the basis of a synthesis which would be the transcendental unity of apperception. Whilst not being subjectivity, or subjective idealism, transcendental idealism lays the ground for the subject, for its autonomy and self-identity in the unity of the 'I think'. Nancy is not interested simply in exposing an absence of foundation within thought in some philosophical wrecking exercise. Rather he is attempting to think that foundation otherwise, and outside any logic of substance or subjectivity, and this is why he talks principally in terms of the syncopation of the Kantian system rather than using Heidegger's term 'abyss' (*Abgrund*). Ultimately what is at stake in

Nancy's reading of foundation in Kant is the status of philosophical discourse (its status as *Dardichtung*) but with this also the status of the subject of philosophy and of subjectivity per se. Nancy underlines this by relating syncopation and the 'I think' of the transcendental unity of apperception to the Cartesian Cogito:

> Syncopation is not the negative passage of one moment to another, it is not a gap which would serve as a footbridge. It has, very exactly, the instantaneous, punctual and discrete nature … of the *cogito*: and one understands besides this that if it *is* not the *cogito*, then nor is their any *cogito* without it (*L*, 13).

The syncopation of critical philosophy is not simply its negation or destruction, rather it is an interruption of the self-identity and substance of the thinking subject. The undecidable relation between philosophy and literature, here, has as its consequence the modification or transformation of metaphysical ground.

Yet in the motif of syncopation we are not lead to a stark alternative between grounding and groundlessness, foundational and anti-foundational thinking. Rather Nancy opens the way for us to think the philosophical determination of subjectivity, whether it be Kant's transcendental unity of apperception, or indeed Descartes' Cogito, as the simultaneous presentation and withdrawal of the thinking subject. In posing itself as foundation the subject here also withdraws from any possibility of foundation, it opens, in Nancy's words, 'onto the exclusivity of its own ground'. Ground here if it is ground at all, is not universal, transcendental or ideal, rather, in its simultaneous presentation and withdrawal, it is in each case (Kant, Descartes, or any posing of a subject) both singular and unique. Nancy is pointing a way towards a thinking of subjectivity, or as he later calls it Ego, which is always outside of itself, is always in excess of any symbolic, or discursive presentation, and rather than being a property of mind is contingent and perhaps bodily in nature. Syncopation in Nancy can be read as that moment which shakes the foundations of any metaphysical system, that moment which affirms the system as non-self-identical. But which also, in the instant of presentation and withdrawal, affirms that the system opens out beyond itself, in an exposure to its absence of ground, a contingent instance of material singularity. It is this thought which is developed in Nancy's later materialist ontology of the singular plurality of being. On the basis of his reading of Kant in the 1970s he opens the way for the development of his later thinking of being conceived as the infinite plurality of singular and material instances, which are irreducible to any logic of grounded subjectivity, or universal metaphysical foundation. Whilst being situated within a broader tradition of anti-foundationalist thought, which has most recently been associated with broad terms such as post-structuralism and philosophical post-modernism, Nancy's motif of syncopation takes

thought beyond the foundationalist/anti-foundationalist paradigm, and opens the way for a new kind of materialism, and re-engagement with the question of multiplicity and plurality within being.

Endnotes

[1] *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Paul Guyer and Alan W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 123; from the preface to the Second Edition (*B*, xliv). References will be to this addition preceded by the abbreviation *CPR*. The equivalent page references to the first and second editions of the original German are also given (preceded by A and B respectively: *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft.* 2 vols., 1781, 1789, (London: Routledge, 1994)).

[2] Howard Caygill, *A Kant Dictionary* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), p. 149.

[3] Martin Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, trans. R. Taft (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), further references will be to this edition prefaced with the abbreviation *KPM* and followed by the equivalent page reference in the *Gesamtausgabe* of Heidegger's works, *Kant und Das Problem der Metaphysik*, vol. 3 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1991), abbr. *GA3*; Gérard Granel, *L'Équivoque ontologique de la pensée kantienne* (Paris: Gallimard, 1970); Jacques Derrida, *Du Droit à la philosophie* (Paris: Galilée, 1990), *Force de loi* (Paris: Minuit, 1994); Geoffrey Bennington, *Frontières kantiennes* (Paris: Galilée, 2000). Bennington explicitly cites the influence, and underlines the importance of Nancy's reading of Kant in *Logodaedalus* (Paris: Flammarion, 1978) (hereafter *L*), *Frontières kantiennes*, p. 114, n. 1.

[4] Here the issue of translation is potentially decisive. The French translation of the first *Critique* renders 'a general but sufficient characterization' as 'à l'aide de signes généraux mais suffisants' and emphasizes much more closely the role of verbal signs than does the English rendering with its more general term 'characterization'; see *Critique de la Raison Pure*, trans. A. Tremesaygues and B. Pacaud (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1944), p. 150. The original German reads, transcendental philosophy: 'muß zugleich die Bedingungen, unter welchen Gegenstände in Übereinstimmung mit jenen Begriffen gegeben werden können, *in allgemeinen aber hinreichenden Kennzeichen darlegen*' [my emphasis]. The use of the term 'Kennzeichen' suggests specific verbal characters rather than the more general 'characterization'. Nancy's reading, which as will become clear, questions the fundamental role of the presentation *in language* of transcendental philosophy appears much more plausible on the basis of the (arguably more accurate) French translation than it might in reference to the English translation which underplays slightly Kant's emphasis on specific signs or characters ('Kennzeichen').

[5] For an illuminating and more detailed account of this process see J. M. Young, 'Functions of Thought and the Synthesis of Intuitions' in *The Cambridge Companion to Kant* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 101-22.

[6] See Philonenko, *L'Œuvre de Kant* (Paris: Vrin 1969), p. 90.

[7] Philonenko remarks that the categories give an overview of thinking about the scientific method to date, see Philonenko, *L'Œuvre de Kant*, pp.113-114; see also, H. Cohen *Kants Theorie der Erfahrung* (Berlin: 1922), pp. 351 ff., 'Logik der Reinen Erkenntnis'.

[8] As Eisler puts it, the schematism: 'constitutes … the only true condition of the signification of the concepts of understanding', Rudolphe Eisler, *Kant-Lexicon* (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), p. 937.

[9] Again see Philonenko who contest both the ontological status Heidegger ascribes to the pure power of the imagination and the reasons why Kant so rapidly elides his account of the schematism in favour of the categories, *L'Œuvre de Kant*, pp. 172, 176.

[10] To this extent Nancy's reading also owes a debt to Granel's earlier 1970 work *L'Équivoque ontologique de la pensée kantienne*, see in particular p. 160.

[11] Unsurprisingly Nancy cites Gödel's theorem in this context.

Kant´s Philosophical Theology in His Critique of Pure Reason

Christian Kanzian*

1. Introduction

Without any doubt the concept of God plays an important role in Kant´s practical philosophy. According to Kant´s Critique of Practical Reason, God is a postulate which cannot be demonstrated but which we have to accept in order to give sense to our moral action. But how is it possible to speak about God philosophically according to Kant´s theoretical reasoning? Is there a "Philosophical Theology" (as I would call the theoretical philosophical speech about God) in his *Critique of Pure Reason?*

Kant´s opinion on the problem of Philosophical Theology in his *Critique of Pure Reason* (CPR) may be interpreted in two ways. The first would be that Kant denies all possibility of philosophical speech about God – because of his limitation of philosophical knowledge to the scope of empirical experience. This is the interpretation of those schools of Neo-Kantianism, which have their roots in empiricism and sensualism. For them, Kant is the hero of Anti-Metaphysical Philosophy. The so called Vienna Circle, for instance Carnap and his followers, has important philosophical roots in this kind of Neo-Kantianism. A second way would be to interpret Kant´s CPR as an attempt to introduce a new theory of rationality for the theoretical speech about God: A special form of rationality, which is clearly distinguishable from the rationality of natural science, underlies our theoretical speech about God. According to the second way, CPR can be interpreted as an attempt to give Philosophical Theology a new and irreducible place within theoretical reasoning. From that point of view Kant is the beginner of a new critical scientific metaphysics. Philosophers taking this view are less well known than the friends of the first alternative, but they do have a strong influence in the development of Christian Philosophy. According to my opinion it could be of interest for all theistic philosophies.

The aim of my contribution is to argue for the second way: Kant´s CPR is an attempt to introduce a new theory of rationality for the theoretical speech about God. In favour of my position I am going to analyse three aspects in detail: 1) the different functions of natural science and of

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Philosophical Theology for a theory of experience, according to CPR. 2) The different formal structures of judgements in natural science and in Philosophical Theology, according to CPR. 3) The different ways of explanation in natural science and in Philosophical Theology, also according to CPR. The irreducibility to each other of the mentioned characteristics of natural science and of theoretical speech about God gives reason to accept natural science and Philosophical Theology as two different and irreducible theoretical disciplines.

2. "God" in CPR

Before I go into details, I try to introduce very briefly the main aspects of Kant´s concept of God and its theoretical function in CPR.

Kant´s "Copernican Revolution" in epistemology is that not the objects in themselves, but the recognizing subject is that which determines our knowledge. The subject constitutes the objects of knowledge. Of course, the subject cannot constitute objects in themselves, but only empirical objects. That is the reason of Kant´s thesis of the inaccessibility of the object or thing in itself and his limitation of knowledge to empirical knowledge which results in the consequence of his sharp boundary between the world of experience and the transcendent world. But, as Kant points out at the very beginning of his CPR: the consequences for the transempirical or transcendent world are not only negative. Taking the boundary strictly only means that we must distinguish clearly between our speech about empirical things and our speech about transempirical things. Speaking about God, for instance, only becomes senseless when we mix it up with our speech about the natural or empirical world. Kant says that Agnosticism and Atheisms are the result of neglecting the different kinds of rationality of the speech about the empirical and the transempirical world. "Knowledge" in a strict sense is reserved for empirical knowledge. But rationality is not reserved for this narrow sense of knowledge. Kant´s transcendental philosophy as a whole, which is an investigation in our subjective epistemological capacities, should be seen as a means to grasp these differences and to establish a new way of rational speech about God.

In a next step I am going to focus on the special concept of God in CPR, the so called Transcendental Ideal. The Transcendental Ideal is what Kant calls a "concretizised idea". Ideas are fundamental principles of reason which have the function of bringing the manifold of separated cognitions into a unified system. The Transcendental Ideal cannot be an empirical object and so, in consequence, it is no object of knowledge. Nevertheless, Kant stresses its important epistemological function. I want to mention only two aspects: 1) According to Kant, in order to have a full grasping of an object, it is necessary to know from every property, whether it belongs to the

object or not. We must be able to examine a thing under the respect of all properties. This presupposes the idea of a "whole of all properties", in Latin: the "omnitudo realitatis". But it is only the Transcendental Ideal which can cover such an idea because God and only God is such that all (positive possible) properties belong to him. So we need the concept of God to explain the possibility of the full understanding of an object. 2) In his Transcendental Dialectics at the end of CPR Kant often speaks about the high importance of "system" in the context of his theory. Without system there is no unity of knowledge. Without unity of knowledge there is no science in a qualified sense. Yet, and this seems to be decisive for our topic: Without the Transcendental Ideal, without "God", there is, in the end, no possibility of a unified system because "God" is the only possible last foundation of it. The Transcendental Ideal is, as Kant says, the last foundation of a systematic unity of the manifold of the whole world.

God is no object of knowledge, but he is the last basis for the systematic or scientific unity of all of our knowledge. So we see that "God" is a central concept of Kant´s theory of knowledge.

From here I can come to my next step: the three aforementioned aspects of irreducible relevance of Kant´s Philosophical Theology. The first is the proper function of the concept of God within his theory of experience.

3) Kant´s Theory of Experience in CPR

According to CPR, experience is structured empirical perception. The structures are grounded on subjective epistemological capacities, space and time, the pure forms of sensuality, and the categories, i.e. the concepts of pure understanding (German: "Verstand"). This concept of experience is exactly the concept of experience in natural science. This becomes clear when we see that the mentioned subjective or a priori structures are responsible for the necessity of judgements in natural science. Judgements in natural science are necessary because they are grounded in those subjective capacities which make our perception into real or objective valid experiences. This concept of experience is used by Kant in a strict univocal sense. That means there are no alternative concepts of experience in CPR. Thus, experience of God or religious experience is impossible for Kant because of conceptual reasons.

Nevertheless, and this is my point, it is possible to analyse this scientific concept of experience in a way which allows finding important differences between the scopes of natural science and Philosophical Theology. And, as we will see, this way allows maintaining the irreducible importance of both scopes for this analysis. The key to such an understanding is that those subjective epistemological capacities which are relevant for natural science and which play a role in Philosophical Theology have different and

irreducible functions in a complete theory of experience. The first function is "constitution" of experience. This is the function of those subjective capacities, which are necessary for the foundation of the necessity of judgements in natural science. As mentioned before they are the pure forms of sensuality, space and time, and the pure concepts of understanding, i.e. the categories, just to mention causality and causal interaction, which are the a priori preconditions of the necessity of judgements in natural science. It is well known, that it is the Newtonian physics which Kant had in mind when he elaborated his theory of the foundation of necessary scientific judgements. Newton´s physics is, according to Kant, necessarily guilty because its judgements can be understood as being based on a priori epistemological concepts. They same subjective capacities which are responsible for the foundation of physics have the function of constituting experience. So it is clear that the world of our experience must be a Newtonian world.

But constitution is just one aspect of a complete theory of experience in CPR. There is another. This is the aspect of systematical order of experience. And we need a systematical order of experience because otherwise we could not understand what Kant calls the "postulated unity" of all experience (cf. CPR B 675). Without the idea of the unity of experience there could not be a unity of judgements about single experiences; that means nothing other than that there could be no science based on experience. The only candidate for being the last basis for such a unity of experience is the Transcendental Ideal, "God". Only the concept of God can fulfil the function of systematising all experience because God is, according to Kant, the last ground of systematical unity of all manifolds.

First we can conclude that the aspect of the systematising of experience is indispensable for a complete theory of experience; second, we can conclude that the function of systematising is not reducible to the function of constituting experience; and third, the function of systematising can only be fulfilled by the central concept of Philosophical Theology, that is "God". So Philosophical Theology plays an irreducible role in the theory of experience in Kant´s CPR.

4) The formal structure of judgements in natural science and of the speech about God.

My next point is the distinction between the formal structure of judgements in natural science and the formal structure of our speech about God. Judgements in natural science are empirical judgements. Their logical form is grounded in those pure concepts of understanding which Kant calls the "categories". Categories are a priori concepts. That means they have their function in advance of and independent from sensual perception. The

function of categories is to bring the manifold of perception to the unity of a judgement. Thus, categories can be regarded as the logical prerequisites for empirical judgements. Of central importance for natural science is the category of causality (cf. CPR B 106). The formal structure of the most scientific judgements is based on the category of causality whose function is to unify different empirical data to the unity of a causal judgement. The judgement "The fall of the stone causes the deformation of the bottom" is based, according to Kant, on the capacity of our understanding to unify the perception of the fall of the stone and the perception of the deformation of the bottom in a causal manner. And the logical basis for such a unification is the pure concept of causality.

I cannot speak about the problem of justification of causal judgements, the problem of deduction. My aim is the comparison of the form of scientific judgements and the form of statements about God. How can we understand the speech about God under this aspect? Statements about God are no judgements when we understand judgements in a Kantian sense, that is as empirical judgements based on categories. (In modern western philosophy of religion some authors assert that statements about God do not have the form of "descriptive" judgements. Cf. Muck 1999, 28ff). Are we to draw the conclusion, that statements about God have no logical form at all? Are they senseless according to Kant? Some positivists and anti-metaphysicians are of that opinion. But I think that this conclusion is false. Statements about God have a very special logical form, according to Kant´s CPR (cf. B 386). Decisive for the understanding of this special logical form is that it is not based on the categories, which are pure concepts of understanding. The structure of statements about God is based on concepts of pure reason (German: "Vernunft". What does that mean? Understanding ("Verstand") is the capacity to judge. Pure Reason ("Vernunft") is the capacity to infer syllogisms and, in consequence, chains of episyllogisms (which are syllogisms taking the conclusion of other or higher syllogisms as one of their premises). No episyllogistical chain can proceed infinitely. Endless chains of conditions and consequences are impossible. So we have to postulate something unconditioned and absolute to stop the episyllogistical chains and to bring the single judgements within the chains to a unity. And here is the place of pure reason and its concepts. Pure reason is the capacity to infer from concrete and conditioned knowledge to an absolute, unconditioned and unifying horizon. But there are rules dictating how our reason infers from the concrete to the absolute. These are the pure concepts of reason: "Soul", "World" and "God". I cannot go into detail here. What I want to mention is that "God" or the Transcendental Ideal plays a crucial role in this context. The concept of God stands for the "absolute unity of conditions of all objects of our thinking" (CPR B 391). "God" is the major principle of our reason in

its project of bringing all knowledge into an absolute unity.

According to Kant, we cannot recognize God because he is not an object of empirical perception. Statements about God have not the logical form of judgements because the logical form of judgments are based on the categories of understanding. The logical form of statements about God is based in a concept of reason. When we speak about God we speak about the supreme principle of bringing all judgements into a last unity.

I cannot say more about the Kantian logics of the concepts of pure reason. What I want to point out is that judgements of natural science do have a proper logical form. Statements about God, however, are not logically formed in a similar manner. That does not mean that they have no logical form at all. Statements about God are not senseless, according to Kant. The logical form of sentences about God is based on the capacity of inferring from the conditioned to a last unconditioned unity. The irreducibility of the logical form of sentences about God is a further argument for the irreducibility of the proper rationality of our theoretical speech about God.

5) Explanation in natural science and in Philosophical Theology

The third aspect under which I want to examine the difference between natural science and Philosophical Theology is their specific way of coming to explanations. Kant gives an elaborated theory of the difference between scientific and theological explanations in his CPR.

In CPR we can distinguish between three aspects which characterise scientific explanations: 1) Essential for a scientific explanation is that it relates a single experience to a general natural law. Take for example an apple falling from the tree. I explain this event by applying to it a natural law, for instance Newton's law of gravitation between two masses. My explanation of the falling of the apple is that, according to the law of gravitation, two masses attract one another exactly as we can see it in the case in question. 2) The second characteristic of a scientific explanation is that, if it is correct (that means if the applying of a general law to a single experience succeeds), it is necessarily correct. The reason is that natural laws are necessarily true because of their foundation in a priori structures of our understanding. 3) Scientific explanations are prognostic. They allow prognoses about future events. If the given explanation of this falling of the apple is correct, the same will occur with other apples under the same circumstances: they will fall to earth when they are separated from their branches. The reason is the general applicability of the natural law which makes an explanation correct. With regard to all three aspects we can call explanations in natural science "functional" explanations. They fulfil specific functions in everyday life and in science.

Explanations referring to the concept of God cannot be functional in this sense. Must we infer from that that it is entirely impossible to explain with reference to "God"? I think that we need not draw this conclusion if we take into account the above mentioned epistemological aspects of "God". As we saw, "God" is the last basis of the unity and the systematic order of all knowledge. If this is true, it is also true that every science and every single theory in the scope of a science has its place within the whole of knowledge only because of the unifying function of "God". With reference to "God" we cannot explain single empirical facts. But we can explain why a scientific theory about the fact, for instance a physical one, has a different place within the whole of knowledge than a metaphysical theory about the same fact. Furthermore, "God" is the last foundation of an explanation of how, for instance, physical theories can be related to ethical theories (that seems to be the core aim of Kant´s practical writings), of how ethical explanations are related to aesthetic ones, and so on. Because "God" is the last foundation for the unity of all theories within a science and of all sciences within the whole of knowledge, the reference to "God" is indispensable for a theory of science. "God" is the last foundation of the integration of all single judgements, of all theories and of all sciences in all of knowledge. Therefore, we can call explanations which recur to "God", "integrative explanations".

I cannot go into detail here. My aim is to point out the differences between scientific or "functional" and theological or "integrative" explanations. Despite their differences to scientific explanations, integrative explanations are indispensable for a complete theory of explanations. They have a special, irreducible kind of rationality.

Together with the remarks on the topics "theory of experience" and "formal structure of judgements", we can take the characteristic feature of theological explanations (explanations referring to "God") as an argument that Philosophical Theology in CPR plays an important and irreducible role. Kant´s CPR can be understood as an approach to establish Philosophical Theology within theoretical philosophy.

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Kant's Enlightenment Project, its Inherent Difficulties and its Consequences in Modernity

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Section I:

It was Kant with whom the German Enlightenment Project began. Kant was the first to use the German word 'Aufklärung' meaning Enlightenment. It is, according to Kant, an autonomous force directing human life; it is an attainment of maturity through the use of reason. "It is man's release from his self-incurred tutelage. Tutelage is man's inability to make use of understanding without direction from outside authority."[1] Kant's idea of Enlightenment is meant for us to recognize the critical powers of human reasoning and its triumph over custom, tradition, religious dogma and despotism. Furthermore, to be enlightened one must truly be autonomous in the exercise of his will. With this, a man of Enlightenment takes charge of his destiny by making choices based on rational decisions without being forced by an outside authority. It is reason and freedom, the twin virtues, with which an enlightened person is endowed. The Enlightenment project claims the autonomy of human reason and human will. We humans are approaching, as Kant assumes, the maturity where, by rational thought, we would be able to guide our own destiny and be able to use our own minds to make rational decisions without any direction from an outside authority.

The Enlightenment thus is open to anyone who relies on his reason (that is being enlightened). It is reason, which is a natural faculty shared among human beings, that in effect defines them as human beings. Among the Enlightenment thinkers, though diverse in many ways, one motif that stands out prominently is their impulse for universalization through the use of human reason and rationality. The moral agents are defined in terms of universal characteristics and the test for ethical judgment lies in whether it can be universalized or not. The Enlightenment thinkers had envisioned a grand scheme for the universal principles and their modes of discourse applicable to all human beings regardless of their varied cultural, social, religious and ethnic differences. This impulse for universalization calls for,

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as Peter Gay states, "a social and political order that would be secular, reasonable, human, pacific, open and free."[2] It is not only ironic but also tragic that even after such a long time after the Enlightenment period, that we are no closer to conceiving of such an ideal. That makes one wonder why and where did something go wrong?

The ideal of universalization conceives the individual and the self in terms of a formal and general definition that precludes any historical, cultural, social, political, religious, ethnic and regional differences among different people and different groups. Kant considers that in the 'public matters' these differences do not count. Even in 'private matters' only the matters of taste are allowed so long as they are 'accidental' and not 'essential' toward their being universalized. It was, indeed, this basic factor, which contributed toward 'opening for arbitrariness'. "So long as 'human' and 'rational' are defined ahistorically and abstractly, it is at its best arbitrary in its applications and at worst, a pretext used to conceal other purposes."[3] The principles of universalization in their concreteness, become in the hands of the groups, communities and nations with power and control over others' desires, wishes and ideals, arbitrarily decided by those who come to be fully within the domain of that particular culture, race, nationality and ethnicity at the exclusion of the particularities and differences of others.[4] Indeed, it is this arbitrariness and looseness in application of the principle of universalization which gives free reign to interpret it quite arbitrarily by an authority in whom the power becomes vested by a group, community, people with the same goal, race, nation or any invisible hands such as political power, money and its control, popular ideology or intellectual fame. This means that any arbitrariness rooted in the Enlightenment project seems to be allowed. It suggests, to use the phrase in the strong sense, any group, community, people, race or ethnic group that you do not identify with is perceived as the 'other'. This was inherent and embodied in what the Enlightenment was projecting as envisioned by Kant.

Section II:

Kant's Enlightenment project is conceived too narrowly and too abstractly. It is conceived too narrowly in the sense that it is conceived from the perspectives of European philosophical, rational and cultural background which theoretically presupposes a shared history of European culture. It does not take into cognizance that there are other cultures and cultural perspectives. It is also conceived too abstractly, because it does not take into account that in the formation of judgment, it is not simply impersonal abstract faculty of judgment that is involved, but subject in its concreteness acts intellectually, emotionally and, more importantly, it is his social and

cultural make up that plays equally an important role. Kant's basic fallacy lies in thinking that "(t)he very abstractness of our representation of Self, expressed in tokenings of 'I' makes it capable of representing both the impersonal point of view and a particular point of view as a point of view that shares something in common with 'other' point of view, but also differs in some respect or other from those different points of view."[5] Kant expects that we as rational beings should be capable of placing ourselves in the position of other and come to form universal judgments that can provide shared universal values. Kant conceives of subject in universal ways, but fails to demonstrate how the conditions for the intersubjectively communicable concepts and formation of judgments can be created especially in varied cultures, racial and ethic groups that have different value systems.

Section III:

Thus the Enlightenment project, in spite of its great aspirations of rationality and human autonomy of will, has ended up creating the varied kinds of fragmentations. It has erected the terrible tyrannies of ideologies that include, regionalism, territorialism, differences of nationalities, creed, skin color, racism, and so on and so forth. It is the fragmentation of human society and communities across the board and in every spectrum. Societies, communities and humanity itself become fragmented. This fragmentation can be justified in terms of economic status, ethnic and regional differentiations or any other factors, which can support it, even if not justifying its case on the grounds of universal principles.

Seeing this in a wider context, this should have culminated in what was inherent as an inner necessity of the Enlightenment project, because it was conceived within a narrow historical framework and was the creation of the European mind which wrestled with its cultural, political, social circumstances in trying to deal with them. It was a European worldview and its models were erected based upon the European culture and was closely related to its own cultural backgrounds and traditions. And it bore the fruits of its endeavors in its own cultural environment. But, when it tried to envision it as a universal principle, it could not transcend those limitations with which it was bound and thus its dream of universal principles and universal mode of discourse remained abstract. This narrowly based European Enlightenment was taken as the norm for everyone and everywhere. It did not even think to take the consent of other cultures, societies and communities. Foucault comes to the conclusion in his analysis of the mechanism of order and exclusion that this is how the European society has operated since the sixteenth century. It was all in all 'Eurocentric' and continues to be so in the present world. Foucault finds

conflict between the 'same' and the 'other'. Every 'same' needs the 'other' against which it can define itself, just as every master needs a slave.[6] When one takes a look at the development of the philosophical thought from Kant culminating in Heideggerian ontology that makes a distinction between Being and beings, the alleged priority of the former to the latter is a manifestation, as Levinas contends, of the most vicious of all tyrannies of the 'same' over the 'other'.[7] "… Heideggerian ontology, which subordinates the relationship with the other to the relation with Being in general, remains under obedience to the anonymous, and leads inevitably to another power, to imperialist domination, to tyranny."[8] Or what he calls 'ontological imperialism' that reduces the 'other' to the 'same'.[9]

The West, seen in this light, in relation to the 'other' is perceived as a "relationship of power, domination, of varying degrees of complex hegemony."[10] This scenario can be perceived even today wherever and whenever the Western powers enter into any conflict with developing countries and especially the countries which the Western powers colonized in the past. As a rule of thumb, these countries perceive themselves as if they are an "inferior complement to the West, its opposite 'other' the bearer of negative qualities whereby West's own superiority is by contrast underscored and its rule legitimized."[11] As a result, the serious issues that have come into a sharp focus today are multiculturalism, ethnic identity, gender and the relationship of the West with developing countries, other cultures and colonized countries of the past.[12]

As a matter of fact, when one sees the origins of the Enlightenment and what Kant was envisioning it to be, a triumph of the human race and its confidence in the rationality of human being in light of Foucault's analysis as "the relationship between knowledge and power, one finds that it is the 'master narrative' of Western imperialism that constructs and controls its subjected other."[13] The Enlightenment could not see beyond its own conceived universal ideology and, as such, got carried away. It saw the eggs in its own nest and when it could not hatch them all, it started building other nests outside its own flying zones. But, the eggs could not be hatched in those new nests as they did in the native nest.

The Enlightenment project had envisioned a grand scheme for the universal principles and their modes of discourse applicable to all humans regardless of their varied cultural, religious, ethnic and other social differences. Howevermuch the quest for the realization of this ideal seemed to be admirable, it failed not only to achieve it but, on the contrary, it has left behind it a negative trace. According to Kant's theoretical and philosophical

approach, for the normative commitment the possibility of an impersonal point of view requires one's ability to recognize not only one's point of view, but also the possibility of other points of view to which those norms apply. But such a normality, contrary to Kant's aspirations, stopped at a certain level of a certain group or community.[14] This is due to the fact that the Enlightenment was indeed a Western project growing out of its philosophical, scientific, cultural, social and religious legacy. It was through and through a European worldview. The universal principle was understood in terms of a narrow historical base of the European worldview and was taken by the Enlightenment thinkers to be a norm for everyone and everywhere. It saw other cultures, peoples, ethnic and racial groups as the 'other' necessary to be reckoned with in order to realize the goal of the Enlightenment in terms of its universal principle. This led to the elevation of its own particular ideologies, creating the Eurocentricity and hegemony of Europe.

Section IV:

We are living in fragmented societies and communities. Our lives are fragmented. Our age is fragmented. The root of it lies in the Western European Enlightenment project. We now know the cause of the problem. We just have to find out how to deal with it. We know where lie its roots, we need now to find out the ways to extirpate them by creating an entirely different and new model by constructing a structure of knowledge and power that engages the 'other' in an ethical relation, that is to say, one sees himself, to borrow Levinas' phrase, in 'the face of the other'.[15] The Enlightenment thinkers got carried away with the universalization and ended up dealing with abstract interlocutors. Levinas' ethical relation brings back the concretization of the individual where interlocutors do not "renounce their unicity ... in desiring the universal," but in desiring one another. The Enlightenment project in its zeal for universal principles and discourse went abstractly in which multiplicity and particularism were reabsorbed and "discourse came to an end, for lack of interlocutors." It went on creating a model based upon knowledge, rationality and science from within its own cultural background, legacy and traditions which did not take into account the concreteness of the 'other', his culture, traditions and living environment which he was surrounded by. Thus it could not bring human dimensions into it. The 'other' ceased to be an interlocutor. From this one can see Kant's birth of reason is not something that can easily emerge in man's abstract mind, but rather and more importantly, it emerges when one comes to converse and discourse with the 'other' and, with which, the essence of discourse becomes ethical. One sees the face of the 'other', makes it a mirror

to see his own face and finds himself in the 'other'. It is not the 'other', rather the 'other' is him. It is the 'other' standing with me and not a stranger standing against. "The ethical presence is both 'other' and imposes itself without violence." The "very fact of being in a discourse consists in recognizing the 'other' a right over one's egoism... the 'other' as my speech and interlocutor..."[16] The conversational relationship is the birth of reason, when one considers and acknowledges what the 'other' says, not as the 'other' but as the one in whom the 'other' has become him and is no longer the 'other'. What is being said does carry the significance. It has meaning and is to be read in the 'face of the other'. His saying does not melt into air becoming evanescent. It has meaning and context. It has a unique sense and tries to give it a certain direction orienting it towards its goal. This amounts to saying that the 'other' is acknowledged and what he says is taken seriously. His voice is heard and what he has to say carries significance in 'the face of the other'. They both face each other, communicate with each other and take into consideration what has been said in the context in which it concretely conveys what it intends and means. When this takes place, the birth of reason is on its way to finding its home. Derrida reinforces Levinas' approach by introducing in his essay on Politics of Friendship[17] the concept of the 'generated other' that generates an ethical force and makes subjects confront each other in an asymmetrical relation.[18] It is oriented and directed. But it is still far from its destiny. There is a long way to travel through the process of its being accepted when it is being said. There is a procedure to follow which can explain how what one says or speaks is acceptable by following this principle in a procedural way as suggested by Habermas.

According to Habermas, we understand a speech act when we know what makes it acceptable. The language implies a communicative action that leads to mutual understanding and communicative reason. This mutual understanding and communicative reason implies a principle of universalization, which involves the satisfaction of everyone interested and thus takes into consideration the concern of 'other'.[19] No groups or communities are excluded as 'other' from the process of participation into this communicative reason. This should bring together the polarities of Kant's abstract principle of universalization and the concretization demanded by Levinas' birth of reason in discourse. This concept of Habermas' communicative reason is grounded in the principle of universalization and, at the same time, entails structurally the procedure. This communicative reason as a principle of universalization is what the Enlightenment project envisions and it entails, at the same time, the procedure to follow concretely in which everyone takes 'care' of the concern of 'other' and accommodates it.

To conclude, this principal and procedural approach should enable us to get rid of the ideas of absolutism and hegemony and acknowledge pluralism and autonomy, thereby, accepting others as they are and not as the 'other'.

Endnotes

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[3] Berel Lang, "Genocide and Kant's Enlightenment," in ***Act and Idea in the Nazi Genocide*** (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), p. 189.

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[8] Emmanuel Levinas**,** *Totality and Infinity*, translated by A. Lingis (Pittsburg: Duquesne University Press, 1969), p. 46-47.

[9] Ibid., p. 43.

[10] Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Pantheon, 1978), p. 5.

[11] J. J. Clark*, Oriental Enlightenment*, (London and New York: Routledge, 1977), p. 8.

[12] Ibid., p. 11.

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[19] Jűrgen Habermas. "Discourse Ethics," in *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*, translated by Lehnhardt, Nicholson and McCarthy (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1990), pp. 86-93. See also the excellent Introduction by Thomas McCarthy, pp. viii-ix.

‘How Are Synthetic Judgments a Priori Possible?’

A new account for Kant’s justification with respect to section ‘The Analytic of Concepts’

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Abstract

In this article I argue that Kant’s question of how synthetic judgments a priori are possible can be reconsidered against the background of the metaphysical tradition. The Critique of pure reason (1781) is the attempt to make metaphysics a science; the synthetic judgment a priori is of central importance here since Kant claims that this type of judgment shares necessity and universal validity and therefore provides the possibility of a scientific metaphysics. This aspect has led interpreters to ask if there is something like a synthetic judgment a priori. Agents of Logical Empiricism like Carnap, other philosophers like Quine have doubted the possibility of these judgments (for different reasons). I shall argue that Kant’s central question might be discussed on this fundamental level, but that we shouldn’t forget trying to investigate the Kantian justification of these judgments itself. Therefore I assert that the relation between the ‘Analytic of Concepts’ and the ‘Analytic of Principles’ must be considered; whereas there is the implication of a ‘critical ontology’ in the ‘Analytic of Concepts’, this ‘ontology’ implies a normative ontological aspect which is then realized in the ‘Analytic of Principles’. It is at least suggested that Kant’s way of argumentation could be seen as a secular variant of the traditional attempt to parallel the divine process of creation of nature and the human understanding of this nature.

Key words *Critique of pure reason; theoretical philosophy; epistemology; synthetic judgment a priori; justification;*

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ontology; 'Analytic of Concepts'; 'Analytic of Principles'.

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A twenty minutes lecture on the question the title presents is long enough to present a thesis but surely too short to justify this thesis sufficiently. To deal with this question obviously means to challenge not only the Kantian philosophy but a long, intensive and ongoing debate about this question.

In what follows there will be a division in three parts: First, I would like to make a short remark on the relation between the central question and Kant's metaphysics in general. In this first part I would also like to make clear in which way my approach differs from a tendency of interpretation in the twentieth century. The second part explores a passage of the *Critique of pure reason* which allows discussing Kant's answer to our question. This part hopefully will serve as a basis for my following discussion; its aim is to make explicit the premises my thesis is depending on. The third part will be the place where I do present my thesis. Provided that you have accepted part I and II, I am confident that part III is provoking enough to have serious consequences for further acceptance of my approach. This confidence, of course, can be considered responsible for the fact that I have placed my thesis at the end of my presentation.

1. The question in question and the method of interpretation

The *Critique of pure reason*[1] is an attempt to make metaphysics a science by adaptation of a principle that Kant finds in mathematics and *empirical* physics (*not* pure physics). These disciplines, Kant argues, have been successful in finding a scientific method since they had understood that you only understand what you yourself have set into the object of recognition (B XI ff.). Kant is vigorously trying to present this insight as the decisive step towards a "secure path of a science" (B VII). I will call this principle the *principle of understanding*. Of course, the meaning of this principle in mathematics and empirical physics is different. So it does not surprise that the principle transferred to *metaphysics* has its own meaning, too. I will come back to this point later. Here I want to emphasize that Kant's reference to the revolutionary principle in mathematics and empirical physics is not the only hint, that Kant is willing to model metaphysics after successful sciences. There is another adaptation, which is extensively discussed in the introduction.

This second point implies the central question of the *Critique of pure reason* – the question in question: How are synthetic judgments a priori possible? Kant is deeply convinced that judgments of mathematics and *pure* physics are synthetic a priori (B 14ff.). For him such synthetic judgments satisfy the criteria of science: they extend our knowledge, and they are universally valid. It would be wrong to believe that Kant is discussing this

type of judgment in mathematics and pure physics believing that there could be a third science with synthetic judgments a priori of its own. In the introduction Kant leaves no doubt that the question, how synthetic judgements a priori are possible, includes two other questions: How is pure *mathematics* possible? And: How is *pure science of nature* possible? (B 20) The importance of these two questions is mirrored by the fact that two major parts of the book respond to these questions: Whereas the Transcendental Aesthetic answers the first question, the Transcendental Analytic answers the second. Taking into account that Kant attempts to make metaphysics a science, it seems obvious that he is doing so by justifying not only mathematics and pure physics but by justifying *their* synthetic judgments a priori.

Today, many people have lost faith in this Kantian project. It is not because they do doubt the possibility of a scientific philosophy of science; rather they doubt the possibility of synthetic judgment a priori themselves. We observe the most fundamental criticism possible: What is being criticised is not the validity of Kant's justification of these judgments but the legality of the question in question itself. First, in the early twentieth century, agents of Logical Empiricism like Rudolf Carnap tried to show that meaningful propositions are either analytic-apriori or synthetic-aposteriori.[2] Since synthetic judgments a priori were supposed to be impossible as a type of proposition in general, philosophy was restricted to being a pure formal science. By 1950 it followed a sharp criticism of this position: Synthetic judgments a priori were thought to be impossible because the distinction of synthetic and analytic was declared meaningless. Goodman and White, but most important Quine hold that there was in principle no difference between synthetic and analytic propositions.[3] Although Quine did mainly attack Carnap's position, his criticism surely had an impact on the general discussion of Kant's *Critique of pure reason* as far as the Kantian exposition of the central question is concerned. So if many people have lost faith in the Kantian project today, this loss is surely a consequence of this development in the 20th century.[4]

Fortunately this does not force us to give up the idea that Kant's justification can be discussed beyond the standards of present approaches in logic or semantics. These approaches might help to understand that Kant's program is untenable for this or that reason; they might show that Kant is important as an impulse for modern philosophizing in many ways, but fails in his attempt to establish a scientific philosophy via synthetic judgements a priori. Now it is this success which requires attention not only for those who are interested in contemporary discussions. Attention is also required for others who intend to reassure that in between all our philosophical

achievements and post-Kantian paradigms we lost contact to the original process of justification of the question in question. I do share the opinion that we have to transcend the theoretical frame of the first *Critique* in order to evaluate Kant's program of justification. To use current arguments or theories is surely one possible method of interpretation.

Of course, you will have another method in the interpretation of philosophical theories when you apply other standards of argumentation than those of your time. If these standards were known, accepted and applied before the work in question was written, and you apply *these* standards in order to see, whether the philosophy you are dealing with starts to show new characteristics, why then not call this other method the *genealogical method*? I will do so for only practical reasons in order to outline an approach which tries to show a new perspective on Kant's justification by reference to *classical theorems*. This method might be considered old-fashioned, conservative or purely historical, but as long as it serves to suggest that Kant's justification hasn't been understood fully yet, I have no doubts that even an old-fashioned, conservative or purely historical method will be accepted. Before I come to use this method, let me first give a hopefully uncontroversial and immanent discussion of Kant's answer to the question in question.

2. Kant's answer to the question in question

I already mentioned that the Transcendental Aesthetic justifies mathematical judgement, whereas the Transcendental Analytic justifies judgements in pure physics. My thesis, which will be presented in the next part, only refers to the justification of judgements in pure physics. Therefore section II of chapter II of the 'Analytic of Principles' must be considered which is named 'The Highest Principle of all Synthetic Judgments'. Kant here explains the possibility of these judgements. Surprisingly this explanation is short – surprisingly short, because the reader has reached a point where the possibility of Kant's enterprise in general has to be proven. It has to be explained why a proposition like 'All intuitions are extensive magnitudes', mentioned later in the *Critique*, is not only possible but possible as a synthetic judgment a priori. At the end of this section Kant himself summarizes his explanation in a famous passage. Quote: "Synthetic a priori judgments are thus possible when we relate the formal conditions of a priori intuition, the synthesis of imagination and the necessary unity of this synthesis in a transcendental apperception, to a possible empirical knowledge in general. We then assert that the conditions of the *possibility of experience* in general are likewise conditions of the *possibility of the objects of experience*, and that for this reason they have objective validity in a synthetic a priori judgment." (B 197)

Now, this passage belongs to this kind of explanation that leaves you undecided: It sounds reasonable to the reader of the first *Critique*, it might even sound sound, but at the same time you cannot really tell why. Indeed, this passage requires explication since it is full of premises and reference to other parts of the book. Let me start with the last important term mentioned: *objective validity*. This term is central for a more detailed understanding of our question in question.

It is important to remember that the term 'objective validity' is not only relevant with respect to the conditions; it is of central importance for the problem of synthetic judgments a priori itself. The question 'How are synthetic judgements a priori possible?' can be reformulated into the question 'How is it possible that synthetic judgments a priori have objective validity?' So the justification of synthetic judgments a priori is the justification of the *objective validity* of these judgements. As a consequence there has to be a connection between the objective validity of conditions of experience and the objective validity of judgments.

This twofold perspective on the term 'objective validity' is appropriate and misleading at the same time. It is appropriate since the passage cited makes clear that Kant is explaining objective validity of certain conditions of experience. It is misleading since one might think that this explanation is independent from the objective validity of judgments. This is not the case; to the contrary: Kant is convinced that he is able to justify the objective validity of these judgements by justifying the objective validity of certain conditions of experience. And this means: he intends to justify synthetic judgments a priori by reference to the objective validity of certain conditions of experience. Now, to justify judgments implies the justification of their *predicates* as objectively valid. So Kant obviously takes conditions of experience as predicates in describing basic natural laws. Let me shortly go into this.

In the passage which has been quoted Kant speaks of formal conditions with respect to three faculties: intuition, imagination and transcendental apperception. We have to be aware of the fact that these conditions are the same as those which will be addressed in the second part of the passage as conditions of experience. These conditions – time, space and twelve categories – were found in the Transcendental Aesthetic and in the first book of the Transcendental Analytic, the 'Analytic of Concepts'. They were proven by a transcendental deduction in a sense that their *objective validity* in *perception* and *recognition* of sensually given objects was justified.[5]

What does this mean especially for the objective validity of the categories? The general aim of the transcendental deduction of the categories is to settle the problem of the relation between pure forms of understanding

and appearances.[6] Although Kant makes clear especially in Deduction (A) that there is a difference between perception and recognition of sensually given objects, he none the less intends to prove that pure forms of understanding named categories are necessary conditions for both perception and recognition. The objective validity of categories has different meanings in these two forms of experience: With respect to perception their objective validity is the condition of *nature* itself since it is the pure understanding which establishes the lawful connection between appearances. To prove objective validity of categories with respect to perception then implies to prove that nature is possible by pure understanding. One might call this prove a part of *critical ontologiy*. This *ontological* aspect in the realm of transcendental theory of perception will be important for my thesis; therefore I pass over the objective validity of categories in the case of recognition here.

Being aware that there is an ontological aspect in objective validity of conditions of experience, it is easy to conclude, that this objective validity has nothing to do with the objective validity that Kant refers to in our passage. He is not discussing conditions of experience in order to prove their objective validity; he argues that they *are* objectively valid in order to prove the objective validity of synthetic judgments a priori. It follows that objective validity of these conditions cannot be proven only with respect to perception and recognition; they ought to have the potentiality as objectively valid *predicates* in judgements, too. I have mentioned this already; but against the background of my short excursion into Deduction (A) and the observation of a critical ontology I am now able to add the following: If it's true that Kant justifies the objective validity of synthetic judgments a priori with the objective validity of conditions of experience and perception in particular, then the question has to be raised whether the term 'objective validity of judgments' implies a relation between critical ontology and the attempt to justify these judgments. Before I come back to this question in the next part, I would like to discuss a procedure that describes how synthetic judgments a priori are possible from a *methodological* point of view.

I quote again the first sentence of our passage: "Synthetic a priori judgments are thus possible when we relate the formal conditions of a priori intuition, the synthesis of imagination and the necessary unity of this synthesis in a transcendental apperception, to possible empirical knowledge in general." This means: Objective validity of these judgments is possible when we relate transcendental conditions of experience to a possible empirical knowledge. Unfortunately this last translated term – *possible empirical knowledge in general* – could be misleading since the original term (*ein mögliches Erfahrungserkenntnis überhaupt*) refers to possible objects of experience, i.e. to *appearances in general*. So Kant obviously

suggests that one has to relate conditions of experience to appearances in general in order to find to synthetic judgments a priori.

Understood in this way we are required to leave this passage since Kant's instruction to relate objectively valid conditions with appearances in general must be recognized as a refinement of a general instruction given in the introduction to the 'Analytic of Principles'. The 'Analytic of Principles' will instruct, Kant anticipates, "how to apply to appearances the concepts of understanding" (B 171). While Kant later speaks of *relating conditions to possible objects of experience*, he here speaks of *applying the categories to appearances* – which could be seen as identical processes. So if it's true that Kant refines the introductory and general description of argumentation, then it is also true, that the application of categories to appearances will lead to objectively valid synthetic judgments a priori. (Indeed, Kant will do exactly this in the 'Systematic Representation of all the Synthetic Principles of Pure Understanding' with reference to the table of categories.) But if this is true then one might think that the procedure of relating categories to appearances in general *copies* the more fundamental relation between categories and appearances which has been proven in the transcendental deduction. And this could mean that the justification of synthetic judgments a priori is depending on critical ontology. Indeed this will be my thesis. But let me finally give a preliminary answer to the question in question:

Synthetic judgments a priori are possible when conditions of sensual experience are related to possible objects of nature in general; these judgments have objective validity because their predicates are semantically transformed, objectively valid *forms of nature* itself. An epistemological imperative could be this: Relate original constitutive laws of single objects *a second time* to possible appearances in general, and you will be able to determine general laws of nature.

I consider this to be only a provisional answer. It's provisional at least for two reasons: First it's impossible to take into account those elements here, which are usually known to be necessary in every comment on Kant's central question. The second reason directly leads to my thesis. I do believe that my answer is provisional because it does not mention an element which I consider being necessary but which does not seem to be widely recognized.

3. Thesis

We have seen that there is a twofold function of categories. On the one hand Kant justifies these categories as basic forms of natural objects. This justification takes place in the 'Analytic of Concepts'. In the 'Analytic of Principles' on the other hand he demonstrates how they can be applied to appearances in general in order to describe basic laws of natural objects. In both cases we can address some form of recognition (I take 'recognition'

here in the broadest sense, so that even perception is meant by it): Whereas Kant justifies the categories in the transcendental deduction in order to determine the conditions of perception and empirical recognition of individual objects, he then uses these conditions of empirical experience (to which perception belongs) in order to allow a priori recognition of basic laws of natural objects in general. So from this perspective we not only have an interesting relation between the 'Analytic of Concepts' and the 'Analytic of Principles' with respect to a twofold function of categories – beyond that we have an interesting relation between two forms of recognition. Kant explicates the conditions of the first in order to ground the possibility of the second.

If we leave this *epistemological* perspective behind we have also the opportunity to discuss the relation between the 'Analytic of Concepts' and the 'Analytic of Principles' from an *ontological* point of view. It is Deduction (A) where Kant develops a critical concept of *nature*. For Kant, nature depends on the conditions of the human mind, i.e. the conditions of understanding. He calls the (faculty of) understanding the "lawgiver of nature" (*Gesetzgebung vor die Natur*) (A 126), admitting that it might sound "exaggerated and absurd" to say that the understanding "is itself the source of the laws of nature" (A 127). Of course, on the basis of this critical concept of nature it is possible to determine the (pure) understanding as the *originator* or *creator* of nature.[7] The ontological consequences for the 'Analytic of Principles' are evident. Any possible object of pure physics (or metaphysics of nature) is given within a nature which is established by the faculty of pure understanding itself. As I said from an *epistemological* point of view that Kant explicates the conditions of sensual perception and recognition of individual objects in order to ground the possibility of recognition in pure physics, it is now possible to argue from a more ontological standpoint, that he thereby grounds the possibility of pure physics declaring that we ourselves evolve what we recognize in pure physics.

So it seems that there is an ontological implication in Kant's justification of synthetic judgments a priori; it seems that Kant needs ontology, i.e. a transcendental theory of nature itself, in order to justify a priori recognition of this nature. This normative aspect is hidden in the following sentence of Deduction (A): "Thus the order and regularity in the appearances, which we entitle *nature*, we ourselves introduce. We could never find them in appearances, had not we ourselves, or the nature of our mind, originally set them there." (A 125) Remarkably this passage reminds you that Kant tries to adopt the revolutionary insight made in mathematics and (empirical) physics that you only understand from objects what you yourself set into them. The passage quoted can be considered as an expression of this adaptation. But

there is a second aspect in this passage, too, which is more an implication: To put order and regularity into nature for Kant means to establish nature. Therefore I am inclined to assert that Kant transforms the revolutionary principle by developing a critical ontology and putting this into a fundamental relation to the justification of metaphysical judgments.

This relation is fundamental in the sense that Kant seems to need an *ontological system of reference* in order to ground metaphysical (universally valid) recognition of nature *on* this system. Or, in other words, there seems to be a dependency between a theory which explains the conditions of nature itself and a theory which explains the possibility of metaphysical recognition of nature. Or even shorter: There seems to be a dependency between ontology and epistemology. Now, it is *this* dependency which makes me feel confident that Kant is much closer to the tradition than many people might think.

What is common to philosophers like Descartes, Leibniz and Newton is their general reference to God's creation of the world, or better: to the *mathematical* form of this creation, when they tried to give an account of the *mathematical* foundation of natural philosophy. The doctrine is like this: 'If God is a mathematician when he creates nature, then we as human beings in our effort to *understand* nature must incorporate mathematics in natural philosophy.' (So far a possible doctrine.) Therefore mathematically founded natural philosophy in modernity surprisingly has a certain *theological foundation*. This theological foundation is not only compatible with the mathematical method but obviously a point of reference for justification of this method.[8] I do not claim that the belief in God and his special mode of creating world was directly normative for the philosophers mentioned; this would be a historical question which should be left open here. But no doubt it is possible to take these philosophers serious in their remarks and to observe something like an *ontological normativity* in the foundation of natural philosophy: The normative aspect requires *repeating* a central feature of the original process of creation – the mathematical mode. So *repetition* of ontologically relevant features seems to be a feature of natural philosophy itself.

This kind of foundation of mathematical natural philosophy is part of a broader tradition since the late middle ages, in which it was common to compare the original process of creation with the human process of recognition. In this tradition an axiom was highlighted which is well known to the reader of the *Critique of pure reason* – the *principle of understanding*.[9] Although Kant refers to mathematics and modern empirical physics – for good reasons in his attempt to found a scientific metaphysics -, this principle is also known in the classical metaphysical tradition. So we observe that before Kant it was common to relate recognition of nature to the

fundamental conditions of nature itself (the process of creation), and that this relation between ontology and epistemology appears together with the principle of understanding.

The same is true for Kant; at least there is a structural parallelism in him. Of course, there is nothing like a *theological* foundation of metaphysical propositions, but like the tradition Kant is apparently following the tradition in relating human recognition to ontological conditions.[10] Even more: he seems to look for normativity in ontology in order to make possible foundation of pure physics. Now normativity in *this* case has much to do with repetition, too, but what is repeated here is no mathematical mode *but the relation between categories and appearances*.

The thesis I now would like present to you, can almost be guessed. I do assert that Kant's mode of justification of synthetic judgments a priori can be considered as a modern variant of the traditional conviction that human recognition has to be justified with reference to ontological conditions of nature which have been usually associated with the divine creation of the world. And as a consequence I do claim that it is possible to reconsider the relation between the two Analytics of Concepts and Principles (i.e. the relation between critical ontology and synthetic judgments a priori); they seem open to reinterpretation as a secular realization of ontological normativity within the justification of natural metaphysics. I do *not* claim that Kant himself was considering the *Critique of pure reason* as such a modern variant of the traditional conviction nor do I suggest that he was consciously intending the realization of this ontological normativity (although it is, of course, possible).

What I want to suggest is the following: In favour of our effort to understand the Kantian question how synthetic judgments a priori are possible, it might be helpful to use the traditional conception I have referred to in order to detect basic methodological aspects of the Kantian argumentation. To accept the possibility that there is a structural identity between earlier positions and Kant could lead one to accept that there could be a basis for the question in question beyond our present approaches. Therefore my thesis implies methodological ambitions: it might be an old-fashioned, conservative or purely historical approach to the *Critique of pure reason*; but it could be the starting point for a systematic reinterpretation of the central question of this book as well. Thank you very much.

Endnotes

[1] Immanuel Kant, *Critique of pure reason*, translated by Norman Kemp Smith, New York 1965.

[2] Rudolf Carnap, *Meaning and necessity*, *A study in semantics and modal logic*, Chicago 1956.

[3] Nelson Goodman, On Likeness of Meaning, in: *Semantics and the Philosophy of Language*, ed. Leonard Linsky, Urbana 1952, 67-74. – Morton G. White, The Analytic and the Synthetic: an Untenable Dualism, in: Linsky 1952, 272-286. – W.V. Quine, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, in: *The Philosophical Review* 60 (1951), 20-43.

[4] It is all the more it is remarkable that the most recent German commentary on the first *Critique* presented by Otfried Höffe (*Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, *Die Grundlegung der modernen Philosophie*, München 2003) justifies the return to Kant's synthetic judgments a priori with the hint that there is no consensus about the formal impossibility of synthetic judgments a priori (p. 65). He therefore discusses the relevant arguments although he avoids answering the central question how Kant justifies the possibility of synthetic judgments a priori in the section 'The Highest Principle of all Synthetic Judgments'.

[5] There is a transcendental deduction of time and space in the Aesthetic although there is neither a section titled 'Transcendental Deduction' (of time and space) nor a passage in which Kant directly speaks of the transcendental deduction of time and space. None the less he tries to prove the *objective validity* of both with respect to appearances; later in the *Critique* he will refer back to this attempt when he addresses the difference between an empirical and a transcendental deduction emphasizing that only a transcendental deduction is possible with respect to time and space (B 119). Indeed, such a transcendental deduction is a central issue of the Aesthetic.

[6] The origin of this problem can be found in a famous letter to Marcus Herz from February, 21st 1772. Kant here discusses the possibility of a relation between representations, i.e. pure concepts of understanding, and objects in order to present different possible approaches. It is important to notice that Kant at this time hasn't developed his *critical* concept of appearance, i.e. if he speaks of an object (*Gegenstand*) he refers to objects of the physical world which are thought to be independent of the conditions of experience. Kant discusses two possible forms of understanding: the *intellectus ectypus* and the *intellectus archetypus*. The intellectus ectypus is related to sensual representations which obviously can have, Kant argues, a relation to objects of the external world; so in this case there is a relation possible between representations and objects but these representations are sensible representations (*sinnliche Vorstellungen*) and not representations of the understanding (*Verstandesvorstellungen*), i.e. pure concepts of understanding. Therefore there is no relation between pure concepts of understanding and objects, and that means that these concepts cannot be explained by the conditions of external objects. The intellectus archetypus is thought to have a relation to objects, but this kind of understanding would be the divine understanding which is supposed to bring objects into existence by pure thinking. Obviously there is no such ontological implication of our human

understanding (or pure concepts of understanding) which means that any possible relation between pure concepts of understanding and objects cannot be explained with an intellectus archetypus. Kant concludes that on the one hand, these pure concepts (representations of understanding) cannot have any relation to external objects (and therefore must be independent from our sensitivity), but that on the other that they cannot be ontologically responsible for objects which means that there cannot be any ontological relation between these pure concepts and objects in a pre-critical sense. (This passage can be found in a longer letter to Marcus Herz which is printed in the collected works of Kant: Kant's Briefwechsel, Vol. I, in: Kant's gesammelte Schriften, ed. Königlich Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Vol. 10, Berlin/Leipzig 1922, p. 130.) – Against this background the relation between pure concepts and objects seems to be impossible; but Kant will settle this problem by introducing the *critical* concept of appearance in order to establish a possible relation between pure concepts and objects, i.e. appearances. Remarkably he will take over the criterion of a possible relation from the ontological discussion of the intellectus archetypus: a relation is possible only if *pure* human understanding can be shown as ontologically responsible for 'nature' in its transcendental sense. It is the transcendental deduction which then will intend to prove this relation nine years later in the *Critique of pure reason* by showing that the objective validity of categories (pure concepts of understanding) has certain ontological implications with respect to our concept of nature. The importance of this letter has been recognized already by Friedrich Paulsen, *Versuch einer Entwicklungsgeschichte der Kantischen Erkenntnistheorie*, Leipzig 1875, p. 151. – Paulsen argues that this letter is a guide to a *historical* understanding of the first *Critique*. For a thorough discussion see also Béatrice Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge, Sensibility and Discursivity in the Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of pure Reason*, Princeton 1998, p. 20.

[7] So it seems that the transcendental deduction is really meant to meet the ontological criterion which I have addressed in my discussion of an important passage found in a letter to Marcus Herz (see above, footnote 6).

[8] Cf. Höffe, *Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, p. 171.

[9] The history of this principle and the relation between divine process of creation and human recognition is discussed by Karl-Otto Apel, Das Verstehen (eine Problemgeschichte als Begriffsgeschichte), in: *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* 1 (1955), 142-199.

[10] In notes from around 1781 which have been published posthumous under the title *Reflexionen zur Metaphysik* (Reflections on Metaphysics) there are many passages that deal with differences between the divine process and human understanding; but Kant also tries to find out parallels in structure of both. His relating allows observing Kant in the tradition whereas the first *Critique* requires interpretation.

Kant's Transcendent Imperative:

Why It Can't Address Morally Ratified Violent Conflict

Helen Lauer*

It's hardly controversial, nor even interesting, to complain that Kant's categorical imperative is impracticable.[1] The deontology can be saved from reducing to a rule-utilitarianism; but that doesn't put a stop to the need for means-end reasoning in order to tell when a consequence of a mandate willed as universal law would be self-contradictory or self-defeating to the intentions of that law.[2]

Other scholars have objected that Kant's groundwork requires of an individual moral agent contrary characteristics that no single entity could possibly have.[3] Essentially this complaint boils down to fussing over fundamental inadequacies in the standard vocabulary philosophers use to think and talk about what it is to be a person.

We can forego vague vocabulary and walk away from metaphysics, as European philosophers famously did between the two World Wars.[4] But we can't leave behind the tools that Kant bequeathed us to face the obstacles to analyzing moral paradoxes that constitute the way of thinking called 'modernity'. Kantian assumptions about what it means to be a moral agent are infused throughout the classical liberal view of personhood, justice, and the legitimate relations between state institutions and community.[5]

Kant's thesis in the *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals* is an inspiration, monumental. And yet like so many works of insight and moral genius, including the Holy Qu'ran and the Bible, what Kant's (1785) *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals* has gained in common currency, it has lost in substance. We think philosophically about acting on principle as Kant taught us to, but his lessons have been so mixed together with un-scrutinized presuppositions about the nature of intention and practical reason, that we wind up with a model of moral agency which fails to capture much of anything confronted in the real world. This is certainly not what Kant envisioned his *Groundwork* to be.[6] To strain at a transcendent grasp of

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reality is not to overlook or deny the aspects of reality which are not transcendent. Otherwise there would be no compelling basis to make judgments that may run contrary to one's own "interest."[7]

Philosophers in the 20th century, most familiarly John Rawls, take the Kantian perspective and propose strategies for analyzing the human potential to overcome derisive conflict—religious, ethnic, and economic. Insofar as the worst manifestations of prejudice and zealous dogmatism are caused in part by erroneous beliefs about the target of violent abuse and annihilation, a Kantian will propose that the criminal behaviour can be extinguished by acquaintance with evidence contradicting the erroneous beliefs. Whenever I strive to maximize my moral accountability I have succeeded in correcting a "cognitive inability" which manifests in the phenomenal world as racial prejudice, religious hatred, and cultural divisiveness.[8]

Rather than pursue here whether or how anti-extremist academics can succeed in convincing extremists to change their false beliefs,[9] I will pursue why it seems to make so little difference whether we succeed or not. I will argue that propositional beliefs about fundamentalist theology do not play a decisive role in an agent's intentional participation in fundamentalist practices and institutions. The orthodox view of rational agency lets us down because it is too simplistic, too narrow a picture, of how rationality is exhibited in an individual social agent's voluntary intentional behaviour.[10]

As long ago as Aristotle, as recently as Donald Davidson,[11] influential philosophers have presupposed a belief/desire model of intention as the centrepiece of their theories of practical rationality which is overly simplistic. Kant's expression of this model is found in his notion of the hypothetical imperative operating to maximize the "interest" of the moral agent.

According to this model of intention, for example if I say you are an enemy of God, I am exhibiting a belief and desire combination of mental states presumed to be causally sufficient to my making the moves in my throat on the occasion when I uttered that phrase. Causally sufficient conditions are not necessary conditions: this model allows for the fact that an unpredictable range of mental states can be traced as the cause of humans' overt voluntary actions.[12]

A comparable combination of beliefs and pro-attitudes that caused my utterance of abuse is presumed to be causally sufficient to my throwing a grenade at you. For the moves in my throat to yield speech, or the movements in my arm to yield the terrorist attack, are examples of intentional action which I am responsible for executing voluntarily or by choice. This clearly does not entail that I know how or what exactly I am

doing with my muscles when I act intentionally, anymore than I can be regarded as a reliable authority concerning the consequences of my speech or grenade throwing.

The trouble here is that people speak and act on the basis of many reasons that do not fit this model of intention. What counts as the legitimate basis for a morally credible action or utterance is not always expressible in terms of propositional beliefs and pro-attitudes that function to maximize the rational agent's self-interest.

In 1985 Annette Baier noted delicately that not everyone who is rational is privileged at all times with the role of maximizing his or her own utility in light of his or her best judgments overall. In accord with plain practicality, if not social design, it is sometimes rational to accommodate to the views and desires of other agents, even when their expectations run contrary to our self-interests and personal convictions. The degree to which this interdependency dominates the individuals' intentions changes with the circumstances. The intention to wipe out a public enemy may require a quality and degree of coordinated subservience different from the intention to wipe out a clothing stain.

A chronic conformist or subordinate might be acting on behalf of his or her independent interests by anticipating another agent's intentions. It may give me terrific fulfilment, consciously or not, to remain at your beck and call. But not all cases of victimization and group pressure are self-imposed. There are traditions of social force that are functioning as effectively as gravity, in determine people's intentional behaviour. Sometimes these can be superseded by pure reasoning, and sometimes it is pure reason that indicates the prudence in precluding any such transcendence. To will such dismissal of certain social norms universally would be self-defeating, if you like.[13] That I sometimes believe I see a car coming down the road when no car is there to see does not preclude that at other times I think I see a car because a car is there to see. Typically I give the right of way to moving cars to avoid getting hit by a car, not because I fear the sensation of getting hit by a car. Thus, social facts and forces and arrangements themselves can be dominant in a primary reason for acting intentionally, and norm-following is such a fact.

The direct-impact causal efficacy of norms enjoys considerable tacit recognition and overt theoretical support in the literatures of psychology, anthropology, and philosophy of mind.

L. Jonathan Cohen has shown how testable theories of cognitive competence presuppose that logical norms—not just intentions or facsimiles of them in the language of thought, but the norms themselves—are attributable directly to the episodic reasoning of individual human subjects engaged in problem-solving. Cohen has argued for an analysis of the

cognitive attitudes that distinguish between our believing an expressible proposition and our accepting something as a policy in the course of our reasoning.[14] Alisdair MacInntyre details how normality of social conditions precludes reason-giving for the bulk of our intentional actions, as these typically engage the beliefs and related attitudes of the individual agent. The contrast as [15]stated here between avowed beliefs vs. "membership norms" is indebted to the field-work analysis of Francesca Cancian studying Mayan villagers.

Sometimes people intentionally act according to what the situation requires; what they are doing is the normal thing to do, and they may be doing it for no other reason than that. Norms are so promethean, as are motives, that such conventionality can yield the most extreme forms of behaviour from the point of view of others standing outside the norm: rape in wartime conditions, for example. People also act intentionally in order to convey an image, or to identify with a group, or to attract approval, or to gain covert prestige. To act intentionally according to what we believe others regard as appropriate behaviour is to follow a social norm. Such norm-following obviously differs form the rule-following of migratory birds, and it differs, though perhaps less obviously, from the rule-following of logicians. Unlike the logical entailments of a set of premises, an agent's manifest versatility in social skills may not yield a specifiable set of responses to public cues, anymore than a speaker's fluency can yield an exhaustive list of future utterances. Following a norm need not be applying a general maxim to a circumstance hence, teaching social rapport to a computer is absurd or cynical, although teaching it chess mastery is not.

Since we may acquire and practice social prejudice the way we learn to make friends at school, awareness of norms need not take the shape of hypothetical or prescriptvite beliefs. So I can follow a norm without having articulable opinions about it, that is without believing that my action is prudent, or ethical, or significant, or universalizable. Supposte that in order to conform with the custom of keeping short people out of my neighbourhood, I intentionally set fire to the houses of any short people trying to move into the neighbourhood. Not because I dislike short people nor believe they make bad neighbours. Instead my arson expresses my concern to be regarded as a good neighbour, together with my belief that—where I live—being a good member of the neighbourhood entails deterring short people from acquiring residence. As a nonverbal way of expressing the claim that I am a good neighbour, I may not need a propositional belief that this refusal has the desirable characteristic of attracting my neighbours' approval. If I use words instead to express the same claim, I do not have any beliefs about the sounds or movements I am making in my larynx. I just go

ahead and make the sounds as I have learned to do in the appropriate speech context. I have thereby expressed the statement that I intended to make to my neighbours. The same norm-following mechanism may be the causal conditions that yield individuals to speak in tongues at dawn every morning. Through their action they are articulating that they are good Christians, in the sense that they are desirable members of their social religious community. They may have no beliefs at all which could be accessible to scrutiny and revision in order to evidence such rational intentional behaviour. Norm following does the job.

I must be aware of social norms in order to follow them nationally. But the content of this awareness may be images of activity; they need not have a propositional structure nor enter into linguistic relations like contradiction or consistency. Being a good neighbour or good Christian—like being a good American—may entail despising short people one year and courting their favour the next. The norm will change as people sense that others have a new image of what good neighbours do, not because anyone has learned new facts about short people.

Thus, social norms as they are observed in operation and without verbal reconstrual may fail to have the requisite linguistic contours to be objects of moral assessment or logical defence, or convincing rebuttal.

Norms function in amorphous collections; they cannot always be individuated for the purposes of revision and correction. Even for a single interaction, it may be difficult to discern whether the evident moral offence is due to racial prejudice rather than economic competition or theological bigotry. I could be keeping short people away through arson practices for any or all of these reasons. Asking me why I am engaged in arson will not necessarily yield the norms that have been causally sufficient in motivating my behaviour. Although it is voluntary behaviour, I am famously a poor authority on the *real* reasons for my behaviour. I may be unaware, for example, of the influence of my father's indoctrination upon my adult choices.[16]

If there are enough nice places for you to live beyond the threat of my arson then my refusing to leave you to live in one next to mine may not be objectionable in itself. But suppose I am intentionally preventing you from settling next door to me in order to accord with the custom of my religious tradition, to keep at bay all short people. And suppose that because of zoning laws the inability to reside in my neighbourhood deprives short people of access to drinking water, or deprives the children of short people access to the best schools. Then whether I believe that my refusal has this effect on you is quite beside the point. There may be features of what I am doing intentionally that I can learn about, just as a speaker can improve his or her understanding of the vocabulary s/he chooses when making perfectly

intelligible statements. My practice counts as outright terrorism, oppression, or a violation of basic human rights not in virtue of any facts about *my* belief s and desires or intentions, but in virtue of circumstantial facts concerning *you* who are disadvantaged by what I am doing.

We can draw a useful contrast, indeed it is a crucial contrast here, between the systemic features that define a fundamentalist tradition (with its rituals, norms, mandates and liturgy or 'commonsense' secular truths) *vs.* the indeterminate variety of preferential attitudes and beliefs of the individual adherents to that tradition. Systemic prejudice is no specifiable individual's attitude. It is a property that belongs to the institutions, their rules and arrangements, through compliance of which individuals secure a specific identity—a phenomenal identity. Acting in accord with such rules and arrangements does not reveal the true moral status of one's action, as Kant is famous for pointing out.[17]

Agents who are intentionally following a norm for no independent reason of their own might describe themselves as acting under the influence of social forces like peer pressure or tradition or higher clerical authority. Kantians assume that the moral agent in this situation could make such a force disappear from his or her motives by reflecting on it from a vantage point that deprives the force of ethical legitimacy. One such Kantian is Professor Anthony K. Appiah, at Princeton University in the USA, in his analysis of essentialist racism as a "cognitive incapacity."[18] He achieves this effect by stressing a formal sense of personal identity, celebrated by Derek Parfit, whereby every episode of world history is part of the heritage of each one of us.[19] To assess Appiah's confidence in the power of pure reason, consider how the metaphor of social force might be extended by appeal to the notion of force in classical physics. The analogy suggested here is prompted by Daniel Dennett's repeated allusion to the parallelogram of forces from vector mechanics, in his "instrumentalistic" portrayal of the folk psychologist's notion of "belief."[20]

Newton's laws of mechanics apply to particles moving only in inertial frames of reference. So when observations are made from a non-inertial frame, additional forces must be introduced, for instance, the Coriolis and centripetal forces if the frame is rotating, in order to describe the particle as if the space of its motion were fixed. If its space of motion really was fixed and these additional forces were not effective, then they would not be included in calculating the particle's motion. These considerations hold even though we may treat the term "physical force" as standing for nothing independent of the cumulative effects of primary particles interacting with each other in a field.[21]

Speaking analogously, even if known laws of social dynamics did exist, we would be wrong to presume that elements of thought essential to the intelligibility of an action within one context of practical reasoning must therefore be recognizably essential from all vantage points of rational reflection. we would be mistaken to assume that if a norm's legitimacy is not convincing relative to every chosen set of *a priori* principled assumptions then it is essential to none. And so we would be mistaken to assume that the force of a racist norm can be gauged away simply by shifting our starting point for practical reasoning to a frame of reference wherein the norm is clearly ludicrous. As the extension by analogy from fictitious forces in physics suggests, and as the empirical data indicate when we study human behaviour in conflict situations, a social norm may persist in its local function as a primary reason for an action, even though when I, as the agent, consider what I am doing from a perspective of so-called "wider reflective equilibrium,"[22] the force of legitimacy for that norm which I am following may vanish. Its legitimacy may vanish in light of a sense of personal identity more abstract, *truer* in its noumenal qualities according to Kant, than those identities I assume normally which influence my decisions. Or its force may vanish in light of new data about the people affected by my dogma-inspired practice. Or the legitimacy of the norm may vanish when the practice is isolated from others with which it normally functions in concert. For example, the ethical legitimacy of shunning or annihilating short people may disintegrate when detached from the norm of stigmatizing people who are rivals in a competition for scarce resources or who are perceived as parasitic because they are burdened by extremely low income.

Yet the norm may still function in the narrower context of practices that motivate and explain an agent's everyday behaviour. Thus, I may write and teach in earnest about *a prior* principles of social justice at this symposium, and sustain my reputation as a good neighbour at home by doing whatever the custom there bids good neighbours to do. Since a rational agent need not approve of a norm in order to follow it, adding to or subtracting from a fundamental extremist's register of beliefs about the moral quality of his or her life may not be sufficient in itself to affect even that particular individual's participation in the institutions constituting his or her status quo. Some of the mental states that determine one's intentional behaviour are part and parcel of the fabric which knits one to others in social terms. These mental states (attitudes, motivating psychic dispositions) are not available in a propositional form for the individual to evaluate on logical grounds and eliminate from his or her motivated behaviour, granted sufficient enlightened awareness and concentrated effort to rise spiritually above one's sectarian peers. The inconsistency between how I reason in order to talk at a Kantian seminar vs. how I might behave intentionally at home in adhering to the

norms of that social world, cannot be dismissed as *akrasic* nor as a "cognitive incapacity" of the individual. It is an empirical, turgid fact about the phenomenal side of socialized life.

Endnotes

[1] Robert Paul Wolff (1973) has covered ably in his classic critique of the *Groundwork* the tendency of categorical deontology to collapse into utilitarianism.

[2] William Frankena (1963: 26) points out that the autonomous will evaluates a maxim not to determine whether its consequences are bad or good, but whether they defeat the institutions (like promise-keeping) presupposed by mandating them universally.

[3] Richard E. Aquila (1979).

[4] A. J. Ayer (1936) especially Chapters I and VI, his famous elimination of metaphysics and "critique of ethics and theology." Also Otto Neurath (1931), Rudolf Carnap (1932).

[5] Widely influential neo-Kantians include John Rawls (1971). See also Onora Nell (1975) for her analysis of how Kant's ethic principle to specific actions, Barbara Herman (1981), Setphen Darwall (1985).

[6] "Keep in mind that in speaking of knowledge by pure reason we do not mean analytical but synthetical knowledge." in the Preamble of *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics.* transl. L. W. Beck (1950) p. 23.

[7] Kant assumes the dependent will depends on "interest" *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals* transl. L. W. Beck ((1785) 1988) p. 262. Beck used here the edition of the Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences, Berlin (1902-1912). Kant's footnote on "interest" appeared on p. 413 of that original version.

[8] Kwame Anthony Appiah (1992) pp. 35-39. An earlier application of the considerations in this paper was applied to a critique of Appiah's theory of essentialist racism; see H. Lauer (1996).

[9] Bernard Williams (1973) pp. 147-8, 169. Also see Sybil Wolfram (1992) considering the extent of ethical obligation in eliminating one's false beliefs.

[10] See for examples G. MacDonald and P. Pettit (1981) pp. 58-66 and Alisdair MacIntyre (1988) pp. 338-341.

[11] Donald Davidson's seminal "Actions, Reasons, and Causes." ((1963) 1980), p. 5.

[12] Were it otherwise we'd be able to build one day a reliable method of learning people's motives and predicting their actions.

[13] Clearly this would have to be so for at least one social norm sustaining an institutional arrangement, if you think about it, for reasons comparable to why it would be self-defeating to will universal practice of making false promises.

[14] L. Jonathan Cohen (1981) and (1992).

[15] Francesca Cancian (1975) pp. 143-147, 153.

[16] The 'unconscious' would have to work as much in determining my functional behaviour as it does the dysfunctional, if it determines any behaviour at all.

[17] In the *Groundwork,* Kant uses the case of attending church with scrupulous regularity to secure a place in heaven as an example of following a hypothetical imperative.

[18] Appiah (1992). See footnote 8 above.

[19] Appiah (1992) pp. 27, 32; Derek Parfit (1984).

[20] Daniel Dennett (1975) repr. in D. M. Rosenthal (1989) p.617.

[21] Daniel A. Akyeampong, lectures on "Vector mechanics," Department of Mathematics, University of Ghana, Legon, and in conversation.

[22] I am indebted here to L. Jonathan Cohen's portrayal of John Rawls' famous "wide vs. narrow" circumspection in moral reasoning (1981) p. 321.

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Radical Evil and Kant's Turn to Religion

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My goal in this essay is not to provide a detailed reconstruction of Kant's doctrine of radical evil. Instead, I want simply to think through the most general consequences of the doctrine, particularly in light of its basic compatibility with the characteristic presuppositions of Enlightenment modernity. The work which announces it, *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone*, can be read as one of the first great works of modern theology,[1] especially insofar as modern theology tries less to answer the charges brought against religion by Enlightenment rationality than to reinterpret religion within an Enlightenment framework. In Kant's text, religion is for the most part identified with morality. God is identified not as the Creator and originator of the world, but as its moral goal and final end. In a word, he is understood not as a separate being, but as the guiding principle for the establishment, through human effort and concern, of the just society. The more traditional ideal of gaining spiritual wisdom, which might be defined as reconciliation with finitude, is subordinated to a new project that, based on the so-called "social gospel," stresses activism and the achievement of the moral ideal. Moral religion focuses on right action, not on anything as mysterious as an endowment of divine grace.

Because the achievement of the ideal would entail the full unfolding of human capacity, the attainment of a state of absolute moral perfection, it is a goal that must be postponed to the end of time. Instead of being regarded as a living presence, God is in a sense infinitely deferred. Only when the kingdom of ends, that perfect human society in which each person lives more thoroughly for the whole than for himself, is finally attained, will God have become God. By thus construing him as postulate and project, the idea of his "command" becomes indistinguishable from the moral imperative that we work towards the achievement of the ideal. All aspects of divine "voice" are stripped away so that Abraham, for instance, is to be specifically reprimanded for failing to question God's command that he slaughter his son.[2] What we are left with as the only trustworthy guide for human action is the rational insight that we are capable of living in harmony with one another if we would but will to do so. Enlightenment humanism, once construed –

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particularly by Voltaire – as a radical alternative to Christianity, can now be interpreted as the hidden *telos* towards which Christianity has been striving all along.[3] Feuerbach's claim that all discourse about God is simply a disguised way of talking about human beings is not far away.

I.

Kant's sporadic essays on the philosophy of history, including his very late work on *Perpetual Peace*, develop this humanistic vision more fully. The vintage tropes of Enlightenment thinking are all recognizable: the idea of progress, belief in the perfectibility of the State, the assurance that the rational comprehension of the natural order will enable us one day to overcome nature and to rule over her, and, in general, the idea that the Good is something we ourselves must constitute. All of this presupposes a fundamental trust in reason combined with a deep distrust for nature. The goodness of our inner humanity is what provides us with hope in the future, the conviction that the nightmare of the past will one day be brought fully behind us. In this context Kant's doctrine of radical evil, his attempt to philosophically appropriate the old Christian doctrine of original sin – which undermines the faith in the essential goodness of humanity – appears to be fully out of place.

And yet Kant's doctrine is neither an anachronism nor a clumsy gesture towards his Christian contemporaries. It speaks directly to other dimensions of modern thinking that should also be called to mind: Enlightenment casts the shadow of Romanticism, modernity the shadow of post-modernity. The two world wars that defined the first half of the twentieth century accomplished much to keep the critique of Enlightenment optimism alive. From this critical perspective, religion emerges as the primary alternative to modernity. Thinkers like Heidegger, convinced that the consequence of modernity is nihilism, sought to reopen the possibility of a fundamentally religious relationship to reality, even within the horizon of modern skepticism. With the end of the Cold War, however, Heidegger was summarily dismissed. His own claim that his ontological mysticism was an adequate way of correcting his earlier foray into Nazi politics was transformed into the new understanding that such mysticism is itself tantamount to irrational politics. His famous slogan, "only a god can save us," no longer appears even discussible. It looms as a kind of *heresy*, an obstinate failure to embrace the modern commitment to autonomous human action.

The discussion of radical evil complicates this picture in interesting ways. For regardless of how much it appears as an aside, irreconcilable with Kant's central vision, it nonetheless shows itself as a thoroughly and consistently Kantian idea. Indeed, in many ways it represents the furthest possible extension of the Enlightenment ideal of autonomy. Kant had once limited

that ideal to the field of good actions – self-determination understood as determination in accord to moral reason. But in his doctrine of radical evil he shows that evil itself can be autonomously willed. This remains the case even though evil involves a deep entanglement in, and self-surrender to, heteronomous forces. For such entanglement, he now assures us, is something we have brought upon ourselves. Moreover, the idea is not that we do evil because we act out of reckless impulses. Instead, where we do evil, we do so with clear and rational intent. Evil as such is an act of pure intelligence. Common vice may well be understood as the random play of sensuality. Evil, on the other hand, lies deeper. Evil is the willed and thoroughly rational decision to let self-love – itself a natural enough principle of human action – assume priority over the dictates of our moral conscience. In other words, evil is not the irrational rule of instinct. It is the spirit of pure utilitarianism, the rule of instrumental reason.

The assertion that calculating intent goes to the heart of evil is, of course, not entirely surprising. It conforms completely with a significant part of our common sense understanding, the part that wants to *punish*. Even so, it wreaks havoc on basic Enlightenment presuppositions. Instead of deifying reason as the always trustworthy instrument of overcoming the evils of nature and achieving human happiness, Kant understood that reason itself can be enlisted on the side of an evil that is far more monstrous than anything nature puts before us. Auschwitz is a more trenchant metaphor for evil than Lisbon.

If evil is something we actively will rather than an unfortunate reverberation of instinctual aggression – thought of as a residue of primitive bestiality – then the project of subduing nature by reason affords no guarantee that any progress whatsoever will be made in overcoming evil. Sophisticated technology and a rationally organized state are almost unquestionably the best means for combating natural evil. They have little to offer, though, in the battle with moral evil. Indeed, to the degree that they increase the level of power available to human beings, they serve only to exasperate the problem, for power must necessarily corrupt any soul that, within itself, is already actively inclined toward evil. And for Kant that includes every soul that is human. It is original sin that he has in mind, not as an inheritance from the past, of course, but as a universally shared mode of human self-constitution.

By acknowledging the possible perversion of reason, Kant carries Enlightenment into its inevitable final posture: self-critique. He thus ends his philosophical career by undermining the deepest core of Enlightenment sensibility: its *faith in reason*. With the deterioration of that faith comes the deterioration of hope as well. Kant's doctrine of radical evil pushes responsibility for evil so far that guilt looms forth as something unforgivable

and irredeemable. While a rational person can forgive anyone whose action can be accounted for by something out of his control, he will be hard put to forgive an opponent who has rationally and soberly willed his evil act.

By emphasizing that the basis of evil lies in a free and rational act of will, Kant delivers a guilty verdict to all humanity – and one that lies beyond the pale of what is rationally forgivable. Moreover, by asserting the universality of that evil, he makes it clear that guilt always belongs as much to *me* as to the person who does me harm.[4] For our real guilt, according to Kant, is that we – and this includes each and every one of us – have willfully contaminated the subjective disposition that guides us whenever we make decisions. We have always "already" decided that moral concerns should be subordinated to self-interest, with the result that radical evil is universal and "*inextirpable* by human powers."[5] "Only a god can save us" hardly seems a Kantian thought. It is incompatible not only with his moral philosophy, but also with the general direction of his thinking in *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone*. Even so, it may still form the most single important consequence of his doctrine. The greatest work of Enlightenment theology may contain its most lasting and compelling challenge. If evil is in fact inextirpable, then God may be rendered necessary, not by the assurance he provides that we will one day realize the project of justice, but by the awful and seemingly godless thought that such an assurance can never be delivered.

Before pushing the issue so far, I want to establish another point of critical engagement with Enlightenment rationality. Anticipated already in Kant's *Critique of Judgment*, it can be simply enough stated: if the Enlightenment premise of freedom is to be justified, the Enlightenment ban on metaphysics has to be lifted. Against what Kant had argued in his first *Critique*, examination of the noumenal is both possible and desirable. "Freedom is the only idea of the supersensible which … proves its objective reality in nature."[6]

Important in this regard is not simply that metaphysical propositions about freedom can be found in Kant's discussion of evil. More important is the general observation that the empirically observable reality of evil in human history is itself enough to awaken metaphysical reflection. If modernity is characterized by a tendency to substitute a scientific description of reality for a metaphysical one, it is the fact of evil that renews metaphysical concerns. For what we find ourselves looking at is something that, to the degree that evil is *not* reducible to natural impulse, quite simply defies causal explanation. If science excludes questions of meaning by reducing the world to a sea of facts, this is one fact that suffices to reawaken the quest for meaning.

II.

Perhaps the most common way of entering a discussion of Kant's conception of radical evil is by contrasting it to the prevailing optimism of Enlightenment thinking. Scholars quote Goethe's shock, for instance, when he discovered that Kant had taken up the conception in the first place.[7] Goethe had his own devil, to be sure, but he was little more than a fool and a rogue, condemned to contribute – and only half against his will – to the advancement of the good.[8] Despite giving his full time and attention to Faust, and over a period of many decades, the devil lost him in the end. And given that Faust serves as a metaphor for modernity as a whole, the implication seems clear enough: all of the hybristic pride and consumer addiction in the world will not derail modernity's path to salvation. Indeed, the errors themselves will provide us with the path to salvation.

The name Adam Smith should suffice to show that Goethe's vision is more than a poetic aside. If the "hidden hand" of providence can be relied upon to transform greed into productivity beneficial to all, then there is no reason why the old strategy of placing limits on desire cannot yield to the frenzy with which the advertisement industry sets out to manufacture endless new desires. Moreover, what Smith's notion accomplished for capitalism, Hegel's "cunning of reason" accomplished for the political ambition of tyrants.

It is remarkable that Kant, the great moralist, ever shared the same hope that evil could be called to the service of good. But we can find it even in his most central works. Already in the *Critique of Judgment* we find it clearly stated: "Although war is an undesigned enterprise of men (stirred up by their unbridled passions), yet is it a deep-hidden and designed enterprise of supreme wisdom for preparing, if not for establishing, conformity to law amid the freedom of states, and with this a unity of a morally grounded system of those states."[9] The implications are clear: evil is not really evil, first of all, because, as an upsurge of unbridled passions, it is unintended, and, secondly, because divine wisdom – or a teleologically construed nature – has actually willed it. The theme of radical evil could not be more distant. If providence itself wills our selfishness, then it can hardly be wrong for us to do the same.

In his *Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmological Point of View*, Kant speaks more generally of the "means employed by Nature" in developing man's fullest capacities. They can be reduced to "unsocial sociability," the competitive and antagonistic spirit that drives human beings forward by marshaling forth hidden talents and energy. Thus the famous statement: "Man wills concord; but Nature knows better what is good for the

race; she wills discord."[10] The same theme is prominent in *Perpetual Peace*. In both of these essays, Kant puts forward a kind of theodicy which culminates in the "justification of Nature" or the "justification of Providence."[11]

Instead of attributing this implicit theodicy to something as vague as Enlightenment "optimism," we do better to recognize in it the secularization of Christian faith. Indeed, this is the primary horizon for almost everything in *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone*. The basic thought was already articulated in the *Critique of Practical Reason.* God and immortality are acknowledged as speculative possibilities in the *Ding an sich* that make it possible to affirm morality even when it remains persistently absent from the world of appearances. All the time in eternity could conceivably be available to achieve a moral imperative that is radically opposed to human nature. God could reward what nature consistently fails to reward. While morality suffices to tell us what we should do, religion may be necessary to facilitate hope by presenting a counterfoil to the harsh realities of nature and history. Kant, committed as he was to the goodness of the moral good, had no choice but to consider the conditions of such hope. The needs of secularized reason gave renewed life to religion, albeit in a streamlined version.

Enlightenment theodicy can be reduced to the belief that history itself will establish the kingdom of God. But history unfolds through the play of self-interest. The vision is compelling, for it represents the theoretical possibility that the reality of human freedom, containing as it does the source of evil, may yet be compatible with the actual goodness of reality as such. But possibility is – alas – only possibility. The project of theodicy finally has to be dismissed as so much wishful thinking. The real prelude to Kant's *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone* is a short essay from 1791 that announces the termination of philosophical theodicy.[12] Because moral action requires hope, the possibility of divine wisdom certainly has to be held open. At the same time, reason has to refrain from the impossible task of trying to divine that wisdom. First of all, it lacks the intuitive organ for penetrating so deeply the noumenal substratum of reality. More importantly, however, it needs to recognize that the very effort to view the world from the divine standpoint represents little more than panicked flight from the reality of evil. Making sense of what does not make sense – or pretending that we can do so – is itself an act of evil. Self-deceit, for Kant, is the evil behind all evils. To come free of it, the reality of evil has to be more squarely faced.

What Kant has come to realize is that something dark and uncanny lurks behind the cheerful notion that God will reconcile all things.[13] The same thing holds for the Enlightenment secularization of such faith. On a very

deep level, Enlightenment optimism is the reflex of old-time fear of the devil. This, at any rate, is Kant's implicit contention in his essay on theodicy. It helps here to remember that already Descartes' decisive turn to reason was framed as a response to the possibility that the world could be the puppet stage of an "evil demon." Holding to the principle of light and reason in a desperate attempt to come free of our demons is a *topos* as old as the oldest form of manichaean gnosticism. Kant himself betrays the same anxiety when, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, he regards the noumenal as the "unknowable." Assimilating the *Ding an sich* to the categories of the understanding and the forms of intuition is a kind of ongoing war with chaos and fight for sanity. The scientific project of objectifying nature – and the technological project of overcoming it altogether – rest upon the fear that nature in itself is entropic disaster always waiting to happen. A sense of this is conveyed in that remarkable image Kant uses in his first *Critique*: "This domain is an island, enclosed by nature within unalterable limits. It is the land of truth – enchanting name! – surrounded by a wide and stormy ocean, the native home of illusion, where many a fog bank and many a swiftly melting iceberg give the deceptive appearance of farther shores…"[14]

The manichaean underbelly of Enlightenment is what gives modernity its sense of stress-inducing urgency. The dogmatic certainty that "there is no hell" competes with the ever-recurring fear that hell could be upon us at any time. In the first instance Enlightenment makes of evil a testament to nature's wisdom: greed leads to prosperity, war will ultimately unify the human community. In the second instance, however, evil is reified into an always threatening, demonic other: the anarchic "state of nature" – with the tyrants it still bequeaths us –, the savagery of impulse, the misery of poverty and despair. Beneath it all stands the ever-looming possibility of death. Worst of all is its consequence: human beings will justify almost anything in the name of survival. Population "control" can become infanticide, euthanasia, and more. Health care can become genetic engineering, organ "harvesting," and more and more. Focusing on the demonic possibility outside of us is the key to awakening the demonic within.

Most commonly, however, the fear of the demonic other fades into the simple denial that it exists. Death, the ultimate evil, is yet regarded as "nothing at all." So too Satan. The most effective way of keeping the horror at bay is to deny its true existence. This is the official view proffered by science, which securely locates itself between the extremes of Enlightenment ideology. Ethically neutral in its final assessment of what is, the scientific viewpoint – that of the first *Critique* – wants to defeat the devil simply by declaring him dead. Evil is stripped of its metaphysical underpinnings so that rationality rather than ethical virtue becomes its proper opponent. In this way, evil is reduced to mere irrationality. The well-organized state that is

based on clear scientific principles emerges as the final goal of history. By dismissing evil as simple ignorance, Enlightenment sets itself up as the full and sufficient avenue to the Good.

The problem, though, lies with evil itself. It refuses to be dismissed. Against the secularized hope that evil is nothing more than the competitive impulse endowed upon us by nature herself, who always knows how to transform it into health and productivity, the evidence of history continues to offer the opposite verdict. After the fall of Communism, we may all aspire to the golden future of universal prosperity and world order, yet the future we actually face is global warming, a plausible metaphor for hell. Against the belief that evil is solely "out there," we find selfishness and greed within ourselves. Against the belief that evil is the savagery of uncontrolled nature, we discover that barbarous actions have been carried out in the name of bureaucratic rationality. Ethnic "cleansing" is a way of practicing social hygiene. Already Hitler knew how to dress it in the language of sociology. As for the Holocaust decision to throw children directly onto the flaming pits, it was the result of a cost-saving measure to cut down on the use of gas. Rationality seems only to enhance certain forms of evil. And, in a more general way, it is bound to evil as its hidden condition. The imperative "be rational" arises directly out of the fear of the irrational. Bureaucratic rationality feeds off fear of the monstrous. The State itself is, as Hobbes saw clearly enough, the backside of evil.

Kant's responded to this secret entanglement of Enlightenment rationality with evil by insisting upon the purest possible conception of morality. Practical reason is not instrumental reason. Nor is practical moral reason to be identified with practical political reason. The secret allure of Manichaeanism is that it frees us from the command of morality itself. "The world is a scary and dangerous place" is its premise. The conclusion lies close at hand: "I have every right to try to gain as much control over it as possible." Once we recognize our enemy, we set out to crush him. It is with this gesture that politics wins out over morality.

To counteract this logic, Kant sought to relocate evil from the "world" to the self. It is thus for the sake of morality that he insisted upon the universality of evil and of my own evil in particular. With this move, he undercut several competing tendencies within modernity. The first is the tendency to deny evil altogether by viewing its effects through the value-neutral filter of science. Closely related is the tendency to identify evil with nature – to be progressively overcome through the instrument of technology and the movement of history. Seemingly opposed to these tendencies, both of which are reconcilable with a belief in the essential good of humanity, is the manichaean substratum of Enlightenment: the identification of evil with the demonic other. But there are important similarities. Each of these

tendencies can actually serve to foster evil by enhancing the desire for power and control. By looking away from "my" evil, the possibility for forgiveness and reconciliation is undercut. Moreover, by externalizing evil it is effectively aestheticized. At that point, the swastika assumes a romantic aura. The devil makes a swell tattoo.

III.

If evil is not first and foremost "out there," then I am well advised to seek it in "me." At the same time, because its real root is given in an act of pure intelligence, I am not to look for it by providing an inventory of moods and desires. Kant's insistence that it is moral evil rather than natural evil that is at issue effectively absolves the physical body and all of its volcanic desires from ultimate responsibility for the existence of evil. "Natural inclinations," he says, "*considered in themselves*, are *good*, that is, not a matter of reproach, and it is not only futile to want to extirpate them but to do so would also be harmful and blameworthy."[15] As a result of this view, the inquiry has to unfold on the field of pure subjectivity. Science, which has objects for its terrain, has nothing to offer the investigation. At best, it can simply confirm our sense that evil is in fact a universal condition of our humanity. At worst, science by its very objectification of reality serves the goal of self-deception by making of evil an external phenomenon.

The inquiry is, in other words, a metaphysical one. We not aided by empirical descriptions of what human beings have done. We have just as little to gain from an introspective catalog of internal moods and feelings. Moreover, while Kant maintains that decision is certainly the root of evil, he is not concerned with a factual description of the particular decisions we make. "We call a man evil," he writes, "not because he performs actions that are evil…but because these actions are of such a nature that we may infer from them the presence in him of evil maxims."[16] The source of evil lies in a kind of "prior" decision that conditions and precedes the particular decision we make. The decision is so very prior, that it cannot be encountered on the field of experience. Instead, it is to be inferred from the fact that all particular decisions require access to a pre-established maxim that constitutes our standard of choice. To lay bare the source of evil is to lay bare the source of that maxim. It is to enter into the self-constitution of human subjectivity. To expose it to view is the task of a purely philosophical anamnesis.

Even so, a phenomenological observation lends a great deal of plausibility to what Kant is saying. Animals can be wild and vicious, but – as I think anyone will readily concede – only humans can be cruel. While aggressive instincts play an undeniable role in acts of evil, they do not account for human cruelty. It is subjective intent alone that makes the

difference. This is where the contemporary discussion of evil, based as it is on the reduction of evil to aggression, falls completely short. In the difference between cruelty and aggression we can glimpse what is compelling in Kant's doctrine of radical evil. It is the difference between a self that is fully aware of what it is doing and a self that is lost in instinctual rage.

By thus viewing freedom as the source of evil, Kant renders problematic his own previous conception of freedom. If freedom is now the freedom to do good *or evil*, then it is caught up in a profound ambivalence. Kant's understanding of freedom in *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone* contrasts sharply with the earlier theory that he elaborated in the *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*. Where evil was identified with aggressive instinct or impulsive desire, as Kant had done in his earlier work, then freedom itself could be identified with the moral good. Viewed in this way, freedom is the liberation of will from desire. Or, stated more positively, it is the autonomy achieved when that will gives itself over to practical reason. According to Kant's new theory, however, this identity no longer holds. Where freedom is the freedom to do evil, then the accomplishment of freedom in itself can no longer be identified with the moral ideal.[17]

The key to Kant's resolution of this problem is the distinction he makes between the freedom of will (*Wille*), which is given only in complete self-subjection to the moral law, on the one hand, and the freedom of choice (*Willkür*), on the other hand. It is the exercise of freedom of choice that enslaves us to time and causality. At the same time, choice derives from an act so spontaneous that it too has to be grasped as unconditioned, that is, as rooted in an origin so original that it cannot be thought of as caused or influenced in any way. This is decisively the case for that original decision whereby we posited as our standard maxim the notion – suggested to us by our natural condition – that we would always first and foremost watch out for our own self-interest. This deepest act of *Willkür*, the one that I cannot experience empirically because each of my empirically observable decisions already presupposes it, Kant refers to as an "intelligible act." It is the act whereby "the supreme maxim is adopted by the will."[18] Grounded in the noumenal it is yet a decisive turning away from its ground. It is noumenal reality flowing outward toward time. As noumenal, "it cannot be eradicated."[19] This does not mean, however, that it cannot be reversed. The good man and the evil man both live out of one and the same foundational act. One of them sees something, however, that the other one doesn't see. One of them looks out to time, the other one casts his look inward to time's ground and condition.

The moral ambivalence of the self is a reflection of a metaphysical

ambivalence within the deepest ground of reality. The self-constitution of subjectivity is the will to will itself – both to be itself and to hold on to itself – that eternally breaks forth from the unconditional will at the heart of reality. This unconditional will we ourselves experience as the command of morality that self-will should be surrendered for the sake of the fullest possible emergence of what is. Precisely because absolute moral will is not self-demanding in this way, because it is so fundamentally detached that its own interest counts for no more than any other interest, it permits self-will to rule within the transitory sphere of time. "Resist not evil!" is its paradoxical command.[20]

The victory of morality is not the attainment of self, but the overcoming of self. It comes, in other words, with the death of the self. This is so decisively the case that final victory is thinkable only in a sphere that transcends time and space. Even so, that final victory can be anticipated within the phenomenal order as the idea of the perfect person who knows how to lay down his life for others. "But just because we are not the authors of this idea, and because it has established itself in man without our comprehending how human nature could have been capable of receiving it, it is more appropriate to say that this archetype has *come down* to us from heaven and has assumed our humanity."[21] Kant's turn to religion starts here, in the acknowledgment of the consequence of evil, the self's inability to save itself, its inability even to constitute out of its own resources the idea of moral perfection. Instead, salvation has to "come down to us from heaven."

We ourselves do, of course, have to contribute to this possibility. The decisive step lies in the recognition of one profoundly disturbing fact: I myself am evil. I will do what is right, by all means, but only on the condition that it does not endanger my primary hold on myself. I may sacrifice my self and my resources, but I will simultaneously work hard to make sure I get "credit" for it.

And yet self-love, Kant asserts, is good, for it is the central condition of nature's self-display.[22] But because that condition is intertwined with its opposite, the ongoing sacrifice of anything that is a self, the self is rendered so vulnerable that it becomes anxious and grows susceptible to evil. Evil is the refusal to make the sacrifice, or, rather, to acquiesce in the sacrifice that is always already the lot of finitude. The refusal shows itself in the decision to elevate self-love to the status of a *maxim*, the rational standard to which all decisions get automatically referred. Discursive reason, the rationality that goes outward to time and causality, is built on the edifice of this maxim. It is the basis of instrumental reason, the manipulation of causality for the sake of the survival and growth of the self. Instead of denying my complicity in evil, I have ultimately to recognize in it the constitutive principle of my

very existence.

I am guilty, in a word, of not wanting to die – which is something very different from wanting to live. For wanting to live is openness to all possibilities, even the possibility of dying. Not wanting to die is the refusal of this openness; it is the will not so much to live as to hold onto my life and all that I need to secure it.

Kant's doctrine of radical evil implicitly contains the recognition that it is the self itself that is evil. The evil is "radical" precisely in this sense: it penetrates into the deepest root of the self. In other words, it is not the case that, apart from radical evil, a self exists within the heart of pure practical reason. The deepest heart is without self. Consequently, we have to avoid the notion that at some point a metaphysically detached self just happened to will an act that is evil. Instead, evil goes to the very bottom of the self that has so acted and is present within us "from birth."[23] The noumenal act that, according to Kant, constitutes radical evil is itself "the ultimate subjective ground of all maxims."[24] Its ground and the ground of the self are one and the same thing.

When Kant says that radical evil precedes all temporal experiences he is expressing the equiprimordiality of evil and the self. In the transtemporal ground of the self there is an act of grasping and securing that holds me into this very now. It is less something "I" have done than what it is that does – or gives birth to – me. Because it has nothing at the bottom of it, from which it could be conditioned, it must be understood as a free act. In other words, freedom is less something I have than something that has me. Individual character is destiny, the self-willed necessity by virtue of which I am what I am. Even as I am bound by it, it itself is bound by nothing. Where we gain a sense of destiny, what we are by deep necessity, we begin to realize ourselves in the element of freedom. Here, within the center, we do not choose and consider. Instead, we are what we are.

What we are is first and foremost something dark and troubling. By holding tightly to itself, the self has cut itself off from its deepest roots. It becomes convinced that its only resources are the resources it carries within itself. Even so, it is never divided in any absolute sense from the Good. The command of morality, that the self should abandon its hold on itself, can always be heard. The problem is that it cannot be received into the heart of the self. No self, Kant insists, is so thoroughly evil that it can deny morality's claim to us.[25] Even the death-camp commandant will pride himself on his generosity and love for children. He will delude himself into thinking that duty forces him to act in violation of his own original goodness. Self-delusion is the source of all evil. "The author of evil," Kant writes, is within us, "the liar from the beginning."[26] Even so, precisely this is

the ground of all hope, for it delivers proof of our original predisposition to what is right and good. The self that has grown dead to the command of morality can be reborn.

Radical evil is the conduit to such rebirth. For it penetrates into the most original ground of the self. Awareness that evil is always *my evil*, indeed, that this is so emphatically the case that all external instances of evil have to be regarded as the actualization of what I carry inside me, reveals the absolute limit of what the self can accomplish. No self can extricate itself from its own primordial guilt. No committee of selves can determine a *techne* for transforming self-willed selves into good and holy selves "for others." Indeed, the belief that good character can be manufactured by the clear and persistent articulation of what constitutes good action, a belief embraced by some of our educational institutions, is itself the source of hypocrisy and self-deception. Good and evil exist within the heart, not within the deed. The establishment of good character requires nothing short of the death and destruction of the self. This death is facilitated by the recognition that the self is evil into its deepest ground.

Kant spoke of the possibility of a radical and decisive change of heart, not the reformation of character, but its thoroughgoing *revolution*. It is requires nothing short of "rebirth, as it were a new creation".[27] Rebirth requires the death of the old self: "For whoever would save his life will lose it, and whoever loses his life for my sake will find it."[28] The possibility for a revolutionary change of heart exists only where the last bridge to a meaningful project for the self has been blasted away, where the self stands naked in its isolation and inner despair and knows that it has nowhere to turn, nothing to do.[29] Where the counterfeit self has been dissolved in the moment of self-recognition, the disclosure of the radical evil that is emphatically *my own*, it has been brought to the ground of Divine Grace. Here the self effectively ends. Reason can acknowledge the possibility of grace, but it cannot adopt this possibility "into her maxims of thought and action."[30] Where the self dies away, God can begin to act. The existence of this God at the root of the self is disclosed in the moment of "highest wonder," the unalterable fact, recognized even by the most evil of men, of our "original moral predisposition."[31] In the "incomprehensibility" of this predisposition, we glimpse its "divine origin." The "sublimity" of our moral vocation, which glimmers through in the experience of a guilty conscience, provides evidence that deeper than the radical evil and nothingness of the self is the God who creates out of such nothingness. Moral rebirth is not the totally inconceivable displacement of one noumenal – and therefore eternal – act for another one. It is a reversal within one and the same act. Taken to the

world, finitude is blindness. Taken to the origin, finitude is awakening.

IV.

In his *Idea for a Universal History*, Kant paints the familiar story of progress towards a world federation of states, the final establishment of world peace. It is a progress that he unabashedly attributes to the stimulus of evil in history. The final union of states, the highest possible goal of Enlightenment thought, he refers to as the "last step" in the process.[32] Then, surprisingly, instead of declaring that the goal of history has been attained, he says it is only the "halfway mark in the development of mankind." And, to make matters worse, he adds that "human nature must suffer the cruelest hardships under the guise of external well-being; and Rousseau was not far wrong in preferring the state of savages." Given that the attainment of "external well-being" is still very much *our* collective project, it is hardly surprising that this astonishingly negative remark has received little or no attention from contemporary commentators. What we all along *thought* that Kant was saying, that the project of establishing a just social and political order is the ultimate project for humanity, seems not to have been what he was saying at all.

Morality is, of course, the missing step, the project for the "second half" of human history. Just as the state, the crystallization of *public morality*, arises from the dialectic of natural evil, true morality arises from a confrontation with our own radical evil. That natural competitive instinct which Kant sometimes deems a necessary evil is, strictly speaking, not evil at all, since it is rooted in the universal "predisposition to humanity," which Kant regards as good insofar as it is fully natural.[33] Morality, on the other hand, does not arise from the dialectic of natural evil at all, but from the private encounter with radical evil. It is "private," because, as Kant always insists, the inner disposition of the heart remains hidden even to our own eyes. What renders the achievement of public morality so difficult is that it is always vulnerable to entanglement with the self-deception that constitutes the foundational element of evil. Even the best ones among us operate, according to Kant, from mixed motives: "actions called for by duty are done not purely for duty's sake."[34] We are, in other words, always predisposed towards hypocrisy, so that our good actions are "nothing but pretense and glittering misery."[35]

The self can become a moral self, a self *for others*, only by passing through the fire of *self-recognition*. While acts of generosity and concern for others are, of course, common enough, their moral worth is destroyed by the very recognition we can gain by engaging in them. Institutions which encourage the doing of good deeds invariably undermine their intent by devising incentives that, rewarding good behavior, simultaneously contaminate it by rendering it heteronomous: one does what is right, but for

the wrong reasons. To become genuinely moral, the self first has to grasp its own radical evil, the source of its practical solipsism, its tendency to act as if it were the only being that is real. Universal to all humanity, this is nonetheless the most *private* point in the self.[36] Death and rebirth, the destruction of the evil self and the release of the moral self, unfold on the field of solitude. The moral law, which commands that we act in recognition of the full reality of all beings, *is not awakened solely by the experience of others in a world*. Such experience, as demonstrated so convincingly in the 1st *Critique*, cannot take us beyond the limit of the self. In other words, those other selves I encounter outside of myself, on the field of experience, are *objectified* selves. They are subject to the conditions of my own subjective appropriation of reality. They act causally, not freely. Only from the perspective of practical reason, a perspective that must first be *achieved*, can they be encountered as free selves at all. Only within the deepest heart of the self, by establishing contact with the source of its very being, can the self find connection with a world outside of itself.

For this reason, there is no institutional solution to the problem of evil. Evil is so intimately bound into the self-constituted ground of the self that it can be overcome only where the self turns radically into itself and grasps the illusory nature of its own self-constitution. This is the path of religion, a path that each person must tread alone. While the institution of the Church can lend support to all who embark on such a path, it cannot release anyone from the necessity of walking alone. For only in the deepest isolation of the self, where it stands removed from time and causality, and from the entire manifold of sensibility, can the self surrender its determinate bounds through baptism in noumenal luminosity. Nor does such "baptism" release us from the necessity of suffering. Quite the contrary: "The coming forth from the corrupted into the good disposition is, in itself (as the 'death of the old man,' 'the crucifying of the flesh'), a sacrifice and an entrance upon a long train of life's ills."[37] The saint who has died and been reborn will be castigated by the rest of us, for, by delivering the proof that each of us is capable of realizing the moral good, he will represent a constant reminder of our own sinful natures. Anyone who has been brought out of himself, who lives for us all, will be made into a pariah. The Son of God will be banished from the public realm.

At the same time, he himself will already have renounced the very possibility of political power. He will have forsaken as the greatest of all temptations the chance to unite all nations and rule over them in justice. Kant associates the principle of evil with "the lord paramount of all the goods of the earth, that is, as the prince of this world."[38] He follows the Biblical account, according to which that prince, the prince of darkness, offered to deliver his power and kingdom over to Jesus Christ. The latter

reveals himself in his fundamental goodness only where he renounces that power and opens himself to persecution and death.

Religion and politics thus form an antithesis for Kant. This is the basis of his strong critique of Judaism and Catholicism. It is why, within the Protestant alternative that Kant embraces, he is clearly more inclined to Pietism than Lutheranism. It is why, even within his own Pietist religiosity, Kant avoided all church services. His purpose in taking up the issue of the Church in *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone* is emphatically not, as some commentators have maintained, because he believes that salvation can only be socially mediated.[39] He remains throughout committed to the Rousseauian insight that "Envy, the lust for power, greed, and the malignant inclinations bound up with these, besiege his nature, contented within itself, *as soon as he is among men*."[40] In other words, society corrupts. The visible Church is institutional and legalistic, the originator of hypocrisy and self-deception. The invisible Church is that collectivity that arises when all of its participants have shared a common change of heart and the infusion of a common spirit, the spirit of morality. It is constituted when individuals are led to face the shameful nature of their very own selves, which they meticulously hide not only from one another, but also from themselves. The inner church is constituted, in another words, in and out of the private heart.

The religion Kant has in mind does not rest on external statutes and commands, but on the inner voice of what Kant calls "reason," the medium through which, in the most private and remote part of ourselves, we discard our "selves" and become receptive to the command of morality. It is reason that delivers to us the standing judgment: "guilty." For within ourselves we are nothing less than the center of reality, yet before reason we are no more nor less than any other self – or, indeed, any other thing. Because of the profound interiority of genuine religiosity, Kant is led to conclude: "We can expect no *universal history* of religion … among men on earth; for, since it is based upon pure moral faith, it has no public status, and each man can become aware only in and for himself o the advances which he has made in it."[41]

External statutes and commands are the source of evil rather than the key to its eradication. Abraham's God told him to kill his son. The true God of his heart spoke better when he told him to put away the knife. The "God of the heart" must finally break through not only the external edict of the state and the publicly organized church, but through the categorical imperative that gives external form to the inner voice of reason. Too much evil has been done in the name of duty. If we are to complete this move, with Kant and beyond Kant, we can end with yet another observation. Reason itself must finally give way to the pure light of truth. Beyond that there is only silence.

[1] Kant, *Religion*, etc. The other great work would be Spinoza's *Theologico-Political-Treatise*

[2] *Religion*, p. 175.

[3] Nor is this development confined to Christianity. Presumably it occurs in every major religion, quite prominently in Judaism and in Buddhism, at least as it is represented in the West.

[4] Given the impossibility of viewing anyone's underlying disposition, the judgment that evil is universal can ultimately be based alone on the fact that I myself act with the *consciousness* that what I do is evil – and that I infer that others also so act (*Rel*. p. 16). Joining my internal consciousness with an observation of their external acts, I form the basis of an *a priori* judgment, but of one that is not apodictic. For it is always possible that others lack the consciousness that I myself have – or even that I myself might be more innocent than I realize. "A man's maxims," Kant asserts, "sometimes even his own, are not thus observable."

[5] P. 32

[6] *Critique of Judgment*, paragraph 91 (p. 327 in Bernard trans.)

[7] See, for instance, K. Vorländer, "Kant, Schiller, Goethe," *Gesammelte Aufsätze* (1923), republished in Aalen, 1984. In letters to both Schiller and Herder, Goethe expresses profound outrage at Kant's doctrine.

[8] Thus Mephistopheles' self-definition as "Ein Teil von jener Kraft / Die stets das Böse will und stets das Gute schafft" from Part I of Goethe's *Faust*.

[9] Paragraph 83, *Critique of Judgment*.

[10] See the fourth thesis in *Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View*, included in *Kant: Selections*, ed. by Lewis White Beck, New Jersey 1988, pp. 417f.

[11] *Idea for a Universal* History, p. 424. *Perpetual Peace*, also in *Kant: Selections*, pp. 440 and 453.

[12] A translation under the title *On the Failure of All Attempted Philosophical Theodicies* forms a supplement to Michael Despland's *Kant on History and Religion*, Montreal and London, 1973, pp. 283-297.

[13] This can be gleaned from his remarks on the *Book of Job* (that can be found in the *Failure of All Attempted Philosophical Theodicies*, where Job's interlocutors are accused, on the basis of their fast retreats into theodicy, of both hypocrisy and the attempt to flatter God. "Better to curse God to his face" is Kant's clear conclusion.

[14] B295

[15] *Religion*, p. 51.

[16] *Religion*, p. 16.

[17] For a full discussion of this dilemma, see G. Prauss, *Kant über Freiheit als Autonomie*, Frankfurt/M, 1983.

[18] *Religion*, p. 26.

[19] *Religion*, p. 27.

[20] *Matt.* 5:39.

[21] *Religion*, pp. 54-55.

[22] *Religion*, p. 22.

[23] *Religion*, p. 17.

[24] *Religion*, p. 20.

[25] *Religion*, p. 30.

[26] *Religion*, p. 37.

[27] *Religion*, p. 43.

[28] *Matt*. 16.25

[29] Thomas Mann's *Doktor Faustus* is a powerful literary portrayal of this idea.

[30] *Religion*, p. 48.

[31] *Religion*, p. 44.

[32] *Selections*, p. 421.

[33] *Religion*, p. 22.

[34] *Religion*, p. 25.

[35] *Selections*, p. 422.

[36] Keiji Nishitani, *Religion and Nothingness*, p. 27.

[37] *Religion*, 68.

[38] *Religion*, p. 73.

[39] An example of this kind of interpretation is the article of Sharon Anderson-Gold, "God and Community: An Inquiry into the Religious Implications of the Highest Good," in *Kant's Philosophy of Religion Reconsidered*, Bloomington 1991.

[40] *Religion*, p. 85.

[41] *Religion*, p. 115.

The concept of "Reality" in Kant's critical philosophy

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Reality versus Realität

Certainly, there must be some kind of pre-theoretical common understanding of what "reality" means. Various philosophers rather present claims of the nature of reality but somehow there must a common ground for understanding what this concept refers to: a totality or a "substrata" of that which exists, or what there is. However, the German *Realität* (regularly translated as "reality" in English) in its scholastic sense was far from the present understanding of reality. Accordingly, interpreting Kant we must first ask what he meant by reality in various context, before one can start a meaningful discussion of the nature of reality.

The German words *Realität*, *Wirklichkeit*, *Dasein, Sein*, and *Existenz* denote some of the most basic metaphysical notions whose interpretations pose notorious difficulties. In the Anglo-American literature on Kant the problems related to these notions are frequently ignored. Heidegger has paid much attention to them and he sees Kant as making a turning point in the understanding of "being".[1] Undoubtedly, Heidegger's guidance among these notions has greatly influenced my interpretation of them. Practically all interpreters of Kant fail to distinguish clearly between existence and actuality, but treat them as synonymous, modal notions. However, existence as such is not a modal notion.

These notions have a long and complicated history in theology and scholastic philosophy. There are also serious confusions concerning the correct translation of them into English. *Wirklichkeit* and *Realität*, and the corresponding adjectives, *wirklich* and *real*, are frequently taken as synonymous (reality, real). Traditionally in the English language philosophy "actuality", "existence" and "reality" are treated nearly as synonymous having clearly a modal connotation; the contemporary common understanding of "reality" is based on that. However, in interpreting Kant

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that is an expression of confusing the categories of modality and quality. It is a serious category-mistake, which vitiates many translations and indicates that the translators have not been aware of the under-lying distinctions.

The scholastic notion of *Realität* refers to that which makes a thing the thing that it is, determines its *Sachheit*, thingness, *quiddity*, essence, thing-content, what-content. *Res*, *Realität* answers a question like what is a thing? *Realitas* are conceptual marks of a thing [begrifflichen Merkmale eines *res*]. Predicates, which in the tradition of Duns Scotus, were counted as *realitas* are the most general predicates, viz., the ontological predicates; most notably "existence" is counted as one of real predicates. The reality of an actual thing contains its essence [*Sosein*] and existence [*Dasein*]. In the Wolffian school philosophy all true predicates were counted as real predicates.

Of course, it is very well known that Kant was grown up in the dominating Wolffian tradition. He inherited its concepts and ideals, but also made a revolution against it. The subject of my present concern is exactly the difficulty of separating between Kant's use of *Realität* in the scholastic sense and his use of the same word *Realität* closer to the modern sense having modal connotations.

A part of these difficulties arise from the very transcendental turn. Kant is still very much faithful to the metaphysical terminology of the German school-philosophy. However, it is less clear whether the old terms any more have a consistent use in his new framework. In various cases the meanings of the terms are radically transformed. "Absolute possibility" is a good and rather clear example, but it is also questionable whether the traditional notion like *Realität* has any coherent place for a transcendental idealist.[2] Kant's notion of "real possibility" has hardly anything common with the scholastic notion, except its mere name. The scholastic notion meant a possibility based on the essence of a thing, while Kant's focus is on the really or actually possible (in a broad sense) in contrast to the merely logically possible. In other word: the notion of *Realität* has its proper use in the context of the traditional understanding of ontology of the "ready made world". The structure of the outside world is in specific way, based on the essences of things, which also are the basis of the ontological modalities. The Copernican revolution entails that the old ontology is thrown overboard and replaced by the "epistemic" ontology of pure concepts and principles. What happens with the modal notions? It is my general thesis — although not the subject of this study — that Kant was not really able to see how to handle with modality: He indicates, and in fact also commits, the mistakes, which according to my interpretation, a good Kantian should not do.

In summary, Kant inherited the Wolffian notion of *Realität* from the tradition even though he might not have been well aware of its complex history. He, on the one hand is still using *Realität* in the traditional way,

most notably also as a category. However, he does not count "existence" as belonging to reality. On the other hand, he is occasionally using *Realität* with clearly modal connotations, especially in combination with other words (e.g. objective reality = actuality). Presumably, the explanation of the transformation of *Realität* is that e.g. the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence was widely discussed. In this way, in addition to the increasing Scottish philosophical influence in German philosophy, the English word "reality" (which means rather *Wirklichkeit*) took its way into German and became misunderstood as a synonymous to *Realität*. [3]

The categories of reality and actuality

The categories of quality are reality [*Realität*], negation and limitation. They are based on the corresponding logical functions of judgments, viz., affirmative, negative and infinite. The modal categories belong to quite a different group of dynamical categories. They deal with the existence of things in their relation to the subject of cognition. They are possibility, actuality [*Wirklichkeit*] and necessity, corresponding to problematic, assertoric and apodictic logical functions.

Wirklichkeit is often translated as "reality". It is certainly correct that in the contemporary usage the English "reality" has this meaning of "actually being the case". But in translating Kant it is obviously a category-mistake. We must separate the modal category of actuality [*Wirklichkeit*] from the category of reality [*Realität*], which is one of the categories of quality. Naturally, because the words are so similar, there is hardly any other reasonable option than to do what all translators have done, viz., to translate *Realität* as "reality".

The distinction between the German *Realität*, *Wirklichkeit*, and *Aktualität* has been transformed also in German. The scholastic meaning of *Realität* has practically disappeared even in philosophical contexts. The first two concepts are frequently treated as synonyms. In English, there is no such distinction but "reality" is very close to the German *Wirklichkeit*. For the three German words *Realität*, *Wirklichkeit*, and *Aktualität*, only two, "reality" and "actuality" are available in English. How we ever use them, some misinterpretations seem to follow.

The non-modal understanding of "reality" is largely unknown to modern philosophers, especially in the Anglo-American world. It is pertinent, indeed crucial, to emphasise what might be called "the referential difference". One has to be frequently alert to consider whether Kant, say by "judgment", means the very act of judging or the correlate of that kind of act: a particular, singular judgment. A similar equivocation applies to an adjectival and substantive sense, say "real" and "reality". In fact Kant frequently talks about something X having objective reality rather than X being objectively

real. However, this apparently innocent difference, might lead to crucial confusions concerning on which level of reflection a concept is used. E.g. predicating "red" to a house is certainly on the basic empirical level, but talking about redness implies a step to a level above the basic act of determining an object. It is precisely my thesis that Kant's modal thought was confused by not separating sufficiently the levels of reflection and consequently also confusing the categories — and the corresponding notions of reflection — of quality and modality. What is the item — a concept, a thing, a state of affairs — under modal consideration, implies directly various levels of reflection.

The categories of quality and the categories of modality

Reality, negation and limitation are the categories of quality. To determine an appearance one category of every group has to be used. "Reality is accordingly the form of unity of the affirming, affirmative, positing, positive judgment."[4] The schema of reality is "Reality [*Realität*] is in the pure concept of the understanding that to which a sensation in general corresponds, that, therefore, the concept of which in itself indicates a being (in time)." (A143/B182) Negation is the opposition of reality.

That *Realität* is introduced as a category of quality might appear strange. Qualities of cognition are certainly empirical and cannot be represented *a priori*. Indeed, Kant understands the connection to quality in a somewhat indirect way, via degree, that is, "quantity of quality". The principle derived from reality is the Anticipations of perception: "In all appearances of the real, which is an object of the sensation, has intensive magnitude, i.e., a degree." Thus all qualities have a degree — which can be presented numerically from 0 and forward. Negation means the absence of degree. Strictly speaking negation must not be understood as degree 0, because degree means the absence of all degree.

Kant calls the second modal category variously *Wirklichkeit*, *Existenz*, or *Dasein*. To be less confusing, he should have always used *Wirklichkeit* and its contrast, *Unwirklichkeit*. *Wirklichkeit* is a modal notion while the various terms denoting "being" are not modal notions but indicate the reflective use of the category of reality. It must be axiomatic that by the second modal category Kant means *Wirklichkeit*, actuality, to be the case, standing of a state of affairs. In this context "actuality" seems to be the best, although not an unequivocal translation of the German *Wirklichkeit*.

I think that already these considerations convincingly show how actuality and reality denote separate categories and belong to different groups of categories. They must be distinguished. Unfortunately, far from all troubles are settled by that. Although belonging to different groups of categories, there is anyhow an intimate relation between the categories of reality

[*Realität*] and actuality [*Wirklichkeit*]. That is due to the basic Kantian fact that in every judgment one category of each group must be employed. Thus in every judgment various categories are set as it were on each other. The modal categories are attached even more directly to the other categories while their task seems to be merely to supervise the categories of quality. The modes of possibility, actuality and necessity modify quality, viz., positing (predicating). The positing — affirmation, negation or limitation — has to be understood as possible (problematic), actual (assertoric) or necessary (apodictic). The reality-content (affirmation), negativity-content (negation) and limitation are determined as how they should be taken; that is, whether their relation to the faculty of cognition is merely possible, actual or necessary. "To be taken", is tantamount how the value of the copula, "is" (or "is not"), should be understood in the different cases.

For example, in the judgment "The house is red", the category of reality is employed — it is an affirmative judgment. "The house is not red" employs the category of negation. Modality is a totally separate matter. The former judgment can be understood as a problematic judgment: "It is possible that the house is red", or as an assertoric judgment: "The house is actually red" or as an apodictic judgment: "The house is necessarily red." Likewise, the negative judgment must be understood as having one of the three modal degrees. Accordingly, modality is independent of the question which category of quality is employed. In both affirming and negating (reality and negation) the same modal cases must be distinguished.

The contemporary concept of "reality" is frequently thought to be closely related to actual being. It is crucial to conceive that Kant's understanding of these matters is more refined. Actual existence implies reality but reality does not imply actual existence. "Real" refers to the thing-relatedness [*Sachbezogenheit*] or thingness (of a state of affairs). "Actuality" denotes the standing of a state of affairs [*Bestehen eines Sachverhalts*]. The suitable starting point is to try to understand Kant's famous thesis that "being" is not a real predicate but indicates only positing a thing. That is the fundamental thesis underlying Kant's modal thought, a thesis, which he originally presented in his pre-critical work *The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God* from 1763. The thesis can be conceived only on the basis of the scholastic notion of *Realität*.

Being (existence) is not a real predicate

Kant's word for "being" in the thesis "*Being* is obviously not a real predicate" (A598/B626) is *Sein*, but *Dasein* and *Existenz* are also used synonymously with it. I will at present ignore the differences between these terms and simply use the English term "being" or "existence".[5] They are derived or rather abstracted from everyday expressions like "there is (exists) something (a thing, an object)" or "a state of affairs is such and such". If we

think or reflect what that something, or a state of affairs, has which exists, we say that it has "being" or "existence". Accordingly, "being" and "existence" are concepts of reflection. In fact it will turn out that the distinction between the existence of a thing and the existence of a state of affairs is of some importance. The existence of a state of affairs does not directly denote the existence of any substance but denotes merely that a predicate is ascribed to a thing, viz., "something being the case". However, indirectly it refers to things, which are involved in a certain state of affairs. Kant seems to have thought that a predication presupposed a thing to which something is predicated. The "is" (the copula) of a state of affairs is the most central notion of being in connection with modality.

Kant presents his dictum in the context of discussing of what he calls the ontological proof of the existence of God — more precisely, proclaiming its impossibility. His original thesis was that "being" is not a predicate, and accordingly from the predicates ascribed to God nothing follows concerning his existence. It is crucial to notice that later in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (A598/B626) Kant always completes this by saying that "being" is not a **real** predicate but is used merely as a logical one. The context of *The Only Possible Argument* makes it quite clear, that that is what he means already there, although it is not always explicitly stated. Being, as any other non-contradictory concept, can be used as a logical predicate, but not as a real one. It does not belong to those concepts used as the determining predicates of things.

Being is obviously not a real predicate, i.e., a concept of something that could add to the concept of a thing. It is merely the positing of a thing or of certain determinations in themselves. In the logical use it is merely the copula of a judgment. (A598/B626)

Kant's aim is to argue that the proof — often called Anselm's proof — of the existence of God, as Kant understood it, will not do exactly because it employs "existence" in a misleading way, that is, as a real predicate. The traditional claim is that from the very concept of the complete being including all positive predicate, that is, the concept of the most real being, its existence must follow. If existence would not follow, the concept would not be of that of the most complete being.

Cognition is tantamount to determining a manifold of an intuition and thus constituting an object, a thing. Predicates, which determine a thing, are real predicates. Reality [*Realität*] as the what-content of the concept of a thing is made up of all these determining (real) predicates. All real predicates add something to the concept of a thing. Reality in this sense is closely related, if not synonymous, with thingness, *Sachheit* or *quidditas*. Real predicates determine the reality of a thing by affirming or negating its predicates, but according to Kant they leave it totally open whether a thing

also exists.

Kant's example of possible and actual hundred thalers illustrates his modal theory (A599/B627), and again in a way, which can only be conceived if reality [*Realität*] is taken in the scholastic sense. Hundred actual thalers are not anything more than hundred possible thalers as far as their reality is concerned. The difference is only that actual thalers are posited while possible thalers are merely possible. Nevertheless, their quality, thing-content, (*Sachheit*, reality) is the same. Possible thalers signify the concept and the actual thalers signify the object and the positing thereof. If an actual object contained more than its concept does, then the concept would not express that very object. The concept would not be commensurable with the object. It is certainly not difficult to conceive what Kant means by saying that as far as their reality, that is, their thing-content is concerned, possible thalers and actual thalers are equal. However, the example employing the modal notions of possibility and actuality is presented in the discussion concerning the concept of existence. Thus, one gets the impression that existence is precisely the modal notion of actuality. While Kant himself occasionally used existence as a modal notion, it is important to make clear why existence as such is not properly a modal notion. Of course, in the concept of actual existence, as used in the example, actuality is embedded.

Reality as the totality of what there is, the universal substrata

My concern above has been mainly to show what an important role the scholastic notion of *Realität* plays in Kant. However, Kant clearly moved towards the English and accordingly contemporary understanding of reality. I can only point out some cases, which indicate of such a transformation — and also of Kant's own vacillations. Only a more thorough study could show the details of the matter.

"The real", *realitas*, is a kind of super matter or substratum of things in general. *Realität* consists of the complete what-content of all the affirming predicates of a thing. A real predicate is one, which can be used to determine a thing in its "what-content". "Real" is now contrasted with negation, a lack of something, privation, as Kant does in his categories of quality.

"Reality" is also used in a different sense as a contrast to ideality. There is little doubt that for Kant "reality" and "real" also frequently have the character of mind-independence. The forms of intuition, space and time, are the prime examples of the entities, which are empirically real but transcendentally ideal. They belong to the *realitas phenomenon*. In this sense reality has modal connotation. "Empirically real" means having actual validity [*Wirklichkeitsgeltung*] in the sphere of the empirical.

Accordingly, "reality" is not only the label of the first category of quality.

It also refers to that which this category gives access to. The category of reality realises the reality, that is, generates our cognition of the real. That something is subsumed under this category means that a thing or a state of affairs has objective reality. "Reality is in the pure concept of the understanding that to which a sensation in general corresponds ...". (A143/B182) Reality is that, those very concept indicates a being [*Sein*] of something (in time) and negation is that those concept presents a not-being [*Nichtsein*] (in time). The real for us can be given only in sensation. Thus, the category of reality can be properly applied only on empirical intuition. If we affirm the content of sensation, we judge its object as real. This affirmation — as well as negation and limitation — is separate from modality but, nevertheless, it is a subject of modality. Thus reality (affirmation) as well as negation and limitation can be possible, actual or necessary.

Reality, in the sense of the category, is a purely conceptual matter. However, reality as a category can properly be employed only on sensible intuition. Accordingly, a judgment employing the category of reality must be connected with empirical intuition, that is, sensations. It is extremely confusing that the postulate of actuality states: "That which is connected with the material conditions of experience (of sensation), is **actual**." Should not Kant, to consistent, have said that it is **real**? It seems to me that the answer must be yes! Instead of a principle based on the category of actuality, Kant presents a principle of reality. That which is connected with the material conditions of experience (of sensation) need not be actual but can also be possible or necessary. Actuality should be bound to specific moment of time. Unfortunately, Kant seems to leave us without a feasible principle based of the modal category of actuality.

Our access to reality

It is amazing how contemporary philosophers frequently claim that, according to Kant, we cannot know anything about the reality (now in the English sense), as it is, but only as it appears to us. This, in my opinion indicates a deep misunderstanding of the nature of transcendental idealism and the conceptions of cognition, things in themselves and reality. Reality is not on the "murky" side of things in themselves but on "our side". Kant's general understanding of the capacity of science to acquire knowledge is nearly naïve.

Kant certainly says that we cannot know (or cognise) anything about things as they are in themselves, but only as they appear. However, this does not imply the same claim about reality. There are good and well-known reasons to think that Kant in fact does not mean to draw a line between that which can be known and that, which cannot be known. [6] Such a line can be

drawn only within the knowable. According to Kant things in themselves are unknowable, that is, outside the domain of human knowledge. "Reality is in the pure concept of the understanding that to which a sensation in general corresponds ...". (A143/B182) The knowable, reality, "that to which a sensation in general corresponds", for the human being — as to all finite beings — can be only the reality for them. But "only" does not mean that there is reality in itself. We have no access to *realitas noumenon*. *Realitas noumenon* is an empty concept without cognitive significance for us.

There are several passages in which Kant is undeniable endeavouring to show or prove the reality or objective reality. What would be the point of these passages if we had no access to reality? In the so-called Refutation of Idealism (B274), Kant's problem was not to prove the "reality [*Realität*, in scholastic sense] of the outer world" but its actual existence [Reality, in the contemporary sense]. This is indicated also by the very fact that the Refutation of Idealism is inserted in the second edition after the explanation of the modal postulate of actuality [*Wirklichkeit*], not the principle of *Realität* (Anticipations of perception). The empirically determined consciousness of my own existence presupposes the actual existence of objects in space outside me [*die Wirklichkeit der äusserer Gegenstände*]. The explicit task of the Transcendental Deduction is to show that the pure concepts of the understanding have objective reality. (A84/B116 ff) Likewise, the principles derived from, viz., synthetic judgments, which can be justified *a priori*, are precisely those, which have objective reality.

Accordingly, it is amazing, and disappointing, that Kant's deepest thought concerning his conception of reality, are still — 200 hundred years after Kant — almost universally misunderstood outside the small circle of Kant-scholars.

Endnotes

[1] E.g.: "We have to drop the currently familiar meaning of 'reality' in the sense of actuality in order to understand what Kant means by the real appearance. This meaning of 'reality' current today, moreover, corresponds neither with the original meaning of the word nor the initial use of the term in medieval and modern philosophy up to Kant. Instead, the present use has presumably come about through a failure to understand and through a misunderstanding of Kant's usage." (Martin Heidegger:, *What is a Thing?*, South Bend: Regnery/Gateway, Inc., 1967, 212) See also Hans Seigfried: Kant's Spanish Bank Account: *Realität* and *Wirklichkeit*, in Moltke S. Gram (ed.), *Interpreting KANT*, Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1982

[2] Kant distinguishes between *realitas phenomenon* and *realitas noumenon*. However, for the critical Kant there is no access to *realitas noumenon.* Reality is contrasted either to negation or to illusion.

[3] See a very instructive paper on Kant's categories of quality by Annaliese Maier: Kant's Qualitätskategorien, 2:th ed. in her *Zwei Untersuchungen zur nachscholastischen Philosophie*, Roma: Edizione di storia e letterature, vol 112, 1968. 1.st ed. *Kant-Studien* 1930.

[4] Martin Heidegger: *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988 (originally in German 1975)

[5] *Dasein* is originally a translation of the Latin *existentia* used by Wolff.

[6] I have tried to explain these matters in a previous study. See especially chapter 5! Markku Leppäkoski: *The Transcendental How; Kant's Transcendental Deduction of Objective Cognition*, Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1993

Remarks on Lacanian Readings of Kant

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How could Kant be read today? Such a broad question sets the framework of the present essay.

The emphasis is to be put upon the word "today" which both points out the existence of an enormous corpus of academic hermeneutic on Kant and indicates the intention to set his philosophy in a different register, more clearly related to contemporary issues of critical thought.If we choose to read Kant through and with Lacan, this is partly because Lacanian remarks on Kant, most notably in his essay *Kant avec Sade* from 1963, establish some possible conditions for such a reading. What is meant by "reading" here is partly to be found in Kant's writings: "…it is nothing unusual …by comparing the thoughts which an author has delivered upon a subject, to understand him better than he understood himself—inasmuch as he may not have sufficiently determined his conception, nay even thought, in opposition to his own opinion.".1 We need to precise these lines by adding that a written text is always a set of answers for which an act of reading could provide some new questions other than the marked questions the text itself proposes.

Two further points should be mentioned. Firstly, the full intellectual significance of Lacanian theories has only recently been recognized— and this for a diversity of reasons among which a certain inaccessibility of his style seems determining.2 Broadly speaking, the Lacanian project 1 *Kritik der reinen Vernuft* , A314-315. In other words, it seeks to read the text as answers to questions that the text itself has not articulated. 2 In this context and besides works by a range of philosophers such as Jean-François Lyotard or Gilles Deleuze that are directly or indirectly inspired or opposed to Lacan, Alain Badious' works in France 2 (the foundation of psychoanalytical theory) involves, revises and develops four operative terms specific to modern configurations of symbolic relations: Kantian problematization of the object, Marxian analysis of value, achievements of modern mathematics and finally Freudian concept of the Unconscious. That is why Lacanian

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theory should be considered as a *sine qua non* for any serious investigation into the contemporary relevance of Kant—at least from the standpoint declared in above.

Secondly, Kant designated a hollowed concept of the essential Good and discerned its inevitable connection to the transcendental logic. Such a singular concept, envelop of the void, problematizes the semantic pertinence of all conception. Through this essay, I maintain that these two achievements of Kantian philosophy correspond to the emerging post-Aristotelian mode of subjective existence. Kantian *Critique* introduced a synthesis where the empty concept, operating at the heart of transcendental logic, made up for a disjunctive conjunction at a point which earlier was reserved for nothing less than the good. This is what a Kantian judgement ultimately evokes: the disjunctive nature of all relation between the singular and the universal; in other words the encounter with a radical undecidability. However, the Critique does not intend to, neither is capable of realizing that the inevitable shift in the mode of existence concerns the nature of connective nexus as such. One might pinpoint the echoes of the functioning of disjunctive connection throughout Kant's discussions of speculative interests of reason or of its desire to attain the unconditional. However, this almost sonorous reflection, this echo is in Kant counterbalanced by the necessity of a unification of the sensible and the idea through the categorical imperative. For Kant, The concrete actualization of this later is ultimately the voice of consciousness. The disjunction is thus only a surmountable effect of activities of reason faced with the multitude of sensible world. In Lacanian theory, the disjunctive synthesis is not only an effect proper to the mode of existence of modern subject, but also the determining and occupies an exceptional place. His philosophical approach represents some unprecedented philosophical insights into the Lacanian theories, notably in such works as *Conditions,* Seuil, 1992 and *L'être et l'événement*, Seuil, 1988. In English speaking world, there are the indispensable writings by Slavoj Zizek, see particularly *Tarrying with the Negative*, Duke Press, 1993. Both these authors have indirectly been instrumental for my arguments.

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nevertheless inevitably overlooked ground of modern subject qua the subject of the Unconscious.3 Spartan Calculus One prominent feature of Kantian critique is its subversion of the Aristotelian concordance of *Bonum, Verum, pulchuru*is. The mentioned concordance or unity is dissembled, dismantled by Kantian writings. The essential unity in the Oneness of *Ousia* is not simply negated, the critique is far more fundamental: there is no underlying substance that maintains the content of each term and moreover the conjunction that makes up for their concordance is neither constitutive, nor essential. While the truth is conditioned by the regulation of speculative

reason, the Good is conceived not as related to substance but to the law in its pure universal form, and finally in *Critique of Judgement*, the beautiful is ultimately the expression of a power or a capacity that connects imagination to judgement. For the purpose of this essay, we propose a brief review of a pre-critical text. In an early essay, "Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy" ("Versuch über den Begriff der negativen Gr ssen in die Weltweisheit einzuführen") from 1763, Kant makes some observations about the recent mathematization of mechanics. He discusses the notion of Evil in the light of Newtonian physics where the negative magnitudes are introduced into the calculation of laws of movement and of force of attraction and repulsion. The point upheld by Kant is that the negative magnitudes are operative quantities in the real and not mere privative terms. They can enter into calculations that concerns highly real forces in nature. That is what mechanics could demonstrate, Kant states. The importance of these observations amounts in fact to the bearing and accuracy of the classic concept of privation. In a scholastic view point the negativity is devoid of any positive force in itself. The evil was thus a notion explained through absence of the Good as posited. More 3 Disjunctive synthesis is a way to render the logical operation that Lacan singled out as a "rapport du nonrapport".I think that it would be a clarifying strategy to read the Lacanian formula through Gilles Deleuze's arguments concerning such a post-dialectical notion proposed in *Logique du sens*, Minuit, 1969. Another important point to be observed throughout my essay is that the notion of "modern" here is defined by the advent of modern science and the appearance of an abstract concept called value as a concrete object functioning as the expression of social relations.

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precisely, for Aristoteles, privation determines something through absence of a formal cause. The privation has an important function in Thomist doctrine and throughout medieval philosophy; it was instrumental for explanation of the notion of pain for instance.4 Since being is constitutively the one and the good, then the evil could not be allowed any essential consistency. The evil amounts in the last instance to the matter deprived of form, an amorphous and chaotic something.5 It suffices to point out that the privation also played its role to refute such conceptions as diabolic evil. The recognition of the negative magnitude as a real force implies, in respect to privation, two things. Firstly, it means that the thesis according to which the privative is not representable (*Nihil privativum repreaesentabile*) looses its sense. Kant gives the reader a didactic example whose actual weight or brutal clearness— a matter of style —we are not going to judge here. The example is a simple arithmetic calculation. A Spartan woman, mother of a solider, receives the news that his son has

fought courageously for the atherland. This news fills doubtlessly her heart with joy. But she is also informed that the son perished during the glorious fight. This news decreases the level of joy she felt, according to Kant. If we ascribe the value of 4a to the pleasure and if the displeasure (*unlust*) is attributed a value of zero (nihil), the result would be the unchanged 4a. But supposing that the decrease of the pleasure equals 3a, this would give us a consistent negative magnitude of –1a. In other words, 4a – a = 3a. Now, in this example from a pre-Critique essay, the crucial point is neither the mechanistic view point, nor the fact that displeasure and pleasure are unproblematically correlated to the good and the evil. The point is rather that Kant circumscribes a precise moment when, the pure letters of mathemized knowledge are introduced into the physical reality. The outcome of this historical operation is the representability of what has been earlier a pure privation. At the same time, such a stand is highly problematic. The diabolic evil is awaiting at the next step in the argument which would be an unacceptable assumption to Kant. Moreover, the idea of a representation of pure negativity could equally lead into new contradictions.

4 On this point, see Etienne Gilson, *La philosophie au moyen âge*, Payot,1988.

5 See Aristotle in *Metaphysics*, Book I, I, IV and *Nicomachian Ethics* , Book I, II, V. Additionally Jules

Vuillemin makes some valuable remarks in this respect in *De la logique à la théologie, Cinque études sur*

Aristote, Flammarion, 1967.

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A desire without Object

The solution to such aporetic conclusions, the very premise of the critical project, is firstly to differentiate representation (*Vorstellung*) from Thing in itself.6 The Thing in itself is conceived as a limit; that which the intuition can not represent in time and space, and subsequently that which is not subject to categories of knowledge. This brings forward the well-known problem of the possibility of knowledge of such an unknowable thing. The Kantian answer is what he calls a *problematical concept*,7 a rational concept without an object. 8 Still, in the Critique of Pure Reason and throughout the two other critiques, the Thing in itself as an empty concept gets complicated. It becomes clear that the notion of limit has been attributed the quality of thinghood. It is something between a limit and an object. The whole passage in *Critique of Pure Reason* where Kant treats this question is an amazing and highly complex part of Kantian architectonic.9 It provides the moment of transition from organization of empirical data to transcendental dialectic. In short, the decision is to be made in this passage if there is an immanent unity of all categories of understanding; which would make the factual to coincide

with the possible, a return to a Leibnizian position; or if there is a conceptual unity that transcends the range of conditions of a given cognition, a conceptual unity that logically is both extensive and intensive, in other words both unity of the many and unity of the whole. The Kantian genius consists of introducing the Thing in itself at this hinging point, this border, but he does so in a rather surprising way. In the last section and prior to Transcendental dialectic, Kant starts by the concept of an object in general and he ends the passage by a table of four modalities of nothingness among which one is the Thing in itself, the concept without object. The concept of object goes necessarily through a pivotal distinction between void and negativity. That is the first thing to remark; but the thing in itself remains attached to the object as such. The introduction of the thing in itself by Kant is intended to block 6 Our reading evolves around the relationship of representation and object. The basic role of this relation is supposed to be a common place and I am not going into a detailed discussion about its connection to the faculty of judgement, see for instance Ernst Cassirer, *Kant, Work and life*, Yale, 1981, p.146-147.

7 Kritik der reinen Vernuft, A 254.

8 Ibid, A 268-A 293.

9 Ibid.

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the way for reason to fall into a Leibnizian rational empiricism or into rational essentialism. The thing in itself is not presented as the ultimate outpost of our experience; in Kantian philosophy, it seems to operate as an empty box, a zero-value in a natural series and at the same time the thing retains something of its objectality, of its objectal inertia. What I would like to underline is that the connection between the void, implied in the whole passage, and the concept depends ultimately upon the problematic nature of the object itself in Kantian philosophy. One notices a glimpse of the emergence of a certain inconsistency inscribed in the concept of object itself. With both immanent unity and transcendent essence removed, the empty concept is opposed to and at the same time inscribed into the series of totality, oneness and multitude. However the insertion of void at this point means necessarily to allow the concept of concept to encounter its own unconditioned exception on the verge of an abyss. The negativity as a simple absence is replaced by the very presence of a regulatory, albeit hollowed concept. It is then the universal ambition of the concept as such, its constitutive status that is undermined: The universal is now to be found somewhere else than in the connection between the experience and the reason. In order to prevent the reason to fall into the abyss of nothingness and to do away with the problematic object, Kant seeks the universality in the legislative determination of regulatory function, more precisely in the

moral law capable of categorical imperative. Moreover, this law is not an expression of any necessary connection or identity between being and the good. Not any longer supported by any substantial goodness of the object, the universal law is meant to exclude any ontological pretension attributed to its absolute unconditionality: The law should therefore prevent the reason to follow its own desire towards what is the abyss of a void object.10 In this pure sense and freed from both object and the notions of ethics, the law in its core is a deontic modality of pure Will, an "ought" beyond "pathological" interests in objects of desire. Kant presents the independence of the notion of free will over and beyond emotional, empirical conditions, it is the compelling murmur of "the universal voice" that incites its subject to act according to the law.Here, it is important to underline three distinct aspects of Kantian argument. Firstly, One should not miss the point that the free will at this stage of argument is itself an effect of a sway from the abyss of the void, that is the free will, almost in a Spinozian manner, has been chiseled

10 *Kritik der praktischen Vernuft*, Die Analytik der Praktischen Vernuft, p. 70, § 104-106.

out of antinomies of reason. As such the will is the subtraction of an active force from the desire, the latter diagnosed by Kant as a tendency proper to reason to saturate the empty concept of noumenon. At the same time, the radicality of the critique resides in the fact that it is not simply doing away with this desire, not simply reducing it to the mere illusion of mind. On the contrary, it is exactly the indispensable desire to establish the relation between the multitude of objects and the unity of the manifold that makes the imperative necessary. The universal imperative here gains its force from a desire without any empirical object and the law gains its power from such a force. Thirdly, Kant locates the nexus of multitude and the unity in the universal maxim which means that the condition of possibility of a synthesis of the manifold of representations is in the last instance the subjective act according to the law.11 This desire without object, as related to the subjective act, is the extinguished desire; as such it has a precise name in Lacan: the enjoyment of the Other. Let us not forget that Lacan in his essay, *Kant avec Sade*, makes it clear that his reading of Kant aims also towards an ethic. To give up the desire, because of the constitutive discrepancy between its cause and the objects that comes to its encounter, is an act of cowardice.

12The return of the object In spite of the dense style of *Kant avec Sade*, published in 1963, the acanian critical remark is clear and comprehensive. "…throughout the Critique, this object [the phenomenon] slips away. But it can be be devined by the trace which is left by the implacable pursuit which Kant brings to demonstrating its elusiveness and out of which the work

draws this eroticism, doubtless innocent,

11 The argument here would be incomplete without pinpointing its connection with the singularity of the judgement as directly connected to the active force that is *Einbildungskraft* in judgement of taste. The act of judgement, in the singular judgement, is always and already the very condition of any universal principle in the practical field. The act of uttering a phrase such as "This rose is beautiful" is in itself a singular expression (*an sit*) and an actualization of universality of the uttering instance, prior to any concept or idea. The reference for our discussion is *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, §37, Deduktion Der Renen ǥsthetichen Urteile. See also Gilles Deleuze on different modalities of representation and the role of the notion of force in Kantian philosophy in *La philosophie critique de Kant, doctrine des facultés*, P.U.F., 1965.

12 *ǿcrits*, p. 782.

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but perceptible, whose well-foundedness we will show in the nature of the said object."13 The problematic formulated by Lacan is clear: what if the object returns to its place precisely at the moment the universality has been freed from any essential relation to objectality as such. *Kant avec Sade* states ultimately that the discrepancy between concept and the desires of the reason, singled out as a thing in itself by Kant, is tantamount to the incommensurability of the cause of desire and the object of desire. This is a classic Lacanian point. The object that once caused the desire is the same as the object that it tends toward and at the same time, this cause-object could never be found among the objects that satisfies the desire. This dialectic or better topological point is the poignant psychoanalytical stand that the whole essay is built upon. Sade's writings serve in Lacan's essay as a clear-cut example of the return of the object, not in spite of, but by virtue of the universal maxim. Finally, the object returns as the site from where the imperative rule is uttered and that is why such a return involves a practice of cruelty.14 Many commentaries on Lacan's essay have been more or less preoccupied by the uncommon connection made between Kant and Sade, often tacitly perceived as an insolent mixture of high and low. However prevailing such a reception might be, the essay in itself and Lacan's other text from the same period, *Seminar VII*, both show clearly greater ambitions than such a sensational approach. In fact, the essay is a sharp critique of much of romanticism of the time, the Bataillian base materialism in particular.15 13 In *ǿcrits*, p. 768. English translation by James B. Swenson, first published in October, nr 57, p. 57. 14 In this respect, to be clear and to the point, throughout the essay, Lacan demonstrates the mechanism of what is called a *plus-de-juire* as the outcome of the categorical imperative. In

other words that left-over of the object of desire when attained by the desire. 15 Sade is for Lacan a philosopher whose writing articulates a wish to establish the absolute power of the universal imperative by other means. The Sadian utopia is "the monotony of the relation of the subject to the signifier". Compare with Lacans' remarks in *écrits,* p. 775, 787-788. As Pierre Kollosowski noted in his study, Sadian scenes are barely anything more than the reiteration ad infinitum organized around a reversal of bourgeois moral. It is in other words the pedant's enjoyment in boredom, a *delecatio morosa*. See Pierre Kollosowki, *Sade mon prochain*, Seuil, 1967. 9I. The Form of Moral Law is its Substance. The real substance of moral law is its form, states Lacan in his comments upo *Critique of Practical Reason*.16 A maxim freed from its pathological ground is an imperative whose necessity relies on its formal power to detach itself from all contingent and pathological interests. Articulation of the universal and the formal structure of the law coincide. This coincidence resides in the formal requirement put upon the maxims of practical reason. Lacan summarizes the Kantian argument: "For this maxim to become law, it is necessary and it is sufficient that, when tested by practical reason, it can be retained as universal right of logic. …that it is valid for all cases, or better, that it is not valid in any case, if it is not valid in every case."17 The main point made by Lacan here, and repeated elsewhere, is the distinction between a formal proposition of type "for all p q", and the imperative expression of the maxim which is above all a deontic proposition. It concerns "cases", series of cases and the singularity of the case that exceeds the set of cases subsumed under the rule of the universal. That is why, the law at the same time and in its universal ambition, is the suppression of this singularity. In other words, *the substance of the formal imperative enounces that there should not exist such a case that is not a case subsumed under the maxim*. Now the crucial point is to realize that it is the very moment when the will is subtracted from desire, the very moment when the law is thus articulated upon the exclusion of the void that generates such a case, or to put it plainly, the suppressive functioning of the law invokes its own object qua suppressed, excessive but nevertheless present. II. The force of the maxim The suppression of existence of the excessive case makes the force of the command manifest; a force by which the addressee is exhorted beyond all empirical interests. Universality of the maxim calls in fact upon the unconditionality of its force and Lacan's point is that this unconditioned force comes down to nothing else than the passionate pursuit for a pure being, a cause retained from the realm of shifting and fluctuating objects. The crucial point is to understand that Lacan is not maintaining the fantasy according to which behind all universal propositions one could find some hidden pathological interests, some hidden pursuit of pleasure.

16 écrits, p. 770.

17 écrits, p. 767.

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Such a fantasy prevails in all ideologies of dominance and is easily recognizable in contemporary media discourse. It is on the contrary the pathological interests that command the subject beyond the boundaries of the empirical. The pure will is a pursuit of an enjoyment that is not conditioned by any object as such. In better words, it is a pursuit caused by an objectal being that is supposed to provide an enjoyment greater than any object of desire. Such an objectal being beyond all empirical, perishing, living objects of desire is what Lacan calls the Other. The supposed enjoyment located in such an absolute alterity is always greater than the enjoyment received in any particular pursuit of desire. In classic Lacanian theory, the distinction between the enunciation and the statement, inspired by Emile Benveniste and the French school of linguistics, plays an important role. It is not the content of the imperative that is the crucial point, but the imperative as a modality, a demand imposed upon the subject, that is at stake. An imperative is above all about conjoining the instant that is supposed to command and the instance that is the addressee of the demand. The relevance of this point concerning the Kantian universal maxim resides in the fact that the universality of the maxim gains its unconditional power from the absoluteness of the instance of enunciation. The force of categorical imperative establishes a relationship between subject qua addressee of the demand and the unconditional instance of utterance, i.e. the One in its absolute alterity. But every imperative also evokes its object. An example could elucidate this point. Consider the function of prohibition for instance. It is not the physical wall or other hinder that surrounds a given territory that brings it to existence, it is the fence or the wall as a sign that put an interdiction upon trespassing the wall that makes the territory to come into existence. "Do not trespass!" is not only addressing us and urging us not to do so, but it also evokes the existence of something, a territory or else beyond the borderline established by the command. Even a simple imperative such as "Be quiet!" transforms the chain of words to be interrupted into an external object for the subject. But in case of categorical imperative, we are dealing with a dialectical return of the object, since the maxim is explicitly freed from any empirical phenomenon. It differs from both the imperative of silence in the above mentioned example and the establishment of a territory by a symbolic sign of prohibition. It is indeed the silenced, transcended symbolic 11 function, a voice-object capable of imposing the maximum of practical reason upon the subject in each particular case.18 A Point of departure Lacanian critical reading of Kant indicates the restitution of the Oneness as the uniting force upon the

multiplicity of cases at the price of an identification of subjective act and the pure will that is determined by the residual of desire. The object returns but this time not as an element in the series of empirical phenomena but as the object belonging to the absolute Other. As such this is a will that exceeds life and receives its force from a region beyond it. One should be reminded that Lacanian reading is not a critique of the universal. It does not claim that the universal is a category that one could do away with. The Lacanian critique explains that any universality based upon an unconditional moral imperative leads necessarily to the institution of an absolute Other that can not recognize the singularity as a case. The Lacanian critique shows that any universality based upon an unconditional synthesis between the empty concept of a Noumenon and the imperative entails the eclipse of the subject qua the moment of singularity. The existence disintegrates under the weight of the force of pure being. It seems now possible to approach the questions put forward at the beginning of the present essay. Kantian philosophy, read in relation to the contemporary configuration of the subjective articulates a historical crisis, a critical rupture with the pure being, and the paradoxes that such a rupture generates. The subject, as far as it is a modern subject contemporary to the introduction of science, designates in itself the site of such a paradoxality, such a symptomatic existence. In short, The existence is per definition symptomatic. The point is that it is the object in its quality as the consistent external entity (*Gegenstand*) becomes problematic ever since modern science was introduced as an operation upon the real by means of pure letters (the mathematization of physics since Newton, to express this moment in historical terms). Object qua problem becomes therefore the kernel of the subjective configuration. The Freudian term, the Unconscious, is not but the name of the disjunctive synthesis where this problematic and inconsistent object appears as the source of unconditional command. 18 The instance referred to here has a precise name in psychoanalytical theory, Super-Ego. The Lacanian critical reading is informed by his theorization and further precision of Freudian super-Ego. Freud himself took up Kant in his essay “Economy of Masochism”.

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Thus, the Kantian connection between the excesses of desires in the field of what he calls the reason and the categorical imperative could be now grasped as the structure of subjective existence. However, at the very turning point where the problematic nature of this nevertheless unavoidable connection makes its appearance, Kant closes the circle and encounter only what he was trying to avoid, namely the thing in itself, now functioning as the active voice of the absolute alterity dictating its own conditions of possibility. That is how one is to understand Lacan when he claims that Kant could have discovered the unconscious.19 Still, this reading remains a

genealogy of a closure, the closure of an age marked by the event of introduction of scientific letter into the real. These concluding lines contain therefor a point of departure. We should not forget that the closed age was still marked by a pursuit of truth of the spoken word; hysteria of the turn of last century bore witness to such a real significance of words. Kant could write about the art of mastering pathological affects and "Consequences of breathing with closed lips", in these documents from the earlier stages of this age, the author exhibits the whole register of what I called symptomatic existence.20 The closure of the age means that these realities only serve as yardstick to measure the distance from our time. Provided the accuracy of what I propose to be the closure of an age, I conclude this genealogy by following problematic: Today, the question is if the symptomatic conjunction, comprising the assumption of the concept of void and universality of the law, coordinates the field of subjective existence or if we today witness a different coordination of composing instances and of disjunctive axes. Today, The mass of commodities and scientific knowledge are attained the lightness of signs circulating in a plain universe of symbolic differences. The eal is either a reparable malfunctioning of communicative strategies or an incarnation of the brute force of the noumenon. Such a new configuration urges us— and this is the stand I tried to maintain throughout this essay—to think other possible but yet unimaginable disjunctive potentials. 19 See Lacan in *Télévision*, Seuil, 1973, p. 23. 20 References are to some of Kant's writings to be found in diverse places such as *Versuch über dieKrankheiten des Kopfes*, 1764 or *Was heisst Sich im Denken orientiren?*, 1786. My reference is a Swedish translation from 1947, Natur och Kultur, Stockholm. Concerning the hysteric, my proposition on the historicity of the hysteria is a comment to Lacan's analysis of Freud's eventful encounter with the hysteric, for the most succinct instance of his analysis, see his *Seminar XX, Encore,* Seuil, 1975. 13 Bibliography Aristotele, *Nicomachian ethics*, trans. H; Rackham, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994.

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Kantian (History of) Reason and the Platonic Tradition

Johannes Max. van Ophuijsen*

i. Kant and the (ancient) history of philosophy

Like most of his illustrious modern predecessors, Kant is first and foremost a systematic thinker, indeed a comprehensive and uncomprising system builder. As with Hume, Kant's comments on the history of philosophy are mostly incidental to his main purpose and do not, as with his successor Hegel, amount to a sustained attempt at historiography.

Against this general observation it may be pointed out that Kant describes his great project with considerable self-awareness, situating himself within, or more precisely at the finish of the history of the subjects he deals with. He does so in places as conspicuous as the *Preface* to the 2nd ed., published in 1787, of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and the 'history of pure reason' which forms the very end of this *Critique.* It looks as if Kant, like Aristotle, Aquinas and Leibniz before him, deliberately strives to encompass whatever is valuable in previous philosophical systems as well as to supersede them, and that it is part of his programme to explain what is wrong with these systems.

Today I would like to view a number of references Kant makes to Plato and to Platonism, from several angles. Beyond the obvious purpose of elucidating Kant's notion of a history of reason and his view of the actual history of reason, these contexts may throw light first of all on Kant's own evolving programme. I shall argue that, notwithstanding one major reservation, Kant presents his own project as more fundamentally continuous with and akin to Plato's than with that of any of the other predecessors he cites. Secondly I submit that his comments have played a decisive part in reshaping the philosophical analysis of Plato and Platonism, by doing away with a Neoplatonic way of reading Plato, variations of which had held the field for a millennium and a half; and thirdly, they provide a case study bearing on a larger issue, that of Kant's indirect contribution to creating the space for a philosophical history of philosophy. This I take to be one

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conceived neither as a doxographical background report on the gradual exposition of viewpoints that continue to compete at the time of writing, nor as a catalogue of antiquarian curiosities, but rather as the way to bring out the enduring significance of a philosophical position from a systematic point of view, without missing its unique singularity and necessary pastness. It is worth recalling how Kant himself, writing to Morgenstern [de Pl rep. comm. tres, Halle '94, 193 ad *KrV* A 316 f./B 372 ff.] in 1795 and referring explicitly to his own history of pure reason in outline, formulates the need for 'a history of philosophy, not according to the order of writing of its books but of the natural succession in which it was necessary for its thoughts to evolve from human reason'.[1]

ii. Estimate of various Greek thinkers

It has been suggested that Kant, like Hume, found more of philosophical value in the Hellenistic schools of Epicurus, the Stoics and the Sceptics than in the systems of Plato and Aristotle. As Caygill puts it in his very helpful Dictionary,[2] Kant

> does not share the modern fascination with Pl. & Ar., but gives equal if not more weight to the Hellenistic philosophical schools of the Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics

A context which seems to bear out the alleged preference for, or at least emphasis on, the Hellenistic schools is the 'brief outline of a history of philosophy' that provides the fourth ch. of Kant's *Logic*. Here Socrates is placed at the beginning of the most important epoch of Greek philosophy because he gave to the philosophical mind and to all 'speculative heads' a practical direction.[3] Plato and Aristotle get short shrift in a paragraph limited to the claim that Plato occupied himself more with the practical doctrines of his teacher Socrates, whereas Plato's student Aristotle raised speculative philosophy anew.[4] The remaining seven paragraphs on Greek philosophy are indeed devoted to the Stoics, declared to be dialectical in speculative and dogmatic in practical philosophy, to the Epicureans praised for their moderation and as the best of the Greeks in the philosophy of nature, and to the Sceptics, who are supposed to take their cue from Plato, since he presented many doctrines in dialogue form with arguments for and against and without coming down on either side, 'even though he was otherwise very dogmatic'. Kant's review ends with Sextus Empiricus, who in his two works 'has gathered together all doubts'. His cavalier treatment of Aristotle stands in contrast to the major importance Kant allows him in the preceding history of logic.[5] Plato has only one other significant entrance in this lecture course, as a witness to the argument for the logical perfection of knowledge

or cognition (*Erkenntnis*), in which Kant declares that 'our understanding is disposed in such a way that it finds satisfaction in mere insight, even more than in the utility that springs from this.'[6]

iii. Ambivalence about Plato

Caygill s.v. history of ph 227:

> The role Kant accords Plato in the history of philosophy is extremely ambiguous. In CPR he praises Plato's *Republic* and its model of the philosopher (A 316 *wat B?*), but sees considerable danger in Plato's notion of the transcendent ideas. Kant's opposition to this aspect of Plato's thought was fired and fed by his opposition to the Platonic mysticism of some of his contemporaries. This is evident in his late texts on the history of philosophy, 'On a Newly Arisen Superior Tone in Philosophy' and 'Announcement of the Near Conclusion of a Treaty for Eternal Peace in Philosophy' (both 1796). In these texts Kant distinguishes between the philosophical and mystagogic tendencies in Platonism, seeing the latter as exemplified in ancient and modern Neo-Platonism (see 1796a p. 399, p. 64).

It may be noted that the very choice of the terms Phaenomena and Noumena, both of which point back to a Platonic origins, is a doubtful tribute to their intellectual author given the very different content Kant gives to his noumena as entities whose existence must be postulated[7] but whose essence, to put it in deliberately traditional terms, escapes us entirely, and correlatively to the phaenomena as being all that we have cognitive access to, so that establishing correlations between them is all that we can attain in the way of explanation.[8]

These connotations come into play when, in the History of Pure Reason, Plato is contrasted as the head of the noologists with Aristotle as that of the empiricists,[9] with Leibniz following Plato, 'albeit at a sufficient remove from [Plato's] system of mysticism'.

In a similar vein Kant mentions Plato in the Appendix to the *Prolegomena* in a footnote declaring idealism in all existing species except his own critical idealism to be 'enthusiastic' if not 'raving' (*schwärmerisch*), since it has always, as may already be seen from Plato, concluded from our a priori cognitions to another intuition, an intellectual one, besides that of the senses.[10]

But the reference to Plato that most readers are apt to interpret in an ironical vein is the one most conspicuously placed in the Introduction to the first *Critique*,[11] where Plato, venturing on the wings of the ideas beyond the world of the senses into the empty space of pure understanding, is compared to a light dove parting the air with her wings and fancying she would be

lighter and fly higher and more effortlessly still in a vacuum.

What these passages show is that Kant had to insist against Plato on the limits of the understanding unaided by the senses. Elsewhere Kant points out that the Platonists on their part neglected the proper use of the senses in the service of the understanding:[12] Platonism, like Epicureanism, claims more than it knows in that with regard to the only matters of which we may have speculative knowledge, it allows reason to adhere to 'ideal' explanations of natural phenomena and to neglect physical inquiry.

iv. Endorsements

One clue to a more positive valuation of Plato could be gleaned from Kant's endorsement[13] of the 'new *practical* direction' given to Greek philosophy by Socrates heralding its finest hour, and his mention of Plato as occupying himself with Socrates' practical tenets. In *KrV* and KprV Kant asserts the practical usefulness of Plato's Ideas as opposed to their theoretical validity.

In the important terminological discussion prefixed to the transcendental Dialectic,[14] Kant explains the difference between an idea as intended by Plato and a category or concept of the understanding as he himself, more or less in the wake of Aristotle,[15] understands it. He states that Plato understood by 'idea' something not derived from the senses and going well beyond Aristotle's concepts of the understanding, since nothing 'congruent' with them is ever found in experience.[16] Ideas for Plato are not just keys to possible experiences, as categories are, but prototypical models of the things themselves, flowing forth from the highest reason and so communicated to human reason recalling them from the obscurity surrounding them now in the process of recollection that is philosophy.[17] Plato, Kant writes approvingly, was well aware that our cognitive faculty feels a higher need than to register phenomena according to a synthetic unity translating them (B 371) into experience; that our reason rises naturally to cognitions that no object given in experience could be 'congruent' with, but which have a reality all their own and are by no means figments of the brain.[18] These ideas Plato mostly found in what belongs to practice and has its foundation in freedom, Kant notes,[19] adding in a footnote that Plato extended them to pure a priori cognitions including mathematics. Kant comments that he cannot follow Plato either in this respect or in the 'mystical deduction' of the ideas or the exaggerations in which he as it were hypostatized them, but he concedes that Plato's language here is quite capable of a milder

interpretation, more in keeping with the nature of things.[20] It could be said that this concession opens the door to the Neokantian interpretation of Plato, redeeming the forms as an epistemological prerequisite. ment. But the principal justification of the ideas, or of categories in a transcendent use,[21] is in how they enter into the exercise of practical reason.

In *KprV* it is explained how the practical use of Plato's Ideas is neither in proportion nor in inverse proportion to their theoretical validity: [22]

It is only by a deduction of the categories that we can avoid two errors: one is to consider them, with Plato, as an innate feature of pure understanding and to build on them excessive theoretical claims about the supra-sensible, turning theology into a lantern for illuminating figments of the brain, the other is to consider them, with Epicurus, as acquired and for this reason to confine all their use, even for practical purposes, to sense objects and grounds for determination [i.e. choice] derived from these.[23] Our critique has upheld their origin in pure understanding a priori and established that they yield theoretical cognition only when applied to empirical objects, but nevertheless when applied to an object furnished by pure practical reason do serve towards a determinate conception of the supra-sensible, i.e. determined by predicates that belong necessarily to pure practical purpose given a priori and to its possibility.[24]

The conclusion to the *Prol.*, while not mentioning Plato, yet throws light on the function of Ideas in this practical connection.[25]

Our natural tendency towards metaphysics is at the same time a natural provision, corresponding to the aim or end of opening up to our conception a field of objects of pure understanding not with a view to speculative treatment but so as to allow principles of action the universality that practical reason requires.

It is worth comparing this implicit declaration of faith, and of the intent to make room for faith, in the homogeneous purposiveness of human reason in harmony with a more comprehensive plan to the similarly pragmatic motivation to which we see the Platonic Socrates retreating from time to time as to a foothold more unshakable than any truth claim a human may think it safe to stake. Kant's expressed reservations with regard to idealistic enthusiasm are perfectly compatible with a concord between Kant and Plato as far as the ultimate rationale of the postulated ideas is concerned. With both philosophers in the last resort it appears to be a sense of the moral desirability of stipulating a somehow non-subjective reality of concepts not based on experience that determines their theoretical positions.

v. One and many

One way in which Kant formulates the difference between his conception of ideas and Plato's is found in another terminological discussion, this time one distinguishing between categories, ideas and ideals in terms of an increasing distance from empirical phenomena.[26] Categories or concepts of the understanding can be applied to, represented by and indeed realized in the concrete in experience. Ideas, Kant specifies, are at one more remove from objective reality: they comprise a certain completeness not attained by empirical cognition; with them, reason envisages a systematic *unity* at best approximated in empirical reality.[27] From ideas in this sense Kant distinguishes the ideal as an individual determined by the corresponding idea alone;[28] i.e. more or less what Plato scholars have come to call the idea as super-exermplifier. Kant states that what we regard as an ideal was regarded by Plato as an idea of, i.e. contained and originating in, the divine intellect (*Verstand*). He endorses the assumption of ideals as distinct from ideas while denying them the 'creative —' or 'productive force' (*schöpferische Kraft*) assigned to them by Plato yet acknowledging the 'practical —' or 'active force' (*praktische Kraft*) they have as regulative principles. As examples Kant gives the ideas of virtue and wisdom and the ideal of the Stoic sage.

The notion of *unity* contained in ideas as here defined is also invoked at *Prol.* 59/128-29/361, where Kant without mentioning Plato elucidates his distinction between phaenomena and noumena with the help of another familiar Platonic concept: beyond the bounds of sense, reason finds an empty space in which it cannot think things but can think *forms* of things. Reason is neither shut up within the world of sense, nor does she enthuse and rave outside it; she just knows its limit in the sense of knowing the relation between what is outside and what is contained within it. At this limit, reason is led to envision the idea of a supreme being and, in relation to action, that of an intelligible realm, simply in order to guide its own use within the world of sense according to principles of the greatest possible *unity* both theoretical and practical. For this purpose reason refers these principles to an independent rational mind (*Vernunft*) as being the cause of their interconnections and so, while not an object of experience, yet the highest ground of experience, thus determining at least by means of an analogy that reality in itself that the pure understanding must postulate but is unable to determine. Of this highest ground of experience reason tells us something only in relation to its own complete use, [A 362] directed to the highest aims in the field of possible experience.

This unity is only a distant relative of the oneness involved in the Platonic opposition between the one and the many — but not as distant as the unity of

apperception that Kant has substituted for the form not just in its transcendent Platonic status but in its Aristotelian guise, immanent in the species, as well. In his epistemology Kant has embraced conceptualism; his philosophy of action continues to invoke, however tentatively [qualified, reservations], an eminently and compellingly real and ultimately unitary divine author of the objects of human reason in a way that harks back, beyond Berkeley and Descartes, to Neo-Platonic and Christian thought. Kant's terminology towards the end of the *Prolegomena* recalls both Plato's reference in *Republic* VI to what is the cause of being and knowledge yet itself beyond these, and Aristotle's assignment of this part to an impassive intellect whose own act is the purely noetic yet universally motivating one of an understanding of understanding. The wording invites comparison with two pre-critical ones: first that in [1770], § 25 [S. 88], of 'an intuitive act, exempted from the laws of the senses and purely intellectual, such as is that divine intuitive act which Plato calls an idea',[29] the difference being precisely that the critical Kant can no longer allow such an idea any creative force or, as the obverse of this, any explanatory value; and secondly with Kant's terse summing up, in a letter of 1772, of Plato' position in contrast with that of Malebranche: Plato took a past intellectual intuiting of the divinity as the primeval source of the pure concepts and principles of the understanding, Malebranche a lasting, perennial intuiting of this primeval being.[30] The very difficulty of deciding whether the divine reason implied in these contexts is the subject or the object of the intuiting is a sign of their closeness to the Neoplatonic mainstream of divine noetics from late antiquity to Kant's days: here to be, or at least to be human, is not so much to perceive (*cogitare*) or to be perceived (*percipi*) as to be *made to* perceive: to participate in the self-reflection of intellect and reason as such. That intelligible objects presuppose a pure intellect, Kant makes explicit in a footnote to *Prol.* § 34, A 316, spelling out a distinction between intellectual and intelligible. There Kant adds that we have no conception (*Begriff*) whatsoever of such intellect and by the same token none of its putative intelligible objects. However, the sequel to the passage in *KprV* quoted earlier[31] on the application of pure concepts of the understanding to an object furnished by pure practical reason serving towards a determinate conception of the supra-sensible states clearly that the restraining of reason in its speculative use together with an expansion of its application to action is the only way for 'us humans' to achieve the balance that is a necessary condition for the use of reason that corresponds to its purpose, and so, for wisdom. It could be said that Kant has abandoned the traditional programme of a faith seeking understanding and returned to the original Platonic one of understanding seeking faith. His Copernican revolution has not so much

abolished the forms as airlifted them into immunity from scepticism by dividing and redistributing the burden of proof.

vi. Dialectic transformed?

A corollary of Kant's rebuke of reason straying beyond its legitimate confines is a major revaluation of dialectic. The ambitions of those versions of dialectic that do not reduce to logic but aim at true description rather than validity of inference have been condemned as illusory; a condemnation that could hardly fail to be perceived as a disavowal of the philosopher who stakes the highest claims for dialectic. It is worth noting that Kant's explicit comments on Greek dialectic target Zeno, who is introduced as having been strongly censured as a deliberate sophist already by Plato for arguing on both sides of the same question.[32] It looks as if this is also what Kant has in mind when he refers to scepticism as having sprung from metaphysics and its 'unpoliced' (*polizeilose*) dialectic.[33] It seems fair to say, however, that Plato's variety of dialectic, implicitly opposed to Zeno's in Kant's own text, is far from being implicated in Kant's strictures and that actually the application of reason in practical philosophy is the lawful heir to Socratic and Platonic dialectic and indeed a continuation of it by another name. It can be argued, then, that Kant's insistence on the practical need for regulative ideas in no way dependent on experience effectively reestablished Plato, rather than Aristotle or Descartes, as Kant's most indispensable predecessor and a superlatively important philosopher in his own right, at the same time that Kant's rejection of flights into the empty space of the world of ideas spelled the end of the Neo-platonic reading of Plato that had held sway for 1500 years. It created the space for fresh assessments of the significance both of Plato's assumption of a realm of ideas and of his favoured method of dialectic. Such an assessment, emancipated from a philosophical agenda embedded in and kept alive through the longest continuous tradition in western thought, could be driven by historiographical or philological concerns intended to be philosophically neutral, or it could informed by a philosophical position outside Platonism. Thus, the Neo-Kantian interpretation of Plato which had its heyday in the late 19th and early 20th century can be seen to be not so much an accident of history as a philosophical necessity.

vii. Reason's urge

It remains to highlight one more feature of Kant's treatment of ideas that reduces his distance from Plato on. It is that the dividing line between the realm accessible to knowledge and that of action and freedom is made less hard and fast than Kant will sometimes suggest by the fact that reason does

not simply *postulate* its own objects of understanding (*Verstandeswesen*)[34] outside what may be known, but actually evinces a *need* (*Bedürfnis*)[35] for them, craves satisfaction,[36] cannot be satisfied by experience,[37] finds completion and satisfaction only in 'an immaterial being, a world of understanding and a highest of all beings as things in themselves',[38] and would necessarily remain unsatisfied forever without them;[39] just as we have seen[40] that the understanding finds satisfaction in pure insight. The claim that reason itself strives for satisfaction — and neither is, nor ought to be, in Hume's phrase, a slave of the passions — is of a piece with, and presumably in a direct line of descent from, Plato's treatment of reason or the 'calculative part' of the soul in *Phaedrus* and the *Republic.* Kant cites Plato by name and, it might be felt, qualifies/compromises his own distrust of inclination as a motive force in moral choice when he tries to account for this urge of reason: the reason he gives as to why pure insight by itself yields greater satisfaction than any use resulting from its application — as for example the self-evidence of mathematics is superior to its use[41] — is that 'the human being feels his own excellence here: he experiences what it is to have understanding.[42] It appears that theory is credited both with an intrinsic value and with a motivating force even where human reason neither attains to knowledge nor translates into moral choice and action.

viii. Roundup

It is true that Kant had to insist against Plato on the limits of intellect, but against his modern competitors he had to assert the bounds of sense and to bring out the strength as well as the limitations of the understanding built upon it. In this way he claimed to make room for a use of reason to justify belief and faith in realms not accessible to knowledge. The exercise of reason in which he envisaged that this room should be assigned is fundamentally continuous with the original and proper application of Socratic dialectic to existential questions: questions central to the pursuit of that autonomy and moral certainty which alone, as Socrates, Plato and Kant all agree, render us fully human.

Endnotes

[1] an K. Morgenstern [check him, & esp. his de Pl rep. comm. tres, Halle '94, 193 ad KrV A 316 f./B 372 ff.] 14.8.95 [241] … den Mann, der eine Geschichte der Philosophie, nicht nach der Zeitfolge der Bücher, die darin geschrieben worden, sondern nach der natürlichen Gedankenfolge, wie sie sich nach und nach aus der

menschlichen Vernunft hat entwickeln müssen, abzufassen im Stande ist, sowie die Elemente derselben in der Kritik d. r. V. [ad fin.] aufgestellt werden. [against Caygill 226 top]

[2] Caygill, A Kant Dictionary, s.v. 'history of philosophy', 226, 1st full §.

[3] Logik IV [32 ed. Kinkel]: 'Die wichtigste Epoche der griechischen Philosophie hebt endlich mit Sokrates an. Denn er war es, welcher dem philosophischen Geiste und allen spekulativen Köpfen eine ganz neue praktische Richtung gab.'

[4] Ib. [32]: '… Plato, der sich mehr mit den praktischen Lehren des Sokrates beschaftigte; und … Aristoteles, welcher die spekulative Philosophie wieder höher brachte.'

[5] Ib. II [22]: '… kann als der Vater der Logik angesehen worden. … Übrigens hat die Logik von Aristoteles' Zeiten her an Inhalt nicht viel gewonnen und das kann sie ihrer Natur nach auch nicht.' Cf. KrV, Preface to 2nd ed. …

[6] Ib. VI [46]: 'Unser Verstand ist auch überdies so eingerichtet, dass er in den blossen Einsicht Befriedigung findet und mehr noch, als in dem Nutzen, der daraus springt. Dieses merkte schon Plato an.' Cf. … [below].

[7] Prol. § 59, A360 [p. 128 ed. Vorländer] 'Dinge an sich selbst …, welche … (Noumena) … der Verstand ebendarum weil er die Gegenstände der Erfahrung für blosse Erscheinungen erkennt, annehmen muss.'

[8] Ib. § 57, A 354 [120] 'Die Sinnenwelt ist … eine Kette nach Gesetzen verknüpften Erscheinungen', cf. § 34, A 316/7 'unser Verstand kein Vermögen der Anschauung, sondern bloss der Verknüpfung gegebener Anschauungen in einer Erfahrung'; A 355 [121] '… Ableitung der Erscheinungen aus ihren gleichartigen Gründen'; § 59, A 360 [128] 'Erfahrung … gelangt von jedem Bedingten immer nur auf ein anderes Bedingte'; also § 32 A 314-15.

[9] A 853-54 Haupt der Noologisten

[10] Prol. Anhang 146/A375 [my 3] schwärmerische Idealismus; varieties of a priori

[11] A 5/B 9 = Kemp Smith 47 die leichte Taube … Ebenso verliess **Pl** die Sinnenwelt … und wagte sich jenseits derselben auf der Fluegeln der Ideen in den leeren Raum des reinen verstandes

[12] A 471/B 499 = Kemp Smith 427 gegensatz des Epikureisms gegen den Platonisms

[13] L 542, above …

[14] A 312-20/B 368-77 (= Kemp Smith 310-13); see Letter to Morgenstern and cf. O'Neill in CamComp, esp. (v.) 285/6 at (306) n. 5 on ideas as precepts.

[15] Cf. L II [22] Aristoteles' … Lehrart … geht auf die Entwickelung der allgemeinsten Begriffe, die der Logik zugrunde liegen, wovon man indessen

keinen Nutzen hat, weil fast alles auf blosse Subtilitäten auslauft, ausser dass man die Benennungen verschiedener Verstandeshandlungen daraus gezogen.

[16] Ib. B 370 Plato bediente sich des Ausdrucks Idee so, dass man wohl sieht, er habe darunter etwas verstanden, was nicht allein niemals von den Sinnen entlehnt wird, sondern welches sogar die Begriffe des Verstandes, mit denen sich Aristoteles beschäftigte, weit übersteigt, indem in der Erfahrung niemals etwas damit Kongruierendes angetroffen wird.

[17] Ib. Die Ideen sind bei ihm Urbilder der Dingen selbst, und nicht bloss Schlüssel zu möglichen Erfahrungen, wie die Kategorien. Nach seiner Meinung flossen sie aus der höchsten Vernunft aus, von da sie der menschlichen zuteil geworden, die … mit Mühe die … jetzt sehr verdunkelten Ideen durch Erinnerung (die Philosophie heisst) zurückrufen muss.

[18] Ib. Plato bemerkte sehr wohl, dass unsere Erkenntniskraft ein weit höheres Bedürfnis fühle, als bloss Erscheinungen nach synthetischer Einheit <zu Erdmann> buchstabieren, um sie (B 371) als Erfahrung lesen zu können, und dass unsere Vernunft natuerlicherweise sich zu erkenntnissen aufschwinge die viel weiter gehen als dass irgendein gegenstand den erfahrung geben kann jemals mit ihnen kongruieren koenne, die aber … ihre Realitaet haben und keineswegs blosse Hirngespinste sind.

[19] Ib. B 371 Plato fand seine Ideen vorzueglich in allem was praktisch ist, d.i. auf freiheit beruht …

[20] A 314/B 371: …

[21] The categories in their transcendent ('transcending the limits of experience' n. 11) use Kant calls Ideas—Beck xviii

[22] KprV 162 [255] Spekulative Einschränkung der reinen Vernunft und praktische Erweiterung derselben bringen dieselbe allererst in dasjenige Verhältnis der Gleichheit, worin Vernunft überhaupt zweckmässig gebraucht werden kann; cf. reflexive task O'Neill x. 290, -4 that begins with available materials & capacities, -5 self-reflexive discipline, refs at n. 8, self-examination 711/739, -6 lawlike i.e. self-legislative i.e. autonomous)

[23] Ib. 254: … Deduktion der Kategorien … dadurch allein kann verhütet werden sie wenn man sie im reinen Verstande setzt mit Pl für angeboren zu halten und darauf überschwengliche Anmassungen mit Theorien des Übersinnlichen zu gründen …, dadurch aber die Theologie zur Zauberlaterne von Hirngespenstern zu machen; wenn man sie aber für erworben h…alt, zu verhüten, dass man nicht mit Epikur allen und jeden Gebrauch derselben, selbst den in praktischer Absicht, bloss auf Gegenstände und Bestimmungsgründe der Sinne einschränke.

[24] 162 Vorl. /A 254-55

[25] Prol. § 60, A 362-64 (130-32 Vorl., 111-12 Beck) *follow up ref. to KrV regulativ Gebrauch Ideen der rV B 670-96*

[26] A 567/B 595-

[27] -568-96

[28] 568/96, 12-17

[29] intuitum purum intellectualem et legibus sensuum exemptum, qualis est divinus, quem Plato vocat ideam

[30] an M. Herz 21.2.72 [47] <cf. Beiser in CamComp 53/4> Pl nahm ein geistiges ehemaliges Anschauen der Gottheit zum Urqvell der reinen Verstandesbegriffe und <?->Grundsätze an. Mallebranche ein noch dauerndes immerwährendes Anschauen dieses Urwesens.

[31] In iv. above, at n. 24.

[32] A 502/B 530 = Kemp Smith 446 on dialectic Zeno: Pl. tadelt Z. als mutwilligen sophisten (wat hier over Pl.?)

[33] Prol. § 57 p. 116/A 351 polizeilose Dialektik

[34] Prol. § 57, A 352 [118] <Gott> ein blosses Verstandeswesen …

[35] B 370, n. 13 above; KprV 161 [253] ook scharfsinnige Grieken fanden ein praktisches Bedürfnis om hun den Begriff des Urwesens bestimmt anzugeben

[36] 'insufficiency of all species of physical explanation for the satisfaction of reason' Prol. § 57, A 352 [117]

[37] Prol. § 57, A 117 Erfahrung tut der Vernunft niemals völlig Genüge; sie weist uns in Beantwortung der Fragen immer weiter zurück und lässt uns in Ansehung des völligen Aufschlusses derselben unbefriedigt .

[38] 121/A 355

[39] Prol. § 57, A 352 [118] ein blosses Verstandeswesen, ohne die aber die Vernunft auf immer unbefriedigt bleiben müsste

[40] … above at n. 6.

[41] KprV 109 [167] Evidenz das vortrefflichste was (nach Pl.s Urteil) die Mathematik an sich hat, und das selbst allem Nutzen derselben vorgeht

[42] vgl. Logik VI.A. 46 Unser Verstand … findet in der blossen Einsicht Befriedigung und mehr noch, als in dem Nutzen, der daraus entspringt. Dieses merkte schon Pl an. <sequel to quote nn. 6, 37:> Der Mensch fühlt seine eigene Vortrefflichkeit dabei; er empfindet, was es heisse, Verstand haben [zit in deze context ook math? dan K. nog dichter bij Pl.]

The Analogies of Experience as Key to Kant's Transcendental Deduction

Gregg Osborne*

The chapter of the *Critique of Pure Reason* entitled "The Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding" is very widely held to be the heart of that work.[1] Some of Kant's own pronouncements lend weight to this assessment. The following passage from the *Prolegomena*, for instance, might give rise to the impression that this chapter was the keystone and all subsequent parts of the work fell smoothly into place when it was done:

I tried first whether Hume's objection could not be put into a general form and soon found that the concept of the connection of cause and effect was by no means the only concept by which the understanding thinks the connection of things *a priori*, but rather that metaphysics consists altogether of such concepts. I sought to ascertain their number; and when I had satisfactorily succeeded in this by starting from a single principle, I proceeded to the deduction of these concepts… This deduction was the most difficult task ever undertaken in the service of metaphysics… But as soon as I had succeeded in solving Hume's problem, not merely in a particular case, but with respect to the whole faculty of pure reason, I could proceed safely, though slowly, to determine the whole sphere of pure reason completely and from principles, in its boundaries as well as its contents.[2]

This assessment, nonetheless, is brought into doubt by careful analysis of other pronouncements by Kant, his actual procedure in this chapter, and arguments found in the analogies of experience. What seems to be suggested by such analysis is that Kant's own view (at least in 1781) might have been that the section on the analogies rather than this chapter is the heart of the *Critique*. What seems to be suggested by such analysis, in fact, is that Kant's own view (at least in 1781) might have been that the section on the analogies rather than this chapter is the heart of the very deduction to which this chapter is devoted.

In order to show this, I will first present a very brief account of the analogies and then turn to Kant's official strategy for a deduction of the pure

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concepts of understanding, his actual procedure in the first edition version of this chapter, and his distinction in the preface to that edition between an objective side or deduction and a subjective side or deduction. Having argued that the objective side or deduction is nowhere to be found in the first edition version of this chapter, I will return to the analogies in order to point out that they can be seen to carry out the strategy of that side or deduction in regard to the crucial concepts of substance, cause, and community. What this implies, I will conclude, is that the objective deduction of these concepts is found in the analogies and that the chapter so widely held to be the heart of the *Critique* is (at least in its first edition version) dismissed by Kant himself (at least in 1781) as inessential. Given the unusual nature of this conclusion, I will close by pointing to the support provided for it by the work of one of the most eminent living Kant scholars.

I

According to the analogies of experience, sense or apprehension by itself cannot account for our putative awareness of (a) objective as opposed to merely subjective succession, and (b) coexistence. The reason is that the situation in apprehension is always the same. In apprehension, holds Kant, various different elements of the manifold given in or through sense are always successive. So what explains the fact that we in some cases seem to be aware that two or more of these elements exist at the same time? And what explains the fact that we in other cases seem to be aware that they are really and truly successive?

Kant's answer, it seems, is that both of these forms of putative awareness are due to acts we perform. In the second analogy, for instance, he repeatedly asserts that our empirical perception or experience of an event depends on our positing, presupposing, assuming, or judging that there is something preceding the succession that takes place in apprehension of one entity or state (B) on another (A) upon which the replacement of A by B follows in accordance with a rule. In the second analogy, that is, he repeatedly asserts that we would never say (i.e. believe in the first place) that there had been a case of objective as opposed to merely subjective succession if we did not perform this act.[3] Let me cite two examples:

> when we experience that something happens, we presuppose in every such case that something or other precedes upon which it [the succession of entities or states that constitutes the happening] follows in accordance with a rule. Without [my doing] this, I would not say of the object that it succeeds [i.e. that this is a case of objective as opposed to merely subjective succession]. (A195/B240, bracketed interpolations mine)[4]

> The manifold of our representations is always successive. Now absolutely no object [no case of objective as opposed to merely subjective

succession] is represented through this, because through this succession, which is common to all apprehension, nothing is distinguished from anything else. But as soon as I…assume that there is in this succession a relation to the preceding state of affairs, from which the representation [that of the replacement of the first entity or state by the second] follows in accordance with a rule, something [namely the succession] presents itself as an event or what there happens… (A198/B243, bracketed interpolations mine)

Several of the claims put forth or implied in these passages are of course controversial. Many have denied, for example, that the situation in apprehension is always the same.[5] Even in apprehension, they hold, various elements of the manifold given in or through sense can be coexistent. Others hold that objective as opposed to merely subjective succession can be given through sense or apprehension alone and thus deny that any act of positing, presupposing, assuming, or judging is required to account for our putative awareness of it.[6] Yet others insist that this putative awareness can be explained on the basis of regularities in the primitive temporal order of our impressions.[7] They too thus deny that any act of positing, presupposing, assuming, or judging is required to account for it. To defend Kant on all of these points would vastly exceed the scope of this paper. There is still one potential objection, however, that does have to be addressed here.

Let us take an example. In apprehension, let us say, there is an entity of the sort any common person means by a slip of red paper and then an entity of the sort any common person means by a slip of blue paper. And in this case, let us say, we at least seem to be aware that the succession of the one entity or state on the other is objective rather than merely subjective. Now why must the putative awareness that this is the case rest on our positing, presupposing, assuming, or judging that there is something preceding the succession that takes place in apprehension of the one entity or state on the other upon which the replacement of the other by the one follows in accordance with a rule? Why couldn't it rest merely upon our taking the entity that comes first in apprehension and the entity that comes second in apprehension to be the same entity? If we merely do *this*, it may seem, then our awareness that the one entity replaced the other in apprehension and that a single entity cannot be both red all over and blue all over at the same time will lead us to believe that the succession is objective and that what we have here is an *event* (the change in color of a single slip of litmus paper).

To block this objection, we must take Kant to hold that *both* of these actions are required to account for the putative awareness in question. The argument of the *first* analogy, on this view, is that it does indeed rest on our taking the entity any common person means by a slip of blue paper and the

entity any common person means by a slip of red paper to be the same entity. The argument of the second analogy is then that it *also* rests on the further act invoked in that subsequent section. The reason (or so the story goes) is that Kant does not think that we can take opposed determinations to belong to the same entity unless we also take there to be something preceding the succession that takes place in apprehension of the one (B) on the other (A) upon which the replacement of A by B follows in accordance with a rule.[8]

The first two analogies, then, are both concerned with necessary conditions of our putative awareness of objective succession. According to the first, the putative awareness in question is due to our taking an entity that comes first in apprehension and an entity that comes second in apprehension to be the same entity. According to the second, it is also (and even therefore) due to our taking there to be something preceding the succession that takes place in apprehension of the one determination (B) on the other (A) upon which the replacement of A by B follows in accordance with a rule.

This leaves the third to explain our putative awareness that two or more elements of the manifold given in or through sense are coexistent. According to Kant, it would appear, the bare fact that we do not carry out the acts invoked in the first two analogies – and thus do not seem to be aware that the succession of one (B) on another (A) is objective rather than merely subjective – does not suffice to account for our putative awareness that they exist at the same time. The mere lack of any putative awareness that one thing is the case is not to be equated (or so it seems) with the putative awareness that something else is. So what explains our putative awareness that various elements of a manifold that succeed one another in apprehension are in fact coexistent? The answer, holds Kant, is once again an act we perform. The act in question is that of positing, presupposing, assuming, or judging that neither could exist without the other. This is the upshot of his claim on B258 that "the coexistence of substances…cannot be known or recognized [erkannt] save on the assumption of their reciprocal interaction". (What he should really say here, in view of his contention that all substance is permanent – which entails, of course, that different substances are all coexistent – is that the coexistence of various different *determinations* could not be known or recognized save on the assumption of their reciprocal dependence and thus the reciprocal interaction or dynamical community of the substances to which they belong.)

II

The official strategy for the deduction of the pure concepts of understanding is introduced in a very famous passage from A92-4/B125-6:

the representation is a priori determinant of the object if it is the case that

only through the representation is it possible to know or recognize [erkennen] something as an object. There are, however, two conditions under which alone the knowledge or recognition [Erkenntnis] of an object is possible; first intuition, through which it is given…; second concept, through which it is thought… Now arises the question, whether it is not the case that a priori concepts serve as antecedent conditions under which alone something can be thought as object… Now all experience contains, aside from the intuition of the senses through which something is given, also a concept of an object which is given in the intuition…: concepts of objects in general will thus underlie all experiential knowledge as conditions a priori: the objective validity of the categories…will thus rest on experience…being possible only through them…

The transcendental deduction of all concepts a priori has thus a principle upon which the whole enquiry must be grounded, namely that they must be recognized as conditions a priori of the possibility of experience.[9]

This is said near the end of the introductory section of the chapter explicitly devoted to the deduction in both A and B. It is then repeated several times in the first page and a half of the second section of that chapter in A:

Pure a priori concepts…can serve solely as a priori conditions of the possibility of experience. Upon this ground alone can their objective reality rest. (A95)

The concepts which…contain a priori the pure thought involved in every experience, we find in the categories. If we can prove that by their means alone an object can be thought, this will be a sufficient deduction of them, and will justify their objective validity. (A96-7)

Given that this strategy has now been introduced several times, one might well expect that Kant's next move in A will be to go ahead and carry it out. The case is not so simple, however. Before we can do so, he says, we must first do something else:

But because in such a thought [that of an object] more than the single capacity to think, namely the understanding, is at work, and this itself, as a cognitive faculty that is supposed to relate to objects, stands in need of an elucidation with respect to the possibility of such a relation, we must first consider the subjective sources that constitute the foundation a priori of the possibility of experience, not in their empirical but in their transcendental constitution…

If each representation were completely foreign to the others, isolated and separated as it were, there would never arise such a thing as knowledge, which is a whole of compared and connected representations. If I ascribe a synopsis to sense because it contains a manifold in its intuition, it is also the case that a synthesis always corresponds to this and that receptivity can

make knowledge possible only if combined with sponteneity. Now this is the ground of a threefold synthesis that is necessarily found in all knowledge; namely of the apprehension of the representations as modifications of the mind in intuition, of the reproduction of the same in imagination and of their recognition in a concept. These point to three subjective sources of knowledge, which make possible the understanding itself and through it all experience as its empirical product. (A97)

One might naturally wonder what the three "subjective sources" alluded to here are supposed to be. The answer, however, has already been given. For having outlined his strategy for the deduction in the very famous passage from section one of the chapter, Kant has ended that section in A with a paragraph that has always struck me as lacking in organic connection with what has come before (or at least immediately before):[10]

There are, however, three original sources (capacities or powers of the soul) that contain the conditions of the possibility of all experience and cannot themselves be derived from any other powers of the mind; namely sense, imagination, and apperception. On these are grounded (1) the synopsis of the manifold a priori through sense; (2) the synthesis of this manifold through imagination; finally (3) the unity of this synthesis through original apperception. All of these powers have, besides their empirical use, also a transcendental use that concerns solely the form and is possible a priori. We have spoken of this with respect to the senses above in the first part, but now want to strive for insight conerning the nature of the other two. (A94-5)

Hence the three subjective sources alluded to in the later passage from section 2 of the chapter in A must clearly be sense, imagination, and apperception. So in the first instance, it appears, there may be only *two* subjective sources of the possibility of experience, namely sense and *understanding*. (This fits with what Kant has said in several earlier passages from the transcendental logic.)[11] In the second instance, however, there are further such sources. And before we go on to prove that the pure concepts identified at A80/B106 are necessary conditions of the possibility of experience, Kant asserts, we will first have to consider those further such sources. For if we do not, he maintains, it will not be clear how the understanding can be related to objects and thus be possible *as a cognitive faculty that is supposed to be related to objects*. In an important sense, therefore, consideration of imagination and apperception will amount to a consideration of how the understanding is possible.

Before we can prove that the pure concepts identified at A80/B106 are conditions of the possibility of experience, Kant has thus implied, we must first consider the subjective sources (capacities or powers of the soul) that make it possible for the understanding to be related to objects. The term

"must" here, however, may come to seem excessive. For the claim that we *must* do this is clearly and explicitly denied in the preface to A:

I know of no investigations that would be more important to the fathoming of the faculty we call understanding, and at the same time to the determination of the rules and limits of its employment, than those which I have taken on in the second chapter of the transcendental analytic under the title of the deduction of the pure concepts of understanding; they have cost me the most, but as I hope, not unrewarded labor. This examination, which grounded somewhat deep, has two sides. The one concerns itself with the objects of the pure understanding, and should demonstrate and make comprehensible the objective validity of its a priori concepts; it is thus essential to my purposes. The other seeks to examine the pure understanding itself with respect to its possibility and the cognitive powers on which it rests, and thus in its subjective relation, and although this discussion is of great importance to my main purpose, it does not belong essentially to it; because the main question always remains what and how much understanding and reason, free from all experience, can know and not, how is the power to think [i.e. the understanding] itself possible? …the latter is as it were a search for the cause of a given effect and to this extent bears some resemblance to a hypothesis (though it really isn't one, as I shall show at another opportunity)… In this regard I must approach the reader with the reminder; that in case my subjective deduction has not effected in him the complete conviction I expect, the objective, which is my primary concern here, still retains its full strength… (AXVI-XVII)

This passage is both (a) somewhat amusing, and (b) more problematic than is generally acknowledged. The ground for amusement stems from the fact that it occurs immediately after a paragraph in which Kant insists in the strongest possible terms that he has made it a rule in this work that anything that resembles a hypothesis is to be treated as contraband and "confiscated" immediately upon detection. One is thus left to wonder why he leaves in an exposition that he not only describes as bearing some resemblance to a hypothesis but also takes to be inessential. The more substantive problem, however, is that the passage first speaks of a subjective *side* and then of a subjective *deduction*. "Which is it?" one must ask. Is there supposed to be a single deduction that contains two different sides, or are there rather supposed to be two different deductions, each of which would (if compelling) be sufficient by itself?

It should at least be clear, at any rate, that the investigation described here in the preface as (a) bearing some resemblance to a hypothesis, and (b) inessential, is the very investigation into imagination and apperception that the passages from A95-6 and A97-8 say must be undertaken before we can prove that the pure concepts identified at A80/B106 are necessary conditions

of the possibility of experience. The descriptions, after all, are at bottom the same. The subjective side or subjective deduction is said here in the preface to concern the pure understanding itself with respect to its possibility and the cognitive powers on which it rests. But what we must do in the forthcoming investigations of imagination and apperception, imply the relevant passages from A95-6 and A97-8, is consider the subjective sources that make the understanding – *at least as a faculty of knowledge that is supposed to relate to objects* – possible. Any such sources, it seems clear, would be cognitive powers on which the understanding – *at least as such a faculty* – rests.

The upshot seems twofold. First, the forthcoming investigations into imagination and apperception are clearly said in the preface to be inessential. And second, the strategy introduced in the passage from A92-4/B125-6 is that of the objective side or deduction and is not supposed to depend (at least not essentially) on the forthcoming investigations of imagination and apperception. So to say (as Kant does on A97) that we *must* first consider these "subjective sources" not in their empirical but in their transcendental constitution does not square with his own assertion in the preface.

III

Let us take Kant at his word – at least his word in the preface – that the relevant investigations of imagination and apperception are not essential. The task is then to separate the parts of the relevant chapter that *are* supposed to be essential from those that are not. This is not an easy task. For Kant, as luck would have it, never tells us in detail which parts of that chapter belong to the objective side or deduction and which to the subjective side or deduction. All we have to go on is (1) our analysis of the relevant passages from A95-6 and A97-8, (2) our analysis of the passage from the preface already cited, and (3) a rather puzzling claim put forth in a part of that passage not yet cited in full (the part not yet cited is distinguished by italics in what follows):

> in case my subjective deduction has not effected the complete conviction…that I expect, the objective, which is my primary concern here, still retains its full strength, *to which in any case that which is said from page 92 to 93 can be sufficient by itself*. (AXVII, emphasis mine)

Numerous commentators have taken this – and not, as should be clear, without some measure of textual ground – to mean that the very famous passage we have described as *introducing the strategy* of the transcendental deduction should suffice by itself (or perhaps in conjunction with material from the chapter entitled "The Clue to the Discovery of All Pure Concepts of Understanding") to *convincingly prove* that the concepts identified at A80/B106 have objective validity.[12] It is very hard to believe, however, that this could possibly be Kant's considered position. The relevant passage, after all, occurs in a section of the text explicitly headed "*Transition to the*

Transcendental Deduction of the Categories". This would surely seem to indicate that the deduction proper does not even *begin* until the section that follows and that the passage in question is exactly what it clearly seems to be – the outline of a strategy. And then there is the fact that this strategy is introduced once again a few pages later, this time in a form that clearly implies that it has *not* been carried out:

> *If* we prove that by their means alone an object can be thought, this will be a sufficient deduction of them, and will justify their objective validity. But because in such a thought [that of an object] more than the single capacity to think…is at work…we must *first*... consider…the subjective sources that constitute the foundation a priori of the possibility of experience... (A96-7, emphases mine)

The passage on A92-3, it thus seems safe to say, merely serves to introduce a strategy that will be carried out in what follows. But where exactly *is* it carried out? Sections 2 and 3 of the chapter in A dive immediately into discussions related to imagination and apperception from which it is not at all clear that they ever emerge. There are several brief discussions in section 2 of what we mean by the relation of representations to an object, but these would clearly not suffice in the absence of considerations relating to apperception and its unity to show that only through the pure concepts of understanding identified at A80/B106 is it possible to know or recognize something as an object, that these concepts are antecedent conditions under which alone anything can be thought as object, and that these concepts are thus necessary conditions of the possibility of experience. Hence these brief discussions, I suggest, cannot constitute (not by themselves, at any rate) the objective side or deduction. For that side or deduction, implies Kant in the preface, cannot depend – at least not essentially – on the investigations of imagination and apperception. And if that side or deduction is not contained in section 2, it can hardly be contained in section 3 either. For that section, first of all, is merely supposed to take what section 2 has expounded separately and singly and present it in systematic interconnection. In both of its attempts to do that, moreover – namely the "deduction from above" and "deduction from below" – considerations uncovered in the preceding investigations of imagination and apperception are quite clearly essential.

The implication is this: Either Kant is wrong when he suggests that the subjective side or deduction and the objective side or deduction are distinguishable and claims that the subjective side or deduction is not really essential, or the objective side or deduction is to be found (at least in A) partly or even wholly outside of the chapter explicitly devoted to the deduction of the pure concepts of understanding.

IV

According to the first and second analogies, I have said in section I, our

putative awareness of objective as opposed to merely subjective succession is due to two acts we perform; (1) that of taking opposed determinations to be determinations of the same entity, and (2) that of taking there to be something preceding the succession that takes place in apprehension of the one (B) on the other (A) upon which the replacement of A by B follows in accordance with a rule. According to the third, I have added, our putative awareness that two elements of the manifold given in or through sense are coexistent is due to our positing, presupposing, assuming, or judging that neither could exist without the other. But what this means, it should be noted, is that the concepts of substance and cause are held in the first and second analogies to be necessary conditions of our putative awareness of objective as opposed to merely subjective succession and that the concept of reciprocal dependence or dynamical community is held in the third to be a necessary condition of our putative awareness of simulteneity or coexistence. Let me briefly say why:

1. In order to posit, presuppose, assume, or judge that opposed determinations are determinations of the same entity, one must *have the concept* of something that can exist or be determined in multiple ways and thus of something determined (in the sense of having determinations). The concept of something determined (in the sense of having determinations), however, is (at least for Kant) the concept of substance. The concept of substance is thus a necessary condition of the first act Kant takes to underlie our putative awareness of objective as opposed to merely subjective succession and hence of that putative awareness itself.

2. In order to posit, presuppose, assume, or judge that there is something preceding the succession that takes place in apprehension of one entity or state (B) on another (A) upon which the replacement of A by B follows in accordance with a rule, one must *have the concept* of something that precedes a succession of one entity or state on another upon which the replacement of the other by the one follows in accordance with a rule. The concept of something preceding a succession of one entity or state on another upon which the replacement of the other by the one follows in accordance with a rule, however, is the concept of cause. The concept of cause is thus a necessary condition of the second act Kant takes to underlie our putative awareness of objective as opposed to merely subjective succession and hence of that putative awareness itself.

3. In order to posit, presuppose, assume, or judge that neither of two elements given in or through sense could exist without the other, we must have the concept of reciprocal dependence or dynamical community. The concept of reciprocal dependence or dynamical community is thus a necessary condition of the act Kant takes to underlie our putative awareness of simulteneity or coexistence and hence of that putative awareness itself.

Now what this entails, I suggest, is that the analogies of experience carry out the strategy introduced in the much earlier passage from A92-4/B125-6 in regard to the pure concepts of substance, cause, and community. What needs to be shown in a deduction of such concepts, Kant has said in that passage, is that only through them is it possible to know or recognize (erkennen) something as an object, that they are antecedent conditions under which alone anything can be thought as object, and/or that they are necessary conditions of the possibility of experience. But what is purportedly shown in the first and second analogies, as we have now seen, is that our putative awareness of objective as opposed to merely subjective succession depends on our having (and using) the concepts of substance and cause. Only through these concepts, it would follow, can we know or recognize a succession as objective. Only through these concepts, that is to say, can we know or recognize something as an object with respect to succession. Only if we already have these concepts, it would also seem to follow, can we believe or think that a succession is objective. Hence these concepts, it would follow, are also antecedent conditions under which alone anything can be thought as object with respect to succession. And given that what is commonly and naturally referred to as experience contains at least the putative awareness of objective as opposed to merely subjective succession, it would follow a well that these concepts are necessary conditions of the possibility of what is commonly and naturally referred to as experience.

Similar points can be made about the concept of reciprocal dependence or dynamical community. What is purportedly shown in the third analogy is that our putative awareness that two or more elements of the manifold given in or through sense are coexistent depends on our having (and using) this concept. It would follow from this that only through the concept in question is it possible to know or recognize that something (namely the coexistence of two or more elements of the manifold) is objectively the case and thus to know or recognize it as an object. Only through the concept in question, it would thus follow, is it possible to know or recognize something as an object in this crucial respect. It would follow as well that the concept in question is an antecedent condition under which alone it is possible to believe or think that there is a distinction between objective and merely subjective when it comes to time order and thus think anything as object in this crucial regard. And given that what is commonly and naturally referred to as experience includes at least the putative awareness of coexistence, it would furthermore follow that the concept in question is a necessary condition of what is commonly and naturally referred to as experience.

V

Let us now connect all the dots. In the analogies of experience, we appear to find arguments that carry out the strategy put forth in the much

earlier passage from A92-4/B125-6 in regard to the crucial concepts of substance, cause, and community. That strategy, however, is clearly the strategy of the objective side or objective deduction. That side or deduction, moreover, is explicitly said in the preface to A to be the only essential side or deduction. This clearly implies that it cannot depend – at least not essentially – on the subjective side or deduction. The subjective side or deduction concerns imagination and apperception. It follows from the preface to A, therefore, that nothing that depends –at least essentially – on considerations relating to imagination and apperception can belong to the objective side or deduction. There do not appear to be any proofs in the substantive sections (i.e. sections 2 and 3) of the chapter explicitly devoted to the deduction in A that could be separated from the considerations relating to imagination and apperception adduced there and still show that it is only through some or all of the concepts identified at A80/B106 that something can be known or recognized as an object, that some or all of these concepts are antecedent conditions under which alone anything can be thought as object, and/or that some or all of these concepts are necessary conditions of the possibility of what is commonly and naturally referred to as experience. There do not appear to be any proofs in the substantive sections of that chapter, therefore, that meet both of the criteria that must apparently be met by the objective side or deduction. The arguments we have seen from the analogies, however, *do* seem to meet these criteria. Not only do they show (if successful) that the concepts of substance, cause, and community are conditions under which alone something (whether succession or coexistence) can be known or recognized as an object, that these concepts are antecedent conditions under which alone anything can be thought as object with respect to succession or time order, and that these concepts are necessary conditions of what is commonly and naturally referred to as experience; they also seem free from any essential dependence on considerations relating to imagination or apperception. It is thus hard to resist the impression that these arguments are the objective side of the deduction as it relates to these concepts or (more simply) the objective deduction of these concepts. And given that Kant appears to take the chapter explicitly devoted to the deduction to constitute a self-sufficient proof that these concepts as well as the others identified at A80/B106 have objective validity, it also seems that we are faced with two separate deductions and not merely with two different sides of a single deduction.

My conclusion, therefore, is that the arguments we have seen from the analogies are the objective deduction of the concepts of substance, cause, and community and that sections 2 and 3 in the first edition version of the chapter explicitly devoted to the deduction are wholly devoted to a separate deduction that would (if compelling) be sufficient by itself but is not held by

Kant to be essential.

VI

This may well seem extreme, but it also happens to fit with a mass of historical evidence presented and analyzed by Paul Guyer in *Kant and the Claims of Knowledge*. A close look at Kant's unpublished notes from the mid and late 1770's, argues Guyer, strongly suggests (1) that the sort of argument presented in the chapter of the *Critique* explicitly devoted to the deduction of the pure concepts of understanding is a late addition to his thought, (2) that Kant's original aim was only to show that the relational categories of substance, cause, and community have objective validity, and (3) that the manner in which he meant to show this was precisely that later embodied in the analogies of experience. This is shown especially strongly, holds Guyer, in a series of notes collectively known as the *Duisburg Nachlass*: This collection, he writes

does not suggest the distinction later made in the *Critique* between the transcendental deduction of the categories and separate arguments for the principles of judgment. Instead it makes the role of the categories in the determination of the *temporal structure of experience* central throughout. In fact, the *Duisburg Nachlass* attempts to show only that the three relational categories of substance, causation, and composition and/or interaction are the conceptual (rather than intuitional) conditions of the possibility of experience.[13]

"The transcendental theory of experience put forth in the *Duisburg Nachlass*," he later adds

> is…essentially a theory of time determination. What this suggests is that the theory of time determination developed in the analogies…does not merely represent the application of Kant's transcendental deduction of the categories to the special case of empirical or even scientific knowledge but instead reflects the historical origin of Kant's deduction. Indeed, Kant's original conception of the transcendental theory of experience not only contains no distinction between the transcendental deduction of the categories and the proofs of the principles of empirical knowledge, no distinction between a more general theory of the categories and a more specific theory of time determination; it also virtually consists of the analogies of experience alone.[14]

What this suggests, if correct, is (a) that the only pure concepts of understanding originally thought by Kant to be in need of a transcendental deduction were those with which he is concerned in the analogies, and (b) that the analogies were supposed to *be* the transcendental deduction of those concepts. The interpretation of the analogies outlined earlier in this paper differs quite profoundly from that of Guyer himself, but my claim that the objective deduction of the pure concepts of substance, cause, and community is found in the analogies rather than the chapter explicitly devoted to the

deduction of these and other pure concepts of understanding would seem to both support and be supported by his analysis of the unpublished notes from Kant's "silent decade".[15]

Endnotes

[1] See James Van Cleve, *Problems from Kant* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 73. See also Gregory M. Klass, "A Framework for Reading Kant on Apperception: Seven Interpretive Questions," *Kant-Studien*, 94. Jahrg., p. 80.

[2] Immanuel Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, trans. James W. Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1977), p. 6 (pp. 260-1 in the standard AA pagination)

[3] I take this to be said at A194-5/B239-40, A195/B240, A198/B243, A200/B245-6, A201/B246-7, and B233-4. It must be admitted, of course, that the interpretation of these passages is extremely controversial. Paul Guyer, for instance, denies that Kant is ever concerned in the second analogy (or anywhere else) with conditions of our *putative awareness* of objective as opposed to merely subjective succession; he takes Kant to be concerned exclusively with conditions under which alone our judgments that one event as opposed to another has occurred can be verified or confirmed. [See his *Kant and the Claims of Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 237-66.] A detailed defense of my views in this regard would require extensive analysis of the relevant passages and thus prevent discussion of the issues I wish to address in this paper. It should be noted, however, that the contention that Kant is concerned with conditions of putative awareness and not (or not merely) with conditions under which judgments of a certain sort can be verified or confirmed is shared by such commentators as Patricia Kitcher and Beatrice Longuenesse [See Patricia Kitcher, *Kant's Transcendental Psychology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 174-8. See also Beatrice Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge: Sensibility and Discursivity in the Transcendental Analytic of the "Critique of Pure Reason"* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 358-68, especially the footnote to p. 364.]

[4] All translations from the *Critique of Pure Reason* are mine. References to the *Critique* employ the standard procedure of using "A" and "B" to distinguish between the first edition of 1781 and the revised second edition of 1787. Translations from this work are based on the text prepared by Raymond Schmidt (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1956).

[5] Among them are A. C. Ewing, C. D. Broad, H. J. Paton, and Lewis White Beck. [See A. C. Ewing, *Kant's Treatment of Causality* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1924), pp. 83-5; C. D. Broad, "Kant's First and Second Analogies of Experience," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 25 (1926), p. 192; H. J. Paton, *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience* (New York: MacMillan,

1936), vol. two, p. 194; Lewis White Beck, *Essays on Kant and Hume* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), p. 144]

[6] Among the most prominent are C. D. Broad, Jeffrie Murphy, and William L. Harper. [See C. D. Broad, "Kant's First and Second Analogies of Experience, pp. 206-7; C. D. Broad, *Kant: An Introduction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 171-2; Jeffrie Murphy, "Kant's Second Analogy as an Answer to Hume," *Ratio* 11 (1969), pp. 75-8; William L. Harper, "Kant's Empirical Realism and the Distinction between Subjective and Objective Succession," *Kant on Causality, Freedom, and Objectivity*, eds. William L. Harper and Ralf Meerbote (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), pp. 129-31]

[7] See Lorne Falkenstein, "Hume's Answer to Kant," *NOÛS* 32:3 (1998), pp. 348-53

[8] The view outlined in this paragraph is that of Longuenesse. See her *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, pp. 333-40 and 358-68.

[9] The German term "erkennen" can mean either "to know" or "to recognize". Which it means in Kant is not always clear. The same is true in the case of "Erkenntnis", which can mean either "knowledge" or "recognition". I thus try to avoid equating these terms to quickly and exclusively with "to know" and "knowledge". It should also be noted that the standard English translation of the *Critique* (that of Norman Kemp Smith) inserts italics into this passage that are not to be found in Kant's German original. What Kant is made to say in that translation is that "all experience does indeed contain, in addition to the intuition of the senses through which something is given, a *concept* of an object as being thereby given". On my interpretation of this passage, it would have been far better to italicize "object" than "concept".

[10] It *is* organically connected with one earlier passage; that which introduces the doctrine of synthesis in section 3 of the preceding chapter entitled "The Clue to the Discovery of All Pure Concepts of Understanding". The passage in question, however, is one of the most peculiar in the *Critique*.

[11] See A50/B74, for example.

[12] James Van Cleve is one example. See his *Problems from Kant*, p. 77.

[13] *Kant and the Claims of Knowledge*, p. 27

[14] *Ibid*., p. 62

[15] The interpretation of the analogies put forth earlier in this paper takes them to be what Guyer would call a psychological model of the generation of beliefs. According to Guyer himself, they are what he calls an epistemological model of the confirmation of beliefs. My grounds for rejecting his view on this matter are outlined in an article entitled "Two Major Recent Approaches to Kant's Second Analogy" (forthcoming in *Kant-Studien*).

Kant's Ideal of the University as a Model for World Peace

Stephen Palmquist*

1. Conflict and Peace in Kant's Critical Philosophy

Conflict is such a crucial concept in Immanuel Kant's critical philosophy that its role can hardly be overstated. Without conflict, the human mind could not function. Knowledge would be impossible if sensibility and understanding did not stand in stark opposition to each other, "preaching different gospels," as it were. Reason itself does not free us from conflict but only raises the stakes: in our attempts to think about objects that go beyond the bounds of sensibility, we find ourselves giving two opposite yet equally reasonable answers to the most meaningful questions human beings can ask themselves. Does God exist? Am I free? Will I somehow continue to exist after my body dies? But the conflict does not stop there: our faculty of cognition (the source of our ability to know) opposes our faculty of desire (the source of our ability to act intentionally) in such a fundamental way that once again different perspectives arise. Questions that seem unanswerable by reason through theoretical cognition claim clear and distinct answers for themselves when raised by practical reason. Yet even practical reason has its inner conflicts, for it tells us we are radically free, yet it asks us to confine the range of our choices to the narrow realm of self-legislated moral law. The list of fundamental conflicts in Kant's philosophy could go on and on.

What is striking about each instance of conflict in Kant's philosophy is that its purpose is to *create peace*, not by destroying the opposition, but by recognizing and preserving its integrity, then working with the opposition to create a new reality. Sensibility and understanding form a partnership that alone makes *judgment* possible. Without intuitions, concepts would be empty; and without concepts, intuitions would be blind. Even speculative reason with its eternally irresolvable conflicts can be used, Kant tells us, as a "weapon of war"[1]—*not* as an offensive weapon that can eliminate the opposition, but only as a defensive weapon that can protect us against an

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enemy who does not understand the wisdom of preserving creative opposition (and who therefore wants to obliterate us, or our perspective). Theoretical and practical reason win a kind of peace in the third *Critique*, through the recognition that reflective judgments of beauty, sublimity, and natural purposiveness arise like a flower growing out of the turbulent ground of theory, when it allows itself to be tilled and fertilized by the noumenal insights of practice.

In Kant's *Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason*, the peaceful purpose of all critical conflict becomes fully apparent as a struggle between the radical evil that infects our nature and the potential goodness for whose perfection we were made. Note that the peace Kant envisions in that oft-misunderstood book is also *not* the mono-perspectival peace of what might be called "realized perfection". Through our own agency, we can never fully *become* what we believe God wants us to be; we can never entirely overcome the evil within us; but in the struggle, in learning to live with the enduring conflict and to hope for divine assistance, we find true and lasting peace on the moral or spiritual side of our nature.

Near the end of his life, having established the context of a philosophical system that shows over and over how lasting peace is achieved only through the acceptance of creative conflict in a context of mutual respect, Kant wrote two works that carried this lifelong conviction of his into new and culturally significant areas of application: *Perpetual Peace* (1795) applied this reasoning to the relation between state governments; and *The Conflict of the Faculties* (1798) applied it to the structure of a university's "faculties". As far as I know, the complementary nature of the theme and message of these two books has never been fully acknowledged. Yet the message of each can be heightened and deepened by seeing its relation to the message of the other. The purpose of this essay is to explore that relation by examining how Kant portrayed the ideal university not only as a model, but as a key player in establishing the very world peace that he elsewhere hoped—some would say naively—the whole world could enjoy.

2. Public Philosophical Conflict as the Transcendental Condition for Perpetual Peace

In what may be his single most widely read writing, *Perpetual Peace*, Kant proposes a detailed set of guidelines for transforming the natural tendency of nations to engage in hostilities and war into a world where all clashes between civilizations are resolved peacefully. Introducing the concept of *international law* as enforced by a free "federation of states," he lays out a framework of principles for cooperation between nations of vastly different cultures. His plan was a major inspiration behind the United Nations as it now stands, though the current body only partially implements

the policies Kant recommends. The book consists of two main sections, followed by two "Supplements" and two Appendices. Let us look briefly at the proposals Kant raises in each of these six parts.

After starting his book with a bit of ironic humor, about "perpetual peace" being achievable only in the grave, Kant advances in Section I six "preliminary" requirements for achieving peaceful resolution of clashes between different cultures or nations:[2] (1) the only valid peace treaties shall be those that do not provide a justification for some future war; (2) nations must not be treated as objects that can be bought, inherited, exchanged, or otherwise manipulated by larger nations; (3) armies must gradually be abolished; (4) a nation must not use credit to pay for any military conflict; (5) no nation shall use force to interfere with the internal governance of another nation; and (6) if or when a war is unavoidable, no nation shall engage in dishonorable strategies in carrying out their hostile acts. While the United Nations has made significant progress in establishing international laws that put some of these requirements in place, such as (1), (5), and especially (6), the other three are sometimes grossly violated by member states even to this day.

Section II of *Perpetual Peace* is devoted to an explanation of the three "definitive articles" that would need to hold in order for any union between nations to be able to establish and sustain a peaceful world. First, "The Civil Constitution of Every State Should Be Republican."[3] The three characteristics common to any republican constitution are the freedom of the citizens, the dependence of everyone on "a single common legislation", and the equality of all citizens before the law.[4] Kant goes on to clarify that "republican" here refers to "the way in which the state makes use of its power," not to the actual form of the state itself.[5] The latter can be either autocratic, aristocratic, or democratic, depending on whether one person, a small class of people, or all the people *possess* the power. A republican constitution is one that guarantees the *mode of administration* will be based on a "separation of the executive power (the administration) from the legislative;" any government that allows the ones who make the laws also to administer them is *necessarily* despotic, even if the despotism is hidden under the cloak of a popular, democratic vote.[6] And the only way this can happen is through a system of representation. Kant argues that such a system will discourage wars because in a republican state, the people must give their explicit consent before the state can go to war, and they will be unlikely to do so, since they are the ones who must pay the cost, both materially and with their lives.[7]

The second article requires that "The Law of Nations Shall be Founded

on a Federation of Free States."[8] Here Kant compares the relations between different states in his day to the condition of uncivilized "savages", who prefer to live in "lawless freedom" rather than to submit themselves to constraints in deference to their fellow human beings, so that everyone may live in a condition of "rational freedom."[9] In the same way, sovereign states paradoxically foster a condition of rational freedom for the citizens within their boundaries, yet tend to treat *other* states in barbaric ways. The problem is that, whereas citizens who disagree can appeal to a tribunal, such as the court system, to assist them in resolving their differences in a civilized way, *states* cannot appeal to any such tribunal. The federation of states Kant has in mind would give all the member states precisely such an avenue of appeal. Since "reason, from its throne of supreme moral legislating authority, absolutely condemns war," this federation will function as "a league of peace."[10] At first, such a federation is likely to be quite small, and the "international law" it creates for itself will bind only the member states; but when its benefits are seen by other states, it will gradually increase until it includes all the world's governments. For most fundamental among the principles of international law must be that the federation's purpose *cannot* be that of establishing "a law of nations as a right to make war".[11]

The third and final article is "The Law of Universal Citizenship Shall Be Limited to Conditions of Universal Hospitality."[12] Here Kant briefly points out that, as world travel and communication between states grows, so that "a violation of rights in one place is felt throughout the world, the idea of a law of world citizenship is no high-flown or exaggerated notion."[13] To protect the citizens of all states from such a threat, a basic principle of all international law must be "a right of temporary sojourn, a right to associate" shared by peoples of *all* nations.[14] This right, Kant explains, does not guarantee that a person must be allowed to become "a permanent visitor," but merely establishes "the right of a stranger not to be treated as an enemy when he arrives in the land of another."[15]

In the "First Supplement" Kant goes on to argue that the "great artist, nature" has "a built-in mechanism" that "guarantees" the slow progress of the human race toward the goal of international peace, as set out in the main part of the book. This mechanism operates in four stages:[16] hostility between different groups is necessary in the initial stage of human history in order to encourage people to spread throughout the whole earth; as the earth begins to fill up, groups living together must establish laws, thus creating different civilizations, so they can wage war on other groups hostile to them; the differences that naturally develop during this process (especially differences

in language and religion) prevent all people from being united in one civilization and therefore require a federation of separate nations to keep the peace amidst the continued tendency to clash; finally, as the idea of "world citizenship" becomes more and more prominent, different civilizations will come to recognize that peace is in everyone's best interests. That is, human self-interest, while constituting the very aspect of our nature that causes hostility and war in the first place, is also the key mechanism leading to peace.

The "Second Supplement" briefly states a so-called "Secret Article" that Kant believes must be present "subjectively" in any legislation leading the nations of the world along the road to perpetual peace. By this he means that the lawyers who draft the legislation must have this article in mind, and employ it in practice, even though it is not "objectively" part of any state constitution or body of international law.[17] It states: "The opinions of philosophers on the conditions of the possibility of public peace shall be consulted by those states armed for war."[18] Although few take Kant very seriously at this point, I believe this is an *absolutely crucial* part of his plan for enduring world peace. It is essential because if those who draft legislation depend solely on the *objective* articles, the path to peace will be devoid of what we might call the *transcendental conflict* that Kant views as a necessary condition of real peace. That is, legislators must be *open* to have their professional opinions challenged, analyzed, and subjected to the judgment of dispassionate reason by those with expertise in the latter, otherwise their legislation, drafted in a context devoid of creative conflict, will fail to establish the desired goal of peace.[19] Unlike Plato, Kant does not expect "[t]hat kings should philosophize or philosophers become kings;" rather, he only asks that those who belong to the "Faculty of Law" be willing to give those in the "Faculty of Philosophy" a fair hearing. Here Kant is clearly hinting at the central point of this paper: that the ideal of peaceful conflict within the university is the most effective model we can employ in order to realize world peace between nations.

Appendix I expounds further on the necessary opposition, or *conflict*, that exists between "politics" and "morality," at least as regards their different functions on the path to peace. Politicians, Kant argues, are typically immoral because of the inevitable relationship they have to those holding power: "they flatter the power which is then ruling so as not to be remiss in their private advantage, and they sacrifice the nation and, possibly, the whole world."[20] In direct contrast to philosophers, politicians "make a great show of understanding *men* … without understanding *man* and what can be made of him, for they lack the higher point of view of anthropological observation

which is needed for this."[21] He concludes that, although "objectively … there is no conflict between morals and politics," the reality of selfishness and evil in human nature necessitates that "[s]ubjectively … this conflict will always remain."[22]

Perpetual Peace concludes in Appendix II with an explanation of how "the transcendental concept of public right" can be used to establish *harmony* "between morality and politics"—the necessary condition for lasting peace. Here Kant proposes a "transcendental condition of public law: 'All actions relating to the right of other men are unjust if their maxim is not consistent with publicity.'"[23] After discussing several examples of this merely "negative" principle, Kant warns that "we cannot infer conversely that the maxims which bear publicity are therefore just," because those who wield sufficient levels of power have little need to conceal their plans, whether they are good or not.[24] The affirmative version of this basic transcendental principle is: "'All maxims which *stand in need* of publicity in order not to fail their end, agree with politics and right [i.e., morality] combined."[25] Careful attention to Kant's arguments in the apparently incidental Supplements and Appendices reveals that, if Kant's plan for perpetual peace between nations is *ever* to become a reality on earth, then a context *must exist* wherein philosophers are not only "allowed" but *encouraged* to engage in *open conflict* with legal professionals, through peaceful public discussion of universal principles relevant to actual legislation. In the remainder of this paper I shall argue that Kant believed such a context already exists, in the form of the *university*.

3. Conflict between University Faculties as the Empirical Expression of Perpetual Peace

Having briefly reviewed the content of Kant's masterpiece on peace, we should hardly be surprised to find that the last book Kant penned with his own hand—published just three years after *Perpetual Peace*—expounded on the very issue his earlier work had alluded to as the context where the transcendental condition for peace can be empirically realized: the empirical reality of academic debate between university faculties.[26] In his 1798 book, *The Conflict of the Faculties*, Kant offers a philosophical interpretation of the actual structure of the Prussian university system, portraying it as a vehicle for promoting just the sort of open public *conflict* between philosophers and various types of "professionals" that his previous work had treated as a transcendental condition for peace. The universities of Kant's day had a far simpler structure than our contemporary universities typically

do. Instead of a seemingly endless array of departments grouped into a smaller but still indeterminate number of faculties, the whole system consisted of four faculties divided into two types. The three "higher" faculties of law, medicine, and theology, were charged with the task of training the professionals (i.e., lawyers, doctors, and priests) whose task was to assist the public in solving problems relating to their property, their health, and their moral/spiritual well-being, respectively. The fourth faculty, philosophy, was called the "lower" faculty because its job was not to train professionals but to educate, examine, and if necessary, *chasten* all the other faculties in matters pertaining to reason. Kant's book is divided into three parts, devoted (at least in theory)[27] to an explanation of how the philosophy faculty engages in creative conflict with each of the three higher faculties.

Kant's assumption was that this ideal of peaceful yet creative conflict in an academic setting can *make a difference* to the general public, while causing them no harm, because the arguments of the philosophers can and should change the way lawyers, doctors, and priests deal with the public. An important difference between the lower and higher faculties, however, concerns the role of government regulation—an issue Kant deals with only incidentally throughout *Conflict*. (The book, of course, was published soon after the edict preventing Kant from publishing anything on religion had been lifted, so the issue was clearly at the forefront of Kant's mind.) Because the content taught and published by members of the higher faculties has a direct influence on those professionals who deal immediately with the public, the government has a responsibility to regulate what is taught by these faculties; the philosophy faculty, by contrast, does not train professionals and therefore should not have to answer to any authority other than reason. In this way, it fulfills a crucial role in any republican state, by providing a "checks and balances" system from within the state-sponsored educational system itself. When the potential of this system is fully realized, academic debate can not only exemplify the kind of healthy "conflict" that has the potential to make society a wiser and safer place to live; it can also actually *bring about* the goal of peace through its indirect effect on the general public.

Unfortunately, Kant's stated plan for this book was more of an idealized hope than an accurate account of what is actually written therein. For the only part that is treated in full accordance with his stated goal (namely, to show how the philosophy faculty, through its emphasis on rational self-criticism, can deepen and further the insights of the other faculties, while chastening their improprieties) is Part I, on the theology faculty. The other two parts, being essays Kant had written for previous publication elsewhere, only tangentially touched on the specific issue of *conflict* between philosophers and the relevant professionals (i.e., lawyers or doctors). As a

result of this defect in the composition of Kant's book—perhaps excusable due to his old age at the time of publication—the only detailed explanation of how empirical conflict in an academic setting can pave the way for peace is to be found in his account of the relationship between philosophers and theologians.

The theology faculty, according to Kant, adopts a wholly different standpoint from the philosophy faculty. Members of the two faculties are, in many respects, enemies—or perhaps "warring neighbors" would be an appropriate metaphor.[28] This is because the fundamental basis of the theology faculty's authority is its appeal to divine revelation. The Word of God (i.e., the Holy Scripture of whatever religious tradition is being taught), and the Spirit of God (i.e., the presence of God's voice in the interpreter's heart, leading him or her to formulate the right interpretation) are the fundamental basis for all consideration, both theoretical and practical. By contrast, the philosophy faculty's authority is grounded in reason alone. Because theologians must inevitably *make use* of reason whenever they interpret or apply the statements they find in Scripture, they are necessarily subject to the philosopher's critical analysis. Conversely, philosophers may offer interpretations and applications of Scriptural statements *without* subjecting themselves to the doctrinal restrictions of orthodoxy, because they (the philosophers) never step outside of their role as messengers of reason. If this paper were about religion and the conflicts between different religions, we would need to examine this part of Kant's book in great detail. But it is not; our concern is rather with politics and the conflicts between different states. I shall therefore resist the temptation to make further observations about Kant's views on the philosopher's conflict with the theologian.[29]

In applying the same principle of free and open (i.e., unregulated) conflict in a university-based setting to the faculty of law, Kant's intention would obviously be to suggest that the philosopher's role is to provide a universal, rational standpoint for assessing and improving our actual empirical legislation. Unfortunately, the essay that actually appears as Part 2 of *Conflict* deals only with the far more limited issue of whether "the human race [is] constantly progressing".[30] A few of Kant's arguments can be applied fairly easily to the university setting; for example, when he explains how the future of human history can be known a priori by noting such knowledge is possible "if the diviner himself *makes* and contrives the events which he announces in advance,"[31] we can surmise that this would be one of the key differences between the way the faculty of law and the faculty of philosophy deal with legal issues. Members of the faculty of law, strictly speaking, would have the sole task of teaching and interpreting the *given body of law*, as handed down by whatever body holds sovereign power in the

state (i.e., the monarch, the aristocracy, or the people as a whole). Members of the faculty of philosophy, by contrast, would have the task of determining *in advance* what law reason determines as best, and then comparing the existing body of law with this ideal in order to assess its validity.[32] Beyond this, we can surmise that Kant's underlying intention was to suggest that perpetual peace between nations will become a reality only when philosophers are given the right (at least "subjectively"—i.e., unofficially, or "in secret") to participate fully in the dialogue over matters of policy as well as in the character development of politicians—e.g., through moral and philosophical education.

Although Part 2 of *Conflict* does not deal directly with the conflict between philosophers and lawyers in the university, we may glean some important insights by looking further into what Kant does say there about the issue of world peace and its relation to different approaches to conflict. After making the above point about foreknowledge being a form of self-fulfilling prophecy, Kant goes on to compare politicians who institute laws aimed at preventing revolt (but who thereby *create* the very conditions for revolt) with preachers who "prophesy the complete destruction of religion and the imminent appearance of the Antichrist; and in doing so they are performing precisely what is requisite to call him up."[33] Next, Kant proposes three possible scenarios that would make prediction possible: the human race must either be "in continual *retrogression* toward wickedness, or in perpetual *progression* toward improvement …, or in eternal *stagnation* in its present stage of moral worth …".[34] He refers to the first option as "moral *terrorism*," but points out problems with all three options that make them equally untenable. Experience can never be a sufficient basis for solving "the problem of progress" because human beings are *free* and can at any point in time act in accordance with either a good or an evil disposition: what people "*ought* to do may be *dictated* in advance, but … it may not be *predicted* what they will do …".[35] To assume otherwise would be to adopt "the standpoint of Providence which is situated beyond all human wisdom;" for only God can experience the future before it happens.[36]

Nevertheless, Kant suggests that, if a "prophetic history" is to be advanced in a philosophical manner, "some experience" must be cited as an empirical grounding for one's reasoning.[37] A good example of such an experience, he claims, is the reaction of the general public in France to the revolution that had begun in 1789; he interprets this reaction as a clear sign of two moral causes operating in the society:

first, that of the *right*, that a nation must not be hindered in providing itself with a civil constitution, which appears good to the people themselves;

and second, that of the *end* …, that that same national constitution alone be *just* and morally good in itself, created in such a way as to avoid, by its very nature, principles permitting offensive war.[38]

What reason can discern as the "pure" (a priori) lesson to be drawn from this experience is that people are inclined, as a matter of their inner moral nature, "to striv[e] after … a republican constitution."[39] This memorable experience "has revealed a *faculty* in human nature for improvement such that no politician … might have conjured out of the course of things hitherto existing …".[40] On this basis, Kant advances a "philosophical prophecy": "the human race has always been in progress toward the better and will continue to be so henceforth."[41]

Although the bulk of this part of Kant's book does not deal very explicitly with the actual conflict between the university faculties of philosophy and law, he does emphasize at one point (§8) that "public instruction of the people in its duties and rights vis-à-vis the state to which they belong" constitutes nothing less than "*Enlightenment*" itself.[42] He then argues that the "free professors of law" who are "the natural heralds and expositors of these" duties and rights must *not* be the ones "officially appointed by the state" (i.e., members of the higher faculty of law, and all the professionals—lawyers and judges—who are taught by them); rather, they are "philosophers who, precisely because this freedom is allowed to them, are objectionable to the state, which always desires to rule alone …".[43] Only philosophers are able to teach "the eternal norm" (or "Platonic *ideal*") of "a constitution in harmony with the natural right of human beings," a norm "for all civil organization in general" that "averts all war."[44] For "the duty of the monarchs"—and in a democratic system, the *people themselves* are the monarch—is "to treat people according to principles which are commensurate with the spirit of laws of freedom (as a nation with mature understanding would prescribe them for itself)," and philosophers, unlike the members of the faculty of law, are able to convey this insight to the public, for they appeal to reason as their sole authority.

Had Kant paid more attention to the stated theme of his book here in Part 2, he surely would have said more about the conflict that will inevitably arise between philosophers who attempt to take up this duty (i.e., to educate the public in the true nature of law) and the legal professionals and teachers who teach merely the *status quo*. Instead, the remainder of Part 2 in *Conflict* merely clarifies two concluding points. First, the successful implementation of Kant's plan—starting, we may presume, with an openness in university law faculties to input from philosophers—will give rise only to a *legally*

better society, where people's external actions conform to principles of civility, without necessarily requiring any change in the moral corruption of human nature; as such, his plan must be distinguished from all *utopian* visions, whereby a *religious* revolution based on "a kind of new creation (supernatural influence) would be necessary." [45] Second, the plan can be expected to succeed only if it is implemented "*from top to bottom*"—i.e., according to "a well-weighed plan of the sovereign power"—for the simple reason that if the state is *not* supporting the plan, then it will have "no money left … for the salaries of its teachers who are capable and zealously devoted to their spheres of duty, since it uses all the money for war."[46] Thus, even with all its imperfections and awkwardness, the existing Part 2 of *The Conflict of the Faculties* provides ample evidence to enable us to conclude that for Kant the university was to be the *primary context* wherein, through the education of the public in an approach to law that is grounded in reason, the drama of the evolution of the human race from a random collection of warring nations to a single, peacefully coexisting partnership of nations with radically conflicting ideas, would evolve.

4. The Role of the Contemporary University in Promoting Perpetual Peace

In this year that marks the 200th anniversary of Kant's death, the foregoing review of these two relatively short essays, both written near the end of his life and clearly conveying one of their author's deepest and most urgent concerns, should leave us more convinced than ever of Kant's greatness. For the plan he sketched so long ago has, in fact, been a major influence on the thinking of politicians and political philosophers in the shaping of public policy during the intervening two centuries. Yet at the same time, the review may leave us somewhat discouraged at how far we still have to go. Far from eliminating war, the century that saw the creation of the United Nations and the institution of a whole body of international law aimed at protecting universal human rights *also* witnessed the most horrifying atrocities ever committed by human beings against other human beings throughout the whole history of humanity's time on earth. As technology advances, governments have become *more* adept at killing off their perceived enemies and *less* willing to sit down with them and dialogue until they reach the point where they can find a way to live in peace in spite of their conflicting perspectives.

Although he acknowledges a natural purpose for war in the early stages of human civilization—namely, it encourages people to spread themselves throughout the entire earth, in order to get away from their enemies—Kant argues that this initial purpose has been fulfilled, inasmuch as people now

inhabit the vast majority of the earth's land, and that this renders war no longer necessary in the modern era. Cultural differences, including "differences of language and of religion," should now be viewed in an altogether different light: as shades and hues on the single tapestry of humanity itself. As we saw even more clearly from our review of Kant's *Conflict*, these differences are not to be abolished, but *highlighted*, if the beautiful image of one world at peace with itself is to become a reality. Here, as throughout his major critical writings, Kant sees conflict not as an evil to be abolished but as a preliminary step on the road to concord. Despite its idealistic overtones, Kant seemed to be quite serious in promoting his plan as a *realistic solution* to the greatest human social problem, *war*. Why, then, do the conflicts we have witnessed during the past centuries, and in recent years, so rarely lead to the creative concord Kant had in mind? That is, why is war an even greater problem today—especially in light of the threat from weapons of mass destruction—than it was in Kant's day?

Kant's answer, I suggest, would be that the world's universities in general, and their philosophy departments in particular, have largely failed to realize their calling as the *instruments of peace* in their respective societies. This may be due in part to a lack of receptiveness on the part of governments and/or the law schools and those trained by them to give ear to the rational arguments being put forward by philosophers. But in larger part the responsibility lies with philosophers themselves, who in a majority of cases are quite happy to live in the false peace of their ivory towers, talking *only with each other* about the problems and issues they should be promoting in the public square. Is it any wonder that few outside the discipline of philosophy have listened seriously to what we philosophers have been saying?

Some would say the rise of terrorism in the last quarter of the twentieth century, as well as its association with Islam in the first few years of this new century, casts a dark shadow of doubt over the validity of Kant's optimistic vision for a future when the nations of the world exist together in peace. But far from denying its validity, we could just as easily interpret the phenomenon of terrorism as a confirming expression of the reality of the natural mechanism Kant introduces in the First Supplement to *Perpetual Peace*, thus indicating that nature continues to challenge us when the political frameworks we construct lack viability. That is, terrorism could be regarded as the birth pangs of the human race's transition to the kind of *genuine* Federation of States Kant had in mind. Perhaps that is why terrorism came into being shortly after the United Nations was established, and reached a new crescendo when the break-up of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War left the USA as the world's only "superpower". World civilization cannot survive for long with only one dominant nation; nature

herself demands that a lone superpower be challenged; and since the United Nations cannot consistently do so, terrorism fills the gap. If we are to believe Kant's scenario, cooperation through an increased willingness on the part of *governments* to take seriously the reasoning of their philosophers—and a corresponding courage on the part of philosophers to make their reasoning known to the sovereign power, even when it may be unpopular—is the only promising way forward.

The fact that peaceful conflict can take place within the university setting, as exemplified by truly international conferences such as this one, suggests that terrorism (like war in general) is a direct result of an imbalance of power between nations or people groups, and is particularly serious when one country is the dominant force in world politics. To attempt to solve this problem by annihilating the persons engaged in terrorist activities is therefore a step backwards; it will only add fuel to the fire. A more forward-looking solution is to redress the imbalance between the world powers representing different cultures. As philosophers, we must take seriously our potential role as peacemakers by encouraging our governments to adopt policies of engagement that promote balance and mutual respect between different nations and people groups. Although our modern universities are structured differently from those in Kant's day, with the departments of philosophy no longer enjoying a privileged position—indeed, in some universities they no longer exist at all!—we should still aim to practice Kant's high ideal of peaceful, creative conflict. If Kant could send us any message from his resting place in the grave, I believe it would be to remind us philosophers that we really can help solve contemporary political problems, and that once we realize this fact, we shall find we are closer than we ever before realized to the day when all the nations on earth, despite their radically conflicting perspectives, may live together in lasting peace.

Endnotes

[1] *Critique of Pure Reason*, B805. Kant uses the "weapon" metaphor throughout the section entitled "The Discipline of Pure Reason," for this is where he explains how we are to deal with the conflicts entailed by our rational nature.

[2] Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace*, tr. Lewis White Beck in *On History*, ed. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1963), 343ff. Page numbers refer to the pagination of the German *Akademie* edition, provided in the margin of the translation.

[3] *Perpetual Peace*, 349.

[4] *Perpetual Peace*, 350.

[5] *Perpetual Peace*, 351-352.

[6] *Perpetual Peace*, 352. Democracy without separation of powers (i.e., non-republican democracy) is despotic because " 'all' decide for or even against one who does not agree; that is, 'all,' who are not quite all, decide, and this is a contradiction of the general will with itself and with freedom."

[7] *Perpetual Peace*, 356.

[8] *Perpetual Peace*, 354f.

[9] *Perpetual Peace*, 354.

[10] *Perpetual Peace*, 356.

[11] *Perpetual Peace*, 356. Kant goes on to say (357): "The only conceivable meaning of such a law of nations [i.e., conceived as a right to make war] might be that it serves men right who are so inclined that they should destroy each other and thus find perpetual peace in the vast grave that swallows both the atrocities and their perpetrators."

[12] *Perpetual Peace*, 357.

[13] *Perpetual Peace*, 360.

[14] *Perpetual Peace*, 358.

[15] *Perpetual Peace*, 358.

[16] *Perpetual Peace*, 360f.

[17] *Perpetual Peace*, 368.

[18] *Perpetual Peace*, 368.

[19] Objective legislation made *without* the controlling conflict of the philosopher's voice echoing in the subjective background will never lead to world peace, because on their own, lawyers can be expected to do nothing other than look after their own self interest. As Kant puts it (*Perpetual Peace*, 369): "The lawyer, who has made not only the scales of right but also the sword of justice his symbol, generally uses the latter not merely to keep back all foreign influences from the former, but, if the scale does not sink the way he wishes, he also throws the sword into it…, a practice to which he often has the greatest temptation because he is not also a philosopher, even in morality."

[20] *Perpetual Peace*, 373.

[21] *Perpetual Peace*, 374. Kant proceeds to explain three rather cynical (though all too often, penetratingly accurate!) "maxims" that guide the typical professional at law. He then challenges his reader to stand up and be courageous in fighting against this feature of modern culture (376): "Let us … force the false representatives of power to confess that they do not plead in favor of the right but in favor of might."

[22] *Perpetual Peace*, 379.

[23] *Perpetual Peace*, 381.

[24] *Perpetual Peace*, 385.

[25] *Perpetual Peace*, 386.

[26] Actually, Kant wrote much of this book earlier, in the form of journal articles, and may have conceived of the idea of publishing it as a book right around the same time he wrote *Perpetual Peace*. Kant had to wait until the Prussian king died in 1798 to publish *The Conflict of the Faculties*, because it contained a section on his religious views, which he had been banned from publishing during the reign of that king.

[27] See note 26, and the further discussion of this issue in the main text, below.

[28] Kant uses a similar, territorial metaphor in the Preface to the first edition of his 1793 book, *Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason*. This was the book whose publication was regarded by the king's censor as a violation of the edict against publishing anything contrary to the church's traditional position on matters of religion. The Preface discusses the basic differences between what Kant there calls the "philosophical theologian" and the "biblical theologian," concluding that the two neighbors, despite their fundamental differences, have the potential to be "at one," if only they will respect each other's fundamental perspectives and work towards mutual self-understanding.

[29] I have, however, discussed this issue in significant depth in two other publications: first, in my book, *Kant's Critical Religion: Volume Two of Kant's System of Perspectives* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), especially Chapter IX; and second, in my essay, "Philosophers in the Public Square: A Religious Resolution of Kant's *Conflict of the Faculties*," Chapter 12 in *Kant and the New Philosophy of Religion*, ed. Chris L. Firestone and Stephen R. Palmquist (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005).

[30] Immanuel Kant, *The Conflict of the Faculties*, tr. and ed. Allen W. Wood and George Di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 79. Page numbers refer to the German pagination provided in the margin. Section numbers, where cited, refer to Kant's numbered sections in Part 2 of the book.

[31] *Conflict*, 80 (§2).

[32] This is precisely what Kant did in *Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason*, only as applied to the faculty of theology. The Preface to the second edition of that work describes these two tasks (determining in advance what rational religion should be, then comparing one empirical religion with that ideal) as the two "experiments" being conducted in that work. Kant's decision *not* to address directly (in Part 2 of *Conflict*) the need for such a pair of experiments as applied to the faculty of law might suggest that Kant's own experience of a very real

threat of *legal* prosecution, as a result of his own violation of government censorship, was simply too fresh in his mind for him to address the issue explicitly, even after the censorship was lifted. Perhaps he was all too aware that his own *failure* to take up the role of a true philosopher in that situation would have been all-too-apparent, had he written Part 2 in the same direct way he wrote Part 1.

[33] *Conflict*, 80 (§2).

[34] *Conflict*, 81 (§3).

[35] *Conflict*, 83 (§4).

[36] *Conflict*, 84 (§4).

[37] *Conflict*, 84 (§5).

[38] *Conflict*, 89 (§8).

[39] *Conflict*, 87-88 (§7).

[40] *Conflict*, 88 (§7), emphasis added.

[41] *Conflict*, 88-89 (§7). Kant qualifies this prophetic proposition in a way that must have impressed Nietzsche: "provided at least that there does not, by some chance, occur a second epoch of natural revolution which will push aside the human race to clear the stage for other creatures…" (89).

[42] *Conflict*, 89 (§8).

[43] *Conflict*, 89 (§8).

[44] *Conflict*, 90-91 (§8).

[45] *Conflict*, 91-92 (§9).

[46] *Conflict*, 92-93 (§10).

The Logical Mechanism of a *Necessary Illusion*

Bogdan Popoveniuc*

Abstract

The doctrine of contradiction, in particular of antinomy, as inherent in nature of things, is as old as ancient philosophy. Therefore, it is not a surprise that Kant characterized his reflection on the antinomies as the point from which he started to build his critical system. His attempt to solve the problem of human reason has been evaluated in different ways as time has passed by. The present article is focused on the first two antinomies (the cosmological or mathematical-transcendental antinomies). We don't intend to analyze the viability of the solution suggested by Kant or of his argumentation, but rather to make a strictly logical analysis of the transcendental Idea of "World" in the very way it was defined by Kant. According to this analysis we show that is a logic error to define the notion of world in such way. The antinomies resulting only from that and, consequently, it is not necessary to introduce the conflict between intellect and reason in order to explain it. In brief, the definition he gives to "world" – the mathematical sum-total of all phenomena ***and*** *the totality of their synthesis, alike through composition and through division – leaves out the fact that the apprehensive synthesis necessary for the world to be turned into an acquired knowledge is already supposed to have been carried out for the phenomena which constitute the world, otherwise they couldn't be considered as phenomena. This means, the "world" is the phenomenon of all phenomena, therefore a notion defined incorrect from logical point of view. Thus, the accomplishment of what is, in effect, a synthesis of synthesis represents a totally unjustified demand, which Kant imposes on concept of the "world" so as to be accepted as knowledge. It is about a discriminatory demand, because if we treat in the same manner other concepts that are accepted, even*

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by him, as knowledge, few of them would pass this test. However, this logical analysis can lead us to an alternative solution of these antinomies, one alike Kant used to solve the dynamical- transcendental ones, that is a "positive" one.
Keywords: *Kant, antinomies, logical analysis, world's definition, alternative solution*

* * *

For Kant the antinomies are a commonplace **reductio ad absurdum** demonstration, which renders evident the natural contradiction "which human reason must necessarily encounter in its progress"[1]. In a few lines he proofs very convincingly the obvious truth both the theses and the antitheses. Could anything be objected to a clear demonstration like this? Nothing else but the fact that, the entire argumentation starts from a *logically incorrect definition*.

Let's take Kant's definition of the world. World means "the mathematical sum–total of all phenomena **and** the totality of their synthesis, alike through composition and through division"[2]. I will show that from a logical point of view this definition can be considered incorrect for three reasons. First, it is a constructive definition of a concept of an infinite multiplicity and as such has thus having a contradictory character; second, it is a definition by accident; and third it is an idem per idem definition.

Let me explain this in more detail.

When I say the world is infinite or finite in space or in time, I detach myself from the attributes of space – which is infinite -, or of the synthesis – which is finite - and I try to attribute a measure to the world. But the world is the synthesis of phenomena, a synthesis successive in time as much as the latter's size allows, that is unlimited because time is infinite. Or, for the second part of the antinomy, the world is the synthesis of phenomena, a synthesis successive in time within the infinite intuition of space. Thus the contradictory character of the world is a concept, which results from the very definition: the world is a synthesis successive in time and *finished* (in *infinite* space or time). It means the world is an *infinite finished* synthesis. Thus we find ourselves face with *a constructive definition of a virtually infinite collection of objects*, but the rules of the logic forbid such things.

Secondly, that the world is the synthesis of all phenomena in space or, more clearly, a synthesis in space, is a definition by accident because from the concept of world I can't infer this synthesis, which is being done. This situation appears because the attribute of the synthesis, which is attributed to the world, has nothing to do with the aggregate of all phenomena, but only with the second part of the definition, attached (arbitrarily?) by Kant to the concept of world. It might be objected that, by virtue of the demands of the *Critique* I am not allowed to say anything about the world in itself because

the concepts of the intellect do not apply to things in themselves and that is why the world consists of this very synthesis of phenomena composition. To this, however, one may respond that by definition the world is the aggregate of all phenomena and by no means a thing itself, and that they are phenomena already presupposes that synthesis carried out by the laws of the intellect. The fact that entire world is not known (yet) does not imply that it not exist, at least as a possibility, as Idea of reason. Here we encounter one of the situations, which made Alexander Bain to see in these sentences, which are expressing an accidental attribute, the Kant's synthetical sentences. "Indeed, in such sentences, the predicate, being a positive addition to the subject is not contained, in any way, neither directly nor indirectly, in the subject. In other words, the link between the subject and the accidental predicate in such a sentence has no logical foundation as in the essential, identical verbal sentence (Kant's analytical sentence), but has exclusively a foundation in a *fact*, a *finding*, or an *empirical foundation* (in the broadest sense of the word).

This observation is extremely important because if the accident has a *foundation in fact* and nothing else, we have no other means of determining the accidental properties of a thing than indicating it in a concrete manner, because it does not come from the definition of the thing it possesses"[3]. In other words, the error in definition is the one that forces me to show the object corresponding to this synthesis in the experience. If this feature of the synthesis of phenomena had not been *accidentally* attributed to the concept of the world and if it had been limited strictly to its meaning – of the aggregate of all phenomena – there would not have been the *obligation* of showing in *reality* this accomplished synthesis. I believe that not even Kant himself, during his geography classes, would not have defined the field as: "a vast soil surface without significant rugged land **and** the totality of their synthesis, alike through composition and through division."

But the problems, which the empirical synthesis as constitutive part of the world raises, are much more complicated. The necessity of this synthesis *seems* to go without saying because only the phenomena can be known, and they suppose this synthesis of the manifold in intuition. And "phenomena are all without exception *magnitudes*, indeed *extensive magnitudes*. As intuitions in space or time, they must be represented through the same synthesis whereby space and time in general are determined."[4]

From this we must conclude that the world, according to the given definition can't be anything else but the concept of a phenomenon (and not at all that of an Idea!). Only that, in this case, the world is a little more special phenomenon because if it has to be obtained, at least apparently, in the same conditions as the concepts about phenomena, then it means that the Idea of world means in fact *the phenomenon of all phenomena*. And it is

obvious that this is an *idem per idem* definition, that means it is not a definition at all. What happens is subject to the more general case of the class of all classes. The class of all classes is not defined because "we take the notion of class and its definition and we require this definition to define another class, the class of all classes; but the definition of the notion of class can't be *definiens* for no other class but for the class notion so, if we try to define another class with this definition, we obtain a false *idem per idem* definition.

The class of all classes is nothing else but the extension of the notion of class. This is the reason for which it is not possible for us to define the class of all classes through the class notions except if we do this through an *idem per idem* definition."[5]

It is exactly what happens when I try to define the world as an "aggregate of all phenomena" *and also* as a synthesis in their composition and division, which is exactly as a phenomenon, more exactly as a phenomenon of all phenomena. The definition of the phenomenon pretends to be defining another phenomenon. The phenomenon is the result of a synthesis of a manifold given in intuition and subordinated to a concept. In our case "the term 'world', in the transcendental sense, signifies the absolute totality of all existing things, and we direct our attention solely to the completeness of the synthesis, even though that is only attainable in the regress to its conditions."[6] In other words the concept does not even matter, but only the exposition of phenomena, which constitutes, according to the specific way of intellect functioning, the "*world" phenomenon*. "In the first place, the idea of absolute totality concerns only the exposition of phenomena, and does not therefore refer to the pure concept, such as the understanding may form, of a totality of *things in general*. Phenomena are here regarded as given; what reasons demands is the absolute completeness of the conditions of their possibility, in so far as these conditions constitute a series. What reason prescribes is therefore an absolutely (that is to say, in every respect) complete synthesis, whereby the phenomenon may me exhibited in accordance to the laws of understanding."[7] Kant applies a discriminatory treatment to the notion of world, a treatment unapplied to other concepts. In translation, what Kant requires in what concerns the Idea of World is for me to actually accomplish the synthesis of apprehension and this demand would exclude from the field of knowledge most of the concepts. I also do not believe neither that for Kant humankind means "all people and their synthesis in composition, that is in progressive development of this synthesis through composition", nor that he considers it an Idea of reason. Thus, Kant arrives at a contradiction, which he himself creates. If the absolute completeness is based on the fact that "phenomena are here regarded as

given", but the world "can be found only in the empirical regression of the series of phenomena", that is "it is never entirely given", we evidently have here a false problem, or an artificially created problem. Either the phenomena are considered to be given when they are not because they are only to be given through empirical regression, or they are really given, but they have to be given one more time through empirical regression to make up from their aggregate an phenomenon, which is the phenomenon of the "world", that is the phenomenon of all phenomena, a concept which is logically incorrect. (It seems that Kant apparently chose the first alternative. Although he says, „Appearances are here regarded as given; what reason demands is the absolute completeness of the conditions of their possibility, in so far as these conditions constitute a series", when he passes to the demonstration of the antinomies he says: "This, however, is impossible. An infinite aggregate of actual things cannot therefore be viewed as a given whole, nor consequently as simultaneously given."[8] And than what we should understand by „as given"?)

At the same time in our paper "The Mechanisms of Kant's Antinomies"[9], I have shown that the definition of the world in *The Critique of Pure Reason* contradicts the conditions for correctly defining a notion, either given or formed, as Kant in his *Logic* exposes it.

As an alternative solution to this situation, I suggest to come back to a statement made in *Logic*: „The Ideas can't be given by *composition*, because the whole is, in this case, prior to the parts."[10] It seems that Immanuel Kant, because of systemicity needs, gave up or ignored this prior (pure logical) conception. It is clear that he never rejected it explicitly. That is why I suggest that the real Idea of reason is the world defined as "the aggregate of all phenomena". We must underline that this is the Idea of world that isn't self-contradictory and not the Concept of world. And because it is an Idea and not a concept we have the right to suppose that it can exist (as a possibility and not as knowledge). Otherwise, as Leon Brunschvicg said „with Kantian idealism philosophy rather got rid of syllogistic deduction than the thing in itself."[11]

Such a logical error can be strange coming from a rigorous thinker like Kant. But it becomes clear if we consider a fact noticed by a few of Kant's commentators, that his theory of knowledge limits the true cognition to the perceptual knowledge.[12] In the same time, there is a very important distinction that underlies the entire text of the *Critique*, although Kant never states this in a explicit manner (moreover, sometime he seems to make no difference between them), but it's only constantly supposed in his argumentation: the distinction between *the possible experience* - which we could call it the *real* possibility of the experience, the one which could be

completed in a real manner in the sensibility; and *the possibility of the experience (in general)* - which we could called it the *transcendental* (and not transcendent) possibility of the experience. The existence of this two types of *possible experience* are utterly revealed in the moment when they are placed face to face and used against each other in the proofs of the antinomies. The former type of possible experience is related with the empirical intuition and the concepts of the understanding while the latter is connected rather with the pure intuition and the principles of the reason. I just pointed this problem up, like a possible way to read Kant's *Critique*, without any further development, because the aim of this article is to focus only upon the logical issues of the *Transcendental Dialectic*.

In the same time I consider that this perspective can lead to a positive solution of the "mathematical-transcendental antinomies", satisfying both the intellect and the reason, just as in the case of the dynamic-transcendental antinomies. And this can be done not by launching *transcendental artifices* as Kant does for the last two antinomies (using, for example the *meta-critical* concept of *Causality through Freedom*, to solve the third), but by exploiting the new paradigms of modern physics: the relativity theory's *hyper-sphere* for the problem of world's magnitude in space, the *no-boundary condition* for the world's beginning in time and *wave-particle complementarity* for matter's divisibility problem. I consider, and I argue this somewhere else[13], that this is possible without losing a part of the essence of Kant's conception.

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Endnotes

[1] I. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B, translated into Romanian by N. Bagdasar and Elena Moisuc, Bucharest, IRI Publishing House, 1994, p. 358. This work will be abbreviated in subsequent references as *Critique*. For the quotations from

Critique of Pure Reason I also used the e-text version of Norman Kemp Smith translation, site internet: http://www.hkbu.edu.hk, but I will use *phenomenon* instead of *appearance*, because I consider that in Kant's view the phenomenon it is more than a simple appearance (anyway, it is something distinct)

[2] *Critique*, B, p. 356

[3]Anton Dumitriu, *The solution of the logic-mathematical paradoxes*, Pub. Ştiinţifică, Bucharest, 1966, p. 162.

[4] *Critique*, B, p. 188

[5]Anton Dumitriu, *op. cit.*, p. 134

[6] *Critique*, B, p. 357

[7] *Critique*, B, p. 355

[8] For a detailed analysis of the errors of argumentation in Kant's antinomies see: Anton Dumitriu, *The Metaphysical Value of Reason* Pub. *Grinta*, Cluj-Napoca, 2001, pp. 43-71

[9] "Mechanism of Kant's antinomies", in S. T. Maxim, V. Guliciuc (coord.), "2001: Humanism and Education", "Stefan cel Mare" University Press, Suceava, 2001. In this paper I also analyzed the problems raised by the logical method of proof used by Kant here, the apagogic one.

[10] I. Kant, *Logic*, translated into Romanian by Alexandru Surdu, TREI Publishing House, 1996, p. 148. And is known that the entire structure of the *Critique* was prearranged and guided after his *Logic* course.

[11] Leon Brunschvicq, *L'expérience humaine et la causalité physique*, Paris, Alcan, 1922, p. 454

[12] I developed this idea in my PhD. dissertation: "The Mathematical-transcendental Antinomies and its Destiny in the Contemporary Philosophy and Science" (unpublished),

[13] In the same work

Ontological and Phenomenological Distinctness in Kant's Refutation

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Abstract

The paper examines several of Kant's posthumously published notes in an effort to settle a long-standing interpretive issue regarding the Refutation of Idealism: Are the objects that condition inner experience external in the strong sense of being completely independent, numerically distinct things in themselves? Or are they just external in the weaker sense of appearances having spatial form? Kant rewrote the proof of the Refutation several times after 1787, but these later versions have been largely ignored in the secondary literature. The author seeks to redress this neglect by undertaking a fresh analysis of the relevant Reflexionen. The only commentator in English who has looked at these notes in any detail is Paul Guyer, who believes that they support the stricter interpretation of externality unambiguously. And the evidence they provide colours his now famous interpretation of the Refutation. In this paper the author tries to show that the notes point to precisely the opposite conclusion—that the objects of the Refutation are only external in some weaker sense. The paper can thus be seen as an historically motivated argument for a more modest view of the Refutation's conclusion, offsetting the more ambitious reading prevalent in much of the current literature.

Keywords: *Kant, Refutation of Idealism, Reflexionen, Guyer*

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There is a wealth of literature dealing with what appears to be a contradiction at the heart of Kant's theoretical philosophy. On the one hand, Kant claims to be an idealist. The objects of experience are appearances only:

> In our system…these external things, namely matter, are in all their configurations and alterations nothing but mere appearances, that is,

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> representations in us, of the reality of which we are immediately conscious (A 371-72).

On the other hand, he styles himself a realist, offering—in the Refutation of Idealism added to the second edition of the first *Critique*—a proof that we have direct experience of external objects:

> The required proof must, therefore, show that we have experience, and not merely imagination of outer things… (B 275)

So external things are "representations in us," and yet the Refutation of Idealism shows that we have "immediate consciousness of the existence of other things outside" us (B 276).The interpreter of Kant's metaphysics must find a way to relieve this tension by showing that Kant's refutation of idealism is not at the same time a refutation of his own position.[1]

That task cannot be undertaken here. Instead I want to consider a prior but related question that was first posed clearly by Paul Guyer in 1987 (and which he has recently repeated)[2]: Are the objects under discussion in the Refutation—the objects that Kant thinks are the necessary conditions of our having inner experience—external in the strong sense of being *completely* independently existing things? Or are they external only in the weaker sense of having spatial form (which implies that they are *not completely* independent since space is a subjectively constituted form of intuition)?

The answer turns on a distinction drawn in the first edition between two ways in which things can be said to be *outside* of us. The first signifies "what as *thing in itself* exists distinct from us" (A 373). Kant says such things are "external in the transcendental sense" (A 373). Guyer calls this 'ontological' (also 'numerical') distinctness or independence (Guyer, 1987, 280). [3] The second meaning of 'outside us' is "what belongs solely to outer *appearance*" (A 373), that is to say, what is external in the merely 'empirical' sense. In Guyer's terminology, such things are 'phenomenologically' distinct, which means that they are things having the phenomenological form of objects in space, but which are not ontologically distinct or distinct in the transcendental sense. Guyer formulated the interpretative question regarding which sense of externality is at work in the Refutation of Idealism, and to my knowledge his is the only answer to be found in the English-language secondary literature that takes full account of the evidence provided by Kant's ten or more attempts to restate the proof in his unpublished notes. These notes are useful because they can throw new light on an argument that is very obscure in the printed text.

In this paper I want to reexamine the relevant *Reflexionen* (as the notes are called) with Guyer's question and answer in mind. I will try to show that this evidence does not adequately support his ontological reading of externality but points squarely to the *phenomenological* interpretation

instead. The focus is on those notes that speak most forcibly for the ontological reading, thus causing the greatest difficulties for my own view.

According to Guyer's dating (which I follow throughout), the first was written some time after October 1788:

> That if I make myself into an object space is not in me but (yet) is in the formal subjective condition of the empirical consciousness of myself, that is time, proves that something outside of me, that is, something which I must represent in a different manner [*auf eine andere Art*] than myself, is connected with the empirical consciousness of myself, and the latter (is) at the same time consciousness of an external relation, without which I could not empirically determine my own existence (**R** 5653, 18:309—Guyer's translation).

Guyer thinks this passage has nonreductionist implications—that is to say, it implies that objects are something more than mere representations, which, for Guyer, means independent, transcendentally real existence. He remarks, with a certain justice, that it is "hardly natural" to say of a mere state of the self that it is 'represented in a different manner' than the self (Guyer, 1987, 290). It is also unnatural to say that the object stands in an external relation to the self, if that object is conceived as being nothing more than a mental state.[4] But natural or not, the occurrence of such expressions does not necessarily imply that Kant's aim in the Refutation is to prove ontologically independent existence as a condition of time-determination. I will attempt to explain why.

In the sentence immediately preceding the passage Guyer quotes, Kant does say that there is a correlate to the inner, temporal representation of ourselves, and that we don't *know* this correlate [*ohne doch dasselbe zu erkennen*]. An unknown correlate would be transcendentally external of course, but there is no reason to believe that the transcendentally external thing makes inner time-determination possible. It is more likely that the sensible representation *of* this correlate makes inner experience possible, not the unknown correlate itself. Indeed, Kant says: "…the sensible, but real representation *of* this external relation is space; this representation itself however, and consequently everything that is represented in space, is in time" (**R** 5653, 18:309; italics added). After all, the spatial representation of an external relation between us and objects seems a more obvious candidate for making temporal determination possible than a merely inferred entity. And at the top of this page Kant writes: "[t]hat we must always perform the spatial and temporal determination simultaneously…". This is cryptic enough, but Kant's talk of space in this context gives some prima facie reason to believe that the phenomenal object, not its noumenal counterpart, is what makes temporal experience possible. We shall return to this passage in a moment.

Guyer finds further support for his ontological interpretation in a

reflection from 1793, where Kant writes:

> The impossibility of determining [our] existence in the succession of time through the succession of representations in us, and yet the actuality of this determination of [our] existence, [requires] an immediate consciousness of something outside me, which corresponds to these representations,* and this intuition cannot be mere illusion [*Schein*]…
>
> * (and which does not exist merely in my representation (rather (as thing) in itself)… (**R** 6323, 18:643—Guyer's translation).

The footnote following the asterisk is obviously crucial for the ontological interpretation. Kant quite clearly wants to say that the determination of our existence (i.e. of inner experience) requires an object 'outside' of us, and, according to this footnote, that object *exists as a thing in itself*. So Guyer's reading of the passage is defensible. But the evidence is only superficially compelling.

To take the realist bite out of Kant's remark we just need to bear in mind that while he does say that the object exists as a thing in itself, he does *not* say that it is its transcendent existence rather than the spatial representation *of* its transcendent existence that makes time-determination possible. I do not want to suggest that this note supports the phenomenological reading. My point is simply that it does not preclude it, and I think we should exercise caution in drawing our conclusion. There is nothing here to suggest that the object *qua thing in itself* has any role to play with respect to the temporal ordering of experience.

This caveat applies to the first passage discussed as well. There too reference is made to an object (or correlate) that exists 'extra-mentally', but I see no indication that the ontologically distinct item rather than its phenomenologically distinct representation is what conditions time relations. In fact, earlier in the same reflection Kant put inner experience and spatial objects into reciprocal dependence:

> but the empirical consciousness of myself (which consciousness constitutes inner sense)…can by no means occur immediately, and that the consciousness of other things outside of me…and the determination of their existence in space must be simultaneous with the determination of my existence in time. Thus I am no more [immediately conscious] of my own empirically determined existence than that of things—which I do not know as they are in themselves—outside of me (**R** 5653, 18:306).

Kant's wording here is potentially misleading. The 'things' referred to in the last sentence could be understood as things in themselves. In that case, 'my own empirically determined existence' would be co-conditioned by ontologically distinct objects. But this is a superficial reading.

We need only ask ourselves: *What*, for Kant, are the objects 'which I do not know as they are in themselves'? The answer is canonical: We do not know *appearances* as they are in themselves. And so it is appearances, that is, *phenomenal objects*, which stand in a relationship of mutual dependence

with inner experience. Kant remarks parenthetically, as he often does, that I know nothing of these (phenomenal) objects as they may be in themselves. But that is neither here nor there. What matters for us is that the objects determining temporal experience are spatial appearances, which, *qua* spatial, are known to be only phenomenologically distinct from the subject. The references to things in themselves signal only Kant's constant concern to caution us against falsely believing that in knowing appearances we know something about a transcendentally external world. They do not show that Kant wanted to implicate that world in a relationship of co-determination with inner experience.

Another passage that presents a possible stumbling block to the phenomenological interpretation comes from the fall of 1790, a passage which Guyer takes to be an "explicit endorsement of [ontological] realism" (Guyer, 1987, 291). Kant makes a familiar distinction between a representation and its object (I insert numbering for ease of reference):

> My representations cannot be outside me, and an external object of representations cannot be in me, for that would be a contradiction. It could well be, however, that [1] although the representation is in me its object is yet without contradiction outside me, or else [2] that the representation together with its object is in me. On idealism it is asserted that it is not possible to decide that the object of a representation is not in me along with its representation, even when the latter is represented (in intuition) as existing outside me. The realist, on the contrary, asserts of outer intuition that this is possible, and indeed correctly…(R 6315, 18:620—Guyer's translation).

A hasty reading suggests that what I have numbered [1] above represents the 'ontological' view that the object corresponding to the representation exists externally in the transcendental sense, while what Guyer calls the 'phenomenological' view is reduced to [2], which Kant clearly identifies with idealism. Guyer evidently interprets the passage in this way. He writes:

> Here Kant explicitly sides with the "realist" and aligns himself precisely with the position that we can know that in addition to our representations objects numerically distinct from them exist—even though this was just what he denied by his equation of appearances or empirical objects with representations in 1781 (Guyer, 1987, 291).

Yet perhaps [1] could also be read consistently with the phenomenological interpretation, so that the object of the representation is only external in the sense of having spatial form.

I think that this is a plausible reading. Notice first what it is that Kant says the idealist denies: The idealist denies that we can determine that the object is *not* in me, *even when the object is represented in outer intuition.* Kant is contrasting the idealist position with his own, so we might expect that his view would be that we *can* determine that the object is not in me *merely on the basis of its being spatial.* In other words, Kant's view should be that spatial representation is *sufficient* for determining externality. Indeed,

this is what he says: "The realist, on the contrary, asserts of outer intuition that this is possible, and indeed correctly…".

What's more, the text is ambiguous here, as between the realist asserting this 'of outer intuition', as Guyer has it, and the realist being a 'realist *of outer intuition*'. The latter squares better with Kant's own wording. It reads: "*Dagegen behauptet der Realist der äußern Anschauung, daß dieses möglich sey*," which I would render as: 'By contrast, the realist of outer intuition claims that this is possible'. The genitive applies to 'realist'. So we have a 'realist of outer intuition', who claims that the distinction between inner and outer objects (or between representations and objects) can be drawn simply insofar as 'objects' exhibit the form of outer intuition. And indeed, this is what Kant goes on to say.

Guyer has left out the last the three words of the sentence: "…for the following reason [*aus folgendem Grunde*]." And the reason is this: "What I represent to myself as spatial, cannot be counted as representation of inner sense, for the form of the latter is time, which only has one dimension. Just so, what is mere representation, I cannot make into an object of outer sense, since its form is space." Kant stipulates explicitly that what is a mere representation cannot be an object of outer sense. A simple *modus tollens* gives us: What can be an object of outer sense is not a mere representation. So being an object of outer sense is a sufficient condition of *not* being a mere representation, that is, of being an object. Kant clearly connects objecthood with spatiality. And thus what seemed to be strong support for the ontological reading turns out to be an argument against it.

The last passage I want to consider in support of the ontological interpretation is the one on which Guyer relies most heavily. It reads as follows:

> Since the imagination (and its product) is itself only an object of inner sense, the empirical consciousness (*apprehensio*) of this condition can contain only succession. But this itself cannot be represented except by means of something which endures, with which that which is successive is simultaneous. This enduring thing, with which that which is successive is simultaneous, that is, space, cannot in turn be a representation of the mere imagination but must be a representation of sense, for otherwise that which lasts would not be in the sensibility at all (**R** 6313, 18:614—Guyer's translation).

In a moment we will look at an intervening paragraph that Guyer has not included here. His translation continues thus:

> Since we therefore could not perceive succession in ourselves, and thus could not order [*anstellen*] any inner experience, if we could not also become empirically conscious of simultaneity, but since this latter is possible only by means of an apprehension ordered both forward and backward, which does not occur in the case of objects of inner sense, thus even inner experience can be thought only by means of the relation of our senses to objects external to

> us. (Inner sense would otherwise have to be represented as outside us, etc.) (**R** 6313, 18:614—Guyer's translation).

Guyer reconstructs Kant's reasoning along roughly the following lines. In order for us to be in a position to judge that two successive representations are in fact arranged in a determinate order, we must take them to be simultaneous with the successive states of an enduring object (see Guyer, 1987, 306). Call the successive states of the enduring object A and B, and assume two corresponding mental states which represent A and B, and which can be described approximately as 'being appeared to A-ly' and 'being appeared to B-ly', respectively. Finally, take it as given that time cannot be perceived. Under these conditions, it is not possible for us to distinguish between "(a) *now* being appeared to both A-ly and B-ly or else (b) *now* being appeared to A-ly and (*now* remembering) *previously* having been appeared to B-ly," unless the states of affairs, A and B themselves, constrain the possible sequence of the representations (Guyer, 1987, 307).

In other words, it will be possible to determine that one's present representational state is itself a representation of a succession of representations—(b) rather [than] (a)—only if A and B are themselves successive states of enduring objects, rather than, say, simultaneous states of affairs (Guyer, 1987, 307).

And Kant's view is supposedly that we can only judge that the successive representational states have a unique order if we consider them to be *caused* by successive states of enduring objects (Guyer, 1987, 309). But in order for us to think of the objects (or their states) as standing in causal relations to the self they need to be conceived as ontologically distinct entities.

A point to emphasize is that according to Guyer enduring objects are proven to be required for inner time-determination *independently* of any assumptions about their spatiality. And *because* they are conceived of as ontologically distinct from the self, we must represent them spatially, since space is the form of intuition that allows us to represent things as distinct from us. So the argument proceeds from the conclusion that we must conceive of numerically distinct objects as causal agents determining the order of our representations, to the further conclusion that, because these objects are distinct, we must represent them spatially.[5] Spatial objects do not play the role of the relatively permanent thing that makes inner time-determination possible, according to Guyer.

This argument is textually problematic. First, the passage that Guyer quotes really gives no clear indication that the objects in question must be ontologically distinct in the sense discussed. On the contrary, Kant says that the enduring thing "with which that which is successive is simultaneous" is *space*. And this in turn cannot be a representation "of the mere imagination"—the imagination being associated in the following *Reflexion*

with inner intuition[6]—but must be a "representation of sense." Presumably Kant means outer sense. In any case, the reference to 'sense' need in no way imply that the enduring object is a non-phenomenal (i.e. non-sensible) object that exists externally in the transcendental sense.

And the final parenthetical comment Kant makes is that if inner experience were not thought as related through sensation to 'external' objects, then inner sense would "have to be represented as outside us." In other words, inner sense would have to be conceived as a faculty of outer, that is, *spatial*, intuition—which is contradictory. This suggests that it is the spatiality of the external objects that equips them to be the enduring correlate of inner experience. Guyer rests his case for the ontological interpretation upon a selection that does not unambiguously support it.

What is worse for the ontological interpretation is that the passages immediately surrounding this one do strongly support precisely the opposite reading. The intervening paragraph that Guyer passes over is worth quoting in support of the phenomenological interpretation of externality:

> The simultaneity of A and B can not at all be represented without an enduring [object]. For all apprehension is in fact successive. But insofar as the succession can occur not only forwards from A to B, but also (as often as I want) backwards from B to A, it is necessary that A endure. The representations of sense A and B must have, therefore, another ground than that in inner sense, but yet in some [*irgend einem*] sense; consequently, in outer sense. Hence, there must be objects of outer sense (**R** 6313, 18: 614)

The conclusion of the argument is that there must be objects of outer sense, that is to say, there must be *spatial* objects. The conclusion is not that there must be ontologically distinct objects. Simultaneous representations have a ground in outer sense, Kant says, not in what is transcendentally external.

Guyer believes that Kant's argument makes an inference to the need for ontologically (i.e. transcendentally) external objects as standing in causal relation to our representations. This is just the inference that Kant rejected in 1781. But Guyer adduces this late note as evidence that Kant changed his mind about this point and came to recognize the ontologically realistic implications of his Refutation of Idealism. But the paragraph (even the sentence) immediately following Guyer's quotation speaks against that interpretation. Kant there denies just what Guyer attributes to him on the basis of the preceding paragraph:

> If our knowledge of outer objects had to be a knowledge of them (and of space) as things in themselves, then we would never be able to prove their reality from our sensible representations of them (as outside us). For only representations are given to us; the cause of them can be (either) in us or distinct from us [*außer uns*], about which the senses decide nothing. But if the representations of inner sense as well as of outer sense are only

> representations of things in appearance, and if even the determination of our consciousness for inner sense is only possible through representations external to us in space…[Here the text breaks off] (**R** 6313, 18:614-15)

Kant, we may safely assume, is about to say that the determination of our consciousness in inner sense is possible only through representations *external to us in space,* and he denies that we could have knowledge of objects as things in themselves. The paragraph upon which Guyer by and large bases his interpretation is sandwiched between two others that speak fairly clearly against it, so his reading could well come across as partial.

To review, Guyer thinks that the Refutation proves the need for ontologically distinct objects as a condition of inner time-determination, and that, *because* these objects have to be conceived of as (transcendentally) external, they must be represented spatially. It is their numerical distinctness that allows them to serve as the enduring object in relation to which temporal properties can be cognized. Their spatiality follows from that. I think that just the reverse holds: A case can be made that Kant seeks to prove that spatial objects—that is to say, phenomenologically distinct objects—are required for inner experience; that their spatiality is a necessary condition of the permanence needed for time-determination. And—here I add a new point—if anything follows about the existence of ontologically distinct entities it is *as a consequence* of the spatiality of the enduring objects. Insofar as the enduring objects are spatial, and thus, insofar as they are *appearances*, they imply at least the thought that *something* appears. That is just a principle of critical philosophy.[7] But it is not this empty thought that makes inner experience possible. Spatial objects do that. And if this interpretation of Kant's notes is correct, the Refutation of Idealism is his attempt to prove it.

Endnotes

[1] See Förster, 1985 (294-95) for a nice statement of the problem: "either the Refutation of Idealism is also a refutation of transcendental idealism, or it does not *refute idealism* at all."

[2] Guyer returns to this question in his 1998 paper. For an interesting historical precedent, see Sassen, 2000, 180.

[3] Guyer apparently uses 'ontological' and 'numerical' as synonyms. He never explains whether or not there is a distinction here.

[4] I argue elsewhere that this sort of talk does, with certain qualifications, make sense once the Kantian system is placed in (what I take to be) the proper perspective.

[5] Guyer makes his view very clear in the more recent piece on the Refutation. See Guyer, 1998, 315, 318.

[6] "*The imagination, if one is conscious of it as such, can also be viewed as inner sense-intuition*" (**R** 6315, 18, 619).

[7] I am thinking of Kant's claim in the preface to the second edition, viz., "…though we cannot *know* these objects as things in themselves, we must yet be in a position to *think* them as things in themselves: otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be appearance without anything that appears" (B xxvi-vii).

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A Critical Analysis of the Ground of Metaphysics and All Other Ontologies with Reference to Kant's and Heidegger's Works on Metaphysics

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Abstract

The position which we want to defend in this paper (our thesis) is that pure metaphysics is the ground of all other ontologies. We shall also show that the ground of metaphysics itself is the transcendental imagination and that it is only through enquiries into ontology, not anthropology, that we can recapture the pure productive imagination as the established ground of metaphysics. Thus, we believe that Kant devoted his efforts to the production of nonsense when he recoiled and resorted to antropologism as if it is practically feasible to recapture the pure productive imagination as the established ground of metaphysics via anthropological enquiries.

We have two categories of critics of metaphysics – the destructive critics of metaphysics and the constructive critics of metaphysics. Kant and Heidegger fall under the latter category. That is, they constitute the constructive critics of metaphysics and, in this paper, we have treated their metaphysical works, in detail, under that sub-heading.

Ontological knowledge, that is, man's ability for thinking metaphysically is ultimately grounded on the transcendental imagination. In other words, that kind of capacity is ultimately grounded on the finite human mind's free creation of profiles or images without the help of empirical intuition.

Every knowledge has connection with or influence on the world. There is no doubt about that. But it is equally true that there are some imaginative creations, which are not funded by objects of experience. A typical example is the advance formation of the aspects of the horizon of objectivity. It does not, at all, depend on objects of empirical intuition. The

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horizon of objectivity is the antecedent condition, which is so essential that, without it, no objective experience can be gained. Kant began the task of laying the foundation of metaphysics and this led him to the discovery of the transcendental imagination as the centre of man's mental capacities and that it is this seat of man's mental powers that makes ontological synthesis possible. He rightly indicated that the established ground of ontology is the disclosure of finite transcendence. Unfortunately, Kant later "recoiled" and resorted to antropologism. But, according to Heidegger, anthropology cannot found ontology for certain reasons which include the fact that the idea of it is so unclear that it is impossible for it to tackle or deal with the radical philosophical question of being and Prof. Unah has added that it is itself seriously in need of a foundation. Therefore, the problem of laying the foundation of metaphysics is rooted in the Dasein in man, in the question of the ultimate ground and this is the understanding of being as fundamentally existent finitude. This clearly explains why the laying of the foundation of metaphysics should have its starting point in a metaphysics of Dasein. This implies that the job of laying the foundation of metaphysics is also a type of metaphysics.

To carry out again the laying of the foundation of metaphysics, it is vitally important for us to make this metaphysics of metaphysics clear because if this is not done, it will not be possible for us to achieve a complete ground of metaphysics.

The question of the essence of man is the question that is essential for the laying of the foundation of metaphysics and this question is connected with the metaphysics of Dasein.

It was Heidegger who insisted that Kant's unfinished business should be completed and he maintains that it is only through ontology, not antroplogy, that we can recapture the pure productive imagination as the established ground of metaphysics. No amount of anthropological enquiries can yield this result.

Heidegger gave the main idea or fact of the duty of founding metaphysics on a metaphysics of Dasein and this outline appeared in his book, Being and Time, which was published in 1927.

Basically, the tone of Heidegger's thinking is subjective idealism. He himself admitted that the analysis of 'Dasein' is merely an act in a set of actions, which should result in, or lead

to fundamental ontology.
His delay in writing the second part and the fact that even in it he abandoned his original aim made some thinkers to suspect that he had resorted to subjective idealism. The analysis of Dasein does not show the truth of being. It only demonstrates the "shadow in a cave." The actual being makes itself known in the thinking of God.
However, we see a high level of consistency in Heidegger's philosophy. His philosophical stance in Being and Time, which was published in 1927, was radical idealism, which went to the extent of rejecting all subjective or idealistic expressions.
In concluding this paper, we would like to say, even at the risk of sounding repetitive, that pure metaphysics is the ground of all other ontologies and that the ground of metaphysics itself is the transcendental imagination.
Also, it is important to stress the fact that it is only through ontology, not anthropology, that we can recapture the pure productive imagination as the established ground of metaphysics.
Hence, we posit that no amount of enquiry into anthropology can reasonably or correctly yield such a result.
Thus, Kant devoted his efforts to the production of nonsense when he recoiled and resorted to antropologism as if we could recapture the pure productive imagination as the established ground of metaphysics through anthropological enquiries. He, however, deserves commendation for being the first to discover the transcendental imagination as the established ground of metaphysics, even though he later "recoiled" and resorted to antropologism.

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Introduction

Metaphysics is derived from two Greek words, namely "meta" and "physika." "Meta" means "after" whereas "physika" means "physics" or "nature." Therefore, the literal meaning of metaphysics is "after physics." The first person who employed the word was Andronicus of Rhodes who edited Aristotle's works around 70BC. Aristotle wrote some Articles on both physics and metaphysics, but he himself did not refer to his metaphysical articles as metaphysics. It was only his article on physics that he gave a name. He called it physics. His metaphysical article dealt with non-physical matters but he did not refer to them as metaphysics. According to Dr. Eshiet, Aristotle called the subject of his metaphysical texts first philosophy, theology or sometimes wisdom.[1]

Professor Omoregbe has said that apart from Aristotle's treatise on physics, he "also had some other treatises dealing with non-physical matters, but without a title."[2] But I prefer to use the phrase "without a particular title." When Andronicus was editing Aristotle's works for purposes of publication, he "placed the treatises dealing with non-physical matters after those dealing with physics."[3] Andronicus decided to call the treatises dealing with non-physical matters "meta physika" which literally means "after physics." Andronicus simply used the locution "meta physika" to show that the subjects of those treatises "came next after those dealing with physics."[4] Thus, as I have earlier said, Aristotle himself did not use the word metaphysics, it originated from Andronicus of Rhodes.

The position which we want to defend in this term paper (our thesis) is that pure metaphysics is the ground of all other ontologies. We shall also show that the ground of metaphysics itself is the transcendental imagination and that it is only through enquiries into ontology, not anthropology, that we can recapture the pure productive imagination as the established ground of metaphysics. Thus, we believe that Kant devoted his efforts to the production of nonsense when he recoiled and resorted to antropologism as if it is practically feasible to recapture the pure productive imagination as the established ground of metaphysics via anthropological enquiries.

We have two categories of critics of metaphysics – the destructive critics of metaphysics and the constructive critics of metaphysics. Kant and Heidegger fall under the latter category. That is, they constitute the constructive critics of metaphysics and, in this paper, we have treated their metaphysical works, in detail, under that sub-heading.

The Meaning Of Metaphysics

As I have already said, Metaphysics is derived from two Greek words, namely "meta" and "physika" and the literal translation or meaning is "after physics." As time went on, "meta physika" came to be understood as meaning "beyond physics." Simply put, as time went by "after physics" was regarded as being synonymous with "beyond physics." In other words, it was considered to be the same thing as "beyond the physical world." For this reason, "metaphysics came to be understood as the discipline dealing with realities beyond the physical world."[5]

Consequently, many people, even now, understand metaphysics as the discipline which deals with realities that are beyond the physical world. This is a very wrong notion because it is not only realities that are beyond the physical world that metaphysics deals with. Rather, it is the study of the totality of being, that is, the nature and structure of reality as a whole. According to Professor Omoregbe:

> What metaphysicians have been trying to do down

> through the ages is to give a comprehensive account of the whole of reality, its nature, its structure, and the place of man in the universe as well as in the totality of reality.[6]

The Founding Fathers Of Western Philosophy

It is worthy of note that none of the founding fathers of Western Philosophy employed the term "metaphysics." This is not to say that they were not metaphysicians. Parmeniders, Thales, Anaximander, Heraclitus, Plato, Aristotle, and a host of others, did metaphysics, though they never used the term "metaphysics." Professor Omoregbe confirms this when he says:

> They attempted to give a comprehensive account of the nature and structure of reality as a whole. This, for them, was the heart of philosophy, the central theme of philosophy.[7]

Aristotle, for example, called metaphysics "first philosophy" or the science which studies "Being qua Being" and the properties inherent in it in virtue of its own nature. He believed that metaphysics differs from the particular sciences because they "divide off some portion of it and study the attribute of this portion, as do, for example, the mathematical sciences."[8] What Aristotle means is that "while other sciences study an aspect or certain aspects of reality (i.e. Being as Being), metaphysics studies reality as a whole, that is, as the totality of being."[9]

Thus, the metaphysical horizon is all-embracing. It encompasses the whole of reality, unlike the particular sciences that are concerned with a particular being or a particular aspect of being.

Destructive Critics Of Metaphysics

The first well-known critic of metaphysics in the modern period was David Hume who lived from 1711 to 1776. As Professor J. I. Omoregbe has rightly pointed out, if empiricist principles are applied in a way that continually keeps to the principles as Hume did, there will be no need or reason for metaphysics. Berkeley and Locke did not apply empiricist principles in a way that continually keeps to the principles. Both of them had metaphysical elements in their philosophy. The imperceptible and unknown substance of Locke and the spiritual substance of Berkeley are metaphysical elements which run contrary to, and do not agree with, the empiricist principles which they expressed clearly. Hume refused to accept these and criticised metaphysics. He considered it to be complete sophistry and illusion and, for that reason, suggested that every book that deals with metaphysics should be set ablaze because, according to him, they cannot

provide us with genuine knowledge. He believed

that true knowledge could only be attained through empirical or mathematical method.

Hume's philosophy was based on observation and experiment and, therefore, it had no room for metaphysics. This is because he believed that only the sciences, which are based on observation and experiment, were capable of providing us with true knowledge.

Another critic of metaphysics is Augustus Comte who lived from 1798 to 1857. He was the father of classical positivism and he divided the course of the development of the human mind into three stages – the religious stage, the metaphysical stage, and the positive stage. The religious stage is the stage at which men resorted to religion in an attempt to grasp the universe. "They invented gods and used them to explain natural phenomena."[10] The metaphysical stage is the stage at which men resorted to metaphysics in their attempt to comprehend the universe. They invented metaphysical principles and employed them to give explanations to natural phenomena as their ultimate causes.

The positive stage is the age of positive science in which humans have come to understand that genuine knowledge can only be obtained from positive science, and not from religion or metaphysics. This, according to Comte, is the stage in which man is now. The reason why religion and metaphysics cannot provide us with real knowledge of the world is that both of them deal with unseen realities, which are not objects of knowledge and, thus, are not relevant to our knowledge of the world or natural phenomena. In this stage, we must seek knowledge of the world from within the world, and under the auspices of the positive method. That is, with the help of the scientific method.

Ludwig Wittgenstein, who lived from 1889 to 1951, also criticised metaphysics. In his book titled "Tractatus-Philosophicus", Wittgenstein analysed language and presented it as a picture of the world. That is, the world of sense perception.

> Language is analysed and broken down to its smallest units, which Wittgenstein says are names, and calls them the atomic units of language. The world, too, he says, is similarly analysable into its smaller units like language (but he does not say what these atomic units are in the world). The structure of languages, he tells us, corresponds with the structure of the world and reflects it. For language is a picture of the world. A simple proposition pictures a simple state of affairs in the world. A state of affairs in the world is a fact, and the world is composed of facts (not things). The world is a totality of facts,

> not of things. The function of language is to picture these facts for us.[11]

This, therefore, implies that the scope of language is limited by facts in the world. Things that are not facts in the empirical world cannot be pictured by language for it is not within the scope of language. It can easily be understood that it is meaningless to try to talk about such things. For this reason, metaphysical language is simply meaningless and metaphysical propositions are nonsensical because they do not picture any fact in the world. Metaphysics and religion cannot, therefore, be regarded as sources of knowledge. Nevertheless, Wittgenstein later changed his stance and even criticised himself. He evolved a new theory of language which is called the language-game theory.

A. J. Ayer was another critic of metaphysics. He also advocated logical positivism which also rejected metaphysics as a true and genuine source of knowledge. He wanted to destroy the metaphysical proposition that philosophy gives us knowledge of a reality transcending the world of science and common sense. He himself believed that the empirical sciences alone could tell us everything that we want to know about the world.

According to him, any statement which refers to a "reality" transcending the limits of all possible sense experience cannot possibly have any literal significance. Thus, such a statement is nonsensical. Metaphysical sentences are meaningless and their propositions are nonsensical under his criterion of verifiability.

Constructive Critics Of Metaphysics

Emmanuel Kant

Emmanuel Kant launched a stronger attack on metaphysics. His criticism of metaphysics was more systematically worked out, compared to that of David Hume. His Copernican Revolution chiefly depends on his reversion of the view of philosophers that in the cognitive process objects impressed themselves on the mind which merely received these impressions passively. The part that the mind played in the cognitive process was, therefore, seen as being passive. What this means is that the mind made no positive contribution to knowledge.

Kant was the originator and chief proponent of synthetic a priori knowledge and he maintained that if the hypotheses of the passivity of the mind were true, it could not be practically feasible for us to have synthetic a priori knowledge. Every knowledge would, in actuality, be gotten from sense-perception and it would not be practically feasible to attain synthetic a priori knowledge.

Nonetheless, he had the conviction that there was synthetic a priori

knowledge. He cited physics, mathematics and ethics as handy examples of subjects from which synthetic a priori propositions could be obtained. What he did in epistemology was similar to what Copernicus did in astronomy. The earth was widely believed to be at the centre of the universe and the sun and other planets were believed to move round the earth. But Copernicus reversed that view. He attempted to demonstrate that the reverse was the case. That is, he showed that it was the sun that was actually at the centre of the universe and that it was the earth that was actually moving round the sun. Emmanuel Kant did the same thing in epistemology by trying to show that it was not the objects of knowledge that imposed themselves on the mind. Kant asserts that in the cognitive process, the mind does play a very active part.

> It imposes itself, its own structure, on objects and restructures them to conform to its own structure. It makes objects appear to us according to its own structure reflected in the categories.[12]

Therefore, contrary to our belief, the mind is very active in the cognitive process and positively contributes to knowledge. The way things appear to us differ from the way they are in themselves. They appear to us in the way in which the mind has structured them and has made them to appear. Hence, we do not actually know, and cannot at any time know, the way things are in themselves. Our knowledge is limited to the way things appear to us and the way they appear to us is the way the human mind makes them to appear to us. Kant refers to the way they are in themselves as noumena and he refers to the way they appear to us as phenomena. We cannot know things in the noumena.

> Before the mind knows anything it has to apply the categories of human understanding to it (Kant worked out 12 categories altogether). But the categories cannot be applied to noumena, they can only be applied to things that appear in space and time, these are phenomena. They can never be applied to any reality that does not appear in space and time.[13]

The implication of this is that we can never know realities that cannot be perceived with the senses. That is, we can never know realities that do not appear in space and time. Such realities are not within the scope of human knowledge if they exist at all. Any person who attempts to apply the categories of human understanding to them, for purposes of knowing them, will be devoting his efforts to the production of nonsense. It can only lead to illusion and not knowledge. Kant was of the view that this was exactly what the metaphysicians attempted to do. Despite Kant's criticism of metaphysics, he acknowledges that there is practical reason, or an act of metaphysics, which assumes the existence of metaphysical beings as

essential for guidance of the understanding and will in life. Thus, he shows an interest in metaphysics.

Thus, the concept of metaphysics was seriously criticized by the empiricists, particularly Hume. The criticisms later reached its zenith or climax in the said rejection of metaphysics. Kant asserted that it was Hume's radical empiricism that woke him up from his dogmatic slumber. This means that it was Hume who made Kant to realize the clear difference between 'a priori' and 'a posteriori' knowledge, with regard to the short comings of metaphysical knowledge. Since this fascinated and highly intrigued Kant, he unavoidably pitched tent with Hume and this was taken for granted and interpreted to mean that Kant also rejected metaphysics.

There is no gain-saying the fact that Kant was chiefly interested in metaphysics. This is clearly demonstrated by the fact that he often employs the word in his works. In addition, he was a professor of logic and metaphysics. Kant, therefore, did not have the intention of completely denying or rejecting metaphysics. The question of the denial or rejection of metaphysics was not the issue of Kant's philosophy. Kant's philosophy centred on the criticism and reconstruction of metaphysics. The main reason for this was that pre-Kantian philosophers regarded metaphysics to be the same thing as philosophy or to be the major constituent of it. Kant's criticism of metaphysics should be seen as a preliminary to the new metaphysics which he himself aimed at, though he did not finish this by himself for he left it for the subsequent generations.

At the beginning, Kant tended towards the denial or rejection of the old metaphysics, and emphasized empirical science. He held the opinion that a metaphysical thinker dreams with his reason and that metaphysics cannot help us to attain true and useful knowledge. There is no doubt that this sort of criticism is so serious that it appears to lead to the complete denial or rejection of metaphysics. Nonetheless, his subsequent works show that the denial or rejection of metaphysics was meant to ultimately lead to its greater rejuvenation.

Kant meditated for several years after which he felt that he had discovered a means of saving or affirming metaphysics. During these years of Kantian meditation, he was deeply influenced by English empiricism and French rationalism and these influences brought him nearer to realism.

Kant divided the faculty of knowledge into two, namely, sense and understanding. He allocated phenomena (things as they appear) to the sense and allocated noumena (things-in-themselves) to the understanding. Metaphysics was said to be a function of the understanding without experience and the object of it was seen as the first principles of pure understanding.

Kant was of the view that the division of truths into analytic and synthetic

is incomplete and that it fails to show the real and exact nature of his new metaphysics. Thus, according to him, apart from matters of fact, relations of ideas or truths or reason and speculative metaphysical ideas, there are other kinds of knowledge – that it is possible to find out and study other kinds of truth. A typical example of such a non-analytic and non-synthetic truth was derived by Kant from his union of rationalism and empiricism which resulted in what he technically referred to as synthetic a priori knowledge.

Lewis tried to explain in greater detail the division of sources of knowledge into two. According to him:

> Every statement we know to be true is so known
> either by reason of experience or by reason of
> what the statement itself means. There are no other
> sources of knowledge than on the one hand data of
> sense and on the other hand, our intended meaning.
> Empirical knowledge constitutes the one class:
> What is knowledge independently of sense experience
> – the a priori and the analytic – constitutes, the other,
> and is determinable as true by reference to our meaning.[14]

The above quotation illustrates the division between empiricism and rationalism and they are suspicious of each other. But the synthetic a priori mixes the positive characteristics of the two of them together. This suspicion coerced Kant into explaining a compromise between empiricism and rationalism. Thus, he writes:

> Granted, therefore, that we must go beyond a given
> concept in order to compare it synthetically with
> another. Something else is necessary in which as in a
> third, the synthesis of two concepts becomes possible.
> What then, is that third? What is the medium of all
> synthetical judgements? It can only be that in which
> all our concepts are contained, namely the internal
> sense and its a priori form…[15]

Kant's belief in synthetic a priori knowledge is made stronger when he says:

> Thus synthetical judgements a priori are possible, if we
> refer the formal conditions of intuition a priori, the
> synthesis of imagination and the necessary unity of
> it is a transcendental apperception, to a possible
> knowledge in general, given in experience, and if we say
> that the conditions of the possibility of experience in
> general are at the same time conditions of the possibility
> of the objects of experience themselves, and thus
> possess objective validity in a synthetical judgement
> a priori.[16]

Kant believes that the inexplicability of universal laws of nature or pure science of nature and the applicability of mathematical rules to practical

issues on the one hand, and the meaningfulness of metaphysics as a transcendental science within either the system of purely a priori methodology or that of purely a posteriori methodology made the acceptance of synthetic a priori principle necessary.

Mill asserted that mathematical propositions and logical statements have their validity and applicability to real life situations for they are generalizations from experience but Kant differed for he asserted that such propositions are both synthetic and a priori. According to him:

> This is, therefore, the result of all our foregoing inquiries: "All synthetical principles a priori are nothing more than principles of possible experience" and can never be reformed to things-in-themselves, but to appearances as objects of experience.[17]

It is strongly believed that one of the most serious mistakes which Kant made was that he tried to employ the available categories of western philosophy in unorthodox ways. He appears to hold the view that natural laws are absolute and that his table of categories is perfect. Yet, he expects that their Schemata should result, in an equal degree, to a perfect table of the synthetic a priori principles of objective experience.

According to him:

> The principle of possible objective experience are at the same time general laws of nature which can be known a priori…. The concepts grounded thereupon, which contain the a priori conditions of all synthetical and necessary judgements, accordingly constitute a transcendental system.[18]

The reason which he adduced in support of a transcendental mathematics and metaphysics also resulted in the 'scientific metaphysics of morals'. These clearly show that Kant believes that objective knowledge is not empirical and it is not intuitive. He believes that this category of knowledge can only be gained or obtained in the sphere which he refers to as 'noumena'. This sphere can be likened to Plato's world of forms or intelligible world. It is the direct opposite of the sphere of 'phenomena' which is akin to Plato's world of objects. Without the employment of dialectics we cannot succeed in understanding reality or truth.

If we take into account the many and different characterizations of metaphysics which tell about the objects of knowledge, the resultant knowledge produced by means of synthetic a priori method will become apparent and clear. Kant asserts, in the Critique of Pure Reason, that metaphysics is the science which is supposed to tackle the problems that are unavoidable for Reason, that is, God, Freedom and Immortality. Also, in the 'Dialectics', he maintains that the appropriate objects of metaphysics are three in number, namely, God, Freedom, and Immortality and that all other

problems have to do with the ways these ideas and their reality can be gained. In the same way, in the prolegomena, metaphysics is said to deal with the natural concepts commonly used in experience and the concept of pure. For this reason, the main objects of metaphysics are believed to be outside the scope of possible experience. This part of metaphysics is believed to constitute the vitally important end of the science, and that the other is merely the means to attain this end.

From the foregoing, it is quite obvious that Kant regarded the ultimate end of metaphysics to be the knowledge of ideas that are beyond the sensible world. This is the same as saying that metaphysics is the science outside and beyond the sphere of the natural science. Nevertheless, whether or not the final end of metaphysics is the knowledge of ideas that are beyond the sensible world, it does not, in any way, make the knowledge of sensible ideas or things to be outside its scope or jurisdiction. Quite frankly, in its preliminary or applied parts, metaphysics takes or receives natural concepts commonly and generally applied to experience, and these form its secondary objects.

Martin Heidegger

Heidegger says that the criticism of metaphysics was proper because traditional metaphysics has no basis. He said that the true meaning of being has been tampered with and he blames traditional ontology for this. He also said that there is a clear difference between being itself and some aspects of that – which-is, but that this difference has been overlooked in the history of western ontology.

He believed that what has caused the so many interpretations of reality is this confusion between being itself and particular instances of that – which-is. Kant and Heidegger criticized metaphysics in order to make it young again. To Heidegger, man is "metaphysical awareness" or "metaphysical reality." If this is so, man must necessarily be metaphysical. Even when he unknowingly adopts an anti-metaphysical stance, he unknowingly adopts a metaphysics. It is not possible to utter being or reject metaphysics without some kind of metaphysics. As Gottfried Martin puts it, "no finally legitimate objections can be raised against metaphysics in the wider sense."[19]

The purpose of all Heidegger's works is the renewal of the question of the real meaning of being. Heidegger sees the concept of 'being' as the most universal. Yet, it is obscure and indefinable, it is not possible to understand or grasp it as anything that is, it is not possible to deduce it from any higher concept, and it is not possible to represent it by any lower one. 'Being' differs radically from a being, a stone, a chair, a plate or a man. This, notwithstanding, 'being', in a way, appears to be a clear concept. We employ it in all our knowledge, statements, behaviour, and attitude. We are

accustomed to believing that we comprehend being but we do not really know the meaning of being, we do not actually understand being. He considered philosophy to be the same as ontology. According to him:

> There remains the question as to why we talk about the fundamental questions of metaphysics. The term "metaphysics" here should indicate only that the questions dealt with stand at the core and centre of philosophy. However, by "metaphysics", we do not mean a special field or branch within philosophy in contrast to logic and ethics. There are no fields in philosophy because philosophy itself is not a field. Something like a division of labour is senseless in philosophy.[20]

He also believed that metaphysics is of central importance in philosophy, that it is the core of philosophy.

Heidegger's main aim was to give a solid answer to the question of the meaning of 'Being'. He wanted to disabuse the minds of some thinkers of the false notion that 'being' is self-evident. Traditionally, being is regarded as that which already exists, being has been taken for granted, traditionally, as that which "is there." This implies that we already assume the existence of being. Heidegger sees this as a very wrong notion and he feels that this mistaken view is caused by the fact that tradition no longer remembers how the 'being' came into existence.

In actuality, 'being' is different from 'a being'. The subject which has a being is in being. Thus, Heidegger began his enquiry with an analysis of 'being' as human existence. A striking feature of human existence is that it is being which in 'being' is concerned about this particular being. It is similar to asking the question: What is the origin of the coming into existence of man? It is man alone that is concerned about knowing this. Hence, human existence is said to be ontological while existence of other objects or entities is said to be ontic. This is true because it is man alone that is capable of asking questions – why this, why that? Other objects or entities lack this capability. For example, Heidegger demanded to know why there is 'anything' rather than nothing. He wanted to know the rationale behind everything or all beings. In his An Introduction To Metaphysics, he said that the fundamental question of metaphysics is: "Why are there essents rather than

nothing?"[21]

Therefore, the being itself – which human existence has a relationship with – is referred to as "Existenz." The ground of all being is 'Being' which is the same as saying that 'being' predicated existence. It can be likened to or compared with saying that God, by his nature, is Existence, which implies that He is the ground of all beings. Heidegger is of the view that the

essence of man is located in his existence from which alone it can be grasped or comprehended. It is only by existenz that we are able to grasp or comprehend existence in its purity. He refers to this kind of understanding as "Existential."

In contrast, the coherence belonging only to the structure of existence is called "Existentiality." It is a clarification of human existence by means of the characteristics of his being which is called "existentials." Existential analysis is fundamental to ontology. It constitutes the basis of every ontology and every science. To Heidegger, phenomenology is hermeneutics and it is applied to existence so as to grasp and comprehend its structure. As a result of this, philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology which arises or results from the hermeneutics of human existence. This is a brief account of his arguments on the design of his new ontology set out in his major work which he titled Being and Time.

The mark of human existence is that man exists. In other words, he has the character of being. The implication of this is that it is not possible for it to form an exampler under a genus and it stands in many and different relationships towards its being. Being-in-the-world is the ground for these modes of being. The indwelling is not a connection that exists between two beings that are extended in space. An important feature of human existence is the fact that it is in the world.

Human existence is in the world. This means that we presuppose that we are already in existence, but 'being-in-the-world' implies taking active part in the world. It is through its thereness that it gives light to the world. Being is its disclosure, for nobody makes my thereness known to me. Disclosure does not mean or show the act of knowing. Instead, it means or shows the existential which is at the root of the act. This mode of being is made up of three elements, namely realization, understanding and discourse. Understanding as used in this context denotes coming face to face with an object or entity. To put it in a different way, if one actually takes part in the world, one will actually comprehend the realities of things around oneself. Understanding is that mode of being of human existence which is the capacity for being. Human existence cannot be made or considered equal with simple presence for it is often and generally what it can be. Heidegger believes that Human

existence is a throwness. A typical example or proof of the fact that human existence is a throwness is the fact that a human being cannot experience his birth. Project is the technical term which Heidegger used to refer to the essential structure of understanding. Understanding involves charging one with existential comprehension of the range of the capacity and this is the very aspect of existence in which human existence is its potentiality.

Discourse differs from language itself but it is the foundation of language. It can be said to be the meaningful expression of the ascertained intelligibility of being-in-the-world or of our existence in the world. Man is a being capable of discourse and it is this capacity for communication that makes him to be a higher animal.

The essential structure of "thereness" is easily imaginable when dread is taken, without proof, as the ground of the phenomenon in question. Dread is not the same as fear because the dread which causes or leads to fear is not anywhere, it is at or in no place. The world in its form is the force which produces dread and the reason for it is the possibility of being in the world. But this being is often and generally self-transcendent. Therefore, the structure of human existence seems to consist in encounter of being as already-being-oneself-in-the-world-with-others. This implies grasping the fact that man exists and that he exists along with other beings. You can only realize yourself by transcending yourself. This is anxiety. Whatever human existence performs, wishes or becomes aware of is our preoccupation or concern. Whenever we wish to do something, whenever we hate or love somebody, we are merely showing anxiety. Hence, anxiety is the being of human existence.

Heidegger's ontology looks like a theory of human existence which he referred to as Dasein. It is the science of 'to be' and it must be based on the ontology of human being. This is remarkably different from previous ontologies because it is either that analysis of Dasein rather than the science of being in general, or if nothing else, it is based on such an ontology. As a matter of fact, Heidegger maintains that Dasein is qualified to be the foundation of the whole of ontology through its superiority in terms of ontic superiority of existence, ontological superiority and superiority in being the foundation of other ontological theories.

It must be pointed out that the ontology that is based on the analysis of 'Dasein' merely offers us a subjective view of the world. This is in contra-distinction to science which offers us objective knowledge. For this reason, we must admit that Heidegger's ontology can only give us subjective knowledge, for he explains the structure of 'Dasein' through the conception of time, but he interprets the 'to be' in terms of temporality which he differentiates from the traditional notion of time, the one being purely subjective, the other nearly objective.

Heidegger describes temporality as historical. The modes of 'Dasein' are historical. The feature or quality of Dasein is made practically feasible by temporality. The historical character of 'Dasein' was hidden or kept secret in the traditional way of thinking. In the ordinary way of being, 'Dasein' has 'fallen into' the world and tradition. Previous ontology interpreted 'Dasein' from the world; it 'has fallen into' tradition and is, accordingly, unaware of

the historical character of 'Dasein'.

In an attempt to prevent or avoid this rigidity and concealment, Heidegger insisted that past ontology should not be accepted. This made him to start his new ontology. Generally, Heidegger's concept of metaphysics is ambiguous between previous metaphysical theories and metaphysics as an area of philosophy. His recent theory of the 'to be' appears to be understood in the sense of metaphysics as a branch of philosophy.

Heidegger compares metaphysics to the root, and the truth of the 'to be' to the ground where the philosophical tree has its roots. As the ground is not the same as the tree, Heidegger's special thinking ceases to pertain to philosophy, despite the fact that it is the primary form of thinking. The important question is: If it is not metaphysics and it is not philosophy, what type of thinking is it? This appears to make Heidegger to be socially uncomfortable and many thinkers believe that they do not know his actual aim or purpose. This has led to the asking of many and different questions such as: Does Heidegger want to dismiss or defend metaphysics? Is metaphysics the science of being or is it the science of 'to be'? What is the science of nothingness? I just mentioned or cited a few. There are many others.

Fundamentally, the nature of Heidegger's thinking can be said to be subjective idealism. In fact, ontology or metaphysics is practically feasible on the basis of realism.

Heidegger once acknowledged the fact that the analysis of 'Dasein' is merely an act in a set of actions which should produce a certain result and that result is fundamental ontology. Heidegger delayed so much before he wrote the second part and in it he even left the initial aim and these led to a deep suspicion that he had resorted to subjective idealism. The analysis of Dasein does not demonstrate the truth of being. It, rather, displays the 'shadow in a cave'. The actual being makes itself known in the thinking of God. According to Prof. J. I. Unah, the problem of the thinking of God is the objectification of being, and he believes that this has its own harmful and evil effects.

The problem of philosophy and, invariably, the problem of metaphysics, is the problem of Being. According to Prof. J. I. Unah, "What makes a philosophy worthy of the name is the fundamentality of its principle of Being."[22] The main subject-matter of philosophy which is being is not an entity. Rather, it is a process of infinite variety of principles. "Philosophy as a serious intellectual endeavour employs a principle of Being to integrate the chaos of experience into a rational, consistent world-view."[23] This explains why "any serious philosophy is usually rested on a metaphysics where metaphysics is understood as a constructive world constituting activity."[24]

> "For metaphysics seeks to give a comprehensive view of the world on the basis of a unifying principle of Being. With metaphysics, philosophy becomes a huge edifice of implications which is anchored on a ground and in which one statement logically follows from another. This is so because once a philosophers metaphysical position is known we can show the implication of his philosophy for the totality of social relations."[25]

But there is a problem here and the problem is that metaphysical thinking frequently results in a conceptual freezing of experience which leads to a condition or situation which Heidegger referred to as a hardened forgetfulness of being, for a metaphysical thinker more often than not regards an aspect or a principle of Being which he is conversant with to be the Being itself or the totality or reality. This, obviously, is where metaphysics 'ran off the rails' and it is because of this derailment that Kant demanded a metaphysics of metaphysics and Heidegger requested for a fundamental ontology. Classical metaphysics 'ran off the rails' when it failed to understand that the ground on which it builds is a tentative ground or even a non-ground, and that it may be practically feasible for there to be other grounds. Despite this state of affairs, it is not possible for a philosophy to offer a complete world-view unless it builds on a metaphysical principle. Thus, metaphysics searches for the ground of Being but it is unaware of the fact that the ground it searches for is a non-ground or a tentative ground. However, that kind of non-ground or tentative ground makes the metaphysician to be able to offer a comprehensive view that often and generally "provides guidelines for politics, ethics, education, law, religion, science, and the totality of social relations."26 This clearly explains why metaphysics is said to be a world constituting activity. It is the duty of philosophy as metaphysical thinking to offer a foundation or a ground which, of course, may be tentative. But as far as "metaphysical thinking has a way of forgetting what it mean to be, of callously repudiating other principles of Being, philosophy regains its element when it researches into the general structures of the world or when it analyses what belongs to any nature whatsoever."[27] The science of the Being of beings is ontology. Differently put, ontology is the analysis of what pertains to any nature at all. For this reason, ontology is the fulfilment of philosophy because it demonstrates the legitimacy as well as the derailment of foundational programmes or world constituting activities.

Somebody cannot be a complete human being unless such a person is metaphysically aware, and being metaphysically aware involves raising the question of ultimate reality or raising the issue of the universality of being as being. This is so because man naturally projects into the beyond and transcends the present state of affairs into the 'not now' or 'the unknown'.

Moreover, man naturally searches for first principles which he uses to unify the experiences in their entirety. These clearly show that man is metaphysical. For this reason, it has been posited that metaphysics is not merely a sort of invention or system. Instead, it is and should be seen as something that is in the nature of man – it is part and parcel or an important part of a thinking being and that it is one of the things that make us to be completely human. Bradley supports this view when he says that nearly every human being is led beyond the boundary of usual and common facts, that in one way or the other we appear to feel and think seriously and deeply about what is outside the physical world. "In various manner we find something higher, which both supports and humbles, both chastens and transports us."[28]

Irrespective of the fact that metaphysics is in the nature of man, it causes a lot of grave obstacles and these problems make it absolutely mandatory and necessary for a phenomenological reduction of metaphysics. Simply put, it is essential for us to bring to light the basic originality of the origin of metaphysics. According to Heidegger, we need to show metaphysics appropriately as it is in itself and he believes that the most efficacious way to carry this out is via (or by means of) the analysis of human essence which Heidegger refers to as fundamental ontology and this fundamental ontology grounds metaphysics in the being of man who is a being-contingent and a being-free.

One of the major problems of metaphysical thinking is that a metaphysical thinker often believes that the only thing that exists is that which he 'sees' and 'interpretes'. Thus, a metaphysical thinker holds the view that reality consists of only those things which fall within his conceptual scheme.

Anything that does not fall within his conceptual scheme is regarded as a second-order reality or even a non-reality. This metaphysical mentality is destructive and devastating because it does not allow freedom of thought and it leads to ideological conflicts and clashes of temperaments, considering the fact that metaphysical principles generally and commonly provide guidelines for social and political behaviour.

> By insisting that his perspective encompasses that totality of being, the metaphysician creates an orthodoxy, a total system of values from which every mortal must not deviate, thereby extolling an attitude of fixism, fanaticism and intolerance. On account of this, we say that metaphysical thinking which is both nihilistic and vengeful threatens the true human vocation to 'see' and 'say'.[29]

Due to the negative effects of the above mentioned problems of the western metaphysical tradition, Heidegger uses phenomenological thought to

solve the problems or effect a change in the status quo. Dr. J. I. Unah has asserted that Kan's duty or purpose is to show that human reason is the final legislator for experience and that he also aimed to point out finitude as the place from which man's natural propensity to metaphysicize comes. He believes that Heidegger has bigger objectives. Firstly, he wants to rebuild the entire man after destruction or damage and this reconstruction has to be in open, prayerful relationship to Being since it is the place from which intelligibility, meaning, truth, and value are derived. Secondly, he intends to examine carefully, so as to learn more, that Being structure in human beings to examine carefully, so as to learn more, that Being structure in human beings from where their natural tendency to think metaphysically comes. Thirdly, he wishes

"his fundamental ontology to interrogate the Being-process and to recapture (retrieve) what Kant 'recoils' from in the transcendental imagination with a view to discerning the mediating power of imagination in relation to time."[30]

The centre of finite transcendence is human pure reason. It is by means of the thinking activity that human pure reason orders experience by organizing raw sensory data into stable regularity and connectedness."31 It is thought that does the processing of raw, disjointed data from experience but it hardly creates the intuitables, for they are factically provided.

Thought asks for and gets the intuitables from intuition. Similarly, the intuitables are drawn towards thought for purposes of processing. Hence, there is a necessary nexus or connection between thought and intuition.

Both depend on each other for the yielding of a perfect act of knowledge. Pure productive imagination is the centre where the two of them come together. Commenting on the imagination, Dr. J. I. Unah has this to say:

> Apart from acting as the grounding power of the soul which assures the unification of thought and intuition, the imagination helps in the formation of the horizon of objectiveness, that is, the antecedent conditions of experience. Without this formation of antecedent conditions, no knowledge can be gained. Consequently, the imagination as the image forming and grounding power of the soul is the seat of ontological cognition.[32]

Intuition receives given or is affected by possible objects and activates reason and sensibility is vitally important if ontological synthesis is to be achieved. According to Heidegger, "if human intuition as finite is receptive and if the possibility of its receiving something 'given' pre-supposes affection, then organs capable of being affected – the organs of 'sense' – are necessary."[33] These organs of sense are essential pre-requisites for the successful notification or announcement of the essent or the intuitable. This

is so because intuition is incapable of grasping the graspable without help, it cannot do it alone. This stresses the fact that intuition is finite and the finitude of intuition makes sensibility to be very important if ontological synthesis is to be achieved.

It must be emphasized that ontological knowledge or man's ability for thinking metaphysically is ultimately grounded on the transcendental thinking metaphysically is ultimately grounded on the transcendental imagination. That is, such capacity is ultimately grounded on the finite human imagination. That is, such capacity is ultimately grounded on the finite human imagination. That is, such capacity is ultimately grounded on the finite human imagination. That is, such capacity is ultimately grounded on the finite human mind's free creation of profiles or images without the aid of empirical intuition.

There is no knowledge that does not have connection with or influence on the world, but there are, certainly, some imaginative creations that are not funded by objects of experience. This is so because, as Dr. J. I. Unah puts it, "while the imaginative representation of an object of a previous act of perception may be dependent ultimately on experience, the advance formation of the aspects of the horizon of objectivity is not dependent at all on objects of empirical intuition."[34] The horizon of objectivity is the antecedent condition which is so essential that without it, no objective experience can be gained.

A striking feature of finite knowledge is its ability to be communicated to others. That is, it must be such that it is possible or easy to be made more widely known to others, it should and must be possible for others to comprehend it. The intuitable must be communicable and intelligible to others and this involves their understanding it and if there is no understanding knowledge is not possible to be attained. This indispensability of the understanding in the achievement of finite knowledge is the reason why it is often said to be productive.

Making a search for the foundation of ontology is the same as deciding those elements or native traits of finite human reason which make it possible for man to think metaphysically with the aim of "prying loose the rigid tradition of western ontology."[35] There is a school of thought that believes that the analysis of man's finite essence is not ontology. Instead, this group of thinkers see it as anthropology. And specific mention is made of Heidegger's analysis of the being of man in his Being and Time which was published in 1927.

Heidegger believes that the fundamental grounding of metaphysical generalis or ontology is not possible through antropologism.

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant discovered the pure productive imagination as the ground of metaphysics but instead of recognizing the fact

that the grounding of metaphysical generalis is appropriately done through ontology, he resorted to antropologism. But it is impossible to bring back the pure productive imagination as the real ground of metaphysics through anthropological enquiries. It is precisely a fundamental ontology that is capable of offering the ground of every other ontology. In other words, it is not possible to comprehend the imagination as the actual or proper ground of ontology by carrying out enquiries into anthropology. Kant "took a very bold step to work out a thorough ontology as the primary ground for all ontologies, but… nevertheless, made a devour from ontology to anthropology as if the latter could, in any way, furnish the established ground of ontology."[36] It is believed that Kant held himself back from or avoided the 'great unknown' of the transcendental imagination on purpose – it was not done as a result of, say, Kant's ignorance of the dangerous side effects of such an action. Rather, Kant purposely did it and the reason why he did it was because he "was so much a prisoner of the tradition which extolled human reason, and so, saw an abyss in the transcendental imagination which threatened to overthrow the supremacy of logic."[37]

Thus, pure synthesis was initially regarded or seen as the duty of the pure productive imagination but Kant took it away from the pure productive imagination and gave it to the understanding, thereby bringing anthropology fro the first time in the laying of the foundation of metaphysics by enquiring into anthropology, he resorted to what is called philosophical anthropology but Heideger disagrees with Kant, for he believes that various types of things are mixed together to constitute philosophical anthropology and this makes the idea of it to be vague, ambiguous and under terminate. That is, the idea of a philosophical anthropology is unclear because of dissimilar things that are brought together to form it.

> Thus, the upshot of Heidegger's onslaught on antropologism is that philosophical anthropology has not achieved sufficient conceptual clarity to entertain the radical philosophical question of Being. Consequently, Kant's detour from the established ground of ontology to antropologism is a miscalculation. Not only by this move, did he fail to finish what he started, Kant dangerously left mankind on the brink of a precipice (i.e. an abyss). In other words, Kant's recoil from the 'great unknown' of the transcendental imagination is a classic case of a philosophical anti-climax which leaves us on the threshold of nihilism.[38]

Heidegger also said that every anthropology grasps or comprehends human beings merely as human beings on the basis of their limitless or endless possibilities and, for this reason, he posits that questions that centre on what is more primordial than human beings can never be anthropological.

Heidegger, therefore, declared that Kant's unfinished business should be completed. "This unfinished project is the established ground of metaphysics – the great unknown, the nothing which is unthematic and hence not a being, yet not an absolute nothing."[39]

Kant started the task of laying the foundation of metaphysics and in the process he found out that the transcendental imagination is the centre of man's mental abilities and that it is this seat of man's mental powers that makes ontological synthesis to be practically feasible. He unmistakably, pointed out that the established ground of ontology is the disclosure of finite transcendence. Kant later 'recoiled' and resorted to antropologism. But, according to Heidegger, anthropology is incapable of founding ontology because the idea of it is so unclear that it is not possible for it to tackle or deal with the radical philosophical question of Being. Aside from that, Dr. J. I. Unah believes that anthropology itself has no foundation at all. That is, anthropology itself seriously requires a foundation. So, antropologism cannot found ontology.

Hence, the problem of laying the foundation of metaphysics is rooted in the Dasein in man, in the question of the ultimate ground and this is the realization or comprehension of Being as basically existent finitude. This obviously explains why the laying of the foundation of metaphysics is given a starting point in a metaphysics of Dasein. The implication of this is that the job of laying the foundation of metaphysics is also a kind of metaphysics.

To carry out again the laying of the foundation of metaphysics, it is essential for us to make this metaphysics of metaphysics clear for it is only when that is done that it will be practically feasible for us to achieve a complete ground of metaphysics.

The question of the essence of man is the question that is vitally important for the laying of the foundation of metaphysics and this question is connected with the metaphysics of Dasein "whose horizon was first indicated by the Kantian endeavour."[40] If appropriately understood, the result of this attempt belongs to the disclosure of the relationship which binds together the problem of the possibility of metaphysics and the problem of the revelation of the finitude in man.

Ontology is seen as the disclosure of the structure of Being of Dasein. As soon as the ground of the possibility of metaphysics is established in ontology, "taking the finitude of Dasein as its ground, ontology would come to mean fundamental ontology."[41]

> And fundamental ontology embraces the problem of the finitude in man as the decisive element which makes the comprehension of being possible. The structure of being of Dasein and every other essent for that matter is accessible only through the

> understanding conceived as having the character of projection. As fundamental ontology reveals, the understanding is not simply a form of cognition but a fundamental moment of existence.[42]

That explains why every special achievement of projection with regard to ontological understanding is real and automatic construction.

Thus, it was Heidegger that gave the main idea or fact of the duty of founding metaphysics on a metaphysics of Dasein and this outline appeared in his book, Being and Time, which was published in 1972.

Critical Analysis

Ontological knowledge, this is, man's ability for thinking metaphysically is ultimately grounded on the transcendental imagination.43 In other words, that kind of capacity is ultimately grounded on the finite human mind's free creation of profiles or images without the help of empirical intuition.

Every knowledge has connection with or influence on the world. There is no doubt about that. But it is equally true that there are some imaginative creations which are not funded by objects of experience. A typical example is the advance formation of the aspects of the horizon of objectivity. It does not, at all, depend on objects of empirical intuition. The horizon of objectivity is the antecedent condition which is so essential that, without it, no objective experience can be gained.

Kant began the task of laying the foundation of metaphysics and this led him to the discovery of the transcendental imagination as the centre of man's mental capacities and that it is this seat of man's mental powers that makes ontological synthesis possible. He rightly indicated that the established ground of ontology is the disclosure of finite transcendence. Unfortunately, Kant later 'recoiled' and resorted to antropologism. But according to Heidegger, anthropology cannot found ontology for certain reasons which include the fact that the idea of it is so unclear that it is impossible for it to tackle or deal with the radical philosophical question of being and Dr. Unah has added that it is itself seriously in need of a foundation. Therefore, the problem of laying the foundation of metaphysics is rooted in the Dasein in man, in the question of the ultimate ground and this is the understanding of being as fundamentally existent finitude. This clearly explains why the laying of the foundation of metaphysics should have its starting point in a metaphysics of Dasein. This implies that the job of laying the foundation of metaphysics is also a type of metaphysics.

To carry out again the laying of the foundation of metaphysics, it is vitally important for us to make this metaphysics of metaphysics clear because if this is not done, it will not be possible for us to achieve a complete ground of metaphysics.

The question of the essence of man is the question that is essential for the laying of the foundation of metaphysics and this question is connected with the metaphysics of Dasein.

It was Heidegger who insisted that Kant's unfinished business should be completed and he maintains that it is only through ontology, not anthropology, that we can recapture the pure productive imagination as the established ground of metaphysics. No amount of anthropological enquiries can yield this result.

Heidegger gave the main idea or fact of the duty of founding metaphysics on a metaphysics of Dasein and this outline appeared in his book, Being and Time, which was published in 1927.

Basically, the tone of Heidegger's thinking is subjective idealism. He himself admitted that the analysis of 'Dasein' is merely an act in a set of actions which should result in or lead to fundamental ontology.

As I have already said, his delay in writing the second part and the fact that even in it he abandoned his original aim made some thinkers to suspect that he had resorted to subjective idealism. The analysis of Dasein does not show the truth of being. It only demonstrates the 'shadow in a cave'. The actual being makes itself known in the thinking of God.

However, we see a high level of consistency in Heidegger's philosophy. His philosophical stance in Being and Time which was published in 1927 was a radical idealism which went to the extent of rejecting all subjective or idealistic expressions.

Conclusion

In concluding this paper, we would like to say, even at the risk of sounding repetitive, that pure metaphysics is the ground of all other ontologies and that the ground of metaphysics itself is the transcendental imagination.

Also, it is important to stress the fact that it is only through ontology, not anthropology, that we can recapture the pure productive imagination as the established ground of metaphysics.

Hence, we posit that no amount of enquiry into anthropology can reasonably or correctly yield such a result.

Thus, Kant devoted his efforts to the production of nonsense when he recoiled and resorted to antropologism as if we could recapture the pure productive imagination as the established ground of metaphysics through anthropological enquiries. He, however, deserves commendation for being the first to discover the transcendental imagination as the established ground of metaphysics, even though he later 'recoiled' and resorted to antropologism.

Endnotes

1. A metaphysical thinker, Fabian Eshiet, strongly believes that Aristotle called his metaphysical treatise first philosophy, theology and sometimes wisdom. He refuses to accept that Aristotle did not give any name to his metaphysical articles. He, however, admits that Aristotle did not use the word 'metaphysics'.
2. J. I. Omoregbe, Metaphysics without Tears: A Systematic and Historical Study, (Lagos, Joja Educational Research and Publishers Limited, 1996), pix.
3. Ibid., p.ix
4. Ibid., p.ix
5. Ibid., p.ix
6. Ibid., p.ix
7. Ibid., p.x
8. Ibid., p.x
9. Ibid., p.x
10. Ibid., p. 124
11. Ibid., p. 125
12. Ibid., p.125
13. Ibid., p.127
14. C. I. Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co., 1971) p.35.
15. I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (New York: Anchor Books, 1966), Section 11, p.131.
16. Ibid., p.131
17. I. Kant, Prolegomena To Any Future Metaphysics (Indianapolis: Bobb-Merill Publishing Co., 1960), p.60
18. Ibid., p.53
19. G. Martin, An Introduction to General Metaphysics (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1961), 152.
20. M. Heidegger, What is a Thing? Tran. W. B. Barton Jr./Vera Deutsch and Abalysis by Eugene T. Gendlin (South Bond: Gateway Edition, 1967), p.3
21. M. Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, Tran Ralph Manheim (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1959), p.17.
22. J. I. Unah, Essay in Philosophy, (Lagos: Panaf Publishing Inc., 1995), p.29
23. Ibid., p.29
24. Ibid., p.29
25. Ibid., p.29
26. Ibid., p.30
27. Ibid., p.31
28. F. H. Bradley, "A Defense of Metaphysics" in A Modern Introduction To Metaphysics, D. A. Drennen Ed. (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p.41
29. J. I. Unah, Heidegger Through Kant to Fundamental Ontology, (Ibadan: Hope Publications, 1997), p.28
30. Ibid., p.37
31. Ibid., p.75

32. Ibid., p.76
33. Ibid., p.46
34. Ibid., p.58
35. Ibid., p.83
36. Ibid., p.89
37. Ibid., p.90
38. Ibid., p.94
39. Ibid., p.95
40. Ibid., p.97
41. Ibid., p.98
42. Ibid., p.98
43. Kant was the first to discover the transcendental imagination as the established ground of metaphysics. Credit should be given to him for this discovery, even though he later recoiled.

A Critical Evaluation Of GhazzalianAnd Kantian Notions Of Mysticism And Intuition, An Islamic Perspective

Ibrahim Olatunde Uthman*

Abstract

This research is an attempt to study the relationship between the Ghazzalian and Kantian thoughts on mysticism and intuition from an Islamic perspective. This study is intelligible when it is remembered that after Al-Ghazzali, mysticism in Islam was not the same again and even though, Kant was not a Mystic in the real sense of the word but his mystical notions appear similar to that of al-Ghazzali on many points especially on mystical metaphysics, The study begins by tracing the concept and development of mysticism in Islam. It also enumerates some of the Muslim scholars who brought about reconciliation between mainstream Islam or orthodoxy and philosophical Sufism. One of whom and certainly the most famous and acknowledged in the West is al-Imam al-Ghazzali.

In addition, the study has traced the historical background of both the Ghazzalian and Kantian philosophical and metaphysical thoughts vis-à-vis mysticism and intuition. It also unravels both the post Kantian and Ghazzalian trends in mysticism and intuition. In doing, it has attempted to explain some metaphysical concepts germane to their thoughts on mysticism as popularly understood in the Ghazzalian and Kantian schools. It finally ends up revealing that today mysticism has become a euphemism for both laxity and licentiousness. Most mystics today hide behind their esoteric teachings to call for total or unwarranted liberalization of religious observances in the name of promoting religious

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understanding. As a result, there is perennial conflict in the philosophical mystical camps. The study therefore opines that it is the premonition of this problem that accounted for Kantian skepticism and Ghazzalian demolition of philosophy.

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Background To The Study

In order to examine Ghazzalian and Kantian thoughts on mysticism from an Islamic perspective, it is important to understand the meaning and essence of mysticism in Islam, trace its origin and development as well as some of its major proponents and their efforts to bring it into conformity with Islamic orthodoxy. The term mysticism is derived from the Greek verb *muo, which* means silence or closing of the lips. Sufism is the term for mysticism in Islam and is related to the *Batin* which implies "inward", "inner" and "hidden". Sufis therefore see themselves first of all as the noble guardians of *Asrar* or Divine mysteries. It is by its confidential nature meant only for an elected few.[1] In this sense Sufism differs from Fiqh which is concerned with public religious practice of the Muslims.

In the light of the light of the above, Maududi, refers to Sufism as the other side of Fiqh because while the former deals with the esoteric and inner dimension of Muslim worship, the latter deals with the external dimension of this worship.[2] This view is well expounded upon by al- Ghazzali in the *Ihyau 'ulum al-din*. It is also related to the element of Divine love or *mahabbah* shared among His servants, not individualistic or sentimental. As explained by al-Ghazzali, a true Sufi loves only God most High while loving others because of his love of the Almighty and Sublime God. This love of God implies absolute trust and confidence in God or *tawwakul* and the true Sufi gives himself up to God "like a corpse in the hands of a corpse washer.[3]

Sufism is also understood by Sufis as a path of Gnosticism or *al-ma'rifah*. This explains why the Islamic mysticism has had a close relationship with philosophy especially Shiite mysticism.[4] For instance, al-Farabi, who was also inclined towards a Sufi life, was the first celebrated Islamic philosopher. Ibn Sina is another famous Islamic philosopher who was greatly influenced by Sufism especially in his "*al-hikmat al-mashriqiyyah*". In fact, chapter nine of his "al-Isharat wat-tanbihat"- which is still taught in Persia-, contains a strong advocacy of the attainment of the ultimate truth by Gnostics through the Sufi path. In short both Islamic philosophers and Sufis have been concerned with the search for the ultimate truth especially in the Twelve-*Imamiyyah* and *Ismai'liyyah* schools.[5] Ibn Sina's notable student, Shihab ad-Din al-Suhrawardi created a new synthesis

of Islamic philosophy and Gnosticism. A Sufi right from his youth, al-Suhrawardi later went on to master the philosophy of ibn Sina. He then propounded a novel philosophical theory on the attainment of knowledge through illumination and became the founder of the school of illumination or *al-ishraq*. Mullah Sadra further developed this school.

Sufism can also be perceived as a form of quietism as demonstrated by Imam al-Ghazzali who stigmatized any form of revolt even if it is against an unjust and tyrannical ruler. He went further to support the Caliphate and recognized the legitimacy of the Abbasids and even sanctioned its suppression of any revolt against its authority.[6] This could have been induced by his philosophical interpretation of the relationship between the mystic goal of reform and political stability. Indeed, no reform can duly take place in an environment characterized by wars and crises. Consequently, many Sufis tend to reject in its totality the concept of Jihad while they call for reform and restoration of the human conscience because the reform of the hearts needs peace and stability in order for it to be effective and lasting.

At a stage in the history of Sufism, many Sufis strove to bring about a coherent harmonization between Sufi practices and Islamic law and they adopted the Qur'an and Sunnah as their guiding principles. Their focus was the arcane dimensions of Sufism, its accessibility and conformity with Islamic orthodoxy. The *Kitab al-ri'ayah* (Book of consideration) by Abu Abdillah al-Harith ibn Asad al-Muhasibi, who worked in Baghdad and Basra, was one of the first manual written for a Sufi disciple. He expounded upon the examination of the conscience as an effective tool for spiritual advancement and purification.

Other books include are *Kitab al-luma'* (Books of Concise Remarks) by Abu Nasr Abdillah ibn Ali al-Sarraj, *Kitab al-ta'rruf* (Book of knowledge) by Abu Bakr Muhammad al-Kalabadhi, the *Qut al-qulub* (Nourishment of the Heart) and the *Kash al-mahjub* (Unveiling of the veiled) by Hujweree Ali ibn 'Uthman. Abu al-Qasim 'Abdul Karim al-Qushayri also wrote his *al-Risalah al- Qushayriyah*, another manual in the Sufi path. Al the works went a great length in revealing the legitimacy of Sufism. As *Asharite* scholars, the authors proved that it was in tune with *Asharite* theology citing profusely from the Qur'an, Hadith and other legal tradtions. One other effort that is regarded as the culmination of the attempt to bring Sufism into conformity with legal rulings is that of Abu Hamid Muhammad ibn Muhammad al-Ghazzali.

Short Biographies Of Al-Ghazzali And Kant

Abu Hamid Muhammad ibn Muhammad al- Ghazzali was born at Tus, a city in Khurasan in Persia in 450/1058 and received a very good traditional education first at Jurjan and later Nishapur the provincial capital where he

learnt the main principles of *Ash'arite* Kalam at the feet of Imam *al-Haramayn* Abu al-Ma'ali al –Juwayni. He held the *Ash'arite* beliefs of the Unity of God, the reality of Divine attributes distinguished from the essence of God, the eternity of the Qur'an, Seeing the face of God by the blessed in Paradise, the supremacy of revelation over reason and the legitimacy of the succession of the *Khulafa ar-rashidun*. Owing to his conformity with the legal rulings of the Shari'ah, al- Ghazzali also upheld an anti-*Batinite* position at a time when the *Ismaili* state was still very strong in *Fatimid* Cairo and spreading like fire through out the Middle East. He devoted a lot of his energy to the critique of *Ismailism* and its *Batinite* absurdities. Some of his works devoted to this task included *Fada'ih al-batiniyyah wa fada'il al-mustazhiriyyah*. He attacked the *Batinite* heretical innovations of *taqlid* or submission to the authoritarian teachings of their Imams in lieu of the Prophetic Sunnah that is the only necessary guide after the book of Allah.[7]

Al-Ghazzali eventually abdicated his professorial position in Baghdad in 488 because to a spiritual crisis and went into concealment in Syria and Palestine. During the period he devoted himself exclusively to Sufi life and performed pilgrimage to Mecca. He became convinced that he had a divine mandate to carry out the revivalism of Islam for his epoch.[8] He later returned to his professorial position in 499 only to retire two years later before he died in 505. Before his death, al-Ghazzali succeeded in effecting reconciliation between Sufism and the mainstream of Islam. He argued that the mystical experience is the highest form of knowledge when compared to philosophy and theology. This he stated clearly in his *Munqidh minad dalal* where he explained that despite his juristic and philosophical apprehension he was still in need of mystical illumination.[9]

Al-Ghazzali went ahead to analyze in dept the various stages and states that makes up the Sufi path. He also provided the manner of training that can aid the Sufi to gain control over the lower soul (*nafs al-ammarah bi su'*). He explained that true Sufism starts from knowledge of God and His attributes, observing religious obligations like prayers and pilgrimage followed by the avoidance of unlawful and prohibited vices like love of worldly things. According to him these unlawful practices can remove the *murid* or novice from the Sufi path while practices like asceticism, repentance and fear of Allah will sustain him on the path. This is so because the conduct of a true Sufi implies a silent satisfaction with God's decree.[10] According to al-Ghazzali, it is only after attaining the best possible disposition that a *murid* can start his proper journey to God. It begins with the sincere intention or *niyyah* to approach God followed by the continuous remembrance of God's name or *dhikr* which leads to the total annihilation of human weaknesses and immersion in God known as *fana*. Al- Ghazzali differentiates between this

ecstatic moment and *hulul* or incarnation of God. He believes this moment of *fana* is very short and should be devoid of theophatic utterances and acts of Shirk or polytheism.[11]

As for Kant, he was a Prussian philosopher born in Konigsberg and started his life pursuing academic distinction but did not complete his doctoral thesis by which he qualified to teach in a German university, until 1755, when he was already 31 years old. Prior to that he made his living as a tutor but was only paid by the students. This Kantian early life as a tutor however improved when he was later appointed to a regular chair of philosophy, at age 46. Nevertheless, Kant had already made a name for himself with his original ideas in physics and astronomy and with his growing critique of the widely accepted thought of "The First Ground of the Distinction of Regions in Space," which upheld Newtonian arguments against Leibniz's denial of the existence of space.

The "Inaugural Dissertation" that significant work was his first attempt at analyzing the distinguishing characteristics of a critique of Philosophy. The trilogy constitutes his most important works but the writing of the 'Critique of Pure Reason', which was the first of the three, took more than ten years. And its publication in 1781 made Kant, at age 57, achieved the beginning of his academic plan but his age and health, it appeared would hinder and slow the pace of its completion. His concern that he might actually die before finishing his work, in an age when sudden death was an all too familiar phenomenon, spurred him on and he focused his whole time, attention and efforts with unyielding determination on the work at the expense of his friendship, family companionship and socialization and entertainment with all his acquaintances. About this Kantian experience, Ernst Cassirer wrote quoting what Rink says:

> "Kant in his early years spent almost every midday and evening outside his house in social activities, frequently taking part also in a card party and only getting home around midnight. If he was not busy at meals, he ate in the inn at a table sought out by a number of cultured people."[12]

According to Johann George Hermann, Kant had in his head a host of works lined up than he could probably ever have completed in the "whirl of social distractions" in which he was involved at the time. He therefore abandoned this "whirl of social distractions" for his works. He sacrificed this "whirl of social distractions" at the halter of his writing with dogged discipline that surprised most of his intimate friends and colleagues. It appeared as if he was really racing against death[13] As it eventually turned out, he was able to accomplish his plan before death could struck he succeeded in producing the key monuments of the Critical Philosophy and the trilogy of his Critiques his faculties diminished and his pen was stilled. It

was not death but his declining faculties that finally stilled his pen, before he actually passed away. He employed his knowledge of the history of nations and peoples, natural sciences, logic mathematics, and his vast experience sources to enrich his work and enliven his lecture.[14]

A Critical Evaluation Of Their Mysticism And Intuition

Al- Gazzali is a celebrated authority on Islamic mysticism, theology, jurisprudence and philosophy; His *maqasid al-falasifah* was an exposition of the main philosophical issues of his time objectively. His assimilation and mastery of philosophy was so deep so much that it had influence on his mystical thoughts. While fighting against the dialectical contradictions in philosophy, his theology and mysticism had a logical theoretical basis. He argued that philosophy cannot solely ensure the truth because it does not produce the absolute truth and certainty and accused it of making great compromises in its own methodology. He explained in *Munqidh minad dalal* that in applying logic, philosophers usually draw some conditions to be fulfilled in order to ensure certainty but later relax these conditions when it comes to religious issues.[15] To him logic based on the necessary relationship between premises and their conclusions is not satisfying to the mind and the heart. True Knowledge is the product of divine illumination (*ilham*) because when God nurtures the heart and lightens the breasts of men, the mystery of the spiritual realm becomes revealed showing the true reality of things while removing ignorance. In *Tahafut al-falasifah*, the Imam responds to the incoherence of the philosophers, most of whom he accused of atheism unlike their predecessors, and refutes twenty of their claims which include emanation and eternity theories or the ideas that the world had no beginning and will have no end, denial of Divine attributes, knowledge of generals, divisibility into genus and differentia, impossibility of departure from natural course, and annihilation of souls, resurrection, bodily pleasures and pains.[16] On three of these, he explains that they can be considered infidels.

Here it must be stressed that Al-Ghazzali does not deny the existence of natural causality but the existence of a necessary connection devoid of God's will. He precedes David Hume in asserting that the nexus of causality is only an apparent effect of human custom of liking together two occurrences and it is the regularity of this adah that implants in human minds that the two cannot be separated.[17] In reality, according to him, God is the acting cause of effects like burning and not fire through His direct intervention or that of His agents. God has created in us the Knowledge that he will not always bring about everything that is possible or every time for nothing is impossible for Him. He also explains that religious scriptures cannot judge natural sciences.

Whoever interprets them with the literal meaning of the Qur'an and Sunnah will damage religion.[18] He listed philosophical sciences as six, mathematics, logic, metaphysics or theology, ethics, politics and natural science. But not all philosophical arguments are cogent logical and reliable hence dispute between religion and philosophy. He wrote *Iqtisad fi al-'Itiqad* as a proof of religious creeds based on Aristotelian logic. He explains the importance of beliefs in God, His Attributes, Qualities, Deeds, Prophethood and eschatology. He was the first theologian that employs logic to explain beliefs devoid of legal jargons hence Ibn Khaldun considers him as the founder of this tendency. He explains in the *Tahafut* that logic is the prerogative of the philosophers but an art of Kalam or dialectic al Jadal. He uses such logical thinking as every originated being requires a cause for its origination, the world is originated therefore has a cause, any masterpiece proceeds from a master and powerful agent, the world is a masterwork hence proceeds from a powerful agent He considered theoretical certainty as the result of the highest form of knowledge which is revelation.[19] Following the above al-Ghazzali turned the *Ash'arite* Kalam into the dialectical and philosophical basis of his religious revival and mystical reflection. He joined the court of Nizam al-Mulk in 478 and became the *Shafi'te* jurist in the *Madrasah Nizamiyyah* in Baghdad in 484 and an intellectual of the court which made him appreciate the corruption of the depraved Kings and Sultans and the compromises of the *Ulama and fuqaha.*[20]

To Kant himself, only God has an intellectual intuition. Though it is believed that he has no interest in mysticism, [21] yet mysticism is in Kantian philosophy. According to Kantian philosophy any kind of mysticism is an immediate knowledge that is an intuitive understanding that unlike a discursive understanding is immediate and unarticulated. No doubt this shows clearly that Kant agrees that mysticism is an entity of intuitive understanding that stands on its own as a ground for substantive truths in the divine realm only and is not a source of knowledge from our human angle. This is what is to be found and can be said to exist in Kantian mysticism. Other forms of intuitionism may claim intuitive understanding *prior* to discursive but not Kant yet mysticism is very much Kantian. Kantian notion is premised on a wall separating the phenomenal or objects as they are perceived and the noumenal or objects as they actually exist independent of human knowledge. He strongly submits that people only know the appearances of things and not the things as they are in reality *Ding an sich* because they are beyond our human perception.[22] This notion is a delimitation of the Kantian epistemology of knowledge and it implies that humans cannot grasp the noumenal but rather can only understand the

phenomenal that is based on human limited preconceptions and biases. This is contrary to Ghazzalian notion of the numinous. Al-Ghazzali believed that the numinous could not only be felt and experienced by humans but could also be apprehended rationally by them. True Knowledge to him is the product of divine illumination (*ilham*) because when God nurtures the heart and lightens the breasts of men, the mystery of the spiritual realm becomes revealed showing the true reality of things while removing ignorance. In short, according to Ghazzalian thoughts, it is possible to for illuminated humans to access the noumenal or things the way they actually are.

While mysticism is a form of intuitionism, not all intuitionism is mysticism going by the above Kantian mysticism. Mysticism is intuitive knowledge of transcendent concrete objects that are not the phenomenal or material objects of ordinary perception. The mystic sees things that are not part of ordinary experience. According to Kant, transcendent objects cannot *be* understood because they cannot be regularly articulated. For Kant, a theory of transcendent objects ("dialectic") generates antinomies. Kant's theory may therefore allow for mystical knowledge that is not effable in concrete terms. This is rather like what many mystics say, since they gain knowledge that is ineffable and inexpressible. This is also true for al-Ghazzali mystical experience who insists that the mystical knowledge is real but at the same time in an attempt to communicate it to the non-initiated, the mystics cannot escape from committing heresies. The intuitive apprehension of abstract objects does not rise to the level of mysticism since abstract objects do not have independent existence. Intuitions of abstract objects concern meaning and the ordinary sense of "intuition" applies to this. Such intuitions, when analyzed, are the basis of analytic truths, but whether the meanings apply to existence is a separate question, which requires an evidentiary basis. Kant also holds the notion of moral law going by his philosophy of morality. He explains the moral intuition without any reference to a transcendental being. He cannot therefore be considered a mystic, since his God is not transcendent, but immanent, in all the objects of perception, and who does also submit to and is governed by the moral law. He is not beyond the control of moral law.[23] Only a sensible intuition could relate one to an independent transcendent object, since one who knows it clearly cannot create such a thing. However, if the mystic is identical to the transcendent object, this could allow for an intellectual intuition, depending on the metaphysics of the object. It is possible for God's existence to be presented to him passively, in which case he would have sensible knowledge of himself; or, God may actually create his own existence, like that of anything else, merely by knowing it.

This would be an intellectual intuition in a strong Kantian sense, and a form of mysticism, with the transcendence of the Pure Land, in which the

identity with the mystical object is facilitated by the absence of any substantial independence of things whatsoever. Similarly, the Tibetan "Book of the Dead" urges the deceased to realize that the visions of the hereafter are not independent but created by their own Mind. The natures of transcendent objects, to the extent that they can be theorized at all, are matters Kantian metaphysics which resolve some antinomies; and Kantian metaphysics tends to dismiss more substantive doctrine from historic religions (e.g. the Trinity, trans-substantiation Kantian theory of the "numinous" is an abstraction, whose existence is certified by its presence in the objects of experience, but which in an important way is not a natural property, since it is invisible to science and is unrelated to mundane utility. This forms the basis of the numinous as the central theme of all religions in the 'Idea of the Holy' by Rudolf Otto. He argues that there is no religion in which God does not exist as the real and innermost core.[24] But though the idea of the numinous is natural to Otto, but his God comes from the Kantian Ideas and divine his numinous derives from no more than a phenomenology of such religions. In Kantian epistemology and metaphysics, no rational or intelligible system can be built from mystical intuitions. To Kant the antinomian choices between metaphysics of the mystical intuitions as intellectual or sensible apprehension of independent or identical objects and the divine substance cannot be resolved on the mere evidence of a mystical knowledge, since the knowledge of different mystics confirm different apprehensions of the same objects and even the divine substance and the evidence of one tends to refute the evidence of the other. This in itself is one of the most important features of human existence, since it leaves us without any rational certainty that there are transcendent objects at all. The mystics could as well be hallucinating, whether beholding the presence of celestial Beings or visualizing the divine presence itself.

In Kant's theory, complications arise over Kant's original conception of intuition because, as considered by Kant, perception itself comes to be seen in the transcendental deduction as a product of mental activity. Since perception is supposed to be of an active mental synthesis between intuition and thought; but since this synthesis is an activity that cannot occur in the conscious mind then intuition is not lost. There is also the ontological aspect to this, that the phenomenal objects immanent in our perception can be both real and external on the one hand and subjective and internal on the other hand. In arguments about mathematics theories, "intuitionism" tends to mean something else, which can be very confusing. Mathematical intuitionists don't like mathematical or logical constructions that cannot be visualized and disapproving of infinities. Empiricism therefore seemingly has had little effect on the practice of mathematics and if taken seriously, would make much of modern mathematics, suspect. While Kant might be said to be a

kind of intuitionist in this sense, since he thinks that the axioms of geometry and arithmetic are grounded by visualization, there is nothing to prevent the logical extension of mathematics beyond our capacity for visualization, which in fact is what has occurred. While Kant's mathematics is somewhat intuitionist in the modern mathematical sense, it is not necessarily int

uitionist in the traditional epistemic sense, since our mathematical "intuitions can be wrong.

Another Kantian original contribution to philosophy is that knowledge depends on the structure of the mind and not on the world and that it has no connection to the world and is not even true representation, just a solipsistic fantasy. Kant seems threatened with the doctrine that all humans can apprehend is human psychological perceptions and biases but not noumenal, objective and external things. Kant believed that the rational structure of the mind reflects the rational structure of the world and of external things not as they exist in themselves. Kant's theory manages to provide, a phenomenal reality of a sphere for science that was distinct and separate from anything that would relate to morality or religion. The endless confusion and conflict that still results from people trying to figure out whether or not and how science and religion should fit together is deftly avoided by Kant, who can say, for instance, that God and divine creation cannot be part of any truly scientific theory because both involve "unconditioned" realities, while science can only deal with conditioned realities.

Similarly, Kant can be a phenomenal determinist with science yet simultaneously allow for free will in a way that involves obscurities that no one has been able to illuminate. Kantian theory prevents psychological explanations for behavior being used to excuse moral responsibility and accountability. Thus, the tragic childhood of a person however touching cannot excuse crimes committed by that person in full knowledge of the implications and consequences of such crimes. His approach is of comparative interest because of similar philosophical distinction between conditioned realities, which mostly means the world of experience, and unconditioned realities which interestingly include, not only the sphere of salvation, but also space, a form imposed *a priori* on experience by the mind. The problems that must be sorted out with Kant are formidable. Most important is the confusion that results from Kant mixing together two entirely different theories. The first theory is that the fundamental activity of the mind, called "synthesis," is an activity of human thought that applies certain concepts to a previously given perceptual datum from experience as found in the “Critique of Pure Reason”. Thus, Kant still says, "Since intuition stands in no need whatsoever of the functions of thought, appearance would none the less present objects to our intuitions".[25]

Kant realized that "synthesis" would have to produce, not just a structure

of thought, but also the entire structure of consciousness within which perception also occurs. Thus he says, "What is first given to us is appearance. When combined with consciousness, it is called perception. It is the structure of consciousness, through synthesis, that turns "appearances" into objects and perceptions, without which they would be nothing.[26] Consequently Kant made synthesis a function of 'imagination' rather than thought, as a bridge between thought and perception, though this creates its own confusions. This move occurs because Kant hits upon the idea that synthesis produced the unity that we actually find in "in the unity of consciousness". Everything we know, think, see, feel, remember, etc. belongs to our consciousness in one temporal stream of experience. Synthesis therefore brings things into consciousness, making it possible for us to subsequently recognize that our consciousness exists and that there are things in it. In order to resolve the paradoxes of this Kantian theory, it must be recalled that Kant believed that reason connects us directly to things and that Kant did not support Cartesian theory of hidden and transcendent objects, but empirical realism, that we are directly acquainted with real objects. Kantian notion therefore does not allow for speculative metaphysics as practiced by the rationalists because reason alone does not determine any positive content of knowledge but allows for two sources of sources of knowledge that produce the perception of phenomenal objects.

Because of, the paradox of his thought, much of philosophy in recent times has been a mess of Kantian confusing theory. The idea that the mind produces the world it knows conspicuously turns up in modern and postmodern theories that view all realities as "socially constructed". These all produce a fundamental paradox that was avoided by Kant, for they are all relativistic and subjectivist denials that knowledge even exists, which nevertheless maintain that this circumstance is a fact that can be known and demonstrated with some certainty. The "Transcendental Logic" in the *Critique of Pure Reason* is divided into the "Transcendental Analytic" and the "Transcendental Dialectic." The "Dialectic" is concerned with the fallacies produced when metaphysics is extended beyond possible experience. For Descartes, any notion that could be conceived "clearly and distinctly" could be used without hesitation or doubt, a procedure familiar and unobjectionable in mathematics. It was the Empiricists who started demanding certificates of authenticity, since they wanted to trace all knowledge back to experience. Locke was not aware, that not everything familiar from traditional philosophy was going to be so traceable; and Berkeley's pious rejection of "material substance" lit a skeptical fuse whose detonation would shake much of subsequent philosophy through Hume, thanks in great measure to Kant's appreciation of the importance of the issue.

Thus, Kant begins, like Hume, asking about the legitimacy of concepts.

However, the traditional Problem has already insensibly been brought up; for in his critique of the concept of cause and effect, Hume did question the *principle* of causality, a proposition, and the way in which he expressed the defect of such a principle uncovered a point to Kant, which he dealt with back in the Introduction to the *Critique*, not in the "Transcendental Logic" at all. Hume had decided that the lack of certainty for cause and effect was because of the nature of the relationship of the two events, or of the subject and the predicate, in a proposition. In *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, Hume made a distinction about how subject and predicate could be related. While some philosophers spent much of the 20th Century congratulating Hume for having discovered that causality might not exist, they never seem to have noticed that he explicitly denied having done anything of the sort. Kant already knew the type, who "were ever taking for granted that which he doubted, and demonstrating with zeal and often with impudence that which he never thought of doubting..."[27]

Kant's solution to the *quid juris* in the *Critique of Pure Reason* was the argument of the "Transcendental Deduction" (in the "Analytic of Concepts") that concepts like causality are "conditions of the possibility of experience," because they are the rules by which perception and experience are united into a single consciousness, through a mental activity called "synthesis." Once the existence of consciousness is conceded, then whatever is necessary for the existence of consciousness must be conceded?

Kant gave us the real elements of the solution of the Problem of First Principles, even though he could not complete and seal the matter himself. Indeed, no one can hope to do that, even as new elements and new understanding of the solution emerge over time. The term 'principle' [*Prinzips*] is ambiguous, and commonly signifies any knowledge [*Erkenntnis*] which can be used as a principle [*Prinzips*], although in itself, and as regards its proper origin [*Ursprung*], it is no principle. Every universal proposition, even one derived from experience, through induction [*Induktion*], can serve as major premise [*Obersatz*] in a syllogism; but it is not therefore itself a principle [*Principium*].[28]. The obscurity of his theory of empirical realism and transcendental idealism is largely due to his terminology and the difficulties of reconciling parts of his theory. Since "transcendental" is contrasted with "empirical," the two terms are epistemological and mean "independent of (i.e. transcending) experience" and "immanent in experience." Since "realism" is contrasted with "idealism," those two terms are ontological and mean "independent of my existence" and "dependent on my existence." However, using the strict definitions, "transcendental idealism" means something else, "transcendental idealism" would have to mean knowledge of objects that are dependent on my

existence but independent of my experience. This seems to be, not just a paradox, a contradiction, since if something exists as an epiphenomenon of myself, it hardly seems like it could be independent of my experience.

Conlusion

In this work, an attempt has been made to offer a comparison between the main themes of Imam al-Ghazzali and Emmanuel Kant mysticism and intuition especially within the framework of Sufism in Islam. The work has traced the concept, origin and emergence of Sufism in Islam as well as its nature, various developments and current trends. Though, today Sufism in most part of the Muslim world, West Africa inclusive has become a euphemism for both laxity and licentiousness as Sufis hide behind their esoteric teachings to call for total or unwarranted liberalization of religious observances in the name of promoting religious understanding, it is evident that Sufism still, they continue to enjoy a large following in postmodern society. Both Imam al-Ghazzali and Emmanuel Kant actually agreed that mysticism in its social transformations and adaptations to the exigencies of society may develop ineffable features which are not in accordance with high ethical standards.

Endnotes

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Kant' World and the World's Kant

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Abstract

This article gives a brief account of the meaning, the quintessence, and the spirit of Kant's philosophy. It is especially focused on the unusual philosophical, cultural and social significance of his philosophy. It stresses much more on the extraordinary, profound and everlasting influence of his ideas and his works, especially ***Critique of Pure Reason,*** *on not only people's perceptions in the past, but also their perceptions of today and in the future.*

Key words*: Immanuel Kant,* ***Critique of Pure Reason****, perception and philosophy*

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Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), the founder of German classical philosophy, the initiator of German philosophy movement and a prominent philosopher, remains an enduring attraction and ever-lasting charm to those who hold strong beliefs in truth, freedom and love, though he has left the world for over two centuries. His ideas have been deeply carved in the live sculpture of mankind spirit and have become one of the spiritual mainstays of modern western civilization. Schiller, Goethe, Beethoven, three celebrated masters of literary and art, Einstein, Bonn, Laue, three acknowledged giants of natural science have either read about his works or have been widely influenced by his ideas.

Many philosophers have gives incisive remarks on the status of Kant's philosophy in the history of mankind ideology. **Natorp of Die Marburger** once pointed out that Kant's philosophy as a whole is really an outstanding achievement of a genius. It is really a marvel that needs to be written about in the history of mankind ideology and it is really a natural outcome of the overall development tendency of philosophy, science and culture. Kant's

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philosophy belongs to a great spiritual family whose family tree stems from Plato, Parmenides and then comes to Descartes, Leibniz of the modern age. Galileo, Huygens, Newton, Oula, masters of natural science with philosophy tendency, should also be included in the family. Anbei•nencheng, a well-known Japanese scholar described it vividly as the follows: Kant is like a reservoir in the history of modern philosophy. Branches of philosophy before him have become parts of his ideological stream and those after him have taken some parts from his ideological stream.

The above comments illustrate one point: in the spirit of Kant's philosophy there are not only great outcomes from the richer and richer social life practices at his time but also a crystallization of wisdom from all the rational practices in the history of western civilization since ancient Greek. In Kant, there is an influence of natural science with its methodology which is always in a process of vigorous development; there is an enlightenment of ideas from such ideological giants as Socrates, Plato; Aristotle; there is a nurture of religious culture from the Renaissance and later religious thoughts appeared in the religious reform initiated by Bartin•Ruud. There are theoretical conflicts between empiricists and rationalists; there are ideological tints from early French enlightenment scholars and humanists and there are sedimentary accumulations of moral qualities and ideological features from Newton, Rousseau and Hume, great giants of the time. However, the environment of history and culture is only a condition. Kant's philosophy comes out of sparkles of wisdom that only a great genius can have. After having gone through a long and hard process of brewing, growing and ripening, it finally bears the fruit of a priori cultural philosophy which is based on the world knowledge and has human' freedom, development and perfection as its essence. It forms an integral whole, creates a system of its own, has an ability to control everything and shows a nature of illumination and brightness. From prior-critical period's bitter reflection on philosophy to critical period's combination of reflections on truth, goodness and beauty, Kant's ideology goes from the outside of the universe into the inside of the universe. It presents a spectacular picture of nature as well as a penetrating picture of soul.

Taken a panoramic view of the history, it is easily seen that after a short period of quietness, suspicion and shock, Kant's philosophy started an ideological hurricane in Europe which covers all the fields of philosophy, religion, politics, art and science. And all the ideological giants in the 19th century bear stamps of Kant's philosophy deep in their soul. Until the second half of the 20th century there still exists the view that during the several philosophical periods in the history, studies on Kant keep on providing nourishment of inspiration for the studies and then productions of philosophical works. In recent years, studies on Kant in Iran, France, Britain,

Italy and America have displayed a marvelous improvement and development in both quantity and quality. In Germany studies on Kant are still fervent and tend to be multiplying. These facts seem to demonstrate that the time to study and reconstruct Kant's theory is coming and the studies on Kant's creativity, critique and David Hume's spirit will be in a leading position. We may assume that Kant's explanations to questions in knowledge, morality and belief have produced almost twenty decades' impact on mankind's philosophical perceptions.

Therefore, nowadays, both the historical conditions of the time and Kant's philosophy itself have assigned missions to re-evaluate and re-understand Kant. That is to say, while giving analytical studies on Kant we have to make synthesizing studies on it as well. We have to put the principle of analysis in the principle of synthesizing and consider his theory as a complete and inseparable totality.

Under this background, if we re-explore Kant's philosophy, we will notice that Kant provided us not one or a specific discipline such as knowledge, morality, art, religion, law or politics, etc. but a whole and inseparable ideological system which covers all disciplines, that is, philosophy of humanity and culture. Problems or questions of today can not longer be solved only by one kind of discipline or a specific branch of knowledge. We need a comprehensive cultural and philosophical ideology guiding us to attain an overall consideration of whatever happens. In Kant's theory it is found that this kind of comprehensive cultural and philosophical ideology has already been in a considerable scale. The problems or questions Kant considered in his age were not longer about establishing laws of nature and statutes of freedom but about investigating the decisive conditions of rationality that governs all cultural and practical lives of mankind from the point of view of philosophy, about exploring the intuition, the function, the limitation, and the scope of man's spiritual capacity as well as their inborn duties, hopes and directions of the future. In other words, Kant's theory established a firm and profound basis for all creative activities in cultural lives of mankind. This is the significance of his theories.

If we have a study on Kant's philosophy itself, it is not hard for us to see that Kant systematically studied three kinds of capacities existing in the soul of mankind—cognitive capacity, emotional capacity and mental capacity as well as the corresponding propositions that these three capacities refer to—truth, kindness and beauty. Then he wrote three great works—***Critique of Pure Reason*** (1781)**,** ***Critique of Practical Reason*** (1788) and ***Critique of Judgment*** which are recorded in the annals of history. Among them, ***Critique of Pure Reason***, being considered as the primary hallmark of German classical philosophy, forms the theoretical basis of his "critical philosophy" and embodies the theme of the philosophy of truth, kindness

and beauty.

Kant took "human beings are human beings" or "human beings are themselves", the most basic human nature, as the basic subject of rationality and made it the start point of his critical philosophy. Whereas, the theoretical rationality is only the subject of perceptional field and becomes the most basic nature of human's perception. This nature is shown as the retrospection on rationality itself or awareness of self-consciousness itself. The pure or prior self-consciousness shows the above nature and tells about transcendentalism. Unification of transcendentalism of self-consciousness or the principle of unification based on the theory that transcendentalism is the origin and controls perception is the logical demonstration of the original proposition, that is "human beings are human beings" or "selves are selves". This way Kant considered the theory that is based on the most basic nature of human beings as the most basic principle of human knowledge. And he assumes that the most basic nature of human beings is the most basic nature of philosophical understanding whose subject is the highest level of man's perceptions. Thus, human's self becomes the main body of philosophy and the target of philosophical studies. Finally he produced the work —***Critique of Pure Reason*** which is publicly known as the philosophy or studies of human beings in the world.

Since the publications of ***Critique of Pure Reason*** (1781)**,** ***Critique of Practical Reason*** (1788) **and** ***Critique of Judgment***, there have been continuous and non-ending studies on them because in them Kant raised and examined the fundamental and significant problems that philosophical studies can not evade and these problems are all about human beings, nature, science, and the relations among them. They have covered extensive aspects of theory such as knowledge, perception, logic, thing-in-itself, category, culture, dialectic, value and methodology. His works such as ***Critique of Pure Reason***, like his critical philosophy, display some open and self developing systems but not isolated ones and constitute methodologies to a new kind of philosophy. Kant hopes that people will be able to construct and better metaphysics through hard-working under the enlightenment of his ideas. His philosophy is a systematic one, studying on truth, kindness and beauty of human beings. It is a philosophical theory on human's overall development. The study of human's overall development of truth, kindness and beauty is a general topic that all the world is interested in and all researches and discussions about this theory inevitably make people think of Kant's assertions on "truth" in his ***Critique of Pure Reason***.

With the above illustrations we can easily see that Kant's philosophy and his works have produced profound influences on German classical philosophy, the development of western philosophy of modern times and the world philosophy. Studies on Kant in the past, at present or in the future will

be assuredly beneficial to the development of mankind's philosophy, culture and science. If we compare Kant's philosophy as "the most shining pearl in the crown of philosophy", ***Critique of Pure Reason*** is the first shining pearl in the crown of philosophy. It is like one of the stars in the universe, producing sparkles of thought, wisdom and rationality. It makes every one of us full of admirations, awes and respects.

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